Coronapandemin är en pågående kris där de ekonomiska effekterna och inblandade faktorer för företag inte är helt klarlagda ännu. Teoretiska resonemang har förts kring om några av de effekter som sågs vid finanskrisen 2008–2009 (såsom förändrade revisionsarvoden) också kommer att ske till följd av coronapandemin. Studien syfte är att förklara om och isåfall hur coronapandemin påverkat noterade företags revisionsarvoden. Denna kvantitativa studie har utgått från deduktiv ansats för att pröva hypotes utifrån vetenskaplig teori. Datainsamling har gjorts från årsredovisningar från 187 företag på Stockholmsbörsen och Pearson r och OLS-regression har använts för att undersöka eventuella samband. Denna studie visar att coronapandemin har påverkat revisionsarvodet för svenska noterade bolag och att bidragande faktorer är storlek, komplexitet ochkonsultation.

為降低資訊不對稱下企業管理階層與資金提供者間之代理問題，公司須設計有效之治理機制以降低代理成本，如聘任外部董監、設置審計委員會及聘任會計師查核等。而當董監事所具備的獨立性及專業性越高，基於維護專家信譽及降低訴訟成本的考量下，將需要會計師投入較多的查核人力及時間，以降低資訊不對稱現象，並減少會計師與公司管理階層間經濟依存度，以獲得較高品質的審計服務。然目前公司治理議題多著重於公司內部監理機制與公司經營績效間的關係，較少觸及內部董監事會監督功能對外部會計師監督功能的影響，是以本研究嘗試以公司治理的角度出發，探討台灣上市、上櫃及興櫃公司董監事獨立性與專業性對於審計公費以及非審計公費之影響。 本研究實證結果發現，目前我國上市櫃及興櫃公司董監事獨立性對於審計公費及非審計公費尚未有統計上顯著之影響，唯董監事兼任其他公司董監事職位數與非審計公費間存有負向關係。不同於 Carcello et al. (2000)的結論，本研究發現台灣公司董監事會之專業性對審計公費及非審計公費之影響較董監事獨立性大，其原因可能是公司治理在台灣始見萌芽，社會大眾對公司治理及董監事功能之概念不深，一方面股東會欠缺聘任獨立董監之誘因，一般公司設置獨立董監多半僅為符合表面規定，所選出之獨立董監亦未必與管理階層維持實質獨立，而無法收實質監督之效；一方面董監事對其職權之行使並未擴及會計師聘任之實質決策，而多僅接受管理當局推薦，獨立董監亦無法對審計及非審計公費進行審議。反是董監事平均兼任其他公司董監職位數越多，代表其所享之專家信譽越高，會為維護自身信譽且降低訴訟風險，藉由限制管理階層向會計師所購買的非審計服務種類及金額，以降低會計師與管理階層間的經濟依存度。 / To reduce the agency problem between management and capital suppliers, the business should design an effective corporate structure to reduce agency cost, including hiring outside board members and/or the establishment of an audit committee. The board members with higher independence and expertise will ask the auditors to put in more audit time to reduce information asymmetry. And they will expect to lessen the auditor’s economic dependency on the management by restricting non-audit services the company will purchase from the independent auditor firm. Most researches recently focus on the relation between characteristic of the board and business operation results. This research attempted to examine the relation between board characteristics and audit/non-audit fees paid to the independent auditors. This study found there’s no significant relation between board independence and audit fees or non-audit fees, but a negative relation existed between the board expertise and non-audit fees. Opposite to the conclusion of Carcello et al. (2000), this result indicated that the effect of board expertise on fees is greater than that of board independence. It could be due to the initial development of corporate governance in Taiwan. Most companies hire outside board members and set up an audit committee just to meet the regulation stipulated by law. On the other hand, the greater expertise a board processes, the less non-audit fee it will pay to the auditor in order to reduce the economic dependency of the auditor on the management.

