In an attempt to understand the micro-dimensional mechanisms of how some individuals come to perpetrate violence against civilians during wartime, this thesis adopts a theory from organisational psychology. By looking at the military as a professional organisation, violence against civilians perpetrated by state armies during wartime is theorised to be the outcome of a process of script error wherein military scripts of non-combatant immunity fail. The theory is applied on the massacre in My Lai, during the Vietnam war. Findings showed that the mechanism of script error did not play out completely as theorised, however that military scripts did dictate behaviour and that a script error was present to some degree as civilians came to be targeted as if they were enemies. Some mechanisms used in previous research on violence against civilians were supported by this study and could also be integrated into the framework of organisational scripts, showing the explanatory value that organisational scripts have to further understand military violence. The study contributes to a deeper understanding of an important historical case, shows the value of introducing organisational psychology into studies of the military organisation and finally helps us further make sense of situations of violent transgression.  organisational scripts, script error, military violence, violence against civilians, mass violence, atrocity, My Lai

This study examinates technology's traumatic impact on the male subject in The Atrocity Exhibition by J.G. Ballard. In my analysis I show how the protagonist uses a fetischistic strategy in order to make sense of the trauma that technology embeds. Paradoxically it proves to be the agent of his trauma, but also functions as his shield. The machine is thus in a position of the hinge, the point in a structural system that both enables and deconstruct the system. In the same position we find the woman. She is the very epicentre of the novel and the violence directed towards her is part of a complex problem that I adress. The woman is divided into pieces and fetischized by the male gaze to serve as a solution for his trauma. Hal Foster's notion ”the double logic of prosthesis” constitutes a theoretical base. The model shows how a fetischistic strategy is applied by avant-garde artists to solve the technological trauma that they experience. Both content and composition of The Atrocity Exhibition are inspired by avant-garde practices, I have therefore compared the text with Foster's theory on how the avant-garde problematized the interaction between man and machine. Marshall McLuhan's belief that the human body and technology are inseparable in the era of electronics further helps me to study technology's effect on perception.

This thesis takes its starting point from the need for a comprehensive approach towards justice following atrocities, and where not only the states in which the crimes were committed have a role to play. The thesis discusses atrocity crime (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) prosecution and reparations procedures concerning individuals as two appropriate courses of action, through which non-territorial states may contribute to atrocity prevention and justice for the victims of atrocities. The analysis addresses whether, under international law, non-territorial states are allowed to, required to, or prohibited from facilitating prosecution and reparations procedures and includes an assessment of the extent to which international law relating to reparations fails to correspond to that applicable to prosecution. The implications of the lack of correspondence are analysed in light of the historical connection and separation of the two courses of action, the procedural and substantive legal overlaps between prosecution and reparations, and the underlying aims and functions of prosecution and reparations. The study covers a wide spectrum of international legal sources, most of them to be found in human rights law, humanitarian law and international criminal law. The study shows that while non-territorial states are included in both conventional and customary law as regards prosecution of atrocity crimes, the same cannot be said in relation to reparations procedures. This serious deficit and inconsistency in international law, is explained by the framing of reparations, but not prosecution, as a matter concerning victims and human rights, thereby leaving the enforcement of the rules to the discretion of each state. Reparation is also considered a private matter and as such falls outside the scope of the far-reaching obligations regarding prosecution. The study suggests taking further the responsibilities of non-territorial states in relation to atrocity crimes. Most urgently, measures should be considered that bring the legal space for reparations procedures into line with that for prosecution in, for instance, future discussions by human rights treaty-monitoring bodies and in the drafting of new international victims' rights, atrocity crimes or civil procedure instruments.

In August 2017, the Myanmar military initiated what the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights called a text-book example of ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya ethnic minority. In 2020, Myanmar is called to the International Court of Justice to answer to allegations of committed genocide. As the UN has failed to invoke the responsibility to protect, the world has turned to regional organizations as a prevention mechanism in mass atrocity prevention. The research objective of this study is to examine how Myanmar’s regional organization ASEAN has responded to the oppression of the Rohingya minority, as to explain why the atrocities targeting the Rohingya in Myanmar could not be prevented regionally and add to the research on mass atrocity prevention. This thesis is an abductive text analysis with an analytical framework based on Regional Security Complex Theory, which is used to investigate power relations within the region. This thesis argues that the reason the crisis could not be prevented by ASEAN was due to problems on the national, regional, and international levels. Myanmar’s disinterest in human rights, ASEAN’s norm of non-interference, and the international community’s interest in Myanmar’s rich resources all became obstacles in preventing the atrocity from happening. Since genocide prevention has failed several times since the UN’s genocide convention was adopted and entered into force, it is important to add more research to previous work to understand why mass atrocities continue to happen and how we could prevent these atrocities from happening again. The research looks at the Rohingya crisis to draw learnings that can be added to the research on mass atrocity prevention.

