Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This research study aims to analyze the illicit arms trade in states in transition. While both the study of the illicit arms trade and the study of states in transition per se, are characterized by a variety of concepts and debates within academia, this study attempts to establish a coherent and concise connection between the two. Therefore, the main research question is: How do the capacity gaps of social control, social welfare, border control and legitimacy contribute to the proliferation of the illicit arms trade in states in transition? For the purpose of this study, the researcher uses the theoretical framework based on capacity gaps and functional holes as outlined by Phil Williams (2002). Williams (2002) states that organized crime and transnational organized crime (TOC), which the illicit arms trade is a part of, flourish in states that are weakened by capacity gaps and where the accompanying functional holes open up the way for organized crime and TOC to work with impunity. The seven capacity gaps that Williams (2002) outlines are: social control, social welfare, business regulation, oversight and accountability, border control, legitimacy and electoral norms and patterns. However, this thesis does not focus on all seven capacity gaps; instead, only the capacity gaps of social control, social welfare, border control and legitimacy are analysed. This decision has been based on the literature by Williams (2002), Migdal (1988), Beck and Laeven (2006), who suggest that a state in transition cannot complete its transitional period and become a consolidated democracy if high levels of social control, social welfare, respect for the rule of law and legitimacy are not obtained. Moreover, this research study conducts a comparative analysis of two states in transition, South Africa and Croatia, which have both been experiencing difficulties with TOC and the illicit arms trade, and where both states still have not completed their transitional period, and are thus not consolidated democracies. This research does not imply that the findings of this study are applicable to all states in transition; the focus is rather on how the four capacity gaps and functional holes that this research focused on contribute to the proliferation of the illicit arms trade in South Africa and Croatia. The findings indicate that due to high levels of corruption within the judicial system and police, the citizens of South Africa and Croatia lack trust in the states’ capacity to impose social control, which in turn opens the way for organized criminal groups to work with impunity. Furthermore, the social welfare capacity gap contributes to the rise in levels of organized crime and the illicit arms trade due to the fact that levels of inequality and unemployment force the citizens of South Africa and Croatia to look for alternative survival strategies, usually those that organized criminal groups can provide them with. Moreover, the lack of resources and corruption among custom officials and police staff, serve as opportunities for organized criminal groups to traffic illicit goods over South Africa and Croatia’s borders; thus indicating a functional hole in the states interdictory capacity and an overall gap in the states capacity to control its borders. Lastly, due to the South African and Croatian citizens’ lack of trust in the institutions and the state apparatus in general, the capacity gap of legitimacy is visible. This in turn opens the way for organized criminal groups to use patron-client relationships with the citizens of South Africa and Croatia, in order to build and sustain a level of popular legitimacy that the state is lacking. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie navorsingsprojek streef daarna om die onwettige handel in wapens as deel van transnasionale georganiseerde misdaad binne state in transisie te analiseer. Alhoewel navorsing in die onwettige handel van wapens, asook die studie van state in transisie gekenmerk word deur vele konsepte en debatte binne die velde; poog hierdie studie om die twee konsepte in ʼn duidelike en presiese manier te verbind. In die lig hiervan is die navorsings vraag: Hoe dra die kapasiteitsgapings van sosiale beheer, sosiale welvaart, grens kontrole en legitimiteit by tot die volhoubaarheid van die onwettige handel in wapens in state in transisie? Vir die doel van hierdie studie het die navorser besluit om gebruik te maak van die teoretiese raamwerk gebaseer op kapasiteitsgapings en funksionele-openinge soos beskryf deur Phil Williams (2002). Wiliams (2002) voer aan dat georganiseerde misdaad en transnasionale misdaad, waarvan die onwettige handel in wapens ʼn deel uitmaak, floreer in state wat verswak is deur kapasitietsgapings; en waar bygaande funksionele-openinge die weg baan vir transnasionale misdaad om te floreer. Die sewe kapasiteitsgapings soos deur Williams (2002) beskryf is: sosiale beheer, sosiale welvaart, besigheid-regulering, oorsig en aanspreeklikheid, grens kontrole, legitimiteit en verkiesings norme en patrone. Hierdie tesis fokus egter nie op al sewe kapasiteitsgapings nie. Daar word slegs gefokus op die kapasiteitsgapings van sosiale beheer, sosiale welvaart, grens kontrole en legitimiteit. Hierdie besluit is gebaseer op literatuur deur William (2002), Joel S. Migdal (1988), Thorsten Beck en Luc Laeven (2006) en dies meer wat voorstel dat ʼn staat in transisie nie die transisie periode kan voltooi en ʼn vaste demokrasie kan raak indien hoe vlakke van sosiale beheer, sosiale welvaart, respek vir wet en orde en legitimiteit nie verkry word nie. Verder maak hierdie navorsing gebruik van ʼn vergelykende analise tussen twee state in transisie: Suid Afrika en Kroasië. Beide hierdie state ervaar probleme met trans-nasionale misdaad en die onwettige handel in wapens. Beide het ook nog nie hul transisie periode voltooi nie en is dus nie vaste of gekonsolideerde demokrasieë nie. Hoewel die navorser nie aanvoer dat die bevindinge van hierdie studie van toepassing is op alle state in transisie nie, probeer die navorser vasstel hoe die vier kapasiteitsgapings en funksionele-openinge bydrae tot die volhoubaarheid van die onwettige handel in wapens in Suid Afrika en Kroasië. Die bevindinge dui daarop dat as gevolg van hoë vlakke van korrupsie binne die regstelsel en polisie, die bevolking van Suid Afrika en Kroasië nie die staat se kapasiteit om sosiale beheer te handhaaf, vertrou nie. Dit maak die gaping oop vir georganiseerde misdaad om sonder teenkant te handel. Verder, die sosiale welvaart gaping, dra by tot die toename in die vlakke van georganiseerde misdaad en die onwettige handel in wapens as gevolg van hoë vlakke van ongelykheid en armoede, wat die bevolking van Suid Afrika en Kroasië dwing tot alternatiewe metodes van oorlewing wat gewoonlik deur georganiseerde misdaad groepe verskaf word. Verder, die gebrek aan toerusting en ook korrupsie binne grensbeheer en polisie lede, verskaf die geleentheid vir georganiseerde misdaad groepe om in onwettige goedere te handel. Dit dui op die funksionele gaping in die staat se beheersmeganismes en oor die algemeen ʼn gaping in die staat se kapasiteit om grense te beheer. Ten laaste, as gevolg van die gebrek aan vertroue van die bevolking in die strukture van die staat Suid Afrika en Kroasië is die kapasitietsgaping van legitimiteit duidelik teenwoordig. Dit open die weg vir georganiseerde misdaad groepe om populêre gesag op te bou, wat daar nie is by die regering van die lande nie.

