Aujourd’hui, le concept d’exclusion sociale est ambigu, voire banalisé, alors que le processus même affecte des millions d’individus. La plupart des études en sociologie et en politiques sociales dont il est l’objet s’adonnent principalement à une analyse de sa dimension matérielle (et objective). Malgré l’avancée et l’importance de ces études, il existe une dimension symbolique (et subjective) à nos yeux très partiellement explorée jusqu’alors, et qui permettrait de mieux appréhender le processus d’exclusion en termes relationnels. Notre travail se propose d’examiner avec précision cette dimension symbolique dont le contenu moral suggère que l’exclusion peut être conçue comme le signe d’une injustice et plus précisément le signe d’une situation de non-reconnaissance.Ainsi, en faisant appel aux réflexions du philosophe allemand Axel Honneth sur la notion de reconnaissance, et plus particulièrement sur les catégories définies comme étant de « non-reconnaissance », nous traçons de manière critique le chemin théorique qui conduit à une lecture de l’exclusion sociale à la lumière de l’approche honnethienne de la reconnaissance, c’est-à-dire, à une analyse de l’exclusion en termes de non-reconnaissance. En outre, notre travail vise à illustrer le lien entre exclusion sociale et reconnaissance à partir d’une étude de terrain basée sur 40 entretiens réalisés entre juin 2007 et mars 2009 à Bogotá en Colombie. Ceci nous permettra non seulement d’analyser le « caractère opératoire » de la reconnaissance, mais surtout de voir jusqu’à quel point la démarche entreprise favorise la découverte de nouvelles compréhensions du processus d’exclusion, compréhensions sans lesquelles une analyse « opératoire » resterait incomplète.La première partie de cette thèse offre un aperçu général des concepts d’exclusion et de reconnaissance selon l’idée qu’au sein de la dimension symbolique de l’exclusion se révèle un contenu moral que nous nous proposons d’examiner à partir de l’approche de la reconnaissance d’Axel Honneth. La deuxième partie s’attache à l’étude de ce contenu moral ainsi que des éléments qui permettent de faire une lecture de l’exclusion selon les travaux de Honneth. Cette lecture théorique est illustrée sur le terrain comme le montre la présentation de notre étude de cas à Bogotá. La troisième partie examine, à travers l’analyse des entretiens, dans quelle mesure le potentiel heuristique de l’approche honnethienne favorise la compréhension du processus d’exclusion sociale. / The concept of social exclusion might nowadays seem ambiguous and banal, but its underlying processes affect millions of people. The majority of studies in sociology and social policy about the topic mainly analyze its material (and objective) dimension. Despite the progress and importance of these studies, there is also a symbolic (and subjective) dimension to social exclusion – a dimension which has in our opinion only been partially explored and could help to grasp the processes of exclusion from a relational point of view. Our work attempts to examine this symbolic dimension, the moral content of which suggests that exclusion can be perceived as a sign of injustice and more precisely, as a sign of non-recognition.Based on the reflections of the German philosopher Axel Honneth on the notion of recognition, and more precisely on the categories defined as “non-recognition”, we critically draw the theoretical path towards understanding social exclusion in the light of the Honnethian approach to recognition, i.e. towards an analysis of exclusion in terms of non-recognition. Our work also aims to illustrate the link between social exclusion and recognition through a field study consisting of 40 interviews carried out between June 2007 and March 2009 in Bogotá, Colombia. This will not only allow us to analyze the “operational character” of recognition, but more still, to explore to what extent our approach fosters the discovery of new understandings of the process of exclusion, without which a merely “operational” analysis would remain incomplete.The first part of this thesis presents a general overview of the concepts of exclusion and recognition according to the idea that the symbolic dimension of exclusion reveals a moral content that we aim to examine through Axel Honneth’s approach. The second part focuses on examining this moral content as well as the elements that allow an analysis of exclusion following this approach. This analysis is both theoretical and practical as shown by our field study in Bogotá. Finally, the third part uses the interviews to explore to what extent the heuristical potential of the Honnethian approach helps understanding the process of social exclusion. / Hoy en día, aunque el concepto de exclusión social es ambiguo, al punto de parecer banal, el proceso al que está asociado afecta millones de personas. La mayoría de los estudios sociológicos y de políticas sociales sobre este proceso suelen hacer énfasis en una dimensión material (y objetiva). Sin embargo, pese a la importancia de estos estudios, existe también una dimensión simbólica (y subjetiva) la cual, desde nuestro punto de vista, no ha sido lo