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11	ESSAYS IN COORDINATION WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION BOSCO, DAVIDE 06 November 2020 (has links) Questa tesi si compone di due capitoli indipendenti, ciascuno dei quali analizza il ruolo giocato dall’informazione pubblica endogenamente determinata in situazioni caratterizzate da decision-making decentralizzato e da complementarietà strategica. Il primo capitolo analizza un regime-change game, in cui un governo autoritario può influenzare il consenso popolare attraverso l’implementazione di uno strumento di policy. A policy implementata, i cittadini possono tentare di destituire il governo in carica attraverso una rivolta popolare, la cui probabilità di successo è proporzionale al numero di partecipanti, quest’ultimo proporzionale al livello medio di malcontento. Per migliorare l’efficacia del policy-making, il governo necessita di informazioni affidabili sul consenso popolare, tipicamente difficili da reperire. Tali informazioni sono potenzialmente destabilizzanti, poiché aiutano i cittadini a coordinare meglio la loro azione collettiva. I risultati suggeriscono che maggiore trasparenza è desiderabile ex ante per quei regimi che, in equilibrio, hanno maggiore probabilità di implementare delle politiche di consensus-building. Maggiori livelli di libertà di informazione dovrebbero quindi essere osservati in regimi né troppo deboli, né troppo forti. Il secondo capitolo propone un modello di bank run, in cui la presenza di un mercato secondario efficiente dal punto di vista informativo destabilizza una istituzione a priori solida, tramutando uno shock temporaneo di liquidità in una spirale di fire-sales. Gli investitori di un fondo open-ended posso richiedere la liquidazione anticipata delle proprie quote dopo aver ricevuto informazioni private riguardo alla qualità degli asset in portafogli. Per rimborsare le quote, il fund manager vende una quota di asset sul mercato secondario. I potenziali acquirenti estraggono informazione dall’osservazione dell’offerta aggregata: maggiori volumi d’offerta corrispondono ad un maggior numero di investitori pessimisti, e suggeriscono quindi che gli asset potrebbero essere di scarsa qualità. Temendo una spirale discendente dei prezzi, anche gli investitori meno pessimisti sono indotti, ex ante, a liquidare le proprie quote, ulteriormente sostenendo il feedback negativo. Quando l’informazione privata è sufficientemente imprecisa, complementarietà strategica nelle azioni degli investitori del fondo emerge endogenamente. / This dissertation consists of two essays, aimed at providing a sound theoretical investigation of the signaling role of (observed) collective behavior in environments characterized by incomplete information and strategic complementarity. The effects of both endogenous signaling and (the disclosure of) exogenous public information on the degree of coordination failure that arises from decentralized decision-making are analyzed in-depth. In the first chapter I analyze a regime-change game, where an authoritarian government can influence popular support via the implementation of costly policies. Citizens can challenge the government via a riot, whose chances to succeed increase with the unknown average popular discontent. In order to fine-tune its policy-making, the regime needs reliable information about popular consensus. Such information, however, improves the ability of citizens to coordinate their revolt. I show that public information is ex ante beneficial for those regimes which are more likely to build consensus via policy-making in equilibrium. Higher levels of media freedom should therefore be observed in regimes that are neither too weak, nor too strong. In the second chapter I study a bank run model, where the informational efficiency of a (secondary) financial market pushes into insolvency an a priori solvent institution after a temporary, non-fundamental liquidity shock. The most pessimistic investors of an open-ended fund are allowed to ask for the early liquidation of their share after receiving private information about the economic fundamentals of the fund’s portfolio of assets. Some of the assets in portfolio are sold in the secondary market to meet those investors’ requests. Higher volumes of early redemptions decrease both the current price, via a standard law-of-demand effect, and the future price, by signaling bad news to the market. Anticipating such effect, less pessimistic investors, too, opt for early liquidation, thus further exacerbating the price spiral. Strategic complementarity arises endogenously when investors’ private information is sufficiently poor. In this case, a spiral of fire sales is observed in equilibrium. SECS-P/01: ECONOMIA POLITICA
12	存戶決策、銀行投資決策與系統性風險之分析張珮宸 Unknown Date (has links) 本文主要探討存戶決策對銀行投資組合決策之影響，及其可能引發之系統性風險的程度。以代表性銀行開始分析，假設銀行投資於安全性資產與風險性資產，而存戶依其決策可能會產生兩個均衡同時存在之情形。本文利用演化的力量，發展出以風險性資產報酬率作為均衡選擇之標準：當風險性資產報酬率低於某一水準時，擠兌的均衡會單獨發生。並比較銀行考慮擠兌發生可能性時，其投資組合承擔風險之程度，及可能引發的銀行倒閉機率大小。推廣至二家模型，發現愈多家銀行在作投資決策考慮存戶擠兌之可能性，愈會增加經濟體系中之系統性風險，顯示銀行與存戶之衝突與金融體系之脆弱性。最後討論資本適足性管制與央行最後貸款人角色能否有效降低銀行倒閉機率。銀行擠兌系統性風險演化穩定策略演化賽局 bank run systemic risk evolutionarily stable strategy evolutionary game
