This study involves an examination of Anglo-American relations between the years 1933 and 1938 through the policies of U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. It is based on the thesis that both of these foreign ministers believed strongly in the need to establish a "special relationship" between Great Britain and the United States as a means to counter the growing world economic and political crisis that developed during the 1930s, but that in spite of these sentiments, they failed in this effort. This work explores the reasons for this failure. / The study begins by noting the widespread expectation, following the 1932 election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, that the onset of a new American Administration under the leadership of Roosevelt and Hull would lead to closer transatlantic ties. It then goes on to explore Eden and Hull's efforts to establish a new economic and security relationship between the two powers through the workings of the World Economic Conference, the Geneva Disarmament Talks, the London Naval Conference, and the negotiation of an Anglo-American trade agreement. It then traces Eden and Hull's reaction to the outbreak of hostilities in Abyssinia, Spain and China, and notes how the increasing likelihood of a world war led to an intensification of their efforts to find a vehicle of cooperation. / The work then closes by examining the circumstances which led to Eden's resignation, and the successful negotiation of the Anglo-American Trade Agreement. In the latter case, however, it is argued that the trade agreement had little effect on the behavior of the fascist states, and hence proved ineffective as a means to stop the drift towards war. The study then concludes by reiterating the argument that both men shared in the belief that it was in their respective country's best interests to pursue closer transatlantic ties. It also concludes that they each carried certain idealistic notions about the benefits which might accrue from such a pursuit, as each felt that even the mere appearance of Anglo-American solidarity would give serious pause to the dictators and thus further advance the cause of peace. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

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Background: Exposure to perfluorooctane sulfonic acid (PFOS) or to perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) increases mouse and human peroxisome proliferator–activated receptor alpha (PPARα) subtype activity, which influences lipid metabolism. Because cholesterol is the substrate from which testosterone is synthesized, exposure to these substances has the potential to alter testosterone concentrations. Objectives: We explored associations of total testosterone and sex hormone–binding globulin (SHBG) concentrations at age 15 years with prenatal exposures to PFOS, PFOA, perfluorohexane sulfonic acid (PFHxS), and perfluoronanoic acid (PFNA) in females. Methods: Prenatal concentrations of the perfluoroalkyl acids (PFAAs) were measured in serum collected from pregnant mothers at enrollment (1991–1992) in the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC). The median gestational age when the maternal blood sample was obtained was 16 weeks (interquartile range, 11–28 weeks). Total testosterone and SHBG concentrations were measured in serum obtained from their daughters at 15 years of age. Associations between prenatal PFAAs concentrations and reproductive outcomes were estimated using linear regression models (n = 72). Results: Adjusted total testosterone concentrations were on average 0.18-nmol/L (95% CI: 0.01, 0.35) higher in daughters with prenatal PFOS in the upper concentration tertile compared with daughters with prenatal PFOS in the lower tertile. Adjusted total testosterone concentrations were also higher in daughters with prenatal concentrations of PFOA (β = 0.24; 95% CI: 0.05, 0.43) and PFHxS (β = 0.18; 95% CI: 0.00, 0.35) in the upper tertile compared with daughters with concentrations in the lower tertile. We did not find evidence of associations between PFNA and total testosterone or between any of the PFAAs and SHBG. Conclusions: Our findings were based on a small study sample and should be interpreted with caution. However, they suggest that prenatal exposure to some PFAAs may alter testosterone concentrations in females.

British influence on the diplomacy of WWII, as it relates to postwar planning, is underappreciated. This work explores how the use of astute tactical maneuvering allowed Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to impact the development of the post-war world in a greater degree than is typically portrayed in the narratives of the war. Detailing how the study of business negotiations can provide new insights into diplomatic history, Yalta exposes Britain’s impact on the creation of the post-war order through analyzing the diplomacy of WWII as a negotiation. To depict WWII post-war planning diplomacy as a negotiation means that the Yalta Conference of 1945 must be the focal point of said diplomacy with all the negotiations either flowing to or from the conference. This analysis reveals that Britain harnessed the natural momentum of the negotiation process to create bilateral understandings that protected or advanced their interests in ways that should not have been afforded the weakest party in the Grand Alliance. By pursuing solutions to the major wartime issues first and most stridently through the use of age-old British diplomatic tactics, they were able to enter into understandings with another member of the Grand Alliance prior to the tripartite conferences. Creating bilateral understandings with the Americans on the direction of military operations and the Soviets over the European settlement produced the conditions under which the tripartite negotiations transpired. Options available to the excluded party were thus limited, allowing for outcomes that aligned more favorably to British interests. A synthesis of diplomatic documents, diaries, and memoirs with historical writings as well as research on business and international negotiations brings to life the diplomatic encounters that led to the creation of the post-war order. To provide the reader a basis for analysis of wartime diplomacy, this work is broken down into two parts. Part I focuses on the strategies created for Yalta. Part II (future doctoral dissertation) will use these strategies to evaluate the performances of each party. Combined the two parts expose that British diplomatic maneuverings is an undervalued aspect of wartime diplomacy.