La tesi di dottorato su “La tutela dei soci e dei creditori nella fusione concordataria” si compone di tre capitoli. Nel primo, il lavoro muove dalla constatazione della (apparente) marginalità dell’istituto oggetto di indagine, rispetto al quale scarsa è stata finora l’attenzione dedicata dalla letteratura italiana ed alquanto esigua risulta la casistica giurisprudenziale. Viene, quindi, individuata nella carenza di coordinamento normativo tra la disciplina (ed i procedimenti) di diritto societario e diritto concorsuale la causa della trascurabile diffusione pratica dell’istituto e la conseguente necessità di un lavoro di ricostruzione interpretativa tutt’altro che agevole. La revisione critica dell’istituto muove – quindi ed inevitabilmente – dalla valutazione dell’ammissibilità di una fusione concordataria nell’ambito di concordati aventi finalità tanto conservative, quanto liquidative; e ciò considerando sia la possibile applicazione analogica dell’art. 2499 c.c., che in tema di trasformazione consente la realizzazione dell’operazione solo in quanto compatibile con le finalità e lo stato della procedura; sia la modalità in cui le altre (principali) esperienze giuridiche hanno affrontato le problematiche connesse alla fusione come strumento di soluzione concordata della crisi. Tale questione viene positivamente risolta, da un lato, sottolineando l’importanza sistematica e l’innegabile valore innovativo degli artt. 124 e 160 l. fall., per la parte in cui disciplinano la vasta gamma di soluzioni di cui il soggetto proponente dispone nella redazione dell’offerta concordataria: e ciò, in particolare, se si considera che le procedure di auto-regolamentazione della crisi o dell’insolvenza rappresentano soluzioni alternative al procedimento fallimentare e, quindi, derogatorie dello stesso; dall’altro lato, ponendo l’accento sulle soluzioni, tutte tendenzialmente positive, accolte dagli altri ordinamenti giuridici in ordine alla possibilità di contemplare un’operazione di fusione come modalità esecutiva di un piano di regolazione della crisi o dell’insolvenza. Il lavoro passa - nel secondo capitolo - ad individuare gli interessi coinvolti dall’operazione e ne trae spunto al fine della preventiva indicazione dei problemi posti dalla fusione concordataria. Si distinguono, al riguardo, due differenti serie di interessi: quello dei soci della società in procedura, e quello dei suoi creditori sociali. Quanto ai primi, il pregiudizio alla loro posizione è riconducibile alla risalente controversia sulla conservazione della qualità di socio, alla luce della inevitabile riduzione del valore (quantomeno) contabile del patrimonio dell’impresa in procedura. Viene innanzitutto valutata l’ipotesi in cui il valore contabile del capitale risulti azzerato, con la conseguente ammissibilità dell’operazione di fusione solo nel caso in cui il valore reale del patrimonio risulti più elevato di quello contabile e quindi idoneo a consentire la compenetrazione (non solo patrimoniale, ma anche) delle relative compagini sociali; quindi, viene esaminata la diversa circostanza in cui - sebbene il patrimonio dell’ente in concordato conservi un valore anche contabile positivo - alcuni soci si ritrovino a possedere, all’indomani della concentrazione e per effetto della determinazione di un determinato concambio, una partecipazione inferiore al minimo convertibile, venendo così di fatto “esclusi” dall’ente incorporante o risultante dall’operazione. In entrambe le vicende, viene poi affrontata (e risolta positivamente) l’ammissibilità di una decisione maggioritaria dei soci, pure da taluno revocata in dubbio in favore del principio unanimistico, là dove venga leso il diritto di ciascuno alla conservazione della status soci: e ciò, sia in considerazione della previsione legislativa che limita il conguaglio in denaro al dieci per cento delle partecipazioni assegnate, con ciò indirettamente escludendo la possibilità di conguagli totalmente compensativi della posizione di singoli soci, cui non venga riservata alcuna partecipazione nella società post-fusione; sia considerando che la congruità del concambio, la conformità alle regole previste a protezione dei diritti (informativi) dei soci e, in ogni caso, la presenza di contesti in cui sono esperibili i rimedi societari destinati (dal legislatore) assicurano il “ristoro” per eventuali pregiudizi sofferti dai titolari di quote minime di partecipazione al capitale. Quanto al rischio cui sono esposti i creditori della società in concordato, l’analisi viene condotta su due differenti “binari”: i creditori che concorrono all’approvazione del piano restano infatti esposti al rischio che la proposta in cui hanno riposto (con l’approvazione) speranza di soddisfazione subisca una battuta d’arresto a causa della mancata approvazione assembleare del progetto di fusione; i creditori contrari alla proposta di concordato corrono invece il rischio che le decisioni maggioritarie di approvazione della proposta possano (eventualmente) pregiudicare i propri interessi, privi (in assenza di classi) di qualsiasi rimedio endo-concorsuale ed esposti al mancato riconoscimento del rimedio oppositivo previsto – in ambito squisitamente societario – dall’art. 2503 c.c. Una volta individuati gli eventuali pregiudizi cui sono esposti i soci ed i creditori della società in concordato, vengono ricostruiti i rimedi tesi alla tutela delle rispettive posizioni; e proprio a tale profilo è dedicato il terzo capitolo, suddiviso in due sezioni. Nella prima, ci si sofferma sulla questione se la perdita della qualità di socio possa essere in qualche modo evitata o, ricorrendo determinate condizioni, se tale pregiudizio possa trovare adeguato ristoro: viene, quindi, dapprima accreditata la tesi – sostenuta dalla prevalente dottrina – secondo cui la sussistenza di un danno derivante dalla perdita della qualità di socio potrà ravvisarsi solo qualora, all’esito del vaglio giudiziale, venga riscontrata l’incongruità del rapporto di cambio prescelto ovvero, più in generale, un abuso del potere deliberativo della maggioranza. In questo contesto, due sono i principali strumenti predisposti dal legislatore a difesa della posizione dei soci di minoranza; il primo, di stampo “precauzionale”, relativo all’esercizio consapevole del diritto di voto da parte della maggioranza del capitale, e correlato alla disciplina degli adempimenti pubblicitari fissati dagli artt. 2501-ter, comma 3, c.c. e 2502-septies, comma 1, c.c.; il secondo, invece, tipicamente societario, attinente all’impugnativa della delibera (consiliare ovvero assembleare) di approvazione del progetto ex artt. 2373 e 2391 c.c. e, dopo l’iscrizione camerale dell’atto, all’azione di risarcimento ex art. 2504-quater, comma 2, c.c. Movendo dalla constatazione che il ventaglio di rimedi previsto dal diritto societario può apparire soluzione poco attenta alla posizione dei soci di minoranza anche qualora l’operazione di fusione sia del tutto estranea agli scopi concordatari – dal che i tentativi dottrinali di consentire al socio di minoranza l’esercizio dell’azione di risarcimento in forma specifica