Auditing has an important role in the corporate governance process and is essential in ensuring confidence in the reliability of financial information. It is important to understand the reasons why, given the costs involved, companies change their auditor and choose a particular level of audit assurance. To date, however, only a limited number of studies on auditor choice issues are available, especially in the UK setting. Further, since the downfall of Andersen, the audit market environment has changed significantly, creating a new audit environment to be researched. In light of these recent developments, the objectives of this thesis are to address both concentration and auditor choice issues. It is divided into two separate but interrelated parts. The first part of this thesis provides evidence on audit market concentration in the UK domestic listed company market from 1998 to 2003. The effect of Andersen’s demise on both audit market concentration and audit fees is examined. Using four different size measures (number of audits, audit fees, clients’ total assets and sales), three measures of concentration are calculated. Results show that the UK audit market has now clearly surpassed the tight oligopoly threshold and, despite auditing significantly fewer clients in 2003 than in 1998, the B5/4 managed to increase their fee dominance. In particular, the decline in B5/4 ‘number of clients’ market share was mainly due to their lower share of the newly-listed companies audit market. On the other hand, the slight increase in B5/4 audit fee market share was due to the net impact of leavers concentrating the B5/4 share and joiners diluting it. Voluntary switches to/from the B5/4 had a relatively small impact on B5/4 market share for both measures. Following Andersen’s acquisition by Deloitte & Touche, market levels of audit fee and audit fee rate (audit fee scaled by total assets) have increased markedly, suggesting that more audit effort is being expended as a way to restore confidence about audit quality after the damage caused by Andersen’s alleged misconduct. The acquisition has also contributed to a further increase in ‘audit fee’ market concentration for the 4-firm concentration ratio (CR4) and in the overall Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measure. Although, Deloitte & Touche gained significant market share in terms of both audit fees and number of audits through its acquisition of Andersen, it is PricewaterhouseCoopers that continues to hold the largest market share. Deloitte & Touche retained 93 former Andersen clients (74%), 21 (17%) moved to another B5/4 auditor and 11 (9%) chose a non-B5/4 firm. While former Andersen clients paid higher audit fees, in aggregate, the increase was, perhaps surprisingly, less than for the market as a whole. At the industry level, the B4 firms dominated all sectors, the highest non-B5/4 market share in any industry being just 8%. In 2003, PricewaterhouseCoopers was the leader in 18 out of 34 sectors. The second part of the thesis is divided into two separate studies – auditor change determinants and new auditor selection determinants. These studies use a sample of non financial auditor change companies to test logistic regression models of the determinants of auditor change and new auditor selection. The determinant variables include auditee, auditor and audit characteristics. This part also examines the sensitivity of results to alternative functional forms of the basic model specification. Two definitions of auditor quality – brand name auditor and specialism, are employed. Internal governance issues such as audit committee independence, the duality of chairman/CEO as well as the size/quality of the incumbent auditor were found to be significant determinants of auditor change. Expected future growth in the company, rather than past growth, and audit fee reduction were positively related to audit change probability. Result also suggests that companies changed auditor to improve the perception of auditor independence. By contrast, in the new auditor selection models, corporate governance variables did not appear to be important in determining a different quality (brand-name) auditor. Only the chairman/CEO duality variable was weakly and negatively significant, suggesting that duality is associated with a change to a lower quality auditor. Growing companies are more likely to change to a brand name auditor, consistent with the inability of smaller firms to provide services across an international market. Contrary to agency theory predictions, the results show that a company experiencing increased leverage is less likely to choose a B5/4 auditor, suggesting that B5/4 auditors are being selective in avoiding risky clients. Higher audit fees are paid to new auditors by companies that changed from non-B5/4 to B5/4, reflecting a B5/4 fee premium. However, the higher NAS fee result is contrary to initial expectations. Typically, far fewer variables were significant in the models with audit quality proxied by industry specialism. For the specialism models based on audit fee market share, there is counter-intuitive evidence that a company with a large number of subsidiaries is less likely to move to a specialist auditor from a non-specialist. New specialist auditors were more likely to be preferred when a company experienced an increase in current accruals or a reduction in leverage. In general, the results for these models were less strong and were dependent upon the specialist definition adopted. Finally, the thesis provides evidence that the choice of time variant model (ex-ante, contemporaneous or ex-post) made no significant difference to the overall results. The one exception concerns the ‘growth’ variable, where companies are found to change auditor in anticipation of future growth, rather than as a response to past growth. Further, the use of alternative proxy variables does not greatly influence the regression results. One important exception to this general observation concerns the brand name proxy. When brand name was defined as tier12 (to include Grant Thornton and BDO) the significance level was improved in all models. This suggests that, to some degree, Grant Thornton and BDO are viewed as quality service providers closer in quality to B5/4 than to other smaller audit firms.

