Stora företagsbedrägerier och skandaler såsom Kreuger, Enron och Worldcom där fordringsägare led omfattande förluster, följs ofta av en debatt om revisionens syfte och omfattning. Efter påtryckningar från EU om att minska den administrativa bördan, öka konkurrenskraften och stimulera Europas ekonomi, avskaffades revisionsplikten för mindre aktiebolag i Sverige 2010. Fordringsägare i form av bland annat kreditgivare och investerare är parter som kan drabbas vid en konkurs och har därför behov av att ha en fungerande relation med företaget. Tillsammans med kompletterande information från revisorer bidrar kreditbetyg till en bättre bild av kreditrisker som fordringsägare utsätter sig för. Syftet med studien är att öka förståelsen för revisionens betydelse i värderingen av ett litet företags betalningsförmåga när det sedan 2010 inte längre är ett lagstadgat krav att ha revisor. Studien ger även möjlighet till att bättre bedöma revisionens påverkan på kreditrisken för fordringsägare i händelse av konkurs. Detta är en triangulerande studie, där insamling av data har skett genom både kvalitativa intervjuer och kvantitativ information från 57 konkursbon av små bolag från 2009 och 61 från 2012. Intervjuerna har gjorts med 10 respondenter inom revision, kreditgivning och konkursförvaltning. Resultaten har analyserats utifrån framförallt agent- och intressentteorin. Studien har kommit fram till att användandet av revisor är en funktion som värderas högt. De har en viktig roll när det gäller att hjälpa företagare att leva upp till de ekonomiska kunskapskrav som omvärlden ställer. Även när det gäller bedömningen av företagets fortsatta drift kan revisorns kunskaper bidra till att minska risken för en obeståndssituation. Studien har dock inte kunnat fastställa att underskottens storlek i konkurserna har påverkats av om bolaget har haft revisor eller inte. Varken respondenterna eller sambandsanalysen styrker någon skillnad i påverkan på prioriterade borgenärer efter avskaffandet av revisionsplikten. För både 2009 och 2012 har många konkurser små underskott medan få har stora, vilket indikerar att kreditgivare i det flesta fall har kunnat göra rimliga kreditbedömningar. / Major fraud and scandals in corporations such as Kreuger, Enron and Worldcom where creditors suffered significant losses, are often followed with debate around the purpose and scope of corporate audits. After pressure from the EU in order to reduce the administrative burden, increase competitive capacity, and stimulate the European economy the mandatory auditing was abolished for small enterprises in Sweden in 2010. Creditors of which some are banks and investors are parties that who can be affected by a bankruptcy and are therefore dependent on a working relationship with the enterprise. Together with additional information from an auditor credit ratings will aid a creditor in the assessment of exposed risk. This study aims to increase the understanding of audit significance in the aspect of credit rating of small companies and their ability to fulfil payments to prioritised creditors in case of bankruptcy as the legislated audit no longer is a requirement. It will also provide a possibility to assess the influence of auditing on the credit risk creditor is subject to in the event of bankruptcy. The study is using a triangulating method where data is collected using both qualitative interviews and quantitative data from 57 bankruptcies of small enterprises from 2009 and 61 bankruptcies from 2012. The interviews were conducted with 10 respondents representing auditing, loans, and Insolvency practise. The results have been analysed from the perspective of Agent- and Stakeholder theories. The study has derived to the conclusion that the use of auditors does carry a significant value. They have an important role to play when it comes to assisting entrepreneurs to live up to the expectation and skills their counterparts have on them. Even the assessment made by auditors on the company’s ability to continue operation, going concern, is knowledge which can contribute to the prevention of a future situation of insolvency. The study has not been able to prove any relationship between the company's level of debt in bankruptcy and if the company has chosen to have an auditor. Neither respondents in the qualitative data collection nor the search for correlation in the quantitative data has been able to support findings of difference on the impact on the prioritised creditors between the companies using auditors and the ones not using auditors from the time after the abolishment of mandatory audits. From both 2009 and 2012 most bankruptcies have low deficits and a small number have high, which indicate creditors have been able to make reasonable credit assessments.

