[pt] Adotando como fonte principal de nossa investigação a Ética a Nicômaco, discorreremos, na presente dissertação, acerca dos dois tratados sobre o prazer existentes na obra em questão, a saber, nos capítulos 11, 12, 13 e 14 do livro VII e nos capítulos 1, 2, 3, 4 e 5 do livro X. A primeira parte de nossa pesquisa consistirá em uma breve introdução aos escritos éticos do filósofo de Estagira, seguida de um minucioso mapeamento de nossa autoria dos capítulos há pouco mencionados, onde o tema do prazer é abordado por Aristóteles de maneira mais aprofundada. A segunda parte corresponderá ao exame do pensamento contido no livro VII; mais especificamente, concentrar-nos-emos no tradicional debate em torno da associação feita pelo Estagirita entre os conceitos de hedoné e enérgeia, isto é, entre as noções de prazer e atividade. Por fim, a terceira e última parte desta dissertação abordará a discussão a respeito do prazer localizada no livro X, a qual esclarecerá melhor os posicionamentos apresentados em VII; ademais, nesta última parte, investigaremos também as possíveis contribuições dos debates acerca da felicidade, presentes nos livros I e X, para as investigações acerca do prazer. / [en] Adopting the Nicomachean Ethics as the main source of our investigation, we will discuss, in this dissertation, about the two treatises on pleasure existent in the work in question, namely, in chapters 11, 12, 13 and 14 of book VII and in chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of book X. The first part of our research consists of a brief introduction to the ethical writings of the Stagirite, followed by a detailed mapping of the chapters just mentioned, where pleasure is approached by Aristotle in more depth. The second part corresponds to the examination of the thought contained in book VII; more specifically, we will focus on the traditional debate around the association made by Aristotle between the concepts of hedoné and enérgeia, that is, between the notions of pleasure and activity. Finally, the third and last part of this dissertation consists of the discussion about pleasure located in book X, which will better clarify the positions exposed on book VII; moreover, in this last part, we will also investigate the possible contributions of the debates about happiness, present in books I and X, to the investigations about pleasure.

Aristotle proclaimed in his Poetics that there were six elements to drama: spectacle, music, diction, thought, character, and plot. This paper will analyze the play Thom Pain (based on nothing) against these six elements. I will discuss the aspects of each element that are present in the show as well as the ideas and concepts my director, Tad Ingram, and I brought to the show. Through the rehearsal and performance process I discovered a seventh element; the element of fearlessness. In his Poetics, Aristotle does not fully address what the actor brings to the performance and this aspect is just as important as what the script and staging bring to the performance.

[pt] Esse estudo pretende investigar o conceito de disposição afetiva (Befindlichkeit) em Martin Heidegger em sua relação com os pensamentos de Santo Agostinho e de Aristóteles. Para atingir esse objetivo, analisamos as obras do filósofo alemão com ênfase em seus escritos dos anos 1920 até a sua obra magna Ser e Tempo, de 1927, indicando suas interpretações do filósofo grego e do bispo de Hipona. As escolhas de Agostinho e de Aristóteles são justificadas pois, conforme ressaltado por intérpretes de Heidegger como Franco Volpi, Otto Pöggeler e Theodore Kisiel, esses dois filósofos foram, em diferentes aspectos, determinantes não somente para a elaboração da ontologia fundamental, mas para todo o pensamento de Martin Heidegger. A disposição afetiva é fundamento ontológico que abre o Dasein (ser-aí) ao mundo e reciprocamente o mundo ao Dasein. Ela estrutura, junto à compreensão e ao discurso, as significatividades das coisas que vêm ao encontro desse ser-no-mundo, trazendo as possibilidades dele vir-a-ser em sua existência finita. A disposição afetiva é portanto, para Heidegger, determinante para o sentido do ser. Nosso objetivo é indicar que Agostinho e Aristóteles foram centrais para a origem e a consumação final do conceito de disposição afetiva em Ser e Tempo. A tese se desdobra em dois eixos interrelacionados. O primeiro é que o filósofo alemão irá apreender de cada um desses pensadores tópicos fundamentais, mas irá elaborar, em sua ontologia fundamental, conceito próprio e original relativo à afetividade do Dasein. O segundo é que a sedimentação final do conceito terá como lastro principal a leitura do pathos (paixão) em Aristóteles. Dada a pluralidade e a riqueza das obras desses três pensadores, a pesquisa ressalta ainda a atualidade e o aspecto