In this thesis I investigate the economic determinants and consequences of corporate governance (broadly defined) in Canadian “comply or explain” governance disclosure regime. I find that the quality of governance in firms varies in the cross-section and is associated with firm value as economic theory suggests. Furthermore, I find the effectiveness of board and audit committee has a strong impact on the auditor-client management relationship in their negotiation over financial reporting. Such relationships then influence financial reporting quality and audit fees. Overall, my results support that the theorized advantages of “comply or explain” allow firms greater flexibility in tailoring their governance practice to their specific circumstances. Such tailored governance practice is more efficient and cost-effective and serves the interests of shareholders by 1) improving firm value; 2) constraining managerial opportunism; and 3) improving audit quality without incurring higher audit fees. / Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2013-07-26 11:29:18.86

Syfte: Inom revisionsbranschen har rapporteringen om ett företags fortlevnad under en lång tid varit ett omtvistat ämne. Detta specifikt till följd av revisorsskandaler, då företag gått i konkurs utan att ha erhållit en fortlevnadsvarning från sin revisor. I redovisningslitteraturen finns det motstridiga argument kring huruvida revisorer anses oberoende eller inte utifrån deras benägenhet att utfärda fortlevnadsvarningar och de finansiella incitament som finns. Uppsatsens syfte är att: Undersöka om det finns något samband mellan utfärdandet av fortlevnadsvarningar och ekonomisk förlust för revisionsbyrån. Metod: Utifrån tidigare forskning har forskningsbara hypoteser deducerats fram, vilka sedan undersökts empiriskt. En kvantitativ metod har använts för att samla in data från svenska företags årsredovisningar åren 2011-2014. Dessa data har sedan testats och analyserats i ett statistikprogram och har därefter redovisats i olika tabeller. Resultat & slutsats: Denna studie har funnit bevis för den självuppfyllande profetian, vilket indikerar att revisorer drar sig för att utfärda fortlevnadsvarningar. Gällande undersökningen kring ekonomiska incitament som hot mot revisorns oberoende, ger denna studie bevis på att storleken på NAS-arvodet kan utgöra ett potentiellt hot. Studiens resultat visar även att det inte finns någon kvalitetsskillnad mellan Big 4 och icke Big 4 revisorer när det gäller utfärdandet av fortlevnadsvarningar. Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Förslag till fortsatt forskning är att kombinera de finansiella faktorerna med de icke finansiella faktorerna för att studera revisorers oberoende. En tredje begränsning med uppsatsen är att vi utgått från revisorns perspektiv, vilket innebär att förslag till fortsatt forskning är att byta till företagens perspektiv eller kombinera dessa. Uppsatsens bidrag: Denna uppsats har bidragit med mer kunskap kring den självuppfyllande profetian, ekonomiska incitaments påverkan på revisorns oberoende. Uppsatsen har även bidragit med ytterligare förståelse kring hur problematiskt det kan vara att utfärda en fortlevnadsvarning. / Aim: The reporting of an organizations going concern has been center for debate during a long period of time. This is mainly due to auditing scandals where organizations have gone bankrupt without a modified going concern opinion from their auditor. In accounting literature there are conflicting claims about whether auditors are considered independent or not due to their tendency to issue a going concern modified opinion and the influence financial incentives have on auditor independence. The aim of this essay is to: Examine if there is a relation between the tendency to issue a going concern modified opinion and the financial loss for the audit firm. Method: From previous research hypotheses have been deduced. These hypotheses have then empirically been studied. A quantitative method was used to gather data from Swedish companies’ annual reports from the year 2011-2014. After gathering the data, it was tested and analyzed with a stats program and then presented in different tables. Result & Conclusions: This study has found evidence of the self-fulfilling prophecy, which indicates that the auditor withdraws from issuing a going concern modified opinion. Regarding the financial incentives as threats of audit independence, this study gives evidence that the size of Non-audit service fees poses a potential threat. The results of the study also show that there is no significant difference in quality between Big 4 and Non-Big 4 auditors regarding the issuance of going concern modified opinions. Suggestions for future research: In this study the financial factors have been taken into account, a combination of both the financial and non-financial factors is the suggestion for future research. A third limitation of this study is that is based upon the auditors’ perspective, therefore a study based solely on the companies' perspective or a combination of both is our suggestion for future research. Contribution of the thesis: This thesis contributes with more knowledge to the accounting literature. The study has provided more knowledge about the self-fulfilling prophecy, financial incentives on audit independence and the quality among Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. This thesis has also contributed to further understanding of how problematic it can be for an auditor to issue a going concern modified opinion.

