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Bakgrund: Under de senaste två åren så har svenska Private Equity-bolag ökat sina investeringar signifikant. Enkelheten i att anskaffa kapital, såväl som billig skuldsättningsgrad har lett till en ökad aktivitet från PE-bolagen genom uppköp av marknadsledande bolag med starkt kassaflöde. Konkurrensen för attraktiva företag som är till salu har ökat nämnvärt, vilket i sin tur har lett till prisökningar på de utsatta bolagen. De högre värderingarna från PE-bolagen påverkar också antalet börsintroduktioner på Stockholmsbörsen. Ett skäl för de allt färre börsintroduktioner kommer av att bolagen har blivit högre värderade av PE-bolagen jämförelsevis med en värdet av en börsintroduktion. Syfte: Avsikten med denna uppsats är att, från aktieägarens synvinkel, analysera och beskriva de olika skäl som finns för att gör en börsintroduktion istället för att sälja till ett PE-bolag. Metod: Undersökningen är baserad på att samla och förstå information gällande specifika personers val och motiv med ett kvalitativt synsätt. Urvalet från undersökningen innehåller alla företag som har genomfört en börsintroduktion på Stockholmsbörsen mellan 1 januari 2005 och 1 april 2006. Intervjuerna har genomförts med varje styrelseordförande, i och med att författarna tror att dessa företrädare är de bästa representanterna för aktieägarna. De personer som lät sig intervjuas fick tala fritt, även om de större frågorna var tvungna att följas i kronologisk ordning. Slutsats: Alla motiv för att genomföra en börsintroduktion kunde ha uppfyllts genom att sälja till ett PE-bolag, förutom motivet om att uppnå likviditet i aktierna. Ett av de attraktiva motiven för likviditet i aktier är att aktieägarna kan välja mellan att minska ägandet, öka ägandet eller bibehålla de nuvarande aktierna. Ett annat attraktivt skäl är att finansiella institutioner normalt ansluter sig som aktieägare, vilket i sin tur ökar trovärdigheten av företaget. Åtta av det tio företagen hade parallella planer längs med arbetet med börsintroduktionen. De flesta av bolagen hade i åtanke att sälja till ett PE-bolag vid eventuellt gynnsamt bud. Dock fanns det inga PE-bolag som bjöd ett tillräckligt bra pris för de individuella bolagen. Antingen så erhöll de dåvarande ägarna ett bättre pris från börsintroduktionen, eller så trodde de återstående ägarna på att börsen i framtiden skulle prestera bättre än PE-bolagens bud. Enligt teorierna har buy-outs fler fördelar jämförelsevis med börsintroduktioner, men de empiriska undersökningarna visar att de två alternativen var likvärdiga. Den enda fördelen med en eventuell buy-out var att det skulle begära mindre eller samma arbetsbelastning i termer av förberedelser. Dock så ansågs en börsintroduktion vara dyr såväl som att den tar energi och fokus från ledningen. / Background: During the last two years, Swedish Private Equity (PE) companies have increased their investments significantly. Easy access to capital, as well as inexpensive leverage, has led to an increase in activity of PE buy-outs of market leaders with strong cash flow. The competition for objects that are for sale has amplified, which has resulted in price increases of the objects. The higher prices offered by the PE companies also affects the number of initial public offerings (IPO) on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. One reason for the small number of current IPOs is that the objects simply have been valued higher by PE companies than they would do in an IPO. Purpose: The purpose with this thesis is, from a shareholder’s point of view, to analyze and describe the reasons of making an IPO instead of selling to a PE company. Methodology: Since the research is based on gathering and understanding information regarding specific persons’ choices and motives, a qualitative approach has been conducted. The research sample contains of all companies that made an IPO on the Stockholm Stock Exchange between 1 January 2005 and 1 April 2006. Interviews have been made with each company’s Chairman of the Board of Directors, since the authors believe that these individuals are the ultimate shareholder rep-resentatives. The interviewees were allowed to speak freely, even though the major questions had to be followed in a chronological order. Conclusion: All the main motives of the IPO could have been achieved by selling to PE company, except the motive of attaining share liquidity. One of the attractive reasons for share liquidity is that shareholders easily can choose between reducing ownership, increasing ownership or remain with existing shares. Another attractive reason is that financial institutions normally become share-holders, which in turn increases the credibility of the company. Eight out of the ten companies had parallel plans to the IPO; most of them including a possible PE buy-out scenario. However, no PE company offered a price high enough for the individual companies. Either the existing owners received a better IPO price, or the remaining owners believed that the stock exchange would out-perform the PE price offers in the long-run. Theory means that buy-out has got its advantages compared to IPO, but the empirical findings show that the alternatives were on the contrary quite similar. The single advantage with a possible buy-out was that it would demand less, or at most equal, work load in terms of preparation before the sale. However, the negative part with the IPO was that it was considered expensive as well as it took energy and distraction of focus it took from the management team.