e per equivalente, da ingiustificato arricchimento ovvero da responsabilità da voto – viene valutata la possibilità che, allorquando la fusione rappresenti lo strumento di attuazione di una soluzione concordata della crisi, la figura dei soci possa assumere tutt’altro rilievo, fino quasi ad assimilarsi a quella dei creditori; ciò, naturalmente, nei limiti in cui la posizione degli stessi venga coinvolta o addirittura “compromessa” dal processo concordatario, dal quale l’attuale disciplina concorsuale li esclude completamente. Sebbene tale “riqualificazione” sembri inattuabile in ambito nazionale, viene valutato (e criticato) un recente disegno di legge del Governo federale tedesco (Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung), che riserva la tutela della posizione dei soci ai soli rimedi concorsuali, disattivando – una volta ammessa la società al concordato – quelli previsti in via generale dalla disciplina societaria. Nella seconda sezione viene esaminata la modalità di tutela dei creditori che approvano il concordato e, successivamente, la protezione dei creditori contrari alla proposta. Quanto ai primi, più che ricorrere a ricostruzioni dottrinali (in particolare, tedesche) tese a ridurre il potere deliberativo dei soci, si affronta la possibilità di affidare la tutela delle aspettative dei creditori sociali al coordinamento del procedimento decisionale previsto in ambito societario con l’iter procedurale del concordato. Risulta infatti evidente che il pericolo che il diniego assembleare leda gli interessi del ceto creditorio si manifesta solo nel caso in cui l’adozione delle delibere societarie richieste per l’attuazione della fusione venga rinviata alla fase esecutiva del concordato, assegnando così all’offerta concordataria un valore meramente programmatico. E - si osserva - tali “inconvenienti” potrebbero essere evitati avviando il procedimento assembleare contestualmente ovvero nel corso della procedura concordataria, condizionandone peraltro l’esito finale al perfezionamento definitivo del concordato. Passando alla modalità di tutela dei creditori che non concorrono all’approvazione della proposta, viene prospettata la possibilità che la difficoltosa conciliazione delle regole che disciplinano l’approvazione a maggioranza del concordato (artt. 128, comma 1°, e 177, comma 1°, l. fall.) e la normativa societaria che, in tema di fusione, riconosce invece ai creditori il diritto individuale di opposizione (art. 2503 c.c.), venga risolta mediante il disconoscimento di tale diritto, affidando la tutela del ceto creditorio ai soli rimedi previsti in ambito concorsuale. Non diversamente degli obbligazionisti, i creditori concorsuali costituiscono infatti una sorta di “comunità accidentale”, dal momento che è loro vietato di agire individualmente nei confronti del patrimonio sociale ed è prevista un’organizzazione di gruppo (i.e. concorsuale) tesa a risolvere gli eventuali conflitti di interessi tra gli stessi creditori. Dal che l’applicazione a questi ultimi dello stesso regime (di esclusione dal diritto di opposizione) riservato espressamente agli obbligazionisti dall’art. 2503-bis c.c. Tale soluzione viene, infine, confortata da ulteriori considerazioni concernenti, da un lato, la modalità di espressione della volontà dei creditori concorsuali nelle forme della mera partecipazione alla volontà del gruppo e, dall’altro, il combinato disposto degli artt. 2503, comma 1, c.c., e 128, comma 1°, e 177, comma 1°, l. fall., ai sensi del quale il consenso dei creditori anteriori all’iscrizione camerale del progetto di fusione deve considerarsi prestato qualora l’offerta concordataria (implicante la fusione) risulti approvata dai creditori che rappresentano la maggioranza dei crediti. / The doctoral thesis, about “The protection of shareholders and creditors in the merger as a means of insolvency arrangement”, consists of three chapters. In the first one, the work moves from the observation of the low use of the transaction under investigation, to which the Italian scholars and case law have devoted little attention. The lack of coordination between the regulatory framework (and processes) company law and insolvency law is identified as the main reason of the limited practice of the institution and the consequent need for an interpretative work of reconstruction. The critical review of the institute moves by evaluating the eligibility of a merger as a means of an insolvency arrangement with both conservation and the claims settlement purposes; and this is realized through the possible application by analogy of article 2499 c.c., which in terms of transformation allows the transaction only to the extent compatible with the purposes and status of the procedure; or through the implementation of solutions made in the other (main) foreign experiences. This issue is resolved positively, on the one hand, by emphasizing the importance of systematic and innovative articles 124 and 160 l. fall., to the extent they deal with the wide range of solutions in which the proponent can choose; on the other hand, focusing on solutions, all basically positive, accepted by other jurisdictions in order to contemplate the possibility of a merger as a way of an executive plan of adjustment of the crisis or insolvency. The work goes on - in the second chapter - to identify the interests involved in the transaction distinguishing them, in this regard, in two different sets: the shareholders of the company in the procedure, and that of its creditors. As for the former, the prejudice to their position is due to the controversy over the dating of membership retention, in the light of the inevitable reduction in the value (at least) of the company's assets in the accounting procedure. It’s first evaluated the situation in which the value of the capital is zero, resulting in eligibility for the merger only if the real value of the assets is more than that amount; then, it evaluates the different circumstances in which - even though the entity's shareholders agreed to retain a positive value even accounting - some members are found to possess, after the merger and because of the determination of a particular exchange, a share less than the minimum convertible, thus in effect being “excluded” by the surviving or resulting company. In both events, it is then addressed (and answered in the affirmative) the eligibility of a majority decision of members, also called into question by some in favor of the unanimity, where it is breached the right of everyone to the conservation status of the members: and this, both because of the legislative provision limiting the cash compensation to ten percent of the shares allocated, thereby indirectly excluding the possibility of fully compensatory adjustments of the position of some members; whereas both the fairness of the exchange, in compliance with the rules laid down for the protection of rights (information) of the shareholders and, in any case, the presence of contexts in which the general remedies for corporate can be used. As for the risk faced by creditors, the analysis is conducted on