13	Estudo empírico do comportamento dos depósitos das instituições financeiras brasileiras durante a crise de 2008 Ogasavara, Deyse Kaori Numata January 2016 (has links) Submitted by Deyse Kaori Numata Ogasavara (deysekaori@gmail.com) on 2016-02-15T17:37:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 ESTUDO EMPÍRICO DO COMPORTAMENTO DOS DEPÓSITOS DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FINACEIRAS BRASILEIRAS DURANTE A CRISE DE 2008_2.pdf: 1935868 bytes, checksum: 1232d557853d5147456112654d62442e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2016-02-15T17:42:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 ESTUDO EMPÍRICO DO COMPORTAMENTO DOS DEPÓSITOS DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FINACEIRAS BRASILEIRAS DURANTE A CRISE DE 2008_2.pdf: 1935868 bytes, checksum: 1232d557853d5147456112654d62442e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-02-16T11:26:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ESTUDO EMPÍRICO DO COMPORTAMENTO DOS DEPÓSITOS DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FINACEIRAS BRASILEIRAS DURANTE A CRISE DE 2008_2.pdf: 1935868 bytes, checksum: 1232d557853d5147456112654d62442e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 / A motivação do trabalho surgiu dos efeitos causados pela crise imobiliária nos Estados Unidos em 2008, sendo a quebra do banco de investimento 'Lehman Brothers' o estopim para uma série de eventos. No Brasil, os efeitos foram diversos, o presente trabalho se aprofundou nos efeitos sobre as captações, analisando se houve uma corrida bancária dos pequenos e médios bancos para os grandes. Este estudo foi feito por meio da análise de quebra estrutural baseada nos testes OLS Cusum introduzido por Ploberger e Kramer (1992) e Teste F por Chow (1960), bem como por meio da análise de dados em painel, utilizando as metodologias de análise de cluster e o modelo de efeitos fixos. De um modo geral, os nossos resultados demonstram que efetivamente ocorreu uma transferência massiva de recursos dos pequenos e médios bancos para os grandes. / The main motivation has come with the global financial crisis in 2008, being the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers the start of a serial of events. In Brazil, there were many effects, it focused on the effect upon the funding sources, it was analyzed if there was a bank run from the small and middle banks to the major banks. This study was done by means of a structural break analysis based on OLS Cusum test introduced by Ploberger and Kramer (1992) and the F test by Chow (1960), as well as the panel data, making use of the cluster analysis and the fixed-effects model. In general, our results show that actually occurred a massive transfer of resources from small and middles banks to the large ones. Corrida bancária Dados em painel Quebra estrutural Crisis Bank run Structural break Panel data Economia Crise financeira global, 2008-2009 Bancos - Brasil Administração bancária Depósitos bancários Análise de painel
14	Essais sur la liquidité bancaire : contributions à la mesure du risque de liquidité et à la gestion de la production de liquidité bancaire / Essays on bank liquidity : contributions to the measurement of liquidity risk and to the management of bank liquidity production Soula, Jean-Loup 28 November 2017 (has links) Le risque de liquidité des banques reflète leur fonction de création de liquidité. Ces institutions sont fragiles par nature, exposées à la menace de ruées des créanciers de court terme. La thèse contribue par plusieurs aspects à une meilleure compréhension du risque de liquidité. Le deuxième chapitre propose une mesure de la fragilité bancaire basée sur la valeur des actifs détenus. Les résultats confirment de manière originale le caractère fragile des banques. La fonction de production de liquidité bancaire est toutefois bénéfique pour l’économie. Le troisième chapitre propose une analyse de la capacité des banques à produire de la liquidité en lien avec leurs choix d’activité et leur business model. La production d’information dans le cadre d’un modèle relationnel et la capacité à bénéficier de synergies informationnelles entre segments d’activité apparaissent comme déterminant l’efficacité de la production de liquidité bancaire. Néanmoins, l’exposition excessive des banques au risque de liquidité est à l’origine des crises. Le quatrième chapitre évalue l’exposition des banques au risque de liquidité en fonction de l’évolution des conditions générales de liquidité. Les résultats soulignent l’impact différencié des chocs de liquidité sur le risque supporté par les banques. / Bank liquidity risk reflects the function of banks to create liquidity. Banks are fragile, exposed to the possibility of runs from short-term creditors. This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of bank liquidity risk. The second chapter proposes a measure of bank fragility based on the value of the assets held by a bank. Results