Orientador: Lucas Angioni / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-22T14:15:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Almeida_WellingtonDamascenode_D.pdf: 1161998 bytes, checksum: 0afbdf6b89518fac0ebdbbc6ced2e495 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: A Décima Primeira Aporia resulta da cisão de toda a filosofia grega precedente a Aristóteles em dois modos de conceber e propor os primeiros princípios (archai), em especial, o Um (to hen): (i) o modo pelo qual os Fisiologos concebiam o Um como principio, a saber, assumindo uma natureza subjacente, diferente do Um em si mesmo, a qual não pode ser adequadamente caracterizada pelo simples fato de ser um e que e denotada pelo conceito de Um, e (ii) o modo inaugurado pelos Pitagoricos e mais tarde endossado por Platão, marcado pelo abandono do recurso a uma natureza subjacente e por conceber o Um em si mesmo (auto to hen) como principio, desprovendo-o de qualquer conexão com alguma realidade que não seja rigorosamente caracterizada por ser um. Aristóteles enfrenta essa aporia em Metafísico Iota 2 e, segundo a interpretação que proponho, (a) recusa o modo Pitagorico-Platonico de conceber e propor princípios, (b) endossa o modo de proceder dos Fisiologos, e, ao fazê-lo, (c) retoma o "projeto" dos Fisiologos no ponto em que ele havia sido interrompido, a saber, durante a busca de um principio de movimento. A partir desse cenário, tentarei mostrar que o desfecho final da Décima Primeira Aporia pode consistir na introdução do Primeiro Motor como candidato propriamente aristotélico (e cosmológico) ao titulo de Um entre os princípios / Abstract: The Eleventh Aporia results from the breakup of the entire Greek philosophy previous to Aristotle in two manners of conceiving and proposing the first principles (archai), specially the One (to hen): (i) the manner by which Physiologoi conceived the One as a principle, namely, assuming an underlying nature, different from the One in itself, not adequately characterized by the simple fact of being one and which is denoted by the concept of One, and (ii) the manner inaugurated by the Pythagoreans and later endorsed by Plato, marked by the abandonment of the appeal to an underlying nature and by conceiving the One in itself (auto to hen) as a principle, depriving it of any connection with some reality not strictly characterized by being one. Aristotle faces this aporia in Metaphysics Iota 2 and, according to the interpretation I propose: (a) refuses the Pythagorean-Platonic manner of conceiving and proposing principles, (b) endorses the course of action of the Physiologoi, and, in doing so, (c) steps back and retakes the "project" of the Physiologoi at the point where it was interrupted, namely, during the search for a principle of motion. From this scenario, I will try to show that the final outcome of the Eleventh Aporia can be the introduction of the Prime Mover as the properly Aristotelian (and cosmological) candidate to the title of One between the principles / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

[pt] O presente trabalho visa a apresentar a discussão sobre a natureza e o objeto da phronesis na Ética Nicomaquéia de Aristóteles, tomando como ponto de partida o célebre debate ocorrido na França há cerca de quarenta anos: nas ações humanas, a phronesis é essencialmente conhecimento dos meios para realizar os fins desejados, ou, ao contrário, é essencialmente o conhecimento destes fins? Primeiramente, apresentam-se os antecedentes deste debate, nas discussões a respeito da phronesis entre aristotélicos e neokantianos na Alemanha do final do século XIX e suas influências na interpretação de Jaeger. Em seguida, no capítulo central, apresenta-se o debate entre autores franceses. Para ilustrar os pontos de vista opostos, tomam-se, respectivamente, as posturas de Pierre Aubenque, para quem a phronesis é conhecimento somente dos meios, e do Pe. René-Antoine Gauthier, para quem ela é sobretudo conhecimento dos fins. Posteriormente, partindo da constatação de que a questão ainda permanece aberta após este célebre debate, são apresentados seus desdobramentos posteriores, a fim de oferecer o estado atual da questão, apresentando algumas soluções propostas nas duas últimas décadas, na linha de uma superação das oposições. / [en] The following work strives to ponder on the nature and object of phronesis in Aristotle`s Nicomachean Ethics, using as a starting point the renowned debate staged in France around forty years ago: in human actions, phronesis is essentially the knowledge of the means necessary to attain the desired end, or is it on the other hand the knowledge of these ends? In first place the antecedents of this discussion are presented, concerning the debate on the concept of phronesis between Aristotelians and Neokantians in Germany towards the end of the XIXth century and its influences on the interpretations of Jaeger. Following that, in the second chapter, the debate among the French authors is presented. In order to illustrate opposing viewpoints, two exemplary postures are taken into consideration, those of Pierre Aubenque, for whom phronesis is essentially the knowledge of means, and that of Fr. René-Antoine Gauthier, for whom it is essentially the knowledge of the ends. Finally, taking into consideration that the debate is still open even after all arguments are presented, a follow-up is done taking into consideration some of the main proposals of the recent decades in order to have an idea of how the debate has evolved to its present state and with the intention of solving oppositions.

