Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1930. / Description based on print version record. Bibliography: p. v-vii.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1931. / Vita. Description based on print version record. "A selected bibliography" : p. xiii-xvi.

Presented thesis deals with the authenticity in Augustin Aurelius life. The authenticity is undestood as a resonce between our situation evaluation and our reaction. Their aspects are studied from the philosophical point of view (M. Heideger and the existencialims, psychology (Rogers), philosphy of behaviour and so on. Augustin sees as a main objective of his life the searching of the wisdom. The chronological analysis of Augustin life (perido of menicheism, skepticism, new searching, platonism and christianity) than shows, wheather he was truthfull to this attitude. We confronted results of our study with the conclusions of chosen reactions of given philosophers for better understanding of Augustin's realizing of the authenticity and the truthfulness

Denna uppsats är huvudsakligen en diskussion av Augustinus försök att förena tesen att människan har en fri vilja med sin predestinationslära. Enligt de definitioner av ”determinism” och ”fri vilja” som föreslås i uppsatsen, utesluter predestinationens förhandenvarande möjligheten för människan att ha en fri vilja. Augustinus utgångspunkt i tron och hans antaganden om Guds och människans egenskaper, gör det omöjligt för honom att acceptera en sådan slutsats. Det samtidiga föreliggandet av predestinationen och den fria viljan utgör en betydelsefull komponent i hans syn på människans relation till Gud. Uppsatsen undersöker hur Augustinus resonemang i De Libero Arbitrio (Om den Fria Viljan) står sig mot en nutida kritik, för att i förlängningen söka påvisa varför hans antagande att människan har fri vilja inte är förenligt med hans samtidiga antagande att Gud har predestinerat alla händelser i världen. / This paper is mainly a discussion of Augustine’s combination of the idea that human beings have a free will with his doctrine of predestination. According to the definitions of “determinism” and “free will” suggested in this paper, the actuality of predestination excludes the possibility of human free will. Since Augustine takes starting-point in his belief in God and his assumptions about the attributes of God and human beings, such a conclusion is impossible for him. The actuality of both predestination and human free will is an important feature of his view of the relationship between human beings and God. This paper investigates how Augustine’s line of argument in De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will) manages to hold against a modern criticism. The primary aim is to show why Augustine’s assumption that human beings have free will is inconsistent with his assumption that God has predestined all events of the world.

No description available.

This essay takes it’s approach in the role of the Serpent in the Garden story based on the Jewish and Christian tradition’s view of the Serpent in that narrative. The question the study is based on is whether the Serpent has changed character from the creation of the Garden story until about 400 years AD in Christian tradition. My conclusion in this reception-historical analysis of the Serpent is that it has different meanings in Jewish and Christian tradition. The Gnostic texts that began to emerge a couple of hundred years BC were not recognized in the Jewish tradition, while in the Christian tradition they lived with the interpretations, which is not least seen in the Book of Revelations, which is canon in the Christian tradition today. Augustine uses the Book of Revelation’s interpretations of the Serpent, where the Serpent is Satan, which the Gnostic texts write and the Book of Revelation is influenced by. Augustine is so wrapped up in the fact that the Serpent is Satan that he misses what it says in the most important and introductory sentence of Genesis 3:1.  My conclusion is that because God created the Serpent, and therefore the Serpent can not be Satan because God is not evil. The dualistic worldview that emerges from God does not appear in the text, but the Christian interpretations of the Serpent have departed from the text, while the Jewish tradition has remained in the text’s view of the Serpent. The Serpent is not Satan based on Genesis 3.

<p>Denna uppsats är huvudsakligen en diskussion av Augustinus försök att förena tesen att människan har en fri vilja med sin predestinationslära. Enligt de definitioner av ”determinism” och ”fri vilja” som föreslås i uppsatsen, utesluter predestinationens förhandenvarande möjligheten för människan att ha en fri vilja. Augustinus utgångspunkt i tron och hans antaganden om Guds och människans egenskaper, gör det omöjligt för honom att acceptera en sådan slutsats. Det samtidiga föreliggandet av predestinationen och den fria viljan utgör en betydelsefull komponent i hans syn på människans relation till Gud. Uppsatsen undersöker hur Augustinus resonemang i De Libero Arbitrio (Om den Fria Viljan) står sig mot en nutida kritik, för att i förlängningen söka påvisa varför hans antagande att människan har fri vilja inte är förenligt med hans samtidiga antagande att Gud har predestinerat alla händelser i världen.</p> / <p>This paper is mainly a discussion of Augustine’s combination of the idea that human beings have a free will with his doctrine of predestination. According to the definitions of “determinism” and “free will” suggested in this paper, the actuality of predestination excludes the possibility of human free will. Since Augustine takes starting-point in his belief in God and his assumptions about the attributes of God and human beings, such a conclusion is impossible for him. The actuality of both predestination and human free will is an important feature of his view of the relationship between human beings and God. This paper investigates how Augustine’s line of argument in De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will) manages to hold against a modern criticism. The primary aim is to show why Augustine’s assumption that human beings have free will is inconsistent with his assumption that God has predestined all events of the world.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Minnesota, 1983. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [169]-179).

Thesis (doctoral)--University of Frankfurt am Main, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 227-241).

This thesis deals with the question of evil as privatio boni according to the teachings of Augustine of Hippo and the conception of evil in the work of Carl Gustav Jung who denied this Augustine's teachings. In the thesis I analyze attitudes that adopt both thinkers to categories of good and evil in relation to impacts of their conceptions on understanding of God, self-understanding of man, of his life, death and salvation, further of the relation of God and man and the human moral responsibility before God and society. Augustine maintains that evil is an absence of good, but Jung thinks that the reality is put together from the balance of good and evil. Their attitudes I scarify with the aid of the secondary literature and the explanation of that biblical places that both thinkers refer to.