為了加入世界貿易組織，台灣早已自80年代逐步進行金融自由化的工作：早在1983年政府就擴大存放款利差，1984年允許銀行根據其個別情況制定基本放款利率並放寬本國銀行設立分行的家數與條件。然而金融自由化最重大的里程碑則是在1989年7月財政部修訂銀行法，開放新銀行設立並解除利率管制，自此之後台灣才真正成為金融自由化的國家。 本研究針對1986年到2002年的本國銀行，採用資料包絡分析法計算效率值，旨在探討台灣銀行業在開放新銀行設立前後的效率與生產力變動情形。不同於其他研究僅以年度為基礎來計算相對效率值，本研究使用「大邊界」的觀念建構出單一效率邊界，更能顯示出在一致的比較基礎上效率變動的趨勢。本研究的主要結果如下： 1.銀行業全體與開放前既存之舊銀行，在開放前的效率值均顯著大於開放後。至於開放後新舊銀行效率的比較，新銀行的整體技術效率與規模效率較高，舊銀行則在純技術效率上領先新銀行，但檢定結果僅有規模效率一項為顯著。 2.金控子銀行的效率值較非金控子銀行為高，顯示金控公司會挑選表現好的銀行作為合作夥伴。 3.在生產力分析部分，舊銀行開放後的總生產力仍小於開放前，儘管舊銀行在開放後的各項經營效率變動較開放前高，但因技術的大幅衰退以致整體生產力仍呈現衰退現象。顯示舊銀行雖然在效率上有所改善，但對於營運上的創新仍太過保守。 4.在Tobit迴歸分析的部分，股東權益報酬率、資產規模、流動準備率和效率值的關係為正向；分行家數、可控制費用、催收款比率和效率值的關係則為負向。 關鍵詞：銀行業、效率分析、資料包絡分析法、解除管制 / In order to join World Trade Organization, Taiwan has been gradually liberating its banking industry since 1980s. In 1983 Taiwan augmented the interest difference between loans and savings in banking industry. In 1984 Taiwan allowed a bank to set its own basic interest rate of loans base on business difference and reduced the restriction of setting up the new branches. The biggest leap was in 1989, Taiwan passed the new banking law which deregulated the banking industry. The new law opened the market for the new entrants and abandoned the interest regulation. The purpose of this research is to examine the efficiency and productivity changes before and after deregulation of Taiwan’s banking industry. This research applies Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach to measure efficiency scores. The data include most of the domestic banks in Taiwan from 1986 to 2002. Unlike other research use yearly basis to measure relative efficiency difference, this research constructs a single efficiency frontier, grand frontier, to measure the trends of efficiency changes. The major findings of this research as follows. 1. The statistical results of the full sample exhibit that the efficiency measures before deregulation are statistically significant greater than that of after deregulation. Although the new entrants exhibit higher efficiency scores in total technical efficiency and scale efficiency than incumbents after deregulation, however, only scale efficiency indicates statistically significant level. Incumbents exhibit a higher pure technical efficiency than the new entrants after deregulation. 2. Banks that joined the financial holding company exhibit higher efficient scores than those of do not join the financial holding company. 3. The total factor productivity denotes a regress after deregulation. The major factor of productivity regress is due to technology decrease. However, the efficiency change of incumbent banks exhibits a significant increase after deregulation. The finding suggests that although the incumbent banks have significant improvements in efficiency, they are still too conservative in innovations. 4. The Tobit regression suggests that return on equity (ROE), total assets, and current-reserve ratio have a positive effect on efficiency measures; however, the number of branches, controllable expenses, and bad debt ratio have a negative effect on efficiency measures. Keywords: Bank industry, Efficiency analysis, Data envelopment analysis, Deregulation