suficientemente explorada y permitiría una mejor comprensión del proceso de exclusión en términos relacionales. Nuestro trabajo busca examinar esta dimensión simbólica tomando en cuenta su contenido moral, el cual sugiere que la exclusión puede ser considerada como el signo de una injusticia, y más aún como el signo de una situación de no reconocimiento.De esta manera, tomando como base las reflexiones del filósofo alemán Axel Honneth sobre la noción de reconocimiento, y de manera más precisa las categorías de “no reconocimiento”, nuestro trabajo marca, con sentido crítico, las pautas del camino teórico que permiten une lectura más precisa de la exclusión social a la luz del estudio honnethiano del reconocimiento, o dicho de otra forma, releva con precisión el camino hacia un análisis de la exclusión social en términos de no reconocimiento. Además, nuestro trabajo busca ilustrar la relación entre exclusión social y reconocimiento por medio de un estudio de caso basado en 40 entrevistas realizadas entre junio de 2007 y marzo de 2009 en Bogotá (Colombia). Dicha ilustración nos permite no sólo analizar el “carácter operativo” del reconocimiento, sino también observar hasta qué punto nuestro trabajo facilita descubrir nuevas comprensiones sobre el proceso de exclusión sin las cuales el análisis “operativo” resulta incompleto.La primera parte presenta una visión global de los conceptos de exclusión y reconocimiento, según la cual la dimensión simbólica de la exclusión revela un contenido moral que proponemos examinar a partir del estudio de Honneth. La segunda parte está consagrada a estudiar dicho contenido moral, así como los elementos que hacen posible un análisis de la exclusión basado en los trabajos de Honneth. Se trata de un análisis teórico ilustrado gracias a un estudio de caso en Bogotá. La tercera parte examina, por medio de una serie de entrevistas, hasta dónde el potencial heurístico de la teoría de Honneth favorece la comprensión del proceso de exclusión social y su eventual atenuación para permitir un análisis más acertado de un fenómeno que requiere considerar su dimensión simbólica, poniendo de presente lo sugerido por el contenido moral que esta tesis expone.

What do we require from the labor market in order for it to contribute to a free life? And will the labor market of the future live up to what we expect from it? This study examines how a political philosophy of Hegelian inspiration helps us understand the conditions by which the labor market could be capable of providing for what Axel Honneth refers to as ’social freedom’. An analysis by French jurist Alain Supiot is presented as an informative example of this theoretical framework. Supiot develops a sophisticated critique of the deficiencies of the contemporary labor market, while simultaneously pointing at some professions whose function testify of the possibility of the labor market of generating social freedom under proper conditions. As such, I show that a critical framework of Hegelian inspiration is immensely potent as to its capacity of understanding what we require from the labor market at this time of history. Immensely potent, but perhaps insufficient. Indeed, by introducing the research of Aaron Benanav pertaining to the development of the global labor market, this study corroborates the critique of Honneth and Supiot—a critical framework already introduced by Karen Ng and Timo Jütten—concerning the possibilities of the labor market of providing social freedom at any significant scale and thus hints at the probable necessity of overcoming capitalism during the time to come.

Questions concerning children's rights and children's place in society have been on the agenda for some decades now. Parallell to this movement questions about children's place in the bible, in the church and in systematic theology have entered the academical conversation. This paper attempts to find a method to investigate whether systematic theology as we know it, has the tools to address these new questions. Axel Honneth's theory on recognition will be important, since the three levels of recognitions he describes are designed to point out the difference between rights and solidarity, between formal recognition and the recognition that sprouts from genuine intrest in shared experience.  The thougths from Honneth are combined with John Wall's argumentation on seeing the child as a full humna being, as a subject. Risto Saarinen's discussion on asymmetrical relations, adds an important perspective. From these three theories, a method is formulated for putting the child in focus on the theological agenda. The gain is not only the recognition of a neglected group, measured to one third of humankind. The new viewpiont shreds its light upon questions important to all of us. The method is a systematic theological tool both useful for pointing out inconsistencies and to suggest solutions to the very same problems.  In the final discussion I show how this could be done by adressing the children's place in the postmodern family project, described by Katarina Westerlund, and children as liturgical leaders with the help of Karin Rubensson's thesis.