two different “tracks”: the creditors that contribute to the approval of the plan are in fact exposed to the risk that the proposal they put (with the approval) satisfaction hopes suffer a setback, due to the failure to approve the merger by shareholders; and the creditors against the proposal agreed, which are instead exposed to the risk that the majority approval decisions of the proposal would (eventually) affect their interests. In the third chapter, divided into two sections, the remedies are identified to claim protection of their positions. In the first, we focus on whether the loss of membership can be somehow avoided or, under certain conditions, if such injury can find suitable refreshment: it’s endorsed the first argument - supported by the prevailing doctrine – in which the existence of an injury resulting from the loss of membership will be seen in it, only if - the outcome of judicial scrutiny found in the incongruity of the chosen exchange rate or, more generally, an abuse of the decision-making power of the majority. In this context, there are two main instruments prepared by the legislature to defend the position of minority shareholders: the first mold “precautionary” for the aware of the right to vote by the majority of the capital, and related to the discipline the advertising requirements set by the articles 2501-ter, paragraph 3, c.c. and 2502-septies, paragraph 1, c.c., and the second, however, typically corporate, relating to appeals of the resolution (i.e. council meeting) to approve the project under articles 2373 and 2391 c.c. and, after signing the Chamber of the act, action for damages pursuant to art. 2504-quater, paragraph 2, Civil Code. Moving from the observation that the range of remedies provided for company law solution may appear inattentive to the position of minority shareholders even if the merger is entirely foreign to the arrangement purposes - the doctrine is evaluated the possibility that when the merger represents the tool for implementing a mutually agreed solution of the crisis, the figure of the partners can be assimilated to that of creditors, and this, of course, to the extent in which they are involved with “compromised” by the insolvency process. Although this “retraining” seems impractical at the national level, it is evaluated (and criticized) a recent bill of the German Federal Government (Bundesregierung Gesetzentwurf), which reserves to protect the position of shareholders in insolvency remedies just by turning off - once admitted the company agreed to - those generally provided by corporate regulations. The second section examines the mode of protection of creditors who approved the agreement and, subsequently, the protection of creditors against the proposal. As for the former, rather than resorting to reconstructions of doctrine (especially the German one) aimed at reducing the decision-making power of shareholders, we face the possibility of entrusting the protection of creditors ' expectations for the coordination of the decision-making procedure provided for the company with the procedural course of the arrangement. It is clear that the danger of the creditors occurs only if the adoption of corporate resolutions required to implement the merger may be delayed until the execution phase of the agreement, thus giving to the arrangement a merely programmatic rule. And these “problems” could be avoided by starting the process at the same meeting or during the insolvency procedure, however, influencing the final outcome to the improvement of the final agreement. Turning to the ways of protecting creditors which do not contribute to the approval of the proposal, the difficult reconciliation of the rules governing the approval of a majority arrangement agreed (art. 128, paragraph 1, and 177, paragraph 1, l. fall.) and that, in terms of a merger, recognizes the individual right of creditors to oppose (art. 2503 cc), can be settled by their failure to recognize this right, entrusting the protection class of creditors only remedies provided for in the field of competition. Like bondholders, creditors bankruptcy constitute in fact a sort of “community accidental”, since they are forbidden to go it alone against the assets of an organization and is expected to group (i.e. competition) aims to resolve any conflicts of interests between the creditors themselves.

<p>Abstract</p><p>Purpose: A part of this research is to explore if there are partnership firms that voluntarily get an audit of their business. The purpose is to understand and explain why these partnership firms have chosen to get an audit of their business voluntarily. Additionally, the authors research how external stakeholders, such as creditors, view and assess partnership firms that do not execute an audit of their accounts and reports.</p><p>Method: To initiate this research, the authors conducted a telephone survey as a pre-study, to assure the viability of this research. As a major part of this research study, qualitative interviews with partnership firms, banks and the Swedish Tax Agency have been conducted to obtain professional opinion in the subject of interest. Previous researches are presented to provide a broader perspective of the debate.</p><p>Frame of</p><p>Reference: The authors present an extensive background to auditing and accounting. Stakeholder model and agency theory have been applied to facilitate in understanding the relationship between a partnership firm and its stakeholders. Advantages and disadvantages of auditing, as well as the concept of voluntary auditing are presented to facilitate a discussion of the motives of voluntarily executing an audit firms.</p><p>Conclusion: After extensive research the authors have identified and determined the most probable motives of voluntary audits as well as understood how these external stakeholders view and assess these partnership firms that do not execute an audit of their accounts and reports. The authors can after a broad research conclude that partners’ central motives to voluntary auditing is to seek the value that is added through it, as the firm obtains professional assistance to raise the credibility of the firm’s financial reports. Auditing frees them from additional burden and time to manage the work related to accounting records and enables them to devote more time to the core business.</p><p>Through an audit, partners’ quest for orderliness is fulfilled. Moreover, indications have been seen that partners are open to voluntarily execute an audit to achieve a sense of security in relation to the other partners. Another essential motive to why partners voluntarily execute audits is to be assured that there are no significant inaccuracies or errors in their book-keeping. Overall, partners’ intentions of getting an audit of their accounts and reports are to gain an overview of the business as well to obtain enhanced business image externally.