confirm, in an original way, the fragile nature of banks. However, bank liquidity creation benefits to the economy. The third chapter analyses the capacity of banks to produce liquidity in conjunction with their choices in terms of activity and business model. Determinants of the efficiency to produce liquidity appear to be the bank capacity to produce information through a relationship-oriented business model and to benefit from informational synergies through the activity mix. Nevertheless, excessive exposition of banks to liquidity risk results in bank liquidity crises. The fourth chapter investigates bank exposition to liquidity risk depending on the evolution of aggregate liquidity conditions. Results underline the heterogenous effect of liquidity shocks on the risk borne by banks. Risque de liquidité Création de liquidité Ruée bancaire Crise de liquidité Modèle de business Liquidity risk Liquidity creation Bank run Liquidity crisis Business model 332.1
15	Cash is [no longer] king: is an e-krona the answer? : - a de lege ferenda investigation of the Swedish Riksbank's issuing mandate and other legal callenges in relation to economic effects on the payment market Imamovic, Arnela January 2019 (has links) For the past decades, the Swedish public’s payment habits have changed, where the majority of the public has abandoned the old way of making payments, using cash, and instead opted for more modern payment solutions, digital money. The difference between cash and digital money is that cash is physical and only issued by the Riksbank, whereas digital money is created by and stored on accounts at commercial banks. The question of what role the state should have on the payment market is an important point of discussion. But it is not categorically a new question; the Swedish government is tackling essentially the same problem today as it has been doing many times before. Today’s problem is to some extent however manifested in a different way. During the 20th century, discussions were held whether or not the Riksbank should have the exclusive right to issue banknotes. It was considered unnecessary, inappropriate and dangerous. The idea that the Riksbank could cover the entire economy’s need for banknotes was, according to the commercial banks, unreasonable. Nonetheless, in 1904 the exclusive right became fait accompli; the government intervened and gave the Riksbank the banknote monopoly. We are now finding ourselves facing a similar situation, where there is a difference of opinion regarding the Riksbank’s role on the payment market. It is therefore nothing new, but rather an expected task for the government, and thus the central bank, to analyze major changes and draw conclusions from them. The problem is essentially about cash being phased out by digital means of payment. In order to therefore solve the problem, the Riksbank has started a project to investigate whether or not the Riksbank should issue digital cash to the Swedish public, what the Riksbank calls an e-krona. To introduce an e-krona would be a major step, but for the public to not have access to a government alternative, seeing as cash usage is declining, is also a major step. No decision has been made yet regarding whether the e-krona will be introduced on the market or not. A decision that however has been made, is that the Riksbank is now working on building an e-krona to develop and assess the technique. Nonetheless, an introduction would undoubtedly have consequences for both the Riksbank and the commercial banks, which ultimately means it would have effects on the economy as a whole. What about regulatory aspects; is the Riksbank even allowed to issue an e-krona under current legislation? The answer is affirmative, to a certain extent. There are furthermore many other uncertainties regarding how an e-krona would affect the economy; the Riksbank does not fully answer many of the system issues in its project reports. The question of whether or not it even is up to the Riksbank to make a decision on the matter of an introduction is also questioned by the author in the thesis. E-crown e-crown project central bank digital currency money cash banknotes and coins physical money tangibles currency legal tender the Swedish Riksbank Act commercial bank money digital money the Swedish Riksbank central bank commercial bank bank banking law law jurisprudence monetary policy safe and efficient payment system cash-provision economy the payment system digitalization development of society fractional reserve banking bank run zero lower bound E-krona e-kronaprojekt digital centralbankspeng pengar kontanter sedlar och mynt fysiska pengar valuta lagliga betalningsmedel affärsbankspengar digitala pengar Riksbanken centralbank affärsbank bank bankrätt juridik Lag (1988:1385) om Sveriges riksbank penningpolitik säkert och effektivt betalningsväsende kontantförsörjning ekonomi betalningssystemet digitalisering samhällsutveckling fractional reserve banking bankrusning zero lower bound Law and Society Juridik och samhälle

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