Avtal med internationell karaktär är idag vanligt förekommande, då handel inte enbart sker inom ett lands gränser. En fråga som oftast aktualiseras när tvist uppkommer mellan parter i ett internationellt avtalsförhållande är vilken lag som ska tillämpas. För att lösa tvisten och lagvalsfrågan, finns olika tvistlösningsalternativ, bl.a. tvistlösning vid allmän domstol där lagvalsfrågan avgörs med tillämpning av den s.k. Rom I-förordningen, eller tvistlösning genom internationellt kommersiellt skiljeförfarande. Vid båda dessa alternativ är principen om partsautonomi en viktig hörnsten. Principen innebär att parterna själva kan avtala om vilken lag de vill ska tillämpas på avtalet. Vid införandet av Rom I-förordningen utvidgades principen om partsautonomi, från dess tidigare utformning i Romkonventionen, till att även innebära en möjlighet för parterna att välja icke-statliga regler. Denna utvidgning motiverades bl.a. av att detta var möjligt för parter som valde internationellt skiljeförfarande som tvistlösningsalternativ. Frågan som då uppkommer är varför denna utvidgning av principen gjordes, och framförallt varför man motiverade utvidgningen genom att jämföra med principens utformning i internationellt skiljeförfarande. Dessa två tvistlösningsalternativ påvisar stora olikheter, där skiljeförfarandet karakteriseras av att parterna har den övervägande bestämmanderätten av hur förfarandet ska gå tillväga och vilken lag som ska tillämpas. Partsautonomin inom internationellt skiljeförfarande är i stort sett obegränsad, medan det i Rom I-förordningen ställs upp begränsningar som gör att parternas lagval kan frångås. Utformningen av partsautonomin i Rom I-förordningen får anses strida mot den förutsebarhet som principen och förordningen har till syfte att uppnå, och den utformning av principen som hämtades från skiljeförfarandets utformning, är därför inte ändamålsenlig. / Cross-border agreements are more common today, since it’s not unusual that a contract is entered into by parties resident in different states. A question that often occurs when a dispute arises between parties to an international contract is which law that is to be applied. In order to resolve the dispute and determine the applicable law there are various options, for example resolving the dispute before a general court where the applicable law is determined by the provisions of the Rome I Regulation, or by settling the dispute by international commercial arbitration. In both cases, the principle of party autonomy is an important cornerstone. The principle allows the parties to an international contract to determine the applicable law. The principle, which was acknowledged already in the Rome Conventionen, was widened when the Rome Convention was replaced by the Rome I Regulation. Parties were given an additional possibility to choose non-state rules to govern the contract. This was motivated by the fact that the possibility to choose non-state rules was acknowledged in international arbitration. The question that arises is why the principle was widened, and why this was justified by a comparison of the design of the principle in international arbitration. There are notable differences between these two alternatives of resolving a dispute, where the principle of party autonomy in international arbitration is basically unrestricted, while the same principle in the Rome I Regulation is subject to restrictions that might result in another applicable law than the one chosen by the parties. The design of the principle in the Rome I Regulation is in contrary to the purpose of the principle and the Regulation, since the restrictions makes it more difficult for the parties to predict the applicable law. The design of the principle, which was effected by the design of the principle in international arbitration, is therefore not considered as appropriate.

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In the early 1990s the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicted that the gravest effects of climate change could be on human migration, as millions would be displaced by coastal erosion, flooding, and drought. Today, this is considered a reality that is coming ever closer. Yet, there are currently no binding international frameworks dedicated to the issue of climate induced migration. In addition, the current regime of international refugee law is woefully inadequate at responding to the issue. Individuals that do not fall under the refugee definition are thus commonly left with the general scope of international human rights law standards, so-called complementary protection.   On these premises, this thesis sets out to examine the circumstances under which the non-refoulement principle in international human rights law could be applied in the context of climate change effects and especially slow onset processes, and how the principle could potentially be developed. Principally through examining jurisprudence concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, this thesis finds that while there is a possibility for non-refoulement obligations to arise due to the effects of climate change, the precise scope of such protection is unclear. Although case law has emerged and continues to do so, the complex nature of climate induced migration and the undeveloped jurisprudence on this issue leaves important questions unanswered. This thesis finds that there seems to be no obvious response to the question whether climate change is a relevant factor in the legal analysis of non-refoulement claims, and whether it should be. Furthermore, there are great challenges in discerning the required intensity of harm for the threshold to be met and protection to be granted. In addition, this thesis finds that applying the non-refoulement principle in the context of slow onset processes entails several difficulties, particularly concerning the timing and prediction of the harm. It is therefore concluded that, as long as there is no framework dedicated to the issue of climate induced migration, clarity will be much needed in case law as to the scope of non-refoulement obligations in the context of, especially, slow onset processes due to climate change.