</p><p>Creditors are concerned about a firm’s ability to reimburse the obligation. In a newly started firm, banks require annual reports, forecasts and budgets ensure the firm’s solvency. The Swedish Tax Agency receives audit reports from auditors that guide them with hints and directions on what to assess further. Moreover, the Swedish Tax Agency performs tax audits on firms, whereby they conduct an assessment to ensure that the accounts and other documents are in accordance with what is declared to them.</p> / <p>Sammanfattning</p><p>Syfte: Avsikten med denna uppsats är att utforska om det finns handelsbolag som frivilligt upprättar revision i sin affärsverksamhet. Syftet är att få förståelse för samt förklara de bakomliggande motiven till handelsbolags val av frivillig revision. Författarna utforskar ytterligare hur externa parter, såsom kreditgivare samt skatteverket, granskar och ser på handelsbolag som inte upprättar revision på sin verksamhet.</p><p>Metod: Författarna genomförde en förstudie i form av en telefonenkät, för att försäkra sig om att denna studie är genomförbar. För att erhålla en professionell åsikt kring ämnet i fråga, har denna studie till största del bestått av kvalitativa intervjuer med respondenter från delägare av handelsbolag, banker och skatteverket. Tidigare studier är även presenterade för att tillföra debatten ett bredare perspektiv.</p><p>Referensram: Författarna ger en omfattande beskrivning av redovisning och revision. Intressentmodellen och agentteorin har tillämpats i syfte att underlätta förståelsen av relationen mellan företag och dess intressenter. Dessutom beskrivs för- och nackdelar av revision för att underlätta diskussionen kring motiven till frivillig revision i handelsbolag.</p><p>Slutsats: Författarna har efter omfattande forskning fastställt de troligaste motiven till frivillig revision samt fått en djupare förståelse för bankernas och skatteverkets ståndpunkt och granskning av handelsbolag som inte är revisionspliktiga. Sammanfattningsvis kan författarna hävda att grundmotiven till frivillig revision är värdet som den tillför, då bolagen erhåller professionell samråd som höjer redovisningens trovärdighet i bolaget. Revision underlättar för delägarna då de inte behöver ta på sig bördan av att tillägna tid och kraft på att själva utföra bokföringen. Detta tillåter delägarna i sin tur att ägna mer tid till själva kärnverksamheten. Genom revision, fullgörs delägarnas strävan efter ordning och reda i bolaget. För övrigt har man sett indikationer på att delägarna är positivt inställda på att frivilligt upprätta revision i handelsbolagen, då revisionen bidrar till att de erhåller en känsla av trygghet. Ett annat motiv, är att revisionen försäkrar dem om det inte förekommer väsentliga felaktigheter eller misstag i boksluten. Delägarnas främsta avsikt till användandet av revision kan i det stora hela summeras till att de får en översiktsbild av sina bolag, såväl som att de erhåller en kvalitetsstämpel och därmed en förhöjd bild av bolaget utåt sett. Kreditgivare är angelägna över bolagens återbetalningsförmåga. Därför kräver banken att nystartade bolag ska framföra sin årsredovisning, budget och framtida prognoser, för att försäkra sig om och fastställa deras återbetalningsförmåga. Skatteverket mottar årsredovisningar från revisorer, som med fördel förser skatteverket med råd och vägledning kring eventuell vidare granskning i bolagen. Skatteverket utför därtill skatterevision, genom att de granskar bolagen i syfte att intyga att de presenterade räkenskaperna och rapporterna överensstämmer med det som har deklarerats och kommit till skatteverkets förfogande.</p>

Pagrindinis įmonės bankroto tikslas – kuo didesne apimtimi patenkinti jos kreditorių turtinius interesus. Šiam tikslui pasiekti yra sukurtas specialus teisinis reguliavimas, kurio esminis elementas yra įmonės valdymo perdavimas nešališkam subjektui - bankroto administratoriui. Jis perima nemokaus skolininko turtą, dokumentus ir yra atsakingas ne tik už šio turto išsaugojimą, administravimą, bet ir už kiek galima didesnio skolininko turto sukaupimą bei padalijimą kreditoriams. Toks platus įgalinimų perdavimas lemia, kad įmonės administravimas yra vienas esminių elementų, nuo kurių priklauso sėkmingas kreditorių reikalavimų tenkinimas. Šio darbo tikslas – išanalizuoti ir įvertinti administravimo veiklos įtaką įmonės skolininkės kreditorių teisių apsaugos užtikrinimui bei interesų įgyvendinimui. Dėl šios priežasties autorė analizuoja bankroto administratoriaus svarbą bankroto procese, jo padėties įvairialypiškumo keliamas problemas, administravimo veiklos sampratą bei reikšmę sėkmingam bankroto proceso tikslų pasiekimui. Be to, detaliai analizuojamos administravimo veiklos kryptys, susijusios su įmonės valdymo perėmimu, turto masės formavimu, kreditorių teisių apsauga bei papildomi aspektai, tokie kaip administravimo išlaidų sudėtis, jų atlyginimo ypatumai, civilinės atsakomybės taikymo sąlygos ir privalomojo civilinės atsakomybės draudimo reikšmė kreditorių teisių apsaugos atžvilgiu. Šio darbo nauda pasireiškia tuo, kad sistemiškai išanalizuoti administravimo veiklą... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The main purpose of bankruptcy is to satisfy the interests of creditors. The special legal regulation is created in order to achieve this goal as the administration of a company passes to an independent subject – the bankruptcy administrator. He takes over an insolvent debtor's assets, documents, and is responsible not only for the preservation of the property and the administration, but also for the highest possible degree of accumulation of assets of the debtor and its placing between creditors. The assignation of such a broad empowerment leads to the administration being one of the company’s key elements that affects the success of creditors' claims. The goal of this master thesis is to analyze and evaluate the administration impact to the rights of creditors trying to ensure their interests. For this reason, author analyzes the importance of the bankruptcy administrator, the problems posed by his ambivalent status, the administrative activity concept and its influence for the successful achievement of bankruptcy goals. In addition, a detailed analysis was made of the administrative activity aspects which are connected with the takeover of leading, asset mass formation, creditors’ protection and additional elements such as administrative costs, their refund, conditions for a civil liability and how the civil liability insurance ensures creditors’ rights. This master thesis is useful because a systematic analysis of laws, science and periodic publications of Lithuanian and... [to full text]