Bakgrund: Revisionens syfte är att genom en oberoende granskning minska den informationsasymmetri som finns mellan ägare och företagsledning. Nya regler angående bland annat innehållet i revisionsberättelsen trädde ikraft 2016 med syfte att bland annat minska det informationsgap som finns på marknaden. Vår studie har sin utgångspunkt i om mängden informationsasymmetri påverkar revisionskostnaden och om den nya lagändringens syfte uppnåtts.   Syfte: Studiens syfte är att förklara sambandet mellan informationsasymmetri och revisionskostnad i svenska börsbolag. En jämförelse görs även mellan år 2015 och 2016 för att se om de nya kraven på revisionsberättelsen har någon inverkan på informationsasymmetri och revisionskostnad samt sambandet dem emellan.   Metod: Studien har en deduktiv forskningsansats där agentteorin varit utgångspunkt för att härleda hypoteser. Urvalet i den kvantitativa forskningsmetoden har varit svenska bolag listade på small-, mid- och largecap åren 2015 och 2016.   Resultat: Studiens resultat har visat på att det det finns ett negativt samband mellan informationsasymmetri och revisionskostnad. Det kan också konstateras att den nya revisionsberättelsen inte bidragit med en minskad informationsasymmetri och inte heller en ökad revisionskostnad. / Background: The aim of audit is to independently review and reduce the information asymmetry that exists between the owners and management of the firm. A new law about the content of the audit report was implemented 2016 with the purpose of reducing the information gap on the market. Our study is based on whether or not the amount of information asymmetry affects the audit fee and if the purpose of the new law has been reached. Purpose: The purpose of the study is to explain the relationship between information asymmetry and audit fee in Swedish companies listed on the stock exchange market. A comparison between the years of 2015 and 2016 is made to investigate if the new requirements on the audit report have any affection on the information asymmetry, audit fee and the relationship in between. Method: The study has a deductive research approach with the base of agency theory to deduce hypotheses. The sample in the quantitative research methodology consists of Swedish companies listed on small-, mid- and largecap 2015 and 2016. Conclusions: The result of the study concludes that there is a negative relationship between information asymmetry and audit fees. It can also be concluded that the new audit report does not contribute to a reduction of information asymmetry nor an increased audit fee.

In this paper we studied the effect of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on audit fees in Sweden. Using a classic audit fee model, with data between 2001-2019 for 100 publicly traded Swedish firms we studied the effects of IFRS on audit fees during the implementation period as well as the long-term effects of IFRS adoption. In addition to this we investigated if the adoption of IFRS affected large and small firms differently. In contrast to most previous literature, we found that the implementation of IFRS has not had any short- or long-term effects on audit fees in Sweden. However, we found small indications that changes in audit fees are lower for large firms after the implementation of IFRS but the model’s explanatory factor was low and the effect small so no definitive conclusions could be made. The results remain the same after performing several robustness tests.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates public companies to establish internal control systems and assess their effectiveness. Quarterly reports by all companies and annual reports by companies with less than $75 million public float (non-accelerated filers) do not require auditor’s attestation while annual reports by companies with $75 million or more public float (accelerated filers) do require such auditor attestations. Quarterly reports should provide early warning of any impending material weakness (MW) to be disclosed in subsequent annual filings. This dissertation explores three types of “surprise” MW disclosures—positive, negative and no surprise—and consequences of such surprise disclosures. In part one, I document the frequency of surprise MW disclosures and internal control factors that are associated with each surprise type by filer status. Results show that 78 (77) percent of accelerated (non-accelerated) MW disclosures are negative surprise MW disclosures during 2004-2016. Entity level MWs are more associated with no-surprise rather than negative or positive surprise MW disclosures. In part two, I examine some consequences of surprise MW disclosures. The results show that companies with MW disclosures are more likely to dismiss their auditors and CFOs, and experience more shareholder voting against auditor ratification, compared to companies that issue clean reports. Auditor dismissal and CFO turnover are equally likely at negative and no-surprise MW disclosure companies. However, negative surprise accelerated filer companies’ shareholders are more likely to vote against auditor ratification than no-surprise accelerated filer companies. The third essay investigates the association between MW disclosures and audit fees. The results indicate that there is a significant positive association between audit fees and MW disclosures. Further, the results show that audit fees are higher at no-surprise companies than at negative surprise companies. The fourth essay focuses on audit report lag. The results indicate that MWs are associated with increased audit report lags, for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. Further, surprise MW firms are more likely to experience increased audit report lag than no-surprise MW firms. Overall the results suggest that adverse internal control reports have consequences, and that the consequences vary between surprise and no-surprise MW firms. The results provide relevant empirical evidence to the ongoing debate on the necessity and efficacy of SOX Section 404 requirements.