<p>Bakgrund: Under de senaste två åren så har svenska Private Equity-bolag ökat sina investeringar signifikant. Enkelheten i att anskaffa kapital, såväl som billig skuldsättningsgrad har lett till en ökad aktivitet från PE-bolagen genom uppköp av marknadsledande bolag med starkt kassaflöde. Konkurrensen för attraktiva företag som är till salu har ökat nämnvärt, vilket i sin tur har lett till prisökningar på de utsatta bolagen. De högre värderingarna från PE-bolagen påverkar också antalet börsintroduktioner på Stockholmsbörsen. Ett skäl för de allt färre börsintroduktioner kommer av att bolagen har blivit högre värderade av PE-bolagen jämförelsevis med en värdet av en börsintroduktion.</p><p>Syfte: Avsikten med denna uppsats är att, från aktieägarens synvinkel, analysera och beskriva de olika skäl som finns för att gör en börsintroduktion istället för att sälja till ett PE-bolag.</p><p>Metod: Undersökningen är baserad på att samla och förstå information gällande specifika personers val och motiv med ett kvalitativt synsätt. Urvalet från undersökningen innehåller alla företag som har genomfört en börsintroduktion på Stockholmsbörsen mellan 1 januari 2005 och 1 april 2006. Intervjuerna har genomförts med varje styrelseordförande, i och med att författarna tror att dessa företrädare är de bästa representanterna för aktieägarna. De personer som lät sig intervjuas fick tala fritt, även om de större frågorna var tvungna att följas i kronologisk ordning.</p><p>Slutsats: Alla motiv för att genomföra en börsintroduktion kunde ha uppfyllts genom att sälja till ett PE-bolag, förutom motivet om att uppnå likviditet i aktierna. Ett av de attraktiva motiven för likviditet i aktier är att aktieägarna kan välja mellan att minska ägandet, öka ägandet eller bibehålla de nuvarande aktierna. Ett annat attraktivt skäl är att finansiella institutioner normalt ansluter sig som aktieägare, vilket i sin tur ökar trovärdigheten av företaget. Åtta av det tio företagen hade parallella planer längs med arbetet med börsintroduktionen. De flesta av bolagen hade i åtanke att sälja till ett PE-bolag vid eventuellt gynnsamt bud. Dock fanns det inga PE-bolag som bjöd ett tillräckligt bra pris för de individuella bolagen. Antingen så erhöll de dåvarande ägarna ett bättre pris från börsintroduktionen, eller så trodde de återstående ägarna på att börsen i framtiden skulle prestera bättre än PE-bolagens bud. Enligt teorierna har buy-outs fler fördelar jämförelsevis med börsintroduktioner, men de empiriska undersökningarna visar att de två alternativen var likvärdiga. Den enda fördelen med en eventuell buy-out var att det skulle begära mindre eller samma arbetsbelastning i termer av förberedelser. Dock så ansågs en börsintroduktion vara dyr såväl som att den tar energi och fokus från ledningen.</p> / <p>Background: During the last two years, Swedish Private Equity (PE) companies have increased their investments significantly. Easy access to capital, as well as inexpensive leverage, has led to an increase in activity of PE buy-outs of market leaders with strong cash flow. The competition for objects that are for sale has amplified, which has resulted in price increases of the objects. The higher prices offered by the PE companies also affects the number of initial public offerings (IPO) on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. One reason for the small number of current IPOs is that the objects simply have been valued higher by PE companies than they would do in an IPO.</p><p>Purpose: The purpose with this thesis is, from a shareholder’s point of view, to analyze and describe the reasons of making an IPO instead of selling to a PE company.</p><p>Methodology: Since the research is based on gathering and understanding information regarding specific persons’ choices and motives, a qualitative approach has been conducted. The research sample contains of all companies that made an IPO on the Stockholm Stock Exchange between 1 January 2005 and 1 April 2006. Interviews have been made with each company’s Chairman of the Board of Directors, since the authors believe that these individuals are the ultimate shareholder rep-resentatives. The interviewees were allowed to speak freely, even though the major questions had to be followed in a chronological order.