In July 2014, Argentina entered selective default, even as the country remained financially solvent. The default stemmed not from economic woes, but rather from protracted international litigation between Argentina and a group of hedge funds who, for years, refused to negotiate with Argentina over their bond holdings in the wake of the country’s first default in 2001. These holdouts stalled negotiations and locked Argentina out of international credit markets, damaging the country’s economy and financially harming other creditors and Argentinian citizens alike. Argentina ended up in such a dilemma because of the current sovereign debt restructuring process. No international arbitrator of sovereign debt currently exists. Instead, a country must negotiate with creditors on an ad-hoc basis, gathering support from 100% of creditors before it can restructure its debt and reenter international credit markets, an extremely inefficient system. This paper will assess the current system of sovereign default renegotiations, identifying inefficiencies in the current system, reviewing past proposals for improvements to the system, and ultimately proposing an international arbitrator for default negotiations. This text uses the development of the US Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 as a guide for an international bankruptcy court. Prior to the passage of the law, municipalities faced many of the same challenges faced by defaulted nations today, including powerful holdouts and a lack of structure in the negotiation system. Given the similarities between the two cases, the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act serves as an ideal framework for sovereign default arbitration internationally.

Le présent mémoire analyse l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité sur le devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, devoir imposer aux administrateurs de compagnies par la législation corporative canadienne. L'objectif du mémoire est de déterminer un standard de conduite à être adopté par l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire. Dans un premier temps, comment peut-on définir ce que constitue le « meilleur intérêt de la compagnie» ? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que l'intérêt de la compagnie est au carrefour d'une communauté d'intérêts lui étant sous-jacents. L'intérêt de la compagnie, bien qu'indépendant de ces intérêts sous-jacents, ne peut s'analyser en faisant abstraction de ces derniers. La jurisprudence et la doctrine récentes laissent entrevoir que l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité se fait sentir sur la détermination de ces intérêts sous-jacents à celui de la compagnie susceptibles d'être affectés par la finalité poursuivie par la compagnie, finalité axée sur la maximisation des profits à partir des opérations de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, le créancier, à l'instar de l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, supporte le risque commercial résiduel et doit recevoir une attention appropriée par les administrateurs. Par conséquent, dans la détermination de ce que constitue le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, l'administrateur ne peut, lorsque la compagnie est insolvable, faire abstraction de l'intérêt des créanciers. Ainsi, dans un deuxième temps, qui sont les véritables bénéficiaires du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie dans un contexte d'insolvabilité? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que le créancier est un bénéficiaire indirect de ce devoir fiduciaire lorsque la compagnie est insolvable. Tout comme l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, le créancier doit être en mesure d'intenter un recours de nature dérivée en vue d'obtenir réparation, pour et au nom de la compagnie. Le contexte d'insolvabilité fait naître, à l'endroit des administrateurs, une obligation de nature fiduciaire de prendre en considération l'intérêt des créanciers tout en permettant à ces derniers d'intenter un tel recours dérivé en vue d'obtenir réparation à la suite d'une violation du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie. En plus d'être soutenue par une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine canadiennes, cette conclusion s'appuie sur une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine de certains pays du Commonwealth (Angleterre, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande) et des États-Unis, juridictions avec lesquelles le Canada entretient des relations privilégiés, historiquement ou économiquement. Finalement, que doit faire l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie? L'auteur arrive à la conclusion que cette obligation de prendre en considération l'intérêt du créancier dans un contexte d'insolvabilité se traduit par un exercice de conciliation entre les intérêts du créancier et ceux des actionnaires. Les paramètres de cet exercice de conciliation sont déterminés en fonction du scénario envisagé par les administrateurs face à la situation d'insolvabilité. Plus le scénario se rapproche d'une liquidation plus ou moins formelle des actifs tangibles et facilement dissociables de la compagnie, moins cet exercice en sera un de conciliation et plus l'intérêt du créancier devra recevoir une attention prépondérante. À l'opposé, plus le scénario en est un de restructuration fondée sur une relance de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie insolvable, plus l'intérêt de l'actionnaire devra recevoir une attention particulière. / The following thesis analyses the impact of a company's insolvency on the fiduciary duties of its directors and officers, as imposed by Canadian corporate law. More specifically it shall examine the repercussions of an insolvency on management's fiduciary duty to act in accordance with the company's best interests. The objective shall therefore be to assess the extent of such fiduciary duty in the context of an insolvency and to establish a guideline to be followed by directors and officers in view of complying with said duty. Firstly, what constitutes the "best interests of the company"? The author concludes that a company's interests are comprised of a community of underlying interests. Although the interests of the company remain independent, it cannot be determined without taking into account said underlying interests. Amongst this community of underlying interests, shareholders and creditors, members of such community that supports the financing of the company's operations, occupy a predominant place. Recent case law and doctrinal authorities have concluded that the impact of a company's insolvency does not affect the ultimate objective pursued by the company, i.e. the maximisation of profit, but rather affects the determination of the members of the community of underlying interests that shall be affected by the pursuit of such finality. As