promissor da análise da questão da afetividade para a interpretação de fenômenos do contemporâneo. / [en] This research investigate the concept of disposedness (Befindlichkeit) in Martin Heidegger in relationship with the thoughts of Saint Augustine and Aristotle. For achieve this goal we analyze the works of the German philosopher with emphasis on his writings from the 1920s to his magnum opus Being and Time (1927), indicating his interpretations of the Greek philosopher and the bishop of Hippo. The choices of Augustine and Aristotle are justified because, as highlighted by interpreters of Heidegger such as Franco Volpi, Otto Pöggeler and Theodore Kisiel, these two philosophers were relevants for the elaboration of the fundamental ontology and the entire Martin Heidegger s thought. The disposedness is the ontological foundation that opens the Dasein (being-there) to the world and reciprocally the world to Dasein. It structures, together with understanding and discourse, the meanings of the things that come to meet this being-in-the-world bringing the possibilities of becoming in its finite existence. Disposedness is therefore, for Heidegger, crucial for the meaning of being. Our goal is to indicate that Augustine and Aristotle were central to the concept of disposedness in Being and Time. The thesis unfolds in two interrelated axes. Firstly, Heidegger will learn from each of these thinkers fundamental topics, but he will elaborate, in its fundamental ontology, its own and original concept concerning the Dasein affectivity. Secondly, the final meaning of the concept of disposedness will be related with his reading of the pathos (passion) in Aristotle. Given the plurality and the richness of the works of these three thinkers the research also highlights the current and promising aspects of affectivity for the interpretation of contemporary phenomena.

Cette thèse analyse l’oubli et les verbes de même famille sur les plans physique et psychologique au sein du corpus aristotélicien, analyse qui à notre connaissance n’a encore jamais été menée. Cette étude apporte aussi un commentaire du De memoria et reminiscentia en examinant les conceptions de la mémoire et de la réminiscence d’Aristote. À travers l’analyse des occurrences de l’oubli et de ses verbes, elle émet l’hypothèse d’un sens cohérent de l’oubli. L’oubli serait une destruction partielle d’un état particulier de science et de réminiscence. Il serait provoqué par la présence du contraire de la science, l’ignorance. Son genre serait intellectuel. Il serait permanent, quoique rare et exceptionnel, ne faisant pas partie du processus normal d’apprentissage de la connaissance. Bien que l’oubli n’apparaisse pas dans le De memoria, sa définition est utile afin de faire rejaillir la nature sensitive de la mémoire et la particularité de la conception aristotélicienne de la réminiscence. En ce qui a trait à la mémoire, cette thèse suggère qu’elle est une sorte particulière d’affection et de possession de choses perçues ou conçues par le passé après un écoulement de temps. La mémoire permet une unification des multiples souvenirs que l’on acquiert au cours de son vécu, unification qui a lieu non seulement par rapport à différents souvenirs, mais aussi en ce qui concerne les diverses facettes d’un seul souvenir. En localisant la mémoire dans la sensation première, Aristote fournirait une description de l’âme sensitive nécessaire pour qu’un animal possède la mémoire. En considérant que la mémoire applique la notion du temps aux objets sensibles comme intellectuels, Aristote montrerait sa conception synergétique des fonctions psychiques interagissant entre elles. Le fait de se dire en son âme que l’on a auparavant perçu ou appris ne serait pas une affirmation excluant les animaux, le processus décrit étant entièrement sensitif, et l’expression « se dire en son âme » décrivant un fonctionnement de l’âme sensitive. La mémoire, selon Aristote, aurait besoin de l’image. Mais cette thèse suggère de lire les lignes I 450a24-25 et I 451a14-17 en insistant sur la spécificité de l’objet de mémoire. Ces lignes insisteraient sur le fait que bien qu’accidentellement une image, le souvenir ne serait pas imaginaire, mais serait au contraire une copie des choses perçues et apprises par le passé. Les défaillances mnémoniques seraient des phénomènes physiologiques et sensitifs qui ne seraient pas des oublis. La réminiscence serait une délibération donnant les moyens de remonter vers des souvenirs et connaissances que l’intellect aurait établis en tant que fin. Elle permettrait de soigner le souvenir en contemplant à répétition l’objet de mémoire. Elle apporterait une capacité de synthétisation des souvenirs et permettrait de se remémorer une connaissance que l’intellect souhaiterait contempler. Elle emploierait