En plus de ce qu’il avait écrit auparavant sur la libido dans le Traité du libre arbitre, Augustin a consacré deux passages de la Cité de Dieu à la question de l’affectivité. Dans ces deux textes, qu’on trouve aux livres IX et XIV, il s’affronte aux théories stoïciennes et platoniciennes et s’efforce de montrer la particularité de la conception chrétienne de l’affectivité, en liant les affects à la volonté ; ainsi réintégrés dans l’ordo amoris qui structure l’univers augustinien, les affects sont bons si l’amour qui les motive est orienté vers le bien véritable. Toutefois, dans ces textes, Augustin ne détaille pas ce que sont les affects : il n’en définit aucun, il n’analyse pas les relations qu’on peut établir entre eux. Pourtant, si l’on envisage l’ensemble de son œuvre, on découvre des descriptions variées d’affects nombreux. Ce travail cherche à rendre compte de l’affectivité augustinienne. Il découvre la structure essentielle qui la supporte, qui n’est pas l’ordonnancement de la volonté au bien, mais d’abord l’espérance d’atteindre lavie heureuse. Cette espérance éloigne tout à fait la pensée d’Augustin de celle des philosophes stoïciens ou néoplatoniciens. Elle permet de penser l’affectivité dans sa relation au langage, de comprendre que les affects sont portés par la voix, le souffle, le rire ou les larmes, et comment ils forment eux-mêmes un langage, qui raconte le cheminement (peregrinatio) vers la vie heureuse. / First in De libero arbitrio, then in De ciuitate Dei, Augustine describes his theory of affectivity. In books IX and XIV of De ciuitate Dei, he objects to the Stoician theory of apatheia and the Platonician dualism. He points out the Christian idea of affectivity, which considers the affects depending on the will. In this way, emotions are parts of the Augustinian ordo amoris. They are good if they reveal a true love of the good. In these texts however Augustine does not explain what kind of emotions heis thinking about. He gives no definition of them and does not analyse their interconnections. But in the rest of his writings, we can find various descriptions of several emotions. In this work we try to appreciate Augutine’s affectivity, by understanding that it is not predicated on the good will, but on the hope in the beata uita. This hope makes the thought of Augustin different from Stoician or Neoplatonician philosophy. From this point of view, we can understand how affectivity is linked tolanguage, how emotions are embodied by the voice, the respiration, the laughter and the tears, and how they are also a langage, which tells us the peregrinatio to the uita beata.

Como pensar uma atividade que lida com corpos, como é o caso da sensação, numa filosofia que está em constante busca e valoriza como superior o que é incorporal? Não seria de se esperar que em tal filosofia esse problema fosse relegado ao ostracismo ou simplesmente ignorado? Não é o que parece acontecer. Contudo, tal problema nos parece ser pouco estudado. É na busca por resolvê-lo de modo mais aprofundado que se coloca o presente trabalho. Ao que parece, os textos agostinianos tentam mostrar que a sensação é uma atividade da alma. Mas como isso é possível se a alma é incorporal e aquilo que ela sente é corpóreo? Relacionando isso ao problema inicial é necessário ver em que medida essa atividade pode adquirir alguma relevância filosófica. Nossa tese é que tal relevância é afirmada justamente pelo fato de ser uma atividade anímica, já que a alma é superior aos corpos. Mas acima de tudo, essa relevância parece alcançar toda a sua amplitude na obra de maturidade intitulada De trinitate. Tentaremos demonstrar que nela Agostinho propõe uma solução que, no seu pensamento, seria definitiva sobre o problema. Ali ele o redimensiona a partir das tríades humanas que são análogas à Trindade Divina a consideração da sensação se dando em uma dessas tríades inseridas num processo de ascenção interiorizante. Contudo, como isso acontece e se justifica é o que pretendemos expôr no que se segue. / How to think of an activity that deals with bodies, as is the case of sensation, in a philosophy that is constantly seeking and values as superior what is incorporeal? Is it not to be expected that in such philosophy this problem would be ostracized or simply ignored? It is not what seems to happen. However, this problem seems to be little studied. It is in the search for solving it in a more in-depth way that the present work is placed. It seems that the Augustinian texts try to show that sensation is an activity of the soul. But how is this possible if the soul is incorporeal and what it feels is corporeal? Relating this to the initial problem is necessary to see to what extent this activity can acquire some philosophical relevance. Our thesis is that such relevance is affirmed precisely because it is an activity of soul, since the soul is superior to the bodies. But above all, this relevance seems to reach its full extent in the work of maturity entitled De trinitate. We will try to demonstrate that in it Augustine proposes a solution that, in his thought, would be definitive about the problem. There he reshapes it from the human triads that are analogous to the Divine Trinity - the consideration of sensation taking place in one of these triads inserted in a process of interiorising ascension. However, how this happens and is justified is what we intend to expose in what follows.