</p><p>Conclusion: All the main motives of the IPO could have been achieved by selling to PE company, except the motive of attaining share liquidity. One of the attractive reasons for share liquidity is that shareholders easily can choose between reducing ownership, increasing ownership or remain with existing shares. Another attractive reason is that financial institutions normally become share-holders, which in turn increases the credibility of the company. Eight out of the ten companies had parallel plans to the IPO; most of them including a possible PE buy-out scenario. However, no PE company offered a price high enough for the individual companies. Either the existing owners received a better IPO price, or the remaining owners believed that the stock exchange would out-perform the PE price offers in the long-run. Theory means that buy-out has got its advantages compared to IPO, but the empirical findings show that the alternatives were on the contrary quite similar. The single advantage with a possible buy-out was that it would demand less, or at most equal, work load in terms of preparation before the sale. However, the negative part with the IPO was that it was considered expensive as well as it took energy and distraction of focus it took from the management team.</p>

Diploma thesis aims to describe the current state of the Private Equity financing in the Czech Republic. This issue is viewed from two angles. The first part is devoted to macro-economic assessment of the current state of Private Equity in the Czech Republic. It aims to describe the current situation, compare it to economies with a developed private equity market and to draw recommendations that will lead to further development of private equity in our country. The focus of the second part is to characterize the Private Equity market from a microeconomic perspective. It aims to describe the functioning of the Private Equity market at the level of individual entities, the business model and analyze and compare the investment strategies of General Partners operating in the Czech Republic.

Main interest of this diploma thesis is a transaction known as leveraged acquisition. The goal is to provide detailed overview of these transactions starting from history and development of leveraged acquisitions, key market participants, acquisition financing, leveraged acquisition market and its current trends and analysis of a fictional transaction using advanced financial model. Due to the limited extent of the thesis not all aspects of debt financing and modeling could have been covered in the text.

L'objectif de cette thèse est d'étudier la nature de la collaboration productive entre capital investisseur et dirigeant-propriétaire dans le cadre d'une opération OBO et son influence sur la création de valeur à travers l'identification des leviers et mécanismes organisationnels de création de valeur. Pour ce faire, nous avons opté pour une méthodologie mixte. Dans un premier temps, en observant les pratiques managériales de 42 investisseurs en private equity, nous avons cherché à identifier les critères mobilisés par les investisseurs financiers spécialisés en vue de réduire l'asymétrie informationnelle dans la phase de pré-investissement. Grâce à une analyse typologique, nos résultats ont montré que les critères de présélection de la cible à un OBO doivent faire l'objet d'une différenciation en fonction des profils-types des groupes d'investisseurs identifiés (les financiers et les stratèges). La différence entre les deux classes est d'ordre cognitif et concerne essentiellement la perception qu'ont les investisseurs des enjeux stratégiques d'une opération OBO. Dans un deuxième temps, grâce à des entretiens semi-directifs auprès de 17 capital-investisseurs, nous avons cherché à mettre en exergue les leviers et mécanismes organisationnels à l'origine du processus de création de valeur. Notre étude a montré que les modalités liées à leur mise en œuvre doivent elles aussi être nuancées selon la perception qu'ont les investisseurs des enjeux stratégiques associés à une opération OBO. En effet, les investisseurs qui se réclament d'un mode de gestion de type « hands-on » participent activement à la mise en place de stratégies de développement et de transmission de l'entreprise. Ils accordent un intérêt particulier à la viabilité économique à long terme du projet, à la performance des dirigeants en matière de gestion, à leurs motivations et à celles de leurs équipes de direction et notamment à la présence d'un repreneur dès le début de l'opération. En revanche, les contributions des investisseurs qui se réclament d'un mode de gestion de type « hands-off» demeurent limitées à