Le présent mémoire analyse l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité sur le devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, devoir imposer aux administrateurs de compagnies par la législation corporative canadienne. L'objectif du mémoire est de déterminer un standard de conduite à être adopté par l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire. Dans un premier temps, comment peut-on définir ce que constitue le « meilleur intérêt de la compagnie» ? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que l'intérêt de la compagnie est au carrefour d'une communauté d'intérêts lui étant sous-jacents. L'intérêt de la compagnie, bien qu'indépendant de ces intérêts sous-jacents, ne peut s'analyser en faisant abstraction de ces derniers. La jurisprudence et la doctrine récentes laissent entrevoir que l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité se fait sentir sur la détermination de ces intérêts sous-jacents à celui de la compagnie susceptibles d'être affectés par la finalité poursuivie par la compagnie, finalité axée sur la maximisation des profits à partir des opérations de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, le créancier, à l'instar de l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, supporte le risque commercial résiduel et doit recevoir une attention appropriée par les administrateurs. Par conséquent, dans la détermination de ce que constitue le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, l'administrateur ne peut, lorsque la compagnie est insolvable, faire abstraction de l'intérêt des créanciers. Ainsi, dans un deuxième temps, qui sont les véritables bénéficiaires du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie dans un contexte d'insolvabilité? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que le créancier est un bénéficiaire indirect de ce devoir fiduciaire lorsque la compagnie est insolvable. Tout comme l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, le créancier doit être en mesure d'intenter un recours de nature dérivée en vue d'obtenir réparation, pour et au nom de la compagnie. Le contexte d'insolvabilité fait naître, à l'endroit des administrateurs, une obligation de nature fiduciaire de prendre en considération l'intérêt des créanciers tout en permettant à ces derniers d'intenter un tel recours dérivé en vue d'obtenir réparation à la suite d'une violation du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie. En plus d'être soutenue par une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine canadiennes, cette conclusion s'appuie sur une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine de certains pays du Commonwealth (Angleterre, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande) et des États-Unis, juridictions avec lesquelles le Canada entretient des relations privilégiés, historiquement ou économiquement. Finalement, que doit faire l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie? L'auteur arrive à la conclusion que cette obligation de prendre en considération l'intérêt du créancier dans un contexte d'insolvabilité se traduit par un exercice de conciliation entre les intérêts du créancier et ceux des actionnaires. Les paramètres de cet exercice de conciliation sont déterminés en fonction du scénario envisagé par les administrateurs face à la situation d'insolvabilité. Plus le scénario se rapproche d'une liquidation plus ou moins formelle des actifs tangibles et facilement dissociables de la compagnie, moins cet exercice en sera un de conciliation et plus l'intérêt du créancier devra recevoir une attention prépondérante. À l'opposé, plus le scénario en est un de restructuration fondée sur une relance de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie insolvable, plus l'intérêt de l'actionnaire devra recevoir une attention particulière. / The following thesis analyses the impact of a company's insolvency on the fiduciary duties of its directors and officers, as imposed by Canadian corporate law. More specifically it shall examine the repercussions of an insolvency on management's fiduciary duty to act in accordance with the company's best interests. The objective shall therefore be to assess the extent of such fiduciary duty in the context of an insolvency and to establish a guideline to be followed by directors and officers in view of complying with said duty. Firstly, what constitutes the "best interests of the company"? The author concludes that a company's interests are comprised of a community of underlying interests. Although the interests of the company remain independent, it cannot be determined without taking into account said underlying interests. Amongst this community of underlying interests, shareholders and creditors, members of such community that supports the financing of the company's operations, occupy a predominant place. Recent case law and doctrinal authorities have concluded that the impact of a company's insolvency does not affect the ultimate objective pursued by the company, i.e. the maximisation of profit, but rather affects the determination of the members of the community of underlying interests that shall be affected by the pursuit of such finality. As such, in a context of insolvency, creditors, similar to shareholders in a context of solvency, are the residual risk-bearers of the company's commercial expenditure. Consequently, in view of determining what constitutes the best interests of the company, when it is insolvent, directors and officers may not ignore the creditors' interests. Secondly, who are the real beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty to act in a company's best interests when it becomes insolvent? The author concludes that creditors are indirect beneficiaries of such fiduciary duty in a context of insolvency. Similarly to shareholders in a context of solvency, creditors must be entitled to institute a derivative claim against directors and officers in order to obtain, in the name and for the company, compensation for the violation of said fiduciary duty. Insolvency triggers the existence of an obligation, fiduciary in nature, to take into account the creditors' interests. As such, directors and officers are to consider the creditors' interests in exercising their fiduciary duty to act in strict compliance with the best interests of the company. This conclusion is based on a review of the Canadian statutory law, jurisprudence and doctrinal authorities. Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by a review of same from certain Commonwealth jurisdictions (England, Australia and New-Zealand) and from the United States of America, jurisdictions with whom Canada has a privileged relationship, historically and/or economically. Finally, how does the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests translate in practice for directors and officers of an insolvent company? The author concludes that the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests is, in reality, an obligation to reconcile the shareholders' and creditors' interests with that of the company's best interests. The parameters of such obligation shall be determined with respect to the scenario conceived by directors and officers in order to effectively manage a situation of insolvency. Should such scenario focus on the liquidation of the core assets of the company, then the interests of the shareholders shall be subjugated to that of the creditors'. Conversely, should such scenario focus on the reorganisation of the company's commercial expenditures, based on the company's existing structures, then the shareholder's interest shall receive a more extensive attention by directors and officers.