While "scientism" is typically regarded as a position about the exclusive epistemic authority of science held by a certain class of "cultured despisers" of "religion", we show that only on the assumption of this sort of view do purportedly "scientific" claims made by proponents of "intelligent design" appear to lend epistemic or apologetic support to claims affirmed about God and God's action in "creation" by Christians in confessing their "faith". On the other hand, the hermeneutical strategy that better describes the practice and method of Christian theologians, from the inception of theological reflection in the Christian tradition, acknowledges the epistemic authority of the best available tests for truth in areas of human inquiry such as science and history. But this strategy does not assume that such tests, whose authority must be regarded as provisional, provides authority for the warrant of affirming claims constituting the confessed "faith". By attributing theological import to claims advanced by appeal to the best available tests for truth in the practice of science, supporters of ID not only confuse the epistemic authority of these tests with the normative authority of a faith community's confessional identity, but impute to scientific tests for truth a sort of authority that even goes beyond the "methodological naturalism" against which they counterpose their claims.

Although Anne Brontë's first novel, Agnes Grey, presents itself as a didactic treatise, Brontë's work departs from many accepted Evangelical tropes in the portrayal of its moral protagonist. These departures create an exemplary figure whose flaws potentially subvert the novel's didactic purposes. The character of Agnes is not necessarily meant to be directly emulated, yet Brontë's governess is presented as a tool of moral instruction. The conflict between the novel's self-proclaimed didactic purpose and the form in which it presents that purpose raises a number of interpretive questions. I argue that many of these questions can be answered through the application of a hermeneutic presented in Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana. Such a hermeneutic shifts the burden of interpretation away from the author and toward the reader in such a way that the moral figure becomes, not a standard to be emulated, but rather a test of the reader's personal spiritual maturity. This sign theory heavily influenced the works of medieval hagiographers such as Ælfric of Enysham, who depended on Augustine's sign theory to mediate some of the less-orthodox behaviors of saints such as Æthelthryth of Ely. I argue that by applying Augustine's hermeneutic and reading Agnes Grey in the context of these earlier didactic genres, the novel's potentially subversive qualities are not only neutralized, but become an important element of Evangelical instruction.

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This thesis explores the influence of the legend of Troy on Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, and Lydgate's Troy Book. This study seeks to understand why medieval English Christians held the pagan myth of Troy in such high regard beyond the common postcolonial critique of Trojan ancestry as a justification for political power. I begin by demonstrating how Vergil's Aeneid presents a new heroic ideal much closer to Christian virtue than Homeric values, Aeneas submitting his will to fate and earning his piety through suffering. I then turn to Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, assessing how Gawain is not only descended from Aeneas but how the major events of his quest echo Aeneas' journey, especially in both heroes' submission of their wills to fate. Next, I reveal how Chaucer's Troilus enacts a platonic ascent from a state of ignorance to a state of truth, but as Troilus' name is also linked to the city of Troy itself, the fate of Troilus becomes the fate of Troy. In this way, Chaucer dramatizes the spiritual ascent of his Trojan ancestors in that they move from sin to salvation as a culture. Finally, I investigate how Lydgate refashions Troy into an earthly manifestation of Augustine's City of God. In doing so, Lydgate not only remembers his people's past but prophesies the fate of Trojan descendants. Such an analysis helps late antique and medieval scholars understand not only why such classical myths were popular in a predominantly Christian era, but also how the legends of Troy gave medieval English society a myth-history through which to dramatize their spiritual lives.

