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The duty of loyalty of a member of a business company This thesis deals with the topic closely connected with the field of corporate governance which is a part of corporate law. According to the American legal theory is duty of loyalty one of the fiduciary duties. The traditional classification of fiduciary duties is based on dualism - duty of loyalty and duty of care. But this concept is changing over time mainly due to case law. There is no settled opinion on the basic question how many fiduciary duties there are. Current opinion of the respected authority in this field - Delaware' Supreme Court is based on dualism of fiduciary duties, but not in the traditional meaning. The duty of loyalty includes according to the opinion of the judges not only conflicts of interests and self-dealing situations, but breach of good faith as well. On the other hand the traditional point of view was settled on two fiduciary duties - loyalty and care as well. Duty of loyalty was connected with conflicts of interest situations between principal and agent, when the personal financial interest of the agent was present. Duty of loyalty protected the legal position of the principal when agent managed entrusted property. The duty of care was connected with the interest of the principal and due performance of the agent with the...

O estudo da responsabilidade civil dos administradores de companhias abertas na doutrina nacional trata usualmente dos deveres fiduciários, do ato regular de gestão e da teoria ultra vires, da culpa ou dolo do administrador, das ações ut universi e ut singuli e da solidariedade entre a responsabilidade do administrador e a da companhia. Poucos abordam as causas extintivas dessa responsabilidade, e raro são os que tratam da hipótese de exclusão de responsabilidade do artigo 159, § 6º, da Lei nº 6.404/76. Como a disciplina dos deveres fiduciários prevista na lei societária brasileira tem forte influência do Direito norte-americano, buscou-se na legislação, doutrina e jurisprudência daquele país os fundamentos necessários à melhor interpretação e aplicação da regra de exclusão e, em especial, na business judgment rule, doutrina que protege os administradores contra responsabilização por prejuízos à companhia decorrentes de decisões por eles adotadas, proteção esta também conferida pela hipótese do artigo 159, § 6º, da Lei nº 6.404/76, ao administrador leal e de boa-fé. / The study of corporate directors civil liability in national doctrine usually deals with fiduciaries duties, regular management act and the ultra vires theory, directors malpractice or deceit, ut universi and ut singuli actions and solidarity between directors and companies responsibility. Few address the extinctive causes of such liability, and rare are those who address the liability exclusion hypothesis of the Article 159, § 6º, of the Law n. 6.404/76. Whereas that the fiduciary duties discipline provided for in Brazilian corporate law has strong influence of American law, was sought in the legislation, doctrine and jurisprudence of that country the fundamentals for a better understanding and application of the exclusion rule and, particularly, in the business judgment rule, a doctrine that protects directors against liability for damages to the company arising from their acts, protection also afforded by the Article 159, § 6º, of the Law n. 6.404/76, to the loyal and good faith director.

La première source de la business judgment rule a été la jurisprudence. Celle-ci a été la source des codifications incitatives et contraignantes. Nos recherches ont mis en évidence deux types de formulations de la business judgment rule. Le premier type est la formulation prétorienne lato sensu et stricto sensu. Le second type est la formulation codifiée (Model Business Corporation Act, Corporate Director's Guidebook, Principles of Corporate Governance, lois limitant la responsabilité personnelle des dirigeants). De plus, nos recherches ont dégagé 9 types de termes qui se retrouvent dans tous les types des formulations. Les 4 premiers types de termes correspondent respectivement (1) aux pouvoirs des dirigeants et à leur discrétion, (2) au statut des dirigeants, (3) aux devoirs des dirigeants, (4) aux degrés de devoirs requis et à la gravité de la transgression de ces devoirs sanctionnée (standard of conduct). Les cinq types de termes suivants correspondent respectivement (1) au droit à l'erreur, (2) à la présomption de comportement/conduite, (3) au refus d'un contrôle judiciaire, (4) à la charge de la preuve, (5) à la justification de la business judgment rule (standard of revision). Les deux différences fondamentales entre les formulations de la business judgment rule sont les suivantes. La première différence se situe au niveau des conditions d'application de la règle et concerne la relation entre le standard de conduite, c'est-à-dire le type des devoirs, le degré des devoirs et la gravité de la transgression des devoirs, et le standard de responsabilité, c'est-à-dire les devoirs examinés quand la business judgment rule s'applique. La seconde différence fondamentale entre les formulations se situe au niveau des effets de la règle et concerne l'étendue d'un contrôle judiciaire sur le résultat de l'action ou de l'omission des dirigeants, c'est-à-dire le prix grossièrement inadéquat, l'abus de discrétion, le dépassement grossier, etc. / The first source of the « business judgment rule » is the jurisprudence. The jurisprudence was the source of the « soft law » and « hard law » codifications. The research showed two types of formulations of the « business judgment rule ». The first type is the jurisprudence formulation lato sensu_and stricto sensu. The second type is the codification formulation (Mode) Business Corporation Act, Corporate Director's Guidebook, Principles of Corporate Governance, lois limitant la responsabilité personnelle des dirigeants). The research showed nine types of terms which may be found in the formulations of the « business judgment rule». The first four terms correspond respectively to (1) the powers of the governors of the corporation and their discretion ; (2) their status ; (3) their duties, and (4) the degree of their duties. This first type of terms constitutes the standard of conduct. The next five types of terms correspond respectively to (1) the right to the error; (2) the presumption of the conduct; (3) the refusal of judicial review; (4) the burden of proof; (5) the justification of the « business judgment rule ». This second type of terms constitutes the standard of revision. There are two fundamental differences between the formulations of the « business judgment rule ». The first difference is situated at the level of the conditions of application of the « business judgment rule », and concerns the relations between the standard of conduct and the standard of revision. The second difference is situated at the level of the effects of the « business judgment rule » and concerns the scope of judicial review.