such, in a context of insolvency, creditors, similar to shareholders in a context of solvency, are the residual risk-bearers of the company's commercial expenditure. Consequently, in view of determining what constitutes the best interests of the company, when it is insolvent, directors and officers may not ignore the creditors' interests. Secondly, who are the real beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty to act in a company's best interests when it becomes insolvent? The author concludes that creditors are indirect beneficiaries of such fiduciary duty in a context of insolvency. Similarly to shareholders in a context of solvency, creditors must be entitled to institute a derivative claim against directors and officers in order to obtain, in the name and for the company, compensation for the violation of said fiduciary duty. Insolvency triggers the existence of an obligation, fiduciary in nature, to take into account the creditors' interests. As such, directors and officers are to consider the creditors' interests in exercising their fiduciary duty to act in strict compliance with the best interests of the company. This conclusion is based on a review of the Canadian statutory law, jurisprudence and doctrinal authorities. Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by a review of same from certain Commonwealth jurisdictions (England, Australia and New-Zealand) and from the United States of America, jurisdictions with whom Canada has a privileged relationship, historically and/or economically. Finally, how does the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests translate in practice for directors and officers of an insolvent company? The author concludes that the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests is, in reality, an obligation to reconcile the shareholders' and creditors' interests with that of the company's best interests. The parameters of such obligation shall be determined with respect to the scenario conceived by directors and officers in order to effectively manage a situation of insolvency. Should such scenario focus on the liquidation of the core assets of the company, then the interests of the shareholders shall be subjugated to that of the creditors'. Conversely, should such scenario focus on the reorganisation of the company's commercial expenditures, based on the company's existing structures, then the shareholder's interest shall receive a more extensive attention by directors and officers.

A pesquisa procurou levantar a relação entre concentração acionária e risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores no Brasil. O universo amostral compreendeu as empresas de capital aberto listadas na Bovespa no período de 1997 a 2011. Foram traçados dois objetivos na pesquisa: (i) verificar se empresas com a presença de controle acionário definido apresentam maior percepção de risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores do que aquelas que não apresentam concentração acionária; e (ii) verificar entre as empresas com a presença de controle acionário definido se maior participação no controle gera maior percepção de risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros. O suporte teórico do trabalho se deu em estudos sobre estrutura de capital, controle de capital, mercado de crédito e custo de capital de terceiros no Brasil. As variáveis estudadas foram o percentual de ações ON pelos principais acionistas e o custo da dívida medido pelo Ki. Os procedimentos estatísticos se deram pelos testes não paramétricos U de Man-Whitney e Kruskal-Wallis com comparações múltiplas entre grupos. A primeira resposta apresentou indícios, com significância estatística de 5%, que empresas com controle acionário definido tendem a apresentar maior risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros do que as demais. Entretanto, quando o controle é exercido por um único acionista que possui 50% ou mais das ações com direito a voto, as empresas tendem a apresentar menor risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores do que as demais. A segunda resposta encontrada, também com significância estatística de 5%, apontou que, em empresas com a presença de um único acionista na posse de 50% ou mais das ações ON, à medida que esse principal acionista aumenta a participação no controle, o custo da dívida, variável explicativa de risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros, tende a diminuir. Portanto, acredita-se que o presente estudo cumpre a proposta de investigação apresentada ao não encontrar evidências que permitam descartar a ideia de que existe relação entre controle acionário definido e risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores.Palavras-chave: Apreçamento de opções, Modelo HJM Gaussiano, Regressão não paramétrica. / The survey tried to raise the relationship between ownership concentration and risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth in Brazil. The sample universe consisted of publicly traded companies listed on Bovespa in the period 1997-2011. Two main objectives were outlined: (i) verify if companies with the presence of defined shareholder control have a higher perception of risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth than those who do not have shareholder control, and (ii) check between companies with defined shareholder control set if greater participation in the control creates higher perception of risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth. The theoretical basis of the work was in studies on capital structure, capital controls, credit market and cost of third party capital in Brazil. The variables studied were the percentage of ON shares by principal shareholders and the cost of debt measured by Ki. Statistical procedures were given by nonparametric tests U of Mann Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis with multiple comparisons between groups. The first response, with statistical significance of 5%, showed that companies with defined shareholder control set tend to have a higher risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth than others. However, when the control is exercised by a single shareholder who holds 50% or more of voting shares, companies tend to have lower risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth than others. The second one, also with a statistical significance of 5%, pointed out that in companies with a single shareholder who holds 50% or more of ON shares, as this principal shareholder increases his participation in the control, the cost of debt, explanatory variable risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth, tends to decrease. Therefore, it is believed that this study fulfils the investigation proposal presented to find no evidence to discard the idea that there is a relationship between defined shareholder control and risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth.