La violence en temps de guerre prend parfois des formes extrêmes. Non seulement les belligé-rants tuent fréquemment un grand nombre de civils, mais leurs atrocités vont parfois au-delà du seul meurtre pour inclure des actes de cruauté tels que la mutilation, le viol, la torture publique ou encore les abus des corps humains. Si des cas individuels de ce type de violence se produisent probablement dans presque tous les conflits et peuvent s’expliquer par la psychopathie, le sa-disme, ou un processus de « barbarisation » inhérent à la guerre, ni la psychologie individuelle ni les conditions propres à la lutte armée ne peuvent expliquer pourquoi l’ampleur de ce type d’actes spécifiques varie d’une organisation sociale à une autre. Dans certains groupes armés, les atrocités extrêmes demeurent des cas isolés. Dans d’autres, cependant, nombre de combattants font de telles pratiques une part intégrante de leur « répertoire de violence ». Comment expliquer cette variation ? Dans cette thèse, je propose une série d’arguments théoriques permettant d’expliquer, au moins en partie, pourquoi la violence en temps de guerre prend parfois la forme d’atrocités extrêmes. Je définis les « atrocités extrêmes » comme des actes de violence caractérisés par une cruauté manifeste et publique. Je soutiens que ces types d’actes émergent souvent dans un contexte de guerre irrégulière ; des conflits caractérisés par une impor-tante asymétrie des capacités militaires, l’utilisation de tactique de guérilla, et, par voie de consé-quence, un contrôle territorial hautement fragmenté. Dans ce contexte, je montre que les atrocités extrêmes découlent souvent de deux proces-sus alternatifs. Le premier processus implique un modèle de prise de décision « du haut vers le bas, » via lequel des dirigeants organisationnels adoptent des tactiques centrées sur la violence extrême à des fins stratégiques. L’objectif premier est souvent de dissuader les civils de collabo-rer avec l’ennemi dans les territoires contestés. Le deuxième processus implique l’émergence d’atrocités extrêmes en tant que « pratique de guerre ». Ici, les techniques de cruauté émergent au niveau des unités militaires, sans découler d’ordres venus d’en haut. Je soutiens qu’une telle émergence est plus probable dans les unités militaires présentant tant un niveau élevé de cohésion sociale qu’une faible discipline. Dans des conditions de guerre irrégulière, ces unités peuvent dé-velopper des normes informelles légitimant la violence extrême comme moyen de venger les pertes au combat. Ces arguments sont développés et testés dans ma thèse à l’aide d’une variété de matériaux empiriques disséminés dans trois articles qui ont été ou seront bientôt soumis pour publication. Le premier article (chapitre 2) définit le concept d’atrocité extrême et utilise des données venant de quatre guerres civiles pour vérifier la plausibilité d’une série d’explications tirées de la littérature sur la violence envers les civils. Le deuxième article (chapitre 3) analyse l’utilisation des décapita-tions par les groupes djihadistes. Je montre que seule une minorité de ces groupes utilise ce type de violence de manière récurrente et que la variation peut être expliquée par le contexte straté-gique dans lequel les organisations mènent leurs opérations et par la nature de leurs liens transna-tionaux. Le troisième article (chapitre 4) se concentre sur l’émergence des atrocités extrêmes en tant que « pratique » au sein des forces de sécurité étatiques, en utilisant l’exemple des mutila-tions commises par les soldats américains au cours de la guerre du Vietnam. Ce cas démontre spécifiquement comment les atrocités extrêmes peuvent se généraliser malgré leur interdiction au niveau du commandement. Enfin, le chapitre 5 montre que les idées théoriques développées dans mes articles ont une application plus large, en utilisant une base de données originale sur les atro-cités extrêmes perpétrées dans les guerres civiles entre 1980 et 2011. / Wartime violence sometimes takes particularly extreme forms. Not only