This dissertation considers the development of an ethics stemming from the Augustinian revival of early modern England, and the subsequent effect of this ethics on the literary culture of the period. The Preface claims that religious and textual communities operate according to a “cultural mobility” that eludes conventional neo-historicist approaches to literary culture, and Paul Ricoeur’s aphorism, “the symbol gives rise to thought,” serves as a model for thinking through this mobility. Augustinian ethics is a cultural phenomenon in the period, because people are thinking about Augustine, giving new life to his works through their own expressions of thought. After exploring the ways in which the Augustinian revival was brought about during the early modern period in the Introduction, one such expression of thought, John Donne’s relationship with early modern print culture, is examined in Chapter One. Following the theoretical outline of Augustine’s Christianization of Ciceronian rhetoric in his De Doctrina Christiana, it is suggested that though Donne’s aversion to the print publication of his poetry may have begun as a result of his “gentlemanly disdain” of the press, it ultimately found its sustenance in the form of an Augustinian ethic. Chapter Two examines the possibility of a metaphorical acquisition of Augustinian hermeneutics in the metadrama of A Midsummer Night’s Dream. This hermeneutics ultimately calls into question the epistemological framework of Theseus’s skeptical aesthetics, suggesting that a more inclusive aesthetics based on charity can elevate the stage to its proper dignity. The last chapter turns from the communal implications of Augustinian ethics to its subjective implications by examining Augustine’s inner light theology and the role it plays in John Milton’s late poetry. Instead of falling in line with criticism that sees the simultaneous publication of Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes as a dialectical meditation on the virtues of pacifism and the evils of religious violence, this reading suggests that the late poetry asserts the ethical rights of those who attend to the inner light, whether they be peaceful or violent. / text

This thesis provides an historical and intellectual summary of the role of the concepts of 'substance,' and 'participation,' in the making of the doctrine of the Trinity. In the concluding chapter, a study is made of the assumptions of deconstruction, which are somewhat hostile to a substance paradigm. We argue for an appreciation of the importance of both substance and participation for the Trinity, and philosophy generally. Chapters are dedicated to individuals who have in some way contributed to perceptions of these two terms, as they pertain to the Christian notion of the Trinity. Additionally, we seek to define some philosophical problems that accompany a Trinitarian metaphysics of 'substance,' and 'participation.' The problems include those of deconstruction: issues such as 'Logocentrism,' and 'Presence.' Finally, we investigate how Trinitarian ontology can provide answers to many of the questions Derrida raises conceming the problematic future of metaphysical thinking. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / M.Th. (Systematic Theology)

Discipline was an enduring concept in the works of John Milton (1608-1674), yet its meaning shifted over the course of his career: initially he held that it denoted ecclesiastical order, but gradually he turned to representing it as self-willed pious action. My thesis examines this transformation by analysing Milton’s complex engagement in two distinct periods: the 1640s and the 1660s-70s. In Of Reformation (1641), Milton echoed popular contemporary demands for a reformation of church discipline, but also asserted through radical literary experimentation that poetry could discipline the nation too (Chapter 1). Reflecting his dislike for intolerant Presbyterians in Parliament and the Westminster Assembly, the two versions of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643 and 1644) reconsider discipline as a moral imperative for all men, rooted in domestic liberty (Chapter 2). Although written long after this period, the long poetry that Milton composed after the Restoration reveals his continued interrogation of the concept. The invocations of the term ‘discipline’ by Milton’s angels in Paradise Lost (1667) sought to encourage dissenting readers to faithfulness and co-operation (Chapter 3). Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes (1671) advance the concept in the language of ‘piety,’ emphasising that ‘pious hearts’ are the precondition for godly action in opposition to contemporary Anglican ‘holy living’ (Chapter 4). In analysing Milton’s shifting concept of discipline, my thesis contributes to scholarship by showing his sensitivity to contemporary mainstream religious ideas, outlining the Christian—as opposed to republican or Stoic—notions of praxis that informed his ethics, and emphasising the disciplinary aspect of his doctrinal thought. Overall, it holds that in discipline, as word and concept, Milton expressed his faith in the capacity of writing to change its reader, morally and spiritually.