l'apport de ressources financières et à l'alignement des intérêts des différentes parties prenantes afin de garantir un retour sur investissement sur un horizon relativement court. De même, l'absence d'un repreneur potentiel au démarrage d'OBO n'est pas considérée comme rédhibitoire pour cette catégorie d'investisseurs. L'étude a notamment montré que la nature des conflits qui peuvent surgir entre les protagonistes et les mécanismes de résolution sont en corrélation avec le mode de gestion des participations dont se proclament les investisseurs. / The subject of my study is to investigate the nature of productive collaboration between investor capital and owner­manager in an OBO operation and its influence on value creation through the identification of organizational levers and mechanisms of value creation. In order to achieve it, we opted for a mixed methodology. First, by observing the management practices of 42 private equity investors, we have identified the criteria mobilized by specialized financial investors to reduce the information 's asymmetric in the pre-investment phase. Through cluster analysis, the obtained results suggested that the target preselecting's criteria to an OBO must be qualified in terms of the typical profiles of the identified groups of investors (financial and strategists). The difference between the two classes was cognitive and mainly concerned the investor perception of the strategic issues of an OBO operation. Secondly, through selective interviews with 17 capital investors, we highlighted the levers and organizational mechanisms at the origin of the value creation proccss. Our stud has shown that the modalities associated with their implementation must also be qualified according to investors' perceptions of the strategic issues associated with an OBO operation. Indeed, investors who claimed to have a "hands-on" type of management are actively involved in setting up the company's development and transmission strategies. They paid particular attention to the long-term economic viability of the project, the performance of managers in management, their motivations and those of their management teams, and in particular to the presence of a potential buyer at the beginning of the operation. On the other hand, the contributions of investors who claimed to have a "hands-off" type of management are limited to providing financial resources and aligning the interests of the various stakeholders in order to guarantee a retum on investment on a relatively short horizon. Similarly, the absence of a potential buyer at the start of the OBO was not considered as prohibitive for this category of investors. The study showed, in particular, that the nature of the conflicts that can arise between the protagonists and the mechanisms of resolution are correlated with the mode of management of the participations that investors claimed.

One of Sweden’s most well known monopolies is approaching its end, Apoteket AB. A re-regulation of a state owned monopoly is nothing new but it happens within an interesting trade. Since the government is in total control of the whole re-regulation process, we found it interesting to see how they managed to include the potential individuals who want to take over a pharmacy. After all, many are the times the government has emphasized the importance of small firms. Out of the approximately 900 pharmacies owned by Apoteket AB, 150 are going to be sold to individuals. This group is called “small enterprise cluster”, and this cluster became the focus of our thesis. We wanted to get an insight into this group, since it is more complex and diverse compared to the large corporations entering the market. Purpose The purpose of this thesis is to measure the willingness to take over pharmacies among the employees of Apoteket AB, as well as to analyse how the government's support has affected the decisions of individuals. Method In order to get a good view of the re-regulation process we chose a qualitative approach, where we performed personal interviews with 6 respondents equally spread out on 3 pharmacies in a medium sized Swedish city and the surrounding area. The interviews where performed in a semi-structured manner. Besides the primary data, secondary data was collected. It builds the foundation for the theoretical framework and the analysis of the interviews. Since the theoretical framework was created before the research was performed, the study used a deductive research approach.