des mouvements nécessaires ou habituels et un point de départ. Les problèmes de réminiscence seraient de nature physiologique, la réminiscence étant un exercice de l’intellect interagissant avec le composé corps-âme. Ces problèmes ne seraient pas non plus des oublis. / This thesis examines forgetfulness in Aristotle on a physical as well as psychological level. It also offers a commentary of De memoria et reminiscentia, studying memory and reminiscence in this treatise. It examines the various occurrences of forgetfulness and verbs of the same family and deduces its definition from these excerpts. It thus appears that forgetfulness is a destruction of science which does not destroy the whole living being, but only the state of knowledge which is affected by its contrary, ignorance. Forgetting is therefore permanent, but it is exceptional and it does not destroy the intellect. While forgetfulness does not appear in the De memoria, its definition is useful in order to insist on the fact that memory belongs to the sensitive part of the soul and in order to show how Aristotle’s conception of reminiscence is particular. With respect to memory, this thesis mainly suggests that, as a special sort of possession and affection of perception and science, it is able to unify multiple memories that are acquired throughout life. It unifies not only different memories, but also different aspects of a single memory. The De memoria actually describes to us how an animal’s sensitive soul must be in order for it to have memory. Located in the primary perception, memory would be an example of Aristotle’ synergetic conception of the soul, since it would apply the sense of time both to intellectual and perceptual objects. The expression “saying in one’s soul’’ that one has perceived or learned is not one which excludes animals, because it describes a sensitive process. While memory requires an image, it is not a product of our imagination. This thesis thus reads the lines I 450a24-25 and I 451a14-17 as meaning that objects of memory are not objects of imagination. Of course, Aristotle does state that memory needs images. But he nevertheless stresses that objects of memory are copies and are not phantasies. Memory problems are physiological or related to the sensitive part of the soul. They are not a destruction of science like forgetfulness is. Reminiscence is a deliberation which finds the means to attain a specific memory or knowledge determined as an end by the intellect. Reminiscence can preserve memory through the repetitive contemplation of its object as a copy. It can synthesize memories and can recollect a knowledge which the intellect wishes to contemplate. Starting from a principle, it uses necessary or habitual movements. Since recollecting is an intellectual exercise which interacts with the sensitive part of the soul, difficulties in recollecting are caused by physiological problems. These problems are not destructions of science and they are not equivalent to forgetting.

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The scientific aim which distinguishes applied social psychological research from basic social psychological research is that of using social psychological theory to develop interventions meant to rectify social and practical problems in hopes of fostering a flourishing or thriving social sphere. In developing their interventions, however, many applied social psychologists have failed to consider their pre-investigatory philosophical commitments, commitments which imply the kind of flourishing social life that may come as a result of interventions rooted in them. The aim of this dissertation is to invite applied social psychologists to consider if their frequently noted, yet often unexamined, commitment to psychological egoism (i.e., human nature is inescapably self-interested) and instrumentalism (i.e., human rationality is inherently calculative towards self-interest) imply the kind of thriving social life they truly intend for their interventions to foster, or if other philosophical commitments might allow them to better fulfill that scientific aim. To do this, a comparative analysis is given between the vision of social flourishing implied in psychological egoism and instrumentalism, as illustrated in the prevalent Social Exchange Theory and its interventions, referred to as the modern vision, and an alternate vision implied in the Aristotelian understanding of human nature with its concomitant interventions, referred to as the Aristotelian vision. Overall, this dissertation suggests that the Aristotelian vision of a flourishing social life shies away from the instrumentalizing of human relationships implied by the egoistic vision and thus provides more fertile ground for applied social psychologists to accomplish their aim.