A pesquisa procurou levantar a relação entre concentração acionária e risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores no Brasil. O universo amostral compreendeu as empresas de capital aberto listadas na Bovespa no período de 1997 a 2011. Foram traçados dois objetivos na pesquisa: (i) verificar se empresas com a presença de controle acionário definido apresentam maior percepção de risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores do que aquelas que não apresentam concentração acionária; e (ii) verificar entre as empresas com a presença de controle acionário definido se maior participação no controle gera maior percepção de risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros. O suporte teórico do trabalho se deu em estudos sobre estrutura de capital, controle de capital, mercado de crédito e custo de capital de terceiros no Brasil. As variáveis estudadas foram o percentual de ações ON pelos principais acionistas e o custo da dívida medido pelo Ki. Os procedimentos estatísticos se deram pelos testes não paramétricos U de Man-Whitney e Kruskal-Wallis com comparações múltiplas entre grupos. A primeira resposta apresentou indícios, com significância estatística de 5%, que empresas com controle acionário definido tendem a apresentar maior risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros do que as demais. Entretanto, quando o controle é exercido por um único acionista que possui 50% ou mais das ações com direito a voto, as empresas tendem a apresentar menor risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores do que as demais. A segunda resposta encontrada, também com significância estatística de 5%, apontou que, em empresas com a presença de um único acionista na posse de 50% ou mais das ações ON, à medida que esse principal acionista aumenta a participação no controle, o custo da dívida, variável explicativa de risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros, tende a diminuir. Portanto, acredita-se que o presente estudo cumpre a proposta de investigação apresentada ao não encontrar evidências que permitam descartar a ideia de que existe relação entre controle acionário definido e risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores.Palavras-chave: Apreçamento de opções, Modelo HJM Gaussiano, Regressão não paramétrica. / The survey tried to raise the relationship between ownership concentration and risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth in Brazil. The sample universe consisted of publicly traded companies listed on Bovespa in the period 1997-2011. Two main objectives were outlined: (i) verify if companies with the presence of defined shareholder control have a higher perception of risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth than those who do not have shareholder control, and (ii) check between companies with defined shareholder control set if greater participation in the control creates higher perception of risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth. The theoretical basis of the work was in studies on capital structure, capital controls, credit market and cost of third party capital in Brazil. The variables studied were the percentage of ON shares by principal shareholders and the cost of debt measured by Ki. Statistical procedures were given by nonparametric tests U of Mann Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis with multiple comparisons between groups. The first response, with statistical significance of 5%, showed that companies with defined shareholder control set tend to have a higher risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth than others. However, when the control is exercised by a single shareholder who holds 50% or more of voting shares, companies tend to have lower risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth than others. The second one, also with a statistical significance of 5%, pointed out that in companies with a single shareholder who holds 50% or more of ON shares, as this principal shareholder increases his participation in the control, the cost of debt, explanatory variable risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth, tends to decrease. Therefore, it is believed that this study fulfils the investigation proposal presented to find no evidence to discard the idea that there is a relationship between defined shareholder control and risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth.