<p>One of Sweden’s most well known monopolies is approaching its end, Apoteket AB. A re-regulation of a state owned monopoly is nothing new but it happens within an interesting trade. Since the government is in total control of the whole re-regulation process, we found it interesting to see how they managed to include the potential individuals who want to take over a pharmacy. After all, many are the times the government has emphasized the importance of small firms.</p><p>Out of the approximately 900 pharmacies owned by Apoteket AB, 150 are going to be sold to individuals. This group is called “small enterprise cluster”, and this cluster became the focus of our thesis. We wanted to get an insight into this group, since it is more complex and diverse compared to the large corporations entering the market.</p><p><strong>Purpose</strong></p><p>The purpose of this thesis is to measure the willingness to take over pharmacies among the employees of Apoteket AB, as well as to analyse how the government's support has affected the decisions of individuals.</p><p><strong>Method</strong></p><p>In order to get a good view of the re-regulation process we chose a qualitative approach, where we performed personal interviews with 6 respondents equally spread out on 3 pharmacies in a medium sized Swedish city and the surrounding area. The interviews where performed in a semi-structured manner.</p><p>Besides the primary data, secondary data was collected. It builds the foundation for the theoretical framework and the analysis of the interviews. Since the theoretical framework was created before the research was performed, the study used a deductive research approach.</p>

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:22:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 66070100197.pdf: 310163 bytes, checksum: 3b9928fac26ea1cdec9c73ead81d55d9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-01T00:00:00Z / This work seeks to analyze the efficiency of the investment committees of the FIPs (Fundos de Investimento em Participações), the most relevant investment vehicle of the Brazilian private equity industry, taking into consideration that acquisitions made by these vehicles are not leveraged. Such analysis is made by comparing it with the American model, which usually delegates the investment decision to the general partner and employs a significant amount of leverage when acquiring a target. Initially, a non-exhaustive review of the Brazilian papers on private equity is conducted. Next, the particularities of the Brazilian model are pointed out, specially the investment decisions shared by fund managers and investors, and the scarce usage of leverage in the acquisitions, and it is shown how these characteristics affect the equilibrium of Axelson, Strömberg and Weisbach’s model. The conclusion is that the particularities of the FIPs model offer: (i) better protection to the limited partners’ interests and (ii) allow the general partners to take advantage of the period when the transactions occur at lower multiples, resulting in a more efficient investment model with a countercyclical nature. However, such conclusions are subject to the compliance of the following premises: (i) the investment committee must have qualifications as good as, or better than, those of the general partner, (ii) it must have enough time and personnel availability to analyze the opportunities as deeply as the general partner does, (iii) the existence of the investment committee must not result in a competitive disadvantage for the limited partner in terms of agility in the negotiation processes. Finally, some potential situations of conflicts of interests of the committee members are raised. / Este trabalho objetiva analisar a eficiência dos comitês de investimento no modelo de investimento em private equity através de FIPs (Fundos de Investimento em Participações) que não utilizam alavancagens em suas aquisições. Tal análise é feita através de uma comparação com o modelo americano, no qual tipicamente o gestor do fundo tem o poder de decisão sobre os investimentos e as aquisições são realizadas utilizando financiamento de terceiros. A dissertação é iniciada com uma revisão bibliográfica não-exaustiva dos trabalhos da academia brasileira sobre o tema de private equity. Em seguida, levanta-se as particularidades do modelo dos FIPs, principalmente a decisão de investimento feita em conjunto pelo gestor e seus investidores através de comitês de investimento e a rara utilização de alavancagem nas aquisições, e demonstra-se como o impacto destas características altera o equilíbrio do modelo proposto por Axelson, Strömberg e Weisbach. Conclui-se que as particularidades do modelo dos FIPs que não utilizam alavancagens nas aquisições oferecem: (i) melhor proteção aos interesses dos investidores, e uma representativade similar aos conselhos de administração de companhias abertas, e (ii) permitem que o gestor aproveite os períodos nos quais as transações ocorrem a um múltiplo mais baixo, resultando num modelo mais eficiente de investimento e que evita a multiplicação dos ciclos econômicos. Tais conclusões, no entanto, estão sujeitas à observação das seguintes condições: (i) o comitê deve ter qualificação igual ou superior ao do gestor; (ii) o comitê deve ter disponibilidade de tempo e corpo suficientes para analisar os investimentos nas mesma profundidade que o gestor, (iii) a existência do comitê de investimento não deve acarretar numa desvantagem para o gestor em termos de agilidade de resposta nas negociações. Finalmente, são levantadas algumas situações de ponteciais conflitos de interesse nas quais os membros dos comitês de investimento podem se encontrar.