O estudo da responsabilidade civil dos administradores de companhias abertas na doutrina nacional trata usualmente dos deveres fiduciários, do ato regular de gestão e da teoria ultra vires, da culpa ou dolo do administrador, das ações ut universi e ut singuli e da solidariedade entre a responsabilidade do administrador e a da companhia. Poucos abordam as causas extintivas dessa responsabilidade, e raro são os que tratam da hipótese de exclusão de responsabilidade do artigo 159, § 6º, da Lei nº 6.404/76. Como a disciplina dos deveres fiduciários prevista na lei societária brasileira tem forte influência do Direito norte-americano, buscou-se na legislação, doutrina e jurisprudência daquele país os fundamentos necessários à melhor interpretação e aplicação da regra de exclusão e, em especial, na business judgment rule, doutrina que protege os administradores contra responsabilização por prejuízos à companhia decorrentes de decisões por eles adotadas, proteção esta também conferida pela hipótese do artigo 159, § 6º, da Lei nº 6.404/76, ao administrador leal e de boa-fé. / The study of corporate directors civil liability in national doctrine usually deals with fiduciaries duties, regular management act and the ultra vires theory, directors malpractice or deceit, ut universi and ut singuli actions and solidarity between directors and companies responsibility. Few address the extinctive causes of such liability, and rare are those who address the liability exclusion hypothesis of the Article 159, § 6º, of the Law n. 6.404/76. Whereas that the fiduciary duties discipline provided for in Brazilian corporate law has strong influence of American law, was sought in the legislation, doctrine and jurisprudence of that country the fundamentals for a better understanding and application of the exclusion rule and, particularly, in the business judgment rule, a doctrine that protects directors against liability for damages to the company arising from their acts, protection also afforded by the Article 159, § 6º, of the Law n. 6.404/76, to the loyal and good faith director.

Magister Legum - LLM / The so called business judgment rule (hereinafter referred to as ―the BJR or the rule‖) that serves to protect directors from liability for negative consequences of honest, reasonable business decisions that went wrong, was developed by the American judiciary in the early 19th Century.2 Percy v. Millaudon, a Louisiana Supreme Court decision quoted above, articulated what is now referred to as the BJR.3 This case provides the earliest expression of the American BJR.4 Delaware courts subsequently issued a series of cases formulating the BJR as a presumption.5 Although the earliest expression of the rule was provided by a Louisiana court, the dissertation will focus on the Delaware case law formulation of the rule.6 The essence of the BJR is that judges should not second guess directors‘ decisions if certain elements of the BJR are fulfilled.7 Courts are required to exercise caution when dealing with claims brought by either stakeholders or shareholders against directors who have made bona fide, also referred to as good faith, business decisions.8 In order to be protected by the BJR and for it to act as a safe harbour, the court will determine whether certain requirements have been met before applying the rule.9 The Delaware courts formulated the BJR as a presumption and in order for directors to be protected by the rule they must have made an informed business decision, in good faith and in the honest belief that the decision will be in the best interest of the company.10 As will be discussed later, this formulation of the rule is referred to as the traditional BJR. In addition to the aforementioned formulation, another formulation was provided by the American Law Institute (hereafter referred to as the ―ALI formulation‖).11 Initially there had been difficulties codifying the ALI version of the rule but later it was successfully codified in paragraph 4.01(c) of the ALI Corporate Governance Project.12 This formulation requires a director to ensure that he has no personal interest in the matter, he is reasonably informed of the matter prior to making the decision and he rationally believes the decision will be in the best interest of the company.13 If the director complies with the aforementioned requirements, the director will be considered to have acted in good faith.14 Directors owe fiduciary duties to the company and in instances where they breach one or more of these duties they can incur personal liability.15 The rule thus emerged because of the need to protect directors and it serves as a safe harbour for those individuals who made a decision in conformity with the aforementioned requirements.16 In commercial terms the rule bestows economic freedoms and freedom of entrepreneurship to directors guided, in any case, by ―the best interest of the company‖.17 The most commonly cited reasons for the existence of the rule are that it promotes risk taking, encourages competent persons to serve as directors, prevents judicial second-guessing and promotes judicial efficiency. It further provides directors with sufficient freedom to manage the company and it ensures that the interest of shareholders and those of directors are balanced.18