Ce travail étudie l’évolution des politiques de défense et des acquisitions militaires du Qatar et des Emirats arabes unis (EAU) depuis les années 1990. Il cherche à évaluer la prégnance du rôle des déterminants extérieurs et intérieurs dans l’élaboration des stratégies de ces deux petits Etats du Golfe et s’interroge sur la raison pour laquelle, confrontés à des défis en apparence assez similaires, ils ont adopté des stratégies différentes. Tandis que le Qatar a privilégié son rayonnement diplomatique et peu ou prou délégué sa sécurité à ses partenaires extérieurs, les EAU ont quant à eux organisé leur doctrine militaire autour de la consolidation de leurs outils de sécurité et de défense intérieurs tout en veillant à rayonner sur la scène régionale et internationale par divers canaux souvent identiques à ceux choisis par leurs voisins qataris. La thèse montre que les mutations du contexte régional doivent être articulées avec celles du contexte international pour comprendre les dynamiques communes aux politiques de défense et aux acquisitions militaires du Qatar et des EAU. Puis, elle montre que ces déterminants structurels doivent être articulés avec des variables intervenant au niveau national (territoire, démographie) et infranational (perception et réseaux du Prince) pour comprendre les contrastes entre leurs politiques. Pour finir, la thèse interroge la pérennité de l’économie et de la sociologie politique de ces « petits Etats-Princes » en les confrontant à des reconfigurations endogènes et exogènes susceptibles de les faire évoluer. / This thesis studies the evolving defence policies and military acquisitions of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from the 1990s onwards. It seeks to assess the role of external and domestic incentives in shaping the survival strategies of these two small Gulf states and to understand why, while they were confronted with apparently similar challenges, they adopted different strategies. While Qatar has favoured its diplomatic influence and essentially guaranteed its security through its partnerships with external powers, the UAE have consolidated their internal security and defence tools while gaining regional and international influence through various channels which often were the same as those chosen by Qatari leaders. The thesis shows that the mutations of the regional context must be articulated with those of the international context to understand the common dynamics in Qatar’s and the UAE’s defence policies and military acquisitions. It then shows that these structural determinants must be articulated with variables at national (territory, demography) and subnational (the Prince’s perception and networks) levels to understand the contrasts between their policies. Finally, the thesis questions the sustainability of the political economy and political sociology of these “small Princes-states” by confronting them to endogenous and exogenous developments which are likely to make them evolve.