Darbe analizuojami bendrovės vadovo civilinės atsakomybės teisinio reglamentavimo Lietuvoje trūkumai ir spragos bei, remiantis užsienio valstybių praktika ir tendencijomis, pateikiami pasiūlymai identifikuotų trūkumų šalinimui. Darbe bendrovės vadovų atsakomybė vertinama ne tik iš kreditorių ir bendrovės pozicijų – į vadovo atsakomybės teisinį reguliavimą pažvelgta taip pat ir iš bendrovės vadovo pozicijų. Darbe siūloma bendrovės vadovo, kaip civilinės atsakomybės subjekto, sąvoką, iki šiol neturinčią jokios aiškios koncepcijos ir turinio, deformalizuoti. Išnagrinėjus bendrovės vadovo pareigų bendrovei turinį, prieita išvada, jog šiuo metu galiojantys teisės aktai sudaro prielaidas klaidingai suvokti bendrovės vadovo pareigas bendrovei, kuomet vadovas sudaro sandorį su bendrove, todėl siūloma atitinkamai koreguoti reglamentavimą. Įvertinus vadovo atsakomybę bendrovės kreditorių atžvilgiu, prieita išvada, jog būtina išlaikyti pusiausvyrą, t. y. užtikrinti tik objektyviai pagrįstą kreditorių interesų apsaugą, nepagrįstai neišplečiant jos bendrovės vadovo atsakomybės sąskaita. Kartu atkreipiamas dėmesys, jog dabartinis kreditorių teisių įgyvendinimo mechanizmas dėl specialaus reglamentavimo nebuvimo neužtikrina vadovų teisinės padėties apibrėžtumo ir užtikrintumo. / Weaknesses and lacks of legal regulation of civil liability of a company’s director in Lithuania are analyzed and suggestions, how to eliminate identified weaknesses, are given in this work, referring to the practice and tendencies of foreign countries. The liability of a company’s directors is evaluated not only from the point of view of creditors and a company, but also legal regulation of a leader’s responsibility is reviewed from the point of view of a company’s directors. In this work, the concept of a company’s director, as a subject of civil liability, which has not had a clear concept and content so far, is suggested to be deformalized. After analyzing the content of liability of a company’s director for a company, it was concluded, that recent laws capacitate to wrongly understand, what responsibilities of a company’s leader are to a company, when he transacts with a company; therefore, several suggestions to improve regulation are given. After evaluating the director’s responsibility in respect of a company’s creditors, it was concluded, that it is necessary to maintain the balance – to ensure just such interest security of creditors, which is objectively grounded, and gratuitously not to extend it for account of a liability of company’s leader. What is more, attention is drawn to the recent mechanism of creditors’ rights implementation, which does not ensure the determination and security of director’s legal status due to the absence of special regulation.

Due to economic globalisation and integration, as well as the global economic downturn since 2008, the appearance of cross-border insolvencies have increased dramatically. This increase in cross-border insolvencies has led to a demand for a general and fair system to administer cross-border insolvencies globally. In 1997 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) promulgated the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency to act as an aide to countries in globally administering cross-border insolvencies in a uniform way. South Africa, and the United States of America (USA), subsequently accepted this Model Law approach into their respective national legislation. South Africa did this through the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 (CBIA) and the USA by way of Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The CBIA is, however, not currently in operation as the Minister of Justice has not yet designated countries to which the CBIA will apply. Chapter 15 is, however, effective and operational in the USA. The two theories that underlie cross-border insolvencies – universalism and territorialism – have been further refined in the theories of modern universalism and modern territorialism. Supporters of modern universalism hailed the acceptance of the Model Law into the national legislation of countries as a victory over modern territorialism as the characteristics of modern universalism can be found throughout the Model Law. Modern universalism is, however, seen as theory which endangers the interests of local creditors as it favours universal administration of assets. However, modern territorialism is, on the other hand, acknowledged to protect the interests of local creditors. Therefore an investigation into the application of Chapter 15 by the courts of the USA will indicate if the interests of local creditors are sufficiently protected under this so-called modern universalistic approach and, if indeed so, how this is achieved. As the CBIA is neither operational nor effective in South Africa, cross-border insolvencies are governed by the common law and the precedents set down in case law. Writers and case law indicate that South Africa uses a system that can be described as between pure territorialism and modern territorialism. It can therefore be accepted that South Africa currently protects the interests of its local creditors sufficiently. The question then arises if, when South Africa made the CBIA effective and operational, would local creditors‟ interests still be sufficiently protected? As the CBIA and Chapter 15 are both based on the Model Law, they are basically identical in most aspects. Therefore an investigation into the application of Chapter 15 will also indicate if the CBIA will sufficiently protect the interests of local creditors. This dissertation thus attempts, through an investigation of the applications lodged under Chapter 15, to indicate that the USA still succeeds in protecting the interests of its local creditors. The USA achieves this through utilising mechanisms made available through Chapter 15 itself. Consequently this dissertation shows that South Africa can make the CBIA operational, while still sufficiently protecting the interests of its local creditors. / Thesis (LLM (Import and Export Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013

Due to economic globalisation and integration, as well as the global economic downturn since 2008, the appearance of cross-border insolvencies have increased dramatically. This increase in cross-border insolvencies has led to a demand for a general and fair system to administer cross-border insolvencies globally. In 1997 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) promulgated the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency to act as an aide to countries in globally administering cross-border insolvencies in a uniform way. South Africa, and the United States of America (USA), subsequently accepted this Model Law approach into their respective national legislation. South Africa did this through the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 (CBIA) and the USA by way of Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The CBIA is, however, not currently in operation as the Minister of Justice has not yet designated countries to which the CBIA will apply. Chapter 15 is, however, effective and operational in the USA. The two theories that underlie cross-border insolvencies – universalism and territorialism – have been further refined in the theories of modern universalism and modern territorialism. Supporters of modern universalism hailed the acceptance of the Model Law into the national legislation of countries as a victory over modern territorialism as the characteristics of modern universalism can be found throughout the Model Law. Modern universalism is, however, seen