IN ENGLISH The purpose of this paper is to analyse all segments of the duty of due managerial care of member of an elective body of a limited company and propose de lege ferenda approach to segments of the duty. Another goal of this master's thesis was to examine new business judgment rule and present an alternative British model of the rule. To provide a comparative approach the paper utilizes the British company law approach. The first chapter introduces the origin of the duty of due managerial care, in particular its roots in Roman law and Austrian civil code. The second chapter is divided into five subchapters. The first subchapter highlights the recent changes to the duty of due managerial care after recodification of private law. The second subchapter examines duty of care as one of two integral parts of the duty of due managerial care. Firstly, it analyzes the quality of care expected of directors. Secondly, it focuses on the test for determination of necessary standard of care. Thirdly, following a critical examination of the test for determination of a standard of care, the paper suggests de lege ferenda test of due care. Finally, the first subchapter considers the British duty of care, skill and diligence. The third subchapter covers the duty of loyalty including duties derived from it...

Le présent mémoire analyse les dispositions sur l'arrangement ou compromis avec actionnaires prévues aux articles 192 de la Loi canadienne sur les sociétés par actions et 49 de la Loi sur les compagnies du Québec. Dans un premier temps, l'étude de la genèse des dispositions sur l'arrangement dans les lois canadiennes fait ressortir que ces dispositions ont une origine commune et qu'elles partagent une même philosophie, caractérisée par une dualité entre la permissivité des transactions et la protection des épargnants. L'étude des fondements juridiques des mécanismes prévus dans la loi fédérale et provinciale permet ensuite de réaliser que, alors qu'à l'origine, la disposition québécoise était en quelque sorte le calque de la disposition fédérale, cette dernière a été modifiée postérieurement à la réforme de la loi fédérale, de sorte que plusieurs différences distinguent aujourd'hui ces deux lois au chapitre de l'arrangement. Dans un contexte où des démarches ont été entamées afin de réformer la loi provinciale, la question à laquelle ce mémoire tente de répondre peut se poser en ces termes: La « nouvelle disposition» d'arrangement adoptée par le législateur fédéral rencontre-t-elle mieux les objectifs de permissivité des transactions et de protection des épargnants que la disposition québécoise qui, pour sa part, est demeurée pratiquement inchangée depuis son adoption? L'étude parallèle de ces dispositions permet de constater que la «nouvelle disposition» d'arrangement de la L.c.s.a. semble davantage rencontrer ces objectifs. / This thesis studies the arrangement procedure under section 192 of the Canada business corporations Act and the arrangement or compromise with shareholders procedure under section 49 of the Quebec's Companies Act. At the very beginning of this work, the study of the history of the arrangement procedure and its arrival in the canadian laws demonstrates that these provisions have a common origin and that they share the same philosophy, caracterized by a duality between the permissiveness of the transactions and the protection of investors. This history of this mechanism also emphasizes that, despite the fact that the provincial provisions were at the beginning a copy of the federal provisions, we find several differences between them today. In a context in which the legislator has already taken some steps in order to reform the Quebec's Company Act, this thesis endeavours to answer the following question: Does the "new arrangement procedure" under section 192 of the Canada business corporations Act meets the objectives of permissiveness and protection better than the arrangement procedure under section 49 of the Quebec's Companies Act, which has remained practically unchanged since its adoption? The comparison between the two arrangement procedures suggests an affirmative answer to this question.

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This diploma thesis deals with the regulation of the duty of due managerial care of members of a governing body of a limited company. The aim is to evaluate Czech national law with respect to the relevant British law rules. Another objective is to propose de lege ferenda amendments to current state of law. The thesis is divided into three chapters The first chapter defines the duty of due managerial care and the content of duties imposed on members of a governing body of a company in Great Britain. Judicial decisions of both jurisdictions reveal that directors are not expected to have a knowledge possessed by a specialist. However, good general knowledge is required. Subsequently, the dual objective / subjective standard is introduced. Lord Hoffmann borrowed the test set by the Insolvency Act 1986 and stated that such a test should not just apply during insolvency. The second chapter is dedicated to fiduciary duties and the position of duty of loyalty within the scope of due managerial care. The aim is to present the subjective test covering acts exercised to promote the success of a company. The standard rests upon the idea that directors must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they consider, not what the court may consider, is in the interest of the company. Another field of interest is...