The purpose of this thesis is to explain why states obtain nuclear weapons and the role various actors and interests play in the making of states´ nuclear policies. The main questions are as follows: (1) What big theories exist concerning states obtaining nuclear weapon and nuclear armament in International Relations and what relevance do they have of the post cold-war period?, (2) What is the meaning of the perspective of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC)?, and (3)Are there empirical studies which supports the existence of a MIC in the United States? The focus lies on actors and driving forces that are internal to states and it is also important to investigate if the theories have relevance for the post 9/11-era. The study uses the method of qualitative literature-study with some quantitative segments. It is claimed that states might be interested in justifying their behaviour in a morally appealing way and that real reasons may be hidden. There are many reasons for states to obtain and keep nuclear weapons and related technology (which includes many of the most lucrative elements of the arms industry´s sales). Among this reasons are that arms and related technology may be used to influence other states and nuclear weapons-construction and modernisation might be used to protect the state from external threats, stop unwanted interference from other actors, secure job and gain recognition and prestige in world politics. For security reasons states might hold onto their own nuclear weapons and try to hinder other actors from getting access to them. The internal actors and driving forces we look at are bureaucratic, economical and political, and the MIC-perspective. The military can be said to have interests in as much resources and capabilities as possible, which includes advanced weaponary such as nuclear weapons and related technologies, at its disposal because of the goal to defend the state from all possible threats and for officers career reasons. Much of its influence is said to come from its expert knowledge and position and it is said to be especially influential in matters of foreign policy, military spending and foreign policy. The major economical actors mentioned are big corporations involved in military spending and these have interests in maximizing profits. Nuclear weapons making and maintenance and the related areas of missile defense and delivering methods for nuclear weapons seem to be areas with high changes of being profitable for the involved major companies. The actors wield influence for example through lobbying and campaign contributions. An economic driving force claim is that state spending is necessary for stimulating the economy and defense spending is easily justified in other ways. Political actors and driving forces concerns politicians interest in promoting the interests of supporting groups, there are indications that the weapon industry is such a group. Research have shown various results about the extent politicians tend to further the interests of supporting groups. The MIC-perspective talks about groups with interest in high levels of military spending. Most researchers seem to agree that the complex exists but there are different opinions about what actors belongs to it and its power on various issues. There is some mention of the core of the complex consisting of such internal actors as mentioned above. MIC-related empirical research has been conducted and this author finds that the MIC is a relevant analytical tool for the post cold war – and 9/11 era.

The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the degree of influence of the military-industrial complex on the foreign policy decision-making process of the state by examining the examples of certain countries with a large and developed defense industry. In terms of this thesis there were analyzed the contemporary trends in global military expenditures and the dynamics of the global arms transfers. A critical point is evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of the extensive investing in the military-industrial complex of state.