do belligerents frequent-ly kill large numbers of civilians, but violent atrocities sometimes go beyond killing to include acts of overt cruelty such as mutilation, rape, public torture, and the abuse of human remains. While individual instances of such violence likely occur in almost all wars, and might be ex-plained by a certain prevalence of psychopathy or sadism among combatants, or by a process of “barbarization” inherent in war, neither individual psychology nor universal wartime conditions can explain why armed actors seem to vary in the extent to which they perpetrate such violence. In some armed groups, episodes of extreme atrocity remain isolated cases. In others, in contrast, large numbers of combatants appear to adopt such practices as an established part of their “reper-toire of violence.” What explains such variation? In this dissertation, I develop and test a series of explana-tions that help account for variation in the occurrence of “extreme atrocities” within and across conflicts. I define extreme atrocities as acts of physical violence characterized by the public dis-play of overt cruelty, and argue that the occurrence of such violence is closely connected to the context of irregular warfare, that is, of warfare characterized by pronounced asymmetry in mili-tary capabilities and fragmented territorial control. Within this context, I show that there are two common pathways towards extreme atrocity. The first involves a process of “top down” decision making, whereby organizational leaders adopt extreme forms of violence for strategic ends. Among the most important of these is the imperative to deter civilian collaboration with the ene-my in contested territories. Because of the terror they inspire, extreme atrocities can usefully serve this purpose, at least under certain conditions. A second pathway involves the “bottom up” emergence of extreme atrocities among rank-and-file combatants as an unordered “practice of war.” Such emergence, I argue, is more likely in military units with high levels of social cohesion but low levels of discipline. Under conditions of irregular warfare, such units can develop infor-mal norms that endorse extreme violence as a means of avenging combat losses. These arguments are developed and tested in my dissertation using a variety of different empirical material, most of which is presented in three articles that have been or are soon to be submitted for publication. The first article (Chapter 2) defines the concept of “extreme atrocity” and uses violence data from four civil wars to probe the plausibility of a series of explanations of such violence derived from the literature on civilian victimization. The second article (Chapter 3) further develops the idea that irregular warfare creates strategic incentives for the top-down adoption of extreme violence, focusing specifically on the use beheadings by jihadist groups. I show that variation in the use of beheadings among jihadist groups can be explained by a combi-nation of local strategic context and transnational ties. The third article (Chapter 4) focuses on the emergence of extreme atrocity as a “practice” among state security forces, using the example of mutilations perpetrated by American soldiers during the Vietnam war to show how extreme forms of violence can become widespread despite being unambiguously prohibited by military policy. Finally, Chapter 5 shows that the theoretical ideas developed in my articles have broader application. Using original data on extreme atrocities perpetrated in civil wars between 1980 and 2011, I show that the patterns in perpetration of such violence by state security forces and rebel groups are consistent with the theories of top-down adoption and bottom-up emergence of ex-treme atrocity described above. This thesis contributes to our understanding of wartime violence by explicitly theorizing a hitherto neglected dimension of violence, and developing and testing explanations that can ac-count for variation in its occurrence at multiple different levels.