I förevarande uppsats behandlas frågor i gränslandet mellan processrätt och associationsrätt, närmare bestämt den processform som stipuleras för tvister med anledning av inlösen av minoritetsaktier. Av hävdvunnen princip ska inlösentvister slitas genom ett legalt skiljeförfarande som första instans. Givet att stadganden om legala skiljeförfaranden i dag utgör en tämligen sällsynt företeelse i svensk rätt, samt mot bakgrund av den starka presumtion mot specialfora som råder, är det följaktligen av intresse att diskutera ifrågavarande tvistemålsreglerings ändamålsenlighet. Syftet med uppsatsen är således att dels analysera ändamålsenligheten av ett legalt skiljeförfarande som primär tvistlösningsform vid inlösen av minoritetsaktier, dels att presentera några synpunkter avseende regleringens utformning de lege ferenda.      I analysen avseende regleringens ändamålsenlighet behandlas initialt de argument lagstiftaren lyft fram som avgörande vid valet av tvistlösningsform. Analysen visar att dessa argument inte är särdeles välgrundade i bemärkelsen att de inte självständigt kan motivera den processuella särreglering som stadgas för inlösentvister. Vidare uppmärksammas flera andra rättsliga och praktiska problem som kan uppstå i samband med att tvisten ska prövas av skiljemän i stället för allmän domstol, såsom hinder för verkställighet av skiljedomen utomlands. Den övergripande slutsatsen av analysen är att ändamålsenligheten av det legala skiljeförfarandet vid inlösen av minoritetsaktier med fog kan ifrågasättas.      Beträffande tvistlösningsregleringens utformning de lege ferenda, presenteras i uppsatsen två förslag till lagändringar. Det första förslaget utgår från ett fakultativt legalt skiljeförfarande. Sålunda presumeras alltjämt skiljeförfarande som primär processform, men kompletteras med möjligheten till föreskrift i bolagsordningen att tvisten ska prövas i allmän domstol. Det andra förslaget tar avstamp i en form av självreglering, där allmän domstol som huvudregel är behörig att ta upp talan. Undantag härifrån kan göras genom föreskrift i bolagsordningen vari stadgas att tvisten i stället ska prövas av skiljemän. En sådan föreskrift har samma verkan som ett skiljeavtal.      Sammanfattningsvis och i ljuset av de slutsatser som presenteras, påvisar uppsatsen att det finns skäl att se över och ändra nuvarande särreglering med legalt skiljeförfarande som tvistlösningsform vid inlösen av minoritetsaktier. / The thesis addresses issues regarding procedural law and the right of association, more specifically, the proceedings in disputes regarding buy-out of minority shareholders. By tradition, buy-out disputes shall be submitted for arbitration. Since compulsory arbitration is a rather rare phenomenon in modern Swedish law, and in consideration of the prevailing presumption against special fora, it is of interest to discuss the appropriateness of this special legislation. Thus, the purpose of the thesis is to analyse the appropriateness of compulsory arbitration as the primary form of dispute resolution in case of a buy-out of minority shareholders, and to present some comments concerning the legislation de lege ferenda.      In the analysis regarding the appropriateness of the legislation, the arguments put forward by the legislator as crucial when determining the form of dispute resolution, are addressed initially. The analysis suggests that these arguments independently cannot warrant the special legislation stipulated for buy-out disputes. Furthermore, several other legal and practical problems that may arise in connection with having the dispute settled by arbitrators instead of a general court are brought to attention, exempli gratia the impediment to enforcement of arbitral awards in a foreign country. Overall, the analysis leads to the conclusion that the appropriateness of compulsory arbitration in case of a buy-out of minority shareholders can be questioned.      As to the dispute resolution legislation de lege ferenda, two legislative proposals are presented in the thesis. The first proposal promotes a non-compulsory arbitration. Hence, arbitration would still be the primary form of dispute resolution but supplemented with the option of prescribing in the articles of association of the company that the dispute shall be settled by a general court. The second proposal stipulates a sort of self-regulation, whereby the parties, as a general rule, can bring the action before a general court. Exception from the general rule can be made by a provision in the articles of association prescribing that the dispute shall be settled by arbitrators. Such provision would have the same force as an arbitration agreement.      In summary, and in the light of the conclusions presented, the thesis implies that there are reasons to review and change the present special legislation with compulsory arbitration stipulated for disputes in case of a buy-out of minority shareholders.