L’objectif de cette thèse consiste à déterminer si le Traité sur le commerce des armes (TCA) est effectif en ce qui concerne les dispositions relatives au transfert (art. 6) et à l’exportation (art. 7) dans leurs applications aux ventes d’armes à l’Arabie saoudite. Cette effectivité est appréciée en mesurant l’applicabilité du TCA dans les ordres juridiques des principaux fournisseurs d’armes à l’Arabie saoudite, à savoir, la Belgique, le Canada, la France et le Royaume-Uni. L’applicabilité du TCA comprend deux volets : l’examen de la justiciabilité du TCA, à savoir, comment le juge national lui donne-t-il concrètement effet; et l’examen de son opposabilité, à savoir, comment déterminer si les individus peuvent se prévaloir de ses dispositions devant un juge national. Notre thèse vise à démontrer que le TCA en ce qui concerne les obligations relatives au transfert (art. 6) et à l’exportation (art. 7) n’est effectif que partiellement. Cette ineffectivité s’explique par le fait qu’il ne soit pas applicable dans les ordres juridiques des principaux fournisseurs d’armes à l’Arabie saoudite, notamment, ceux de Belgique et de France. Dans l’ensemble, la situation ne tend pas à s’améliorer vu l’inefficacité même du TCA et les multiples obstacles placés par les autorités administratives. Cela n’empêche cependant pas le déclenchement d’un processus de renforcement de cette effectivité portant principalement sur la suppression des obstacles artificiels placés sur la voie de son applicabilité. Ainsi, l’applicabilité directe du TCA, dans les ordres juridiques belge et français, ne doit pas être interprétée de façon à ce qu’elle l’empêche de déployer pleinement ses effets en droit interne. Le renforcement peut également se faire, dans les ordres juridiques britannique et canadien, par une incorporation intégrale des dispositions de ce traité en droit interne et par une attitude des juges qui soit favorable à l’utilisation de celui. / The objective of this thesis is to determine whether the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is effective with respect to the transfer (Art. 6) and export (Art. 7) provisions as they apply to arms sales to Saudi Arabia. This effectiveness is assessed by measuring the applicability of the ATT in the legal orders of the main arms suppliers to Saudi Arabia, namely Belgium, Canada, France and the United Kingdom. The applicability of the ATT is twofold: the examination of its justiciability, namely, how does the national judge give practical effect to it; and the examination of its enforceability, namely, how to determine whether individuals can rely on its provisions before a national judge. Our thesis aims to demonstrate that the ATT with regard to the obligations on transfer (Art. 6) and export (Art. 7) is only partially effective. This ineffectiveness is explained by the fact that it is not applicable in the legal orders of the main arms suppliers to Saudi Arabia, namely those of Belgium and France. Overall, the situation does not tend to improve given the very ineffectiveness of the ATT and the multiple obstacles placed by the administrative authorities. This does not, however, prevent the initiation of a process of reinforcing its effectiveness, mainly by removing the artificial obstacles placed in the way of its applicability. Thus, the direct applicability of the ATT in the Belgian and French legal orders must not be interpreted in such a way as to prevent it from having full effect in domestic law. In the British and Canadian legal orders, reinforcement can also be achieved by a full incorporation of the provisions of this treaty into domestic law and by an attitude of the judges that is favorable to the use of the treaty.