as theory which endangers the interests of local creditors as it favours universal administration of assets. However, modern territorialism is, on the other hand, acknowledged to protect the interests of local creditors. Therefore an investigation into the application of Chapter 15 by the courts of the USA will indicate if the interests of local creditors are sufficiently protected under this so-called modern universalistic approach and, if indeed so, how this is achieved. As the CBIA is neither operational nor effective in South Africa, cross-border insolvencies are governed by the common law and the precedents set down in case law. Writers and case law indicate that South Africa uses a system that can be described as between pure territorialism and modern territorialism. It can therefore be accepted that South Africa currently protects the interests of its local creditors sufficiently. The question then arises if, when South Africa made the CBIA effective and operational, would local creditors‟ interests still be sufficiently protected? As the CBIA and Chapter 15 are both based on the Model Law, they are basically identical in most aspects. Therefore an investigation into the application of Chapter 15 will also indicate if the CBIA will sufficiently protect the interests of local creditors. This dissertation thus attempts, through an investigation of the applications lodged under Chapter 15, to indicate that the USA still succeeds in protecting the interests of its local creditors. The USA achieves this through utilising mechanisms made available through Chapter 15 itself. Consequently this dissertation shows that South Africa can make the CBIA operational, while still sufficiently protecting the interests of its local creditors. / Thesis (LLM (Import and Export Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013

Cette thèse examine trois questions importantes dans le secteur bancaire, à savoir le risque, les fonds propres et le crédit. Elle comprend trois essais empiriques. Le premier chapitre analyse l'impact du «printemps arabe» et de la crise financière mondiale de 2007-2008 sur la stabilité du secteur bancaire dans la région MENA. Les résultats montrent que le «printemps arabe» n'a pas eu d'effet négatif sur la stabilité des banques, alors que la crise financière mondiale a considérablement réduit leur stabilité. Le deuxième chapitre étudie le rôle joué par l'environnement institutionnel dans la mise en place de coussin de fonds propres par les régulateurs ou par les banques en interne. D’après les résultats, pour que les ratios de capital réglementaire soient efficaces, l'environnement institutionnel ne doit pas être négligé lors de la mise en place de ces ratios. Le troisième chapitre étudie les différents effets des droits des consommateurs et des créanciers sur le coût des prêts. Les résultats révèlent que le coût des prêts augmente en présence de lois strictes sur la protection des consommateurs, tandis que l'augmentation des droits des créanciers réduit ce coût. / This thesis examines three important issues in the banking sector, namely: Risk, Capital and Lending. It comprises of three empirical essays. The first chapter analyzes the impact of the 'Arab Spring' and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 on the banking sector stability in the MENA region. The results show that the ‘Arab Spring’ did not have a negative effect on banks’ stability, while the Global Financial Crisis significantly decreased banks’ stability. The second chapter investigates the role played by the institutional environment in determining capital buffers set either by regulators or by banks internally. The findings provide evidence that for the regulatory capital ratios to be effective, the institutional environment should not be neglected when implementing these ratios. The third chapter investigates the different effects of both consumers’ and creditors’ rights on the cost of lending. The results reveal that the cost of lending increases in the presence of strong financial consumer protection laws, while higher creditors’ rights decrease this cost.

Submitted by Mariana Oreng (mariana.oreng@gmail.com) on 2017-03-20T13:51:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_MOreng_final.pdf: 1436091 bytes, checksum: d7213dd44f2cbcc221da2058a36cd19f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2017-03-20T14:01:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_MOreng_final.pdf: 1436091 bytes, checksum: d7213dd44f2cbcc221da2058a36cd19f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-20T14:28:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_MOreng_final.pdf: 1436091 bytes, checksum: d7213dd44f2cbcc221da2058a36cd19f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-20 / This study analyzes how bank creditors vote on corporate reorganization filings. Brazil offers an excellent scenario for bankruptcy research: on the 10th anniversary of the Brazilian Bankruptcy Code, the number of reorganization filings skyrocketed, increasing from 110 in 2005 to 1863 in 2016. Our work is both theoretical and empirical; we suggest a cooperative game setting to explain creditor behavior, and we apply pooled cross-sectional data from 125 reorganization filings in Brazil from 2006 to 2016. We find evidence that the haircut proposed by debtors is the main factor driving bank creditors’ decisions, rather than firm size or age, as the traditional literature proposes. In accordance with our theoretical model, the proportion of senior debt is not relevant in explaining bank responses to reorganizations. By employing a unique dataset, we contribute to the bankruptcy literature by showing that the unified creditors’ framework does not apply. By looking at bank conflict at the interest level, we verify that the approval rate for reorganization filings decreases sharply, which indicates that coordination failures result from negotiation problems and often lead to liquidation. Due to legal and process similarities with countries such as the United States and Canada, the study also offers important insights regarding bankruptcy cases in general. / Este estudo explora como bancos credores votam em processos de recuperação judicial. O Brasil oferece um excelente cenário para este tipo de pesquisa: no décimo aniversário da Lei de Falências, o número de pedidos de reorganização aumentou de 110 em 2005 para 1863 em 2016. Este trabalho é teórico e empírico: Sugerimos um cenário de jogo cooperativo para explicar o comportamento dos credores e utilizamos dados agrupados de corte transversal de 125 registros de recuperação no Brasil de 2006 a 2016. Encontramos evidências de que a margem de redução proposta pelos devedores é o principal fator que pesa na decisão dos credores bancários, ao invés do tamanho da empresa ou seu tempo de mercado, como sugere a literatura tradicional em falências. De acordo com o modelo teórico proposto, demonstra-se que a proporção da dívida sênior não é relevante para explicar as respostas dos bancos credores às recuperações. Ao empregar um conjunto de dados exclusivo, este estudo contribui para a literatura de falências mostrando que a ideia de credores unificados não se aplica. Ao analisar o conflito entre bancos credores no nível da empresa, verifica-se que a taxa de aprovação de pedidos de recuperação diminui acentuadamente em casos de conflito, o que indica que as falhas de coordenação resultam de problemas de negociação e muitas vezes levam à liquidação. Devido a semelhanças legais e processuais a países como os Estados Unidos e Canadá, o estudo também oferece novas percepções sobre casos de falência em geral.