According to Aristotle, for a human being to live their best life, that is a life that flourishes, is to live a political life. A political life is lived best in a polis , or a self - sufficient community, so therefore, the most flourishing human life is one lived in a polis . Also, for a polis to be self - sufficient, its citizens must be flourishing, so there exists a special sort of constitutive relationship between the polis and its citizens. There are certain capacities available to human beings in the polis that promote their flourishing (namely loyalty and trust) that help fulfill important human needs. These capacities are best carried out through various subcommunities in the polis . Subcommunities range in size and interest, but the ones that best fulfil l important human needs also contribute most to the polis, and thus contribute most to human flourishing. In this paper, I will argue that physical retail space is a particular kind of subcommunity that can fulfill an important human need. While it is popular opinion that the shopping mall, and more - broadly physical retail as a whole, does not have a place in the increasingly technologically savvy community, physical retail space offers humans a place to engage that is necessary for their flourishing.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The present dissertation provides a reconstruction of the categorical part of Aristotle s (384 BC 322 BC) syllogistic, from the standpoint of the theory given in Prior Analytics, a piece of the Organon. Throughout the work it will be explained the methods which Aristotle has proposed to give support to his theory, many of them suffering only occasional changes to the present days. So, on one hand, this demonstrates the relevance of syllogistic on heuristic respects, and on the other, it shows that modern logic inherited much from Aristotle s one - either by abandonment or improvement of parts of his theory, either by embedding their methods in more refined formal structures. Initially, I ll give an overview of the theory and its relation to the epistemology proposed by Aristotle, as well as the assumptions derived from his metaphysics. Next, the operation of the methods used to prove Aristotle s theory will be demonstrated. Finally, an heuristics for the theory will be outlined, also proposed by Aristotle himself. Evidently, it is not intended to argue that Aristotle's logic is suitable for scientific research nowadays, as it seems to have been conceived at the time of its emergence and rise. However, through this research it is possible to note that the simplicity behind the syllogistic theory gives us a relatively underrated power today, especially by the emergence of modern logic. / A presente dissertação traz uma reconstrução da parte categórica da silogística de Aristóteles (384 a.C. 322 a.C.), a partir da teoria presente nos Analíticos Anteriores, integrante da compilação Órganon. Ao longo do trabalho serão explicitados os métodos que Aristóteles propôs para dar sustento à sua teoria, muitos deles sofrendo apenas alterações pontuais até os dias de hoje. Por um lado, isto demonstra a atualidade da própria silogística quanto a aspectos heurísticos, e por outro, mostra o que a lógica moderna herdou de Aristóteles seja pelo abandono ou aperfeiçoamento de partes de sua teoria em detrimento de falhas, seja pela própria incorporação de seus métodos em estruturas formais mais aperfeiçoadas. Inicialmente, será dada uma visão geral da teoria, bem como sua relação com a epistemologia proposta por Aristóteles e seus pressupostos oriundos da metafísica. A seguir, serão demonstrados o funcionamento dos métodos utilizados por Aristóteles que provam a sagacidade da teoria. Finalmente, será explicitada uma heurística para a teoria, também proposta pelo próprio Aristóteles. Evidentemente, não se pretende defender que a lógica de Aristóteles seja adequada para a investigação científica, tal como ela parece ter sido pensada no momento de seu surgimento. Contudo, através da presente investigação é possível notar que a simplicidade teórica por detrás da silogística lhe confere um poder relativamente subestimado nos dias de hoje, sobretudo pelo surgimento da lógica moderna.