關於製造業其新產品的成功因素，國內外學者早已做過廣泛的研究，亦提出許多寶貴的結論與建議。反觀服務業創新成功因素這方面的研究，一直到1980年代後期，學者才開始對新型服務採用實證的方法來進行研究。而專門針對「服務業的創新成功因素」來探討的，則是一直到1991年才開始。 　　本論文主要探討在探討下列問題： 　　一、了解服務業業者如何衡量新型服務是否成功？其衡量的變數有那些？最主要的衡量指標又是什麼？ 　　二、經由文獻探討與個案訪談的結果，得知新型服務的成功關鍵因素為何？ 　　三、經由個案分析的結果，發展本研究之命題。 　　本研究係採用個案研究的方法，透過文獻整理與訪問四家銀行所得到的五個個案，歸納出的主要結論有： 　　一、衡量新型服務績效的方法中以「營業收入與市場佔有率的績效」最常為業者所使用，其次為「競爭性的績效」與「外溢效果」，至於「成本績效」的衡量，則較少為業者所使用。 　　二、「新型服務的開發過程」的各項活動的執行品質，對新型服務績效的影響甚鉅。因此，在推出新型服務時的業者應力求行銷、技術和上市的活動執行品質之提高。 　　三、「服務或專案的性質」這個構面來看，其主要的關鍵因素為服務的獨特性和優越性，其次為產品╱市場的配合。而在「服務的特性」這個構面中，只有服務的專業化是影響新型服務成功與否的關鍵因素。

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T21:00:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 4 Andre Alvares Leite Bucione - Turma 2006.pdf.jpg: 2508 bytes, checksum: a2f65c5af5b23551a4dc0fe1c3abcbd3 (MD5) Andre Alvares Leite Bucione - Turma 2006.pdf.txt: 52096 bytes, checksum: 449900717082efece5863c8e2fe88909 (MD5) license.txt: 4712 bytes, checksum: 4dea6f7333914d9740702a2deb2db217 (MD5) Andre Alvares Leite Bucione - Turma 2006.pdf: 168087 bytes, checksum: a635f49727d9a7e37d08060c75001c86 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-11T00:00:00Z / Top management from retail bank industry (PRINCIPAL) needs to delegate authority to lower level managers (AGENTS) under the existence of conflicting interests, asymmetric information and limited monitoring. A system of performance targets and incentives is adopted in order to induct those agents into principal’s interests. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the existence of a casual relationship between the so called “contract of guaranteed variable wage” and the performance of the lower level managers. It means, to investigate how the appliances of this implicit contract, which promote a substantial change in the direct incentive scheme, affect the performance delivered by those agents. We analyze, econometrically, data from jan.2007 to jun.2009 got from one of the largest Brazilian retail bank through an estimator of fixed effects for an unbalanced panel data. The results indicate that the agents subject to the contract of guaranteed variable wage have delivered an inferior performance compared to the agents subject to variable payment. We conclude, therefore, that problem of moral hazard can be observed on the behavior of the agents subject to this contract. / A alta gerência do banco de varejo (PRINCIPAL) necessita delegar autoridade a gerentes de níveis inferiores (AGENTES) sob a existência de interesses conflitantes, informações assimétricas e a impossibilidade de monitoração completa. Um sistema de metas e incentivos é adotado de modo a induzir estes agentes na direção dos interesses do principal. O objetivo deste trabalho é avaliar a relação causal existente entre o chamado 'contrato de salário variável garantido' e o desempenho dos agentes. Isto é, investigar de que forma a aplicação deste contrato implícito, que promove uma substancial mudança no sistema de incentivos diretos, afeta o desempenho destes agentes. Analisamos econometricamente dados de jan.2007 a jun.2009 obtidos junto a um grande banco de varejo nacional através de um estimador de efeitos fixos para um painel de dados não balanceado. Os resultados indicam que os agentes sujeitos ao contrato de salário variável garantido têm um desempenho inferior aos agentes sujeitos a remuneração variável. Concluímos que não podemos descartar existência do problema de risco moral no comportamento dos agentes sujeitos a este contrato.