Este trabalho propõe-se a analisar os mútuos como direitos creditórios dos sócios das sociedades limitadas e dos acionistas das sociedades anônimas na legislação nacional e o tratamento dado pela legislação falimentar brasileira a esses direitos de crédito, à luz dos mesmos conceitos existentes no Direito Comparado, especificamente na Alemanha e nos Estados Unidos da América. A eleição dos referidos dois países para a análise do Direito alienígena justifica-se porque: (i) a Lei de Insolvência Alemã (Insolvenzordnung InsO), de 5.10.1994, em vigor desde 1.1.1999 e editada em substituição à antiga legislação datada de 1877, que previa os institutos da falência e concordata de forma muito semelhante ao sistema falimentar brasileiro do Decreto-lei nº 7.661, de 21.6.1945 (Decreto-lei 7.661/45), veio a regulamentar os institutos da recuperação e liquidação de empresas, com objetivos também muito semelhantes aos da Lei nº 11.101, de 9.2.2005 (Lei de Recuperação de Empresas e Falências), tendo ainda passado por recente reforma em novembro de 2008; (ii) o Bankruptcy Code, que compõe o Título 11 do United States Code, em vigor desde a reforma inserida no sistema concursal norte-americano por meio do Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, foi utilizado como base para muitos dos dispositivos da Lei de Recuperação de Empresas e Falências, seja quanto ao instituto da recuperação extrajudicial, da recuperação judicial ou da falência. Para o estudo do Direito Comparado elegeu-se, assim, um país do direito continental, com legislação bastante avançada e aproximada da nossa; e um país do common law, que foi pioneiro em vários aspectos do direito falimentar, sobretudo na concepção de reorganização de empresas em crise, tendo sua legislação servido de modelo para diversos outros países, além de para o Brasil. Os tipos de sociedades eleitos - sociedades anônimas e limitadas - justificam-se por serem os tipos societários mais utilizados no Brasil e, resguardadas algumas características específicas que assumem em cada ordenamento jurídico, pode-se dizer que são os tipos societários mais utilizados mundialmente; seja sob a denominação, respectivamente, de limited liability partnership e corporation, nos Estados Unidos da América; Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) e Aktiengesellschaft (AktG), na Alemanha; e denominações diversas em outros países. O trabalho (i) busca a intersecção dos seguintes temas: direitos creditórios dos sócios das sociedades limitadas e dos acionistas das sociedades anônimas, direitos patrimoniais dos sócios das sociedades limitadas e dos acionistas das sociedades anônimas, capital social, subcapitalização e, finalmente, direitos creditórios dos sócios e acionistas na falência das sociedades limitadas e anônimas, dentre estes especialmente os contratos de mútuo entre sócios ou acionistas e a sociedade falida; e (ii) estuda os mencionados temas à luz do Direito pátrio e do Direito comparado. Com base nos conceitos acima, este trabalho pretende contribuir para a interpretação das normas que dispõem sobre os direitos creditórios dos sócios e acionistas na falência das sociedades limitas e anônimas, tendo por princípio a adequação da cifra do capital social à realização do objeto social (em oposição à subcapitalização das sociedades), e visando à concessão de crédito, sobretudo mútuos, à prestação de serviços e ao fornecimento de bens à sociedade por seus próprios sócios e acionistas, estes na qualidade de terceiros perante a sociedade, respeitando-se o princípio da separação da personalidade jurídica. / The purpose of this study is to analyze loans as credits rights of partners of limited liability partnerships (sociedades limitadas) and shareholders of corporations (sociedades anônimas) under Brazilian law and the treatment granted by the Brazilian bankruptcy law to those credits rights, in view of the same concepts existing under foreign Law, specifically in Germany and in the United States of America. Both countries were chosen for the analysis of the foreign Law due to the facts that: (i) the Insolvency German Law (Insolvenzordnung InsO), as of 10.5.1994, in effect since 1.1.1999 and edited to replace the former legislation of 1877, which foresaw the bankruptcy and concordata institutes in a very similar way to the Brazilian bankruptcy system of Decree-law No. 7.661, of 6.21.1945 (Decree-law 7.661/45), came into force to regulate the institutes of business reorganization and liquidation of companies, also with similar objectives to the ones of the Law No. 11.101, of 2.9.2005 (Business Reorganization and Bankruptcy Law), having passed through a recent reform in November 2008; (ii) the Bankruptcy Code, which composes Title 11 of the United States Code, in effect since the reform brought into effect in the North-American bankruptcy system by means of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, and which has been used as basis for many rules of the Brazilian Business Reorganization and Bankruptcy Law, regarding the institutes of out-of-court business reorganization, judicial business reorganization and bankruptcy. Thus, for the study of the foreign Law, two countries were elected: one of continental right, with a very advanced legislation and very similar to ours; and the other of common law, pioneer in many aspects of the bankruptcy law, especially with regard to the concept of business reorganization of companies in financial distress, having its legislation as standard for many other countries besides Brazil. The types of companies corporations (sociedades anônimas) and limited liability partnerships (limitadas) were chosen due to the fact that they are the corporate types more used under Brazilian law and, besides some specific features that they assume under each legal system, some may say that they are the corporate types more used worldwide being nominated, respectively, as limited liability partnership and corporation, in the United States of America, or Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) and Aktiengesellschaft (AktG) in Germany; or with other nominations in other countries. This study (i) searches the intersection of the following subjects: credits rights of partners of limited liability partnerships (sociedades limitadas) and shareholders of corporations (sociedades anônimas), patrimonial rights of partners of limited liability partnerships (sociedades limitadas) and shareholders of corporations (sociedades anônimas), corporate capital, undercapitalization/thin-capitalization and, finally, credits rights of partners of limited liability partnerships (sociedades limitadas) and shareholders of corporations (sociedades anônimas) in bankruptcy proceedings, especially with regard to loans granted by partners or shareholders to the bankrupt company; and (ii) studies the referred subjects in view of the national Law and the foreign Law. With basis on the concepts referred above, the study intends to contribute with the interpretation of the rules about credits rights of partners and shareholders in bankruptcy proceedings of limited liability partnerships (sociedades limitadas) and corporations (sociedades anônimas), having as principle the adequacy of the amount of the corporate capital to the accomplishment of the corporate subject (opposed to the undercapitalization of companies), and aiming the granting of credit, the granting of services and the supply of goods to the company by its own partners or shareholders in the capacity of third parties before the company, in accordance with the principle of separation of the corporate entity from its partners or shareholders.