Introduktion Revisionskostnaden styrs till stor del av förhållandet mellan utbud och efterfrågan. Tidigare studier har funnit ett flertal bakomliggande faktorer som påverkar revisionskostnadens storlek i publika bolag och kommuner. Behovet av en jämförande studie har tidigare påpekats för att kartlägga revisionskostnadernas skillnader över tid. Syfte Syftet med studien är att jämföra och förklara utvecklingen av revisionskostnadernas storlek i publika bolag och i den kommunala sektorn över tid. Metod Studiens deduktiva ansats innebär att tidigare forskning och befintliga teorier har legat till grund för att härleda uppställda hypoteser. En longitudinell studie har genomförts för att mäta förändringar och utveckling över tid. Kvantitativ data har samlats in i form av sekundärdata. Slutsats Studiens resultat visar att ett flertal bakomliggande faktorer förklarar revisionskostnadens storlek över tid. Bolagsstorlek, risk och andra uppdrag har i studien ett signifikant samband med revisionskostnaden. I kommuner kan revisionskostnaden förklaras av storlek, skattekraft, resultat och antal mandat. Under perioden 2005-2011 har revisionskostnaden för publika bolag minskat med 0,5 %, medan revisionskostnaderna i kommuner har ökat med 12,8 %. Skillnaden kan till stor del förklaras av revisionens olika ändamål och påverkan av omvärldsfaktorer. / Introduction The audit fee depends mainly on the relationship between demand and supply. Former studies have found multiple underlying independent variables that affect the audit fee in listed companies and municipalities. The need of a comparative study to analyze the differences in audit fees over time between the two has previously been pointed out. Purpose The purpose of the study is to compare and explain the development of audit fees in listed companies and municipalities over time. Method The study’s deductive method means that previous research and existing theories have been the foundation from which hypothesis have been derived. A longitudinal study has been performed to measure changes and development over time. Quantitative data has been collected as secondary data. Conclusion This study indicates that multiple underlying independent variables explains the audit fees over time. The size of the company, risk and non-audit fees have a significant positive relation with the audit fee. In municipalities the audit fee relates to size, tax base, results and number of mandates.  During the period between 2005 and 2011 the audit fees for listed companies decreased with 0.5 %, whereas the audit fees for municipalities increased with 12.8 %. The difference can largely be explained by differing purposes of the audit and effect of global factors.

Jensen(1998)認為，當公司有過多的自由現金流量時，經理人基於自利動機，較有可能從事非最大化主理人的行為，加劇代理問題的產生。Jensen也認為，發行長期負債可以降低公司多餘的自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題的產生。因此，本研究即由此一觀點出發，探討是否可藉由長期負債的發行，減緩代理問題的產生？以及當經理人持股比例低，代理問題較嚴重時，負債可否做為監督機制，以減緩代理問題？ 本研究以審計公費做為衡量代理問題之替代變數。當代理問題愈嚴重，即意味著公司有較高的固有風險，因此將增加查核努力，進而收取較高的審計公費。換句話說，當代理問題愈嚴重，審計公費將愈高。實證結果發現，低成長高自由現金流量的公司，發行長期負債可以降低自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題。而在經理人低持股比例時，長期負債可做為替代的監督機制，以減緩代理問題的產生。故本研究認為，負債確實可做為減緩代理問題之機制。 / Jensen(1986)argued that when company own more free cash flow, based on the self-serving motivation, managers will tend to pursue his benefit rather than principal’s. In such situation, agency problem will become more serious. Jensen also point out that issuing long-term debt can reduce the free cash flow in the company, therefore, ease the agency problem. This study is based on the free cash flow theory, examining whether issuing long-term debt can reducing the free cash flow, therefore reducing the agency problem? Besides, we will examine when managers hold fewer stocks, whether issuing long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism or not? Using audit fee as a variable to measure the agency problem. In auditing, serious agency problem means higher inherent risk and, in turn, audit fees. In other words, more serious agency problem means higher audit fee. The result finds that in low growth firm with higher free cash flow, issuing long-term debt can reduce free cash flow and, in turn, mitigate agency problem. Besides, when managers hold fewer stocks, long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism. As a conclusion, debt can be a mechanism to mitigate agency problem.