De quels critères disposons-nous pour évaluer la validité d’une opinion ?La<p>première partie de la thèse revient sur les tentatives des approches contemporaines<p>de l’argumentation de répondre à cette question. Les approches normatives<p>(pragma-dialectique et logique informelle) évaluent la construction des preuves à<p>l’aune d’un idéal de rationalité, lui-même garanti par un ensemble de règles quant à<p>la construction et la formulation publique des arguments. Les approches descriptives<p>(travaux de Plantin et Doury en particulier) se fondent sur une critique de cette<p>méthode :en prétendant fournir des évaluations objectives des arguments, les<p>théoriciens normatifs s’engagent dans le processus argumentatif et, en définitive,<p>produisent des contre-argumentations et non des évaluations. C’est à l’aune du<p>problème du statut épistémologique de la preuve en histoire que j’ai choisi d’illustrer<p>les limites de l’approche descriptive. En particulier, l’oeuvre du critique littéraire<p>Hayden White se caractérise par une même relation entre (1) un scepticisme sur la<p>possibilité d’établir des critères de rationalité et (2) un parti-pris descriptif :les<p>explications historiques pourraient être décrites comme autant de figures rhétoriques,<p>mais on ne saurait définir un critère permettant d’en évaluer la validité. Comme l’a<p>bien montré Carlo Ginzburg, le scepticisme de White ouvre la porte à toutes les<p>dérives négationnistes.<p>Partant, dans une seconde partie, je propose un modèle d’analyse alternatif. Ce<p>modèle s’appuie sur la définition de la rhétorique comme une dunamis par Aristote :<p>une capacité perfectible à porter un regard technique sur les preuves. Il s’agit,<p>concrètement, de prendre en compte trois points de vues sur la preuve :(1) le point<p>de vue de l’orateur qui invente ses preuves face à un problème concret ;(2) le point<p>de vue de l’artisan qui façonne la matière persuasive; (3) le point de vue de<p>l’auditoire qui reçoit les preuves. L’exercice de ces trois points de vues permet à<p>l’analyste de juger les choix rhétoriques d’un orateur à l’aune de sa propre<p>conscience, perfectible par l’exercice, des alternatives possibles et de leur pertinence<p>en fonction des auditoires concernés. Le critère de rationalité n’est alors pas idéaliste<p>ou transcendant, il est humaniste (Chaïm Perelman, Emmanuelle Danblon) :il est de<p>l’ordre de l’expérience acquise.<p>Dans une troisième partie, j’applique mon modèle à trois ouvrages d’histoire :<p>(1) Les traites négrières d’Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau ;(2) La vie fragile d’Arlette<p>Farge ;(3) The Ascent of Money de Niall Ferguson. Dans chaque cas, j’évalue les<p>choix rhétoriques des historiens (quant aux usages des preuves extra-techniques et<p>à la construction des trois preuves techniques) au regard des problèmes<p>épistémologiques qu’ils affrontent* et des auditoires potentiels auxquels ils<p>s’adressent. Dans chaque cas, je consacre une partie de l’analyse aux réactions<p>suscitées par leurs ouvrages. Ce faisant, je peux mesurer le caractère anti-rhétorique<p>des pratiques actuelles de la critique :le repérage d’une figure de rhétorique<p>(analogie ou métaphore), d’une forte personnalité ou d’un appel aux émotions<p>suffisent à disqualifier un argument aux yeux des critiques. En d’autres termes, notre<p>tradition critique est pétrie d’illusions normatives et, en premier lieu, l’illusion selon<p>laquelle une preuve pourrait être administrée sans technique. Je conclus en montrant<p>que ces illusions, entretenues par notre tradition philosophique, nous ont fait perdre<p>beaucoup de temps dans le développement d’une formation à l’argumentation qui<p>soit de nature à exercer la dunamis critique des étudiants.<p><p>*<p>(1) établir la vérité historique sur un sujet à fort potentiel polémique ;(2) exprimer les intuitions de la<p>phase de découverte ;(3) formuler et justifier une prédiction. / Doctorat en Langues et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

in English: In the first half of the book Theta of his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a property of a being. In this sense, dunamis is primarily a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other, thereby exercising itself in its energeia. In the second half of the book, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a way of being. In this sense, a being is dunamei another thing and in the course of its becoming that thing it changes into being energeiai. The aim of the present thesis is to offer an interpretation of the concepts of dunamis and energeia as they appear in the chapters 1, 2, 6 and partly 7 of the book Theta. The first question is how the concepts of dunamis and energeia in both parts fit together. The problem is posed as follows: Are dunamis in the sense of a principle of change and dunamis as a way of being mutually dependent? Are energeia as change and being energeiai related? Are they not, in fact, two relatively independent philosophical concepts, relative to whether being is regarded from the point of view of physics, respectively metaphysics? Based on the interpretation of Aristotle's statements, the thesis aims to argue that Aristotle starts his exposition with the analysis of dunamis in the sense of a principle of change precisely in order to show the...

in English: In the first half of the book Theta of his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a property of a being. In this sense, dunamis is primarily a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other, thereby exercising itself in its energeia. In the second half of the book, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a way of being. In this sense, a being is dunamei another thing and in the course of its becoming that thing it changes into being energeiai. The aim of the present thesis is to offer an interpretation of the concepts of dunamis and energeia as they appear in the chapters 1, 2 and partly 6 of the book Theta. The first question is how the concepts of dunamis and energeia in both parts fit together. The problem is posed as follows: Are dunamis in the sense of a principle of change and dunamis as a way of being mutually dependent? Are energeia as change and being energeiai related? Are they not, in fact, two relatively independent philosophical concepts, relative to whether being is regarded from the point of view of physics, respectively metaphysics? Based on the interpretation of Aristotle's statements, the thesis aims to argue that Aristotle starts his exposition with the analysis of dunamis in the sense of a principle of change precisely in order to show the...

(in English): Aim of present paper is to reconstruct and compare Aristotle's solution of Zeno's paradoxes of motion from Books VI and VIII of his Physics. Aristotle claims that there is difference between these two solutions. There is difference in charakter of question which is posed by Zeno. In book VI. the question is concerning the possibility of traversing infinite distance in finite time. In book VIII. this question is asked about time itself. It is here, in book VIII, where we should find the right solution to paradoxes of motion. In this paper I shall look into the nature of this difference between solution in book six and in book VIII, and I will find out if there si some consquence for Aristotle's conception of magnitudes.

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The presented dissertation aims to present the concept of an object, which we can observe in Husserl's phenomenological philosophy. It highlights the four basic meanings of an object and tries to connect them. This work also presents a comprehensive history of key metaphysical concepts, mainly through analyzes of Aristotle's Metaphysics and interpretations of his philosophical theories over the ages. Emphasis is placed especially on the concept of οὐσία and on the changes in the understanding of this term in Medieval and Early Modern philosophy.