Paragraphs 138 to 140 of the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN World Summit not only elevated the element of prevention to a prominent place within the principle of “responsibility to protect” (R2P), but also restricted the scope of R2P to four specific crimes under international law: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This thesis explores the conceptual and practical consequences of linking R2P to the concept of international crimes, with a particular focus on the preventive dimension of R2P, the socalled “responsibility to prevent”. To date, much of what has been written about the “responsibility to prevent” borrows primarily from conflict prevention theory and practice. Such conflict prevention inspired accounts of the “responsibility to prevent” tend to depict the principle as a long-term agenda that seeks to build societies resilient to atrocity crimes; that rests primarily on pillars one (state responsibility) and two (international assistance and capacity-building); that is supportive rather than undermining of state sovereignty; and that can largely adhere to the traditional conflict prevention principles of impartiality, consent, and minimal coercion should more direct prevention efforts become necessary. Drawing on literature from criminology, this thesis develops an international crimes framework for operationalizing the preventive dimension of R2P. The framework, combined with three case studies of international crime prevention (Bosnia 1991-1995; Kenya 2007-08; and Libya 2011), challenges key assumptions of the conflict prevention accounts, arguing that linking R2P to the concept of international crimes turns the “responsibility to prevent” into a principle that is more focused on the short-term, rather than on so-called root causes of atrocity crimes; more focused on individuals, rather than on state structures and capacity; more partial regarding perpetrators and victims; and more coercive, intrusive, and controversial than is commonly acknowledged in academic writing and policy debates on the subject. More broadly, the thesis concludes that taking R2P’s focus on the prevention of international crimes seriously requires re-rethinking the “responsibility to prevent” in important respects.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2017-11-14T15:25:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Pedro Bigolin Neto_.pdf: 1923474 bytes, checksum: d7edbb6188e73aa40dae2819d9d3bdb9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-11-14T15:25:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pedro Bigolin Neto_.pdf: 1923474 bytes, checksum: d7edbb6188e73aa40dae2819d9d3bdb9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-29 / Nenhuma / Esta dissertação tem como objetivo analisar, simultaneamente, em que medida os conflitos territoriais envolvendo os Guarani e Kaiowá e o agronegócio no Mato Grosso do Sul são contextos propícios para a ocorrência de crimes de atrocidade e são motivados pela lógica colonial. Apesar das conquistas jurídico-formais que apontam para o reconhecimento de suas particularidades, os conflitos envolvendo indígenas e ocupantes de terras têm-se agravado nos últimos anos e têm sido marcados por episódios de extrema violência, notadamente no Mato Grosso do Sul. As investidas contra os habitantes originários têm íntima relação com a ampliação da ocupação de terras na região, destinadas fundamentalmente à monocultura de exportação de commodities, à pecuária intensiva e à indústria sucroalcooleira nas áreas em disputa. Percebe-se, com isso, uma tendência de vulnerabilização dos povos indígenas. Para realização do estudo, são apresentadas como teoria de base e ferramental analítico a perspectiva descolonial e o Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes. A primeira compreende a colonialidade como constitutiva da modernidade, como uma forma de articulação de uma matriz de poder calcada na hierarquização racial dos sujeitos, na premissa de que somente o conhecimento científico-moderno é válido e na inferiorização das subjetividades não-modernas. Sua permanência até os dias de hoje se revela na negação da diferença e na busca por eliminá-la. O segundo consiste num documento elaborado pela ONU, cuja finalidade é de avaliar a presença de fatores de risco para crimes de atrocidade [genocídio, crimes contra a humanidade, crimes de guerra e limpeza étnica]. O trabalho consiste num estudo crítico diagnóstico, valendo-se de pesquisas bibliográfica, legislativa, documental e visitas in locu. São explorados elementos territoriais dos povos Guarani e Kaiowá e de sua história no contato com os karaí [não-índios] para explicitar a subsistência de um padrão de tratamento que deixa de levar em consideração suas particularidades culturais e viola as legislações nacionais e internacionais. Como resultados, foram encontrados diversos indicadores de fatores de risco para crimes de atrocidade, que consistem em: discriminações estruturais de iniciativa pública e privada, intimamente relacionadas pelo poder político-econômico do agronegócio; privações e violações de direitos humanos básicos, muitas delas decorrentes da não-regularização da questão fundiária indígena; um histórico consistente de violências, ataques e assassinatos; e a manutenção de um imaginário que inferioriza as identidades indígenas por sua diferença como estratégia de desapropriação territorial pelo projeto colonial. Para a superação destes impasses, deve-se buscar respostas na construção de um projeto outro, que lide com a diferença de modo horizontal e, de modo mais imediato, na demarcação dos territórios ancestrais dos povos originários. / This dissertation aims to analyze simultaneously the extent to which the territorial conflicts involving the Guarani and Kaiowá and the agribusiness in Mato Grosso do Sul are favorable contexts for the occurrence atrocity crimes and are motivated by the colonial logic. In spite of the legal-formal achievements that point to the recognition of their particularities, the conflicts involving indigenous and land occupants have been aggravated in recent years and have been marked by episodes of extreme violence, notably in Mato Grosso do Sul. The charges against original inhabitants are closely related to the expansion of the land occupation in the region, mainly destined to the monoculture of commodities for export, livestock farming and the industries of sugar and alcohol in the disputed areas. This shows a trend towards the vulnerability of indigenous peoples. To carry out the study, the decolonial perspective and the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes are presented as ground theory and analytical tool. The first one understands coloniality as constitutive of modernity, as a form of articulating a matrix of power based on the racial hierarchy of the subjects, on the premise that only scientific-modern knowledge is valid and in the inferiorization of non-modern subjectivities. Its permanence to the present day is revealed in the denial of difference and in the quest to eliminate it. The second consists of a document prepared by the UN, whose purpose is to assess the presence of risk factors for atrocity crimes [genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing]. The work consists in a critical diagnostic study, using bibliographical, legislative, documentary and in locu visits. Territorial elements of the Guarani and Kaiowá peoples and their history are explored in the contact with the karaí [non-Indian] to make explicit the subsistence of a standard of treatment that fails to take into account their cultural particularities and violates national and international laws. As results, several indicators of risk factors for atrocity crimes were found, which consist of: structural discrimination of both public and private initiative, closely related by the agribusiness's political-economic power; deprivations and violations of basic human rights, many of them resulting from the non-regularization of the indigenous land issue; a consistent history of violence, attacks and killings; and the maintenance of an imaginary that inferiorizes indigenous identities by its difference as a strategy of territorial expropriation by the colonial project. In order to overcome these impasses, one must seek answers in the construction of another project, which deals with the difference horizontally and, more immediately, in the demarcation of the ancestral territories of native peoples.