yes / A prerequisite for effective international action to prevent and combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) is that states develop a common understanding of what constitutes the ¿legal¿ trade and therefore what is ¿illicit¿. At the same time, failure to exert e ffective control over the legal trade in SALW opens up possibilities for diversion to illicit markets and end-users and blurs the lines between the legal and illicit trade. All governments are potential suppliers of SALW, since even those with no manufacturing capacity will have the potential to export surplus weapons once owned by their police and/or armed forces. A major concern for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects should thus be to define clear parameters for and to agree on a comprehensive mechanism for controlling the legal trade in these weapons. / British American Security Information Council (BASIC), International Alert

yes / Small arms and light weapons have become the weapons of choice in conflicts around the world and figure prominently in crime. Recently, considerable attention has been focused on the proliferation of SALW at the national, regional and international level. The recognition that m o s t illicit SALW began as legal weapons is, however, fundamental to efforts to reduce the proliferation and misuse of SALW and the diversion of civilian weapons is one source of supply. Indeed, it is estimated that there are as many SALW in the hands of civilians worldwide as there are in the possession of states, and that in many parts of the world diversion from civilian stocks is the principal source of the illicit supply. Consequently, strengthening domestic regulation, which reduces the diversion of legal weapons to illegal markets, is a critical part of any strategy to address illicit trafficking. It is also consistent with resolutions from the United Nations Security Council and other Commissions as well as regional initiatives. This briefing reviews the ways in which SALW are diverted from legal to illegal markets and the measures which can be used to reduce this diversion. In addressing illicit trafficking in all its aspects, it is imperative that the UN Conference not does neglect this significant problem.

yes / Efforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking in, and proliferation and misuse of, small arms and light weapons (SALW) are hampered by lack of relevant information-exchange and transparency. International information exchange and transparency arrangements are key elements of each of the main elements of the international action programme on SALW to be launched at the UN 2001 Conference. There is great scope to develop information management and distribution arrangements to disseminate and exchange of relevant information on SALW without seriously compromising national security, necessary commercial secrecy, or law enforcement. Indeed, national security, commerce, crime prevention and law enforcement are generally enhanced by appropriate transparency and information exchange

yes / The 1990s witnessed a change in the way wars were fought as the amount of available weaponry increased and the types of actors engaged in warfare multiplied. The opening up of the international arms trade, in particular with new buyers and more channels of supply, has raised concerns about who purchases weapons and for what use. Afeature of this changing nature of conflict has been the continuing, if not growing, presence of mercenaries and the emergence of private companies contracted to provide military and security services. These range from logistical support and training to advice and procurement of arms and on-the-ground intervention. This briefing highlights how the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies can contribute to small arms proliferation and misuse and examines steps the international community can take at the UN Small Arms Conference and elsewhere to effectively combat mercenarism and regulate the activities of private military and security companies. The role played by these companies relates not only to provisions contained in the contracts they sign with their clients to provide large amounts of weaponry, but also how the military and security services and training that they provide contributes to the demand for weapons in the regions where they operate. There are a number of ways in which mercenaries and private military and security companies are involved in small arms proliferation. These include: l Arms brokering and transportation activities l Violations of UN arms embargoes l Impact on human rights and humanitarian law l Driving demand for small arms Various measures already exist to ban the activities of mercenaries and regulate some of the activities of private military and security companies either through national legislation or international agreements. However, there is concern these efforts are neither comprehensive nor accepted widely enough to effectively control the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies.

yes / Small arms and light weapons can enter the illicit market at many stages in their lifecycle. From manufacture, to sale/export, to import, and then to final end use, States must establish and enforce stringent and comprehensive licensing and monitoring systems to ensure that small arms and light weapons (SALW) remain under legal control. The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and ensuing follow-up process provide States with important opportunities to analyse and compare how existing systems governing the manufacture and trade in SALW are working. They further provide the context in which best practice can be agreed and implemented internationally, and for the discussion of how future trends and developments in SALW manufacture and transfer can be more effectively brought within State control. To this end, this briefing paper covers two separate but closely related issues. The first section of the report will analyse existing State and regional controls on SALW manufacture and examine how international measures, including the UN Conference, can reinforce such controls. In this regard, the growth of licensed production and co-production agreements is highlighted, together with implications for the development of adequate regulations. The second section examines those systems that are currently in place for the authorisation of SALW transfers and for the certification and monitoring of their ultimate end-use. Recommendations for best practice and implications for the UN Conference process are also discussed.