Este trabalho propõe-se a analisar os mútuos como direitos creditórios dos sócios das sociedades limitadas e dos acionistas das sociedades anônimas na legislação nacional e o tratamento dado pela legislação falimentar brasileira a esses direitos de crédito, à luz dos mesmos conceitos existentes no Direito Comparado, especificamente na Alemanha e nos Estados Unidos da América. A eleição dos referidos dois países para a análise do Direito alienígena justifica-se porque: (i) a Lei de Insolvência Alemã (Insolvenzordnung InsO), de 5.10.1994, em vigor desde 1.1.1999 e editada em substituição à antiga legislação datada de 1877, que previa os institutos da falência e concordata de forma muito semelhante ao sistema falimentar brasileiro do Decreto-lei nº 7.661, de 21.6.1945 (Decreto-lei 7.661/45), veio a regulamentar os institutos da recuperação e liquidação de empresas, com objetivos também muito semelhantes aos da Lei nº 11.101, de 9.2.2005 (Lei de Recuperação de Empresas e Falências), tendo ainda passado por recente reforma em novembro de 2008; (ii) o Bankruptcy Code, que compõe o Título 11 do United States Code, em vigor desde a reforma inserida no sistema concursal norte-americano por meio do Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, foi utilizado como base para muitos dos dispositivos da Lei de Recuperação de Empresas e Falências, seja quanto ao instituto da recuperação extrajudicial, da recuperação judicial ou da falência. Para o estudo do Direito Comparado elegeu-se, assim, um país do direito continental, com legislação bastante avançada e aproximada da nossa; e um país do common law, que foi pioneiro em vários aspectos do direito falimentar, sobretudo na concepção de reorganização de empresas em crise, tendo sua legislação servido de modelo para diversos outros países, além de para o Brasil. Os tipos de sociedades eleitos - sociedades anônimas e limitadas - justificam-se por serem os tipos societários mais utilizados no Brasil e, resguardadas algumas características específicas que assumem em cada ordenamento jurídico, pode-se dizer que são os tipos societários mais utilizados mundialmente; seja sob a denominação, respectivamente, de limited liability partnership e corporation, nos Estados Unidos da América; Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) e Aktiengesellschaft (AktG), na Alemanha; e denominações diversas em outros países. O trabalho (i) busca a intersecção dos seguintes temas: direitos creditórios dos sócios das sociedades limitadas e dos acionistas das sociedades anônimas, direitos patrimoniais dos sócios das sociedades limitadas e dos acionistas das sociedades anônimas, capital social, subcapitalização e, finalmente, direitos creditórios dos sócios e acionistas na falência das sociedades limitadas e anônimas, dentre estes especialmente os contratos de mútuo entre sócios ou acionistas e a sociedade falida; e (ii) estuda os mencionados temas à luz do Direito pátrio e do Direito comparado. Com base nos conceitos acima, este trabalho pretende contribuir para a interpretação das normas que dispõem sobre os direitos creditórios dos sócios e acionistas na falência das sociedades limitas e anônimas, tendo por princípio a adequação da cifra do capital social à realização do objeto social (em oposição à subcapitalização das sociedades), e visando à concessão de crédito, sobretudo mútuos, à prestação de serviços e ao fornecimento de bens à sociedade por seus próprios sócios e acionistas, estes na qualidade de terceiros perante a sociedade, respeitando-se o princípio da separação da personalidade jurídica. / The purpose of this study is to analyze loans as credits rights of partners of limited liability partnerships (sociedades limitadas) and shareholders of corporations (sociedades anônimas) under Brazilian law and the treatment granted by the Brazilian bankruptcy law to those credits rights, in view of the same concepts existing under foreign Law, specifically in Germany and in the United States of America. Both countries were chosen for the analysis of the foreign Law due to the facts that: (i) the Insolvency German Law (Insolvenzordnung InsO), as of 10.5.1994, in effect since 1.1.1999 and edited to replace the former legislation of 1877, which foresaw the bankruptcy and concordata institutes in a very similar way to the Brazilian bankruptcy system of Decree-law No. 7.661, of 6.21.1945 (Decree-law 7.661/45), came into force to regulate the institutes of business reorganization and liquidation of companies, also with similar objectives to the ones of the Law No. 11.101, of 2.9.2005 (Business Reorganization and Bankruptcy Law), having passed through a recent reform in November 2008; (ii) the Bankruptcy Code, which composes Title 11 of the United States Code, in effect since the reform brought into effect in the North-American bankruptcy system by means of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, and which has been used as basis for many rules of the Brazilian Business Reorganization and Bankruptcy Law, regarding the institutes of out-of-court business reorganization, judicial business reorganization