This is a study with the purpose of looking over the pattern of consumption of people visiting tourist attractions associated with war, death and suffering; dark tourism. The demarcation of the work has been to look into attractions inside the Stockholm area which do commercial business with the three aspects of dark tourism. With the help of qualitative and quantitative methods, the authors have collected the material needed for the purpose of the study. These qualitative methods have been interviews with visitors of dark tourism and the commercial business themselves, and with observations on three different attractions in Stockholm. The quantitative method, together with some qualitative aspects, has been a poll, with in-depth questions, to get an understanding of the subject at hand. The places for the observations was Stockholm Ghost Walk, the Vasa museum, and the Army museum. As a result of the study, the authors learned that most visitors didn’t know about dark tourism and that they were, in fact, visiting attractions that was called dark. The phenomena itself was unknown to most of them even though they all had visited at least one place under the dark tourism phenomena. / Detta är en undersökning vars syfte är att se över människors konsumtionsmönster på platser associerade med krig, död och lidande; mörk turism. Avgränsningen för arbetet har varit till de attraktioner i Stockholmsområdet som gör kommersiellt nöje av dessa tre aspekter. Med hjälp av kvalitativa och kvantitativa metoder har författarna samlat in det material de behöver för arbetets syfte. Dessa har varit kvalitativa intervjuer med besökare och aktörer på den mörka turism-marknaden i Sverige och observationer på tre attraktioner, samt en kvalitativ och kvantitativ enkät som förarbete för att få en förståelse kring ämnet. De platser som observerades var Stockholm Ghost Walk i Gamla Stan, Vasamuseet samt Armémuseet. Resultatet visar att mörk turism inte alltid är uppenbart som fenomen för besökaren, även om det är ett fenomen som ofta besöks.

Based on Hobsbawm’s notion of “invented traditions,” this thesis argues that the Serbian warrior tradition, the hajduk, was formalised from the folk oral epic tradition into official state practices. Using reports from the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, military histories of Yugoslavia’s Second World War, and case files from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), this thesis shows how the hajduk epics were used to articulate war programs and formations, to construct perpetrator and victim identities, and to help encourage and justify the levels of violence during the Yugoslav wars of succession, 1991-1995. The thesis shows how the formalising of the invented hajduk tradition made the epics an important part of political and military mobilisation for at least the last two centuries. During Serbia’s modernisation campaign in the nineteenth century, the epic hajduk traditions were codified by Serbian intellectuals and fashioned into national stories of heroism. While cleansing territories of undesirable populations during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the hajduks were portrayed in the tradition of nation builders by the Kingdom of Serbia. The hajduk tradition was also mobilised as Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia in 1941, with both Draža Mihailović’s Četniks and Tito’s Partisans appropriating the historic guerrilla tradition. During the “re-traditionalisation” period under Slobodan Milošević in the 1980s, the invented hajduk tradition was again mobilised in the service of war. As Bosnian Muslim bodies were flung from the Mehmed Sokolović Bridge in Višegrad in 1992, the Serbian perpetrators dreamed of themselves as avenging hajduks thus justifying a modern ethnic cleansing. / Graduate

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