本篇論文主要是以藏傳佛教的格魯派所詮釋的中觀應成派思想，來反思Axel Honneth批判理論。雖然兩者都共同關懷如何解決現實的痛苦，都努力提出一個能夠具體解決當前人類不滿的實踐方案，但由於兩者所辨認的痛苦成因有所差異，因此提出了不同的解決之道。本篇論文站在中觀應成派「二諦」的角度，認為Honneth所提出的批判理論並沒有正確地辨認出痛苦的根源「自性執」，而僅僅提出了「世俗諦」層次的解決方案，因而無法真正地對症下藥，從根源之處解決痛苦。 本篇論文企圖論證以下兩個命題：第一，我們必須正確地掌握「作為痛苦的根源的自性執」，如果不透過這個步驟，就沒有辦法根本地解決痛苦。進一步我們應該要了解到，Honneth批判理論本身也是自性空的，否則一個企圖解決痛苦的理論資源，本身反而就是增加痛苦根源的一部份。第二，由於「黑格爾左翼的批判理論」所提倡的「具體地提出具有交互主體性的解決痛苦的實踐方案」這個訴求是作為中觀應成派與批判理論的共同關懷，因此，我也企圖說明從「二諦」的觀點出發，並不會與這個基本關懷相衝突，如此一來，就能夠說明以中觀應成派的二諦作為分析基礎，是具有社會實踐的潛力的。 為了論證這兩個命題，本文的章節安排如下。首先，第一章作為導論，說明全篇文章的論證架構。第二章則說明Honneth所定位的批判理論，即「黑格爾左翼」及其重要的概念「內在超越」的意涵。這樣的方法論特別強調了「對當前的痛苦提出具體的實踐性解決方案」的訴求。在第三章中，我把焦點放在Honneth所提出的「為承認而鬥爭」的批判理論模型，主要的目的是概要出承認理論的根本命題。在第四章中，我會討論中觀應成派的幾個主要概念，即「所破」和「二諦」，希望透過這三個概念能夠概要出格魯派思想的核心，並以此為基礎來形成反省Honneth批判理論的基礎架構。第五章則具體地說明「Honneth承認理論各個概念的空性」。我將從中觀應成派的思想中，提取較為相關的討論來進行說明，包括了「『人』無自性」、「『行動與行動者』無自性」、「『貪欲與貪者』無自性」以及「『苦』無自性」等等討論，這些都是對應於Honneth承認理論的核心概念而來。第六章為結論，以前五章的討論為基礎，重新說明上述的兩個命題。 / In this thesis, I want to reflect Axel Honneth's critical theory through Tibetan Buddhism dGe Lugs pa, founded by Tsongkhapa in the fourteen century, who followed and expounded the thought of prAsaGgika-mAdhyamika. Both Honneth and dGe Lugs pa are focusing how to comfort people's suffering realistically and practically. However, by means of the thought of dGe Lugs pa, especially the view of two-truths, we could point out that Honneth's approach would fail to solve the problem causing people's suffering completely, because he did not recognize the real cause of the suffering. In the view of dGe Lugs pa, our suffering is resulted from the innate ignorance in our consciousness which grasps everything as existing truly and inherently. I want to prove two propositions in this thesis: in the first place, I argue that we can't really comfort our suffering completely unless we recognize the true cause of the suffering, the ignorance of seeing things inherently existing, and transform it rightly by means of understand that everything is empty of inherent existence without exception. I will reflect Honneth's critical theory and find that all essential concepts of his theory of recognition are empty of inherent existence. Secondly, I argue that if we rightly understand dGe Lugs pa's thought, we would not abandon the goal of practically resolving the problems causing people's suffering, which is the common interest of Axel Honneth and dGe Lugs pa. In order to prove these two propositions, I arrange the thesis into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction to the thesis's main arguments. The following two chapters focus on Honneth's critical theory: in chapter two I will illustrate the so called " left-Hegelianism", by this concept Honneth emphasis the critical theory which is directed to diagnosis the social pathology, and accordingly transform it practically through social praxis; the third chapter will elaborate the model of "struggle for recognition", which is founded by Honneth to revive the left-Hegelianism critical theory at the present time. In chapter four I will illustrate some essential concepts of dGe Lugs pa, including the concept of svabhAva, two-truths and bodhicitta. Through these illustrations I want to found the tool for pointing out the misrecognition of the cause of suffering in Honneth's critical theory, and explain the dGe Lugs pa's alternative solution to the problem causing people's suffering. In fifth chapter, some reasoning using for proving the emptiness of inherent existence will be expounded, the concepts which we want to show empty of inherent existence are: "I", persons, actor, act, suffering, the person who suffers, desirous one and the desire. These concepts are those essential for Honneth's critical theory. By means of understanding the emptiness of these concepts, we will understand those concepts Honneth used for constructing his theory are empty of inherent existence. In chapter six, the conclusion of this thesis, I will use the resources illustrated in above five chapters to restate the two propositions arguing in the introduction.