and bankruptcy. Thus, for the study of the foreign Law, two countries were elected: one of continental right, with a very advanced legislation and very similar to ours; and the other of common law, pioneer in many aspects of the bankruptcy law, especially with regard to the concept of business reorganization of companies in financial distress, having its legislation as standard for many other countries besides Brazil. The types of companies corporations (sociedades anônimas) and limited liability partnerships (limitadas) were chosen due to the fact that they are the corporate types more used under Brazilian law and, besides some specific features that they assume under each legal system, some may say that they are the corporate types more used worldwide being nominated, respectively, as limited liability partnership and corporation, in the United States of America, or Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) and Aktiengesellschaft (AktG) in Germany; or with other nominations in other countries. This study (i) searches the intersection of the following subjects: credits rights of partners of limited liability partnerships (sociedades limitadas) and shareholders of corporations (sociedades anônimas), patrimonial rights of partners of limited liability partnerships (sociedades limitadas) and shareholders of corporations (sociedades anônimas), corporate capital, undercapitalization/thin-capitalization and, finally, credits rights of partners of limited liability partnerships (sociedades limitadas) and shareholders of corporations (sociedades anônimas) in bankruptcy proceedings, especially with regard to loans granted by partners or shareholders to the bankrupt company; and (ii) studies the referred subjects in view of the national Law and the foreign Law. With basis on the concepts referred above, the study intends to contribute with the interpretation of the rules about credits rights of partners and shareholders in bankruptcy proceedings of limited liability partnerships (sociedades limitadas) and corporations (sociedades anônimas), having as principle the adequacy of the amount of the corporate capital to the accomplishment of the corporate subject (opposed to the undercapitalization of companies), and aiming the granting of credit, the granting of services and the supply of goods to the company by its own partners or shareholders in the capacity of third parties before the company, in accordance with the principle of separation of the corporate entity from its partners or shareholders.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2019-01-22T14:26:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Möller Martinho_.pdf: 1521488 bytes, checksum: a62473e05e6f31666a01c09b11195287 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2019-01-22T14:26:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Möller Martinho_.pdf: 1521488 bytes, checksum: a62473e05e6f31666a01c09b11195287 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-10-08 / Nenhuma / O presente trabalho tem como objeto a análise do processo de recuperação judicial de empresas e avaliação da sua eficiência enquanto instrumento de superação da crise econômico financeira. Para tanto, o estudo, que se utiliza do ferramental da Análise Econômica do Direito, se fundamenta na análise qualitativa e quantitativa de 181 processos de recuperação judicial ajuizados entre 01/09/2013 e 30/06/2016 na 1ª e 2ª Vara de Falências e Recuperação Judicial do Foro Central Cível da Comarca de São Paulo. Ademais, como base empírica, busca-se identificar todos os aspectos mensuráveis dos processos estudados e analisá-los à luz das teorias econômicas aplicáveis à AED, buscando assim medir a eficiência do Processo de recuperação judicial no Brasil e os fatores que contribuem para a sua maior ou menor eficiência. Os resultados apurados indicaram que a assimetria informacional é o fator de maior impacto na eficiência do processo de recuperação judicial. / The present work aims to analyze the process of judicial reorganization of companies and evaluation of its efficiency as an instrument to overcome the economic and financial crisis. To this end, the study, which uses the method of Law and Economics, is based on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of 181 judicial reorgatization proceedings filed between 09/01/2013 and 06/30/2016 in the 1st and 2nd Bankruptcy Court of the Central Civil Forum of the Region of São Paulo. In addition, as an empirical basis, it seeks to identify all the measurable aspects of the processes studied and to analyze them in the light of the economic theories applicable to Law and Economics, in order to measure the efficiency of the judicial reorganization process in Brazil and the factors that contribute to its higher or lower efficiency. The results suggest that informational asymmetry is the factor that has the greatest impact on the efficiency of the process of judicial reorganization.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Carla Smith de Vasconcellos Crippa.pdf: 1195525 bytes, checksum: cc16220bf4da5f438c79d0f46cf95e8c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-08 / The subject of this academic work is the abuse of right in the judicial restructuring and its objective is to verify the criteria to allow the recognition and punishment of abusive behaviors in the judicial restructuring, analyzing the legal regulation of the abuse, its requirements and consequences. Law No. 11,101/2005 does not rule the abuse of right, being silent on this subject. However, we have seen abusive behaviors by creditors, debtors, shareholders and officers, violating the limits imposed by good faith, good manners and the economic and social purpose of the judicial restructuring. To avoid that such behaviors are not punished as a consequence of an omission in Law No. 11,101/2005, we investigate the regulation of the abuse by Brazilian Law and the possibility of application of such regulation to the judicial restructuring on a subsidiary basis. The investigation is primarily analytic, dealing with the conceptualization of judicial restructuring and abuse of right and the principles and laws applicable to them. It is also empiric, reviewing court precedents. This work aims at setting out parameters that may be used in the discussion of particular cases, as to contribute to the development of court precedents and to the drafting of fair and equitable judicial restructuring plans, which comply with the purposes of Law No. 11,101/2005 / O tema desta dissertação é o abuso de direito na recuperação judicial e o seu objetivo é verificar os critérios que permitem o reconhecimento e a repressão de condutas abusivas na recuperação judicial, analisando a regulamentação legal do abuso, seus pressupostos e consequências. A Lei 11.101/2005 não disciplina o abuso de direito, sendo silente sobre o assunto. No entanto, tem-se visto comportamentos abusivos de credores, devedores, sócios e administradores, que violam os limites impostos pela boa-fé, pelos bons costumes e pela finalidade econômica e social da recuperação judicial. Para evitar que esses comportamentos deixem de ser reprimidos em razão de uma lacuna na Lei 11.101/2005, investigou-se a regulamentação do abuso pela legislação brasileira e a possibilidade de aplicação subsidiária dessa regulamentação à recuperação judicial. A investigação é eminentemente analítica, tratando da conceituação da recuperação judicial e do abuso de direito e da análise dos princípios e leis a eles aplicáveis. É, também, empírica, efetuando uma análise de casos. Esta dissertação procura estabelecer parâmetros para a discussão de casos concretos, visando a contribuir para o desenvolvimento da jurisprudência e para a consecução de planos de recuperação judicial justos, equilibrados e que cumpram com as finalidades da Lei 11.101/2005

O trabalho tem por objetivo à análise jurídica do plano de recuperação e suas consequências práticas, questionando até que ponto o objetivo de um acordo imposto será alcançado, tendo em vista os diferentes interesses em jogo. A primeira parte é dedicada ao exame das disciplinas da recuperação, traçando um histórico evolutivo deste instrumento a partir da concordata. Neste ponto, são apresentadas as teorias quanto a sua natureza jurídica. A segunda parte, por sua vez, aponta breves considerações de como o direito alienígena disciplina a recuperação. Na terceira parte, o trabalho analisa a recuperação como jogo estratégico, pois existem riscos inerentes a sua execução. Isso porque, do ponto de vista econômico, o plano de recuperação, por ser contrato incompleto, impõe riscos, por portar variáveis não previstas, como por exemplo, a mudança de política econômica ou a crise financeira mundial. Assim sendo, o trabalho analisa as possibilidades de renegociação dos termos do plano, bem como as soluções que podem ser usadas quando da incompletude. Neste sentido, analisa os mecanismos da arbitragem, da governança coorporativa e da cláusula hardship, além dos princípios da boa-fé objetiva, função social do contrato, função social da empresa e teoria da imprevisão. Como a recuperação judicial e extrajudicial representam meios de reestruturação que beneficiam a coletividade de interessados: estando de um lado o devedor que pretende obter prazos para o cumprimento de suas obrigações; de outro lado os credores que visualizam uma forma de obter seus créditos, ainda existem outros (credores) que poderão discordar da proposta. Para sanar esta possibilidade (do credor buscar a solução individual de seus interesses em contraposição àqueles coletivos dos credores) a Lei 11.101/05 criou a modalidade impositiva, na qual se impõe aos dissidentes o acordo dos que aderiram voluntariamente. Por este motivo, há divergências quanto a natureza jurídica do plano de recuperação. Neste sentido, a quarta parte do trabalho traz considerações quanto a natureza jurídica dos planos de recuperação judicial e extrajudicial. / The aim of this work is assess the legal analysis of a judicial recovery plan and its practical consequences, questioning to what extent the objective of an agreement will be reached if come into force, given the different interests at stake. The first part deals with the consideration of the disciplines of recovery, tracing the evolutionary history of this instrument from a point of concordata. At this point, theories as to their legal nature are presented. The second part, in turn, brings brief considerations of how the foreign laws discipline the recovery. In the third part, the paper examines the recovery as a strategic game, since there are risks inherent in its execution. From an economic point of view, these risks arise from an incomplete contract carrying unforeseen variables, for instance, the change in the economic policy as well as the world wide financial crisis. So, the paper analyzes the possibilities of renegotiating the terms of the plan, as well as solutions that can be used when the incompleteness. In this sense, analyzing the mechanisms of arbitration, corporate governance and the hardship clause, in addition to the principles of objective good faith, the contract´s social function, the company\'s social function and theory of unpredictability. As the judicial and extrajudicial´s recovery represents means of restructuring, which benefits the collective of the people involved: on one side the debtor who wishes to obtain deadlines for compliance with its obligations, on the other side creditors who see a way to get their credits back, and also there are others (creditors) who may disagree with the proposal. To address this possibility (the creditor seeking the solution of his individual interests as opposed to those collective interests of creditors) Law 11.101/05 created the imposing form, which is imposed on dissidents, the agreement of those who joined voluntarily. For this reason, there are differences of opinion about the legal nature of the recovery plan. In this sense, the fourth part of the work brings the legal considerations in plans and extra-judicial recovery.

Abstract Purpose: A part of this research is to explore if there are partnership firms that voluntarily get an audit of their business. The purpose is to understand and explain why these partnership firms have chosen to get an audit of their business voluntarily. Additionally, the authors research how external stakeholders, such as creditors, view and assess partnership firms that do not execute an audit of their accounts and reports. Method: To initiate this research, the authors conducted a telephone survey as a pre-study, to assure the viability of this research. As a major part of this research study, qualitative interviews with partnership firms, banks and the Swedish Tax Agency have been conducted to obtain professional opinion in the subject of interest. Previous researches are presented to provide a broader perspective of the debate. Frame of Reference: The authors present an extensive background to auditing and accounting. Stakeholder model and agency theory have been applied to facilitate in understanding the relationship between a partnership firm and its stakeholders. Advantages and disadvantages of auditing, as well as the concept of voluntary auditing are presented to facilitate a discussion of the motives of voluntarily executing an audit firms. Conclusion: After extensive research the authors have identified and determined the most probable motives of voluntary audits as well as understood how these external stakeholders view and assess these partnership firms that do not execute an audit of their accounts and reports. The authors can after a broad research conclude that partners’ central motives to voluntary auditing is to seek the value that is added through it, as the firm obtains professional assistance to raise the credibility of the firm’s financial reports. Auditing frees them from additional burden and time to manage the work related to accounting records and enables them to devote more time to the core business. Through an audit, partners’ quest for orderliness is fulfilled. Moreover, indications have been seen that partners are open to voluntarily execute an audit to achieve a sense of security in relation to the other partners. Another essential motive to why partners voluntarily execute audits is to be assured that there are no significant inaccuracies or errors in their book-keeping. Overall, partners’ intentions of getting an audit of their accounts and reports are to gain an overview of the business as well to obtain enhanced business image externally. Creditors are concerned about a firm’s ability to reimburse the obligation. In a newly started firm, banks require annual reports, forecasts and budgets ensure the firm’s solvency. The Swedish Tax Agency receives audit reports from auditors that guide them with hints and directions on what to assess further. Moreover, the Swedish Tax Agency performs tax audits on firms, whereby they conduct an assessment to ensure that the accounts and other documents are in accordance with what is declared to them. / Sammanfattning Syfte: Avsikten med denna uppsats är att utforska om det finns handelsbolag som frivilligt upprättar revision i sin affärsverksamhet. Syftet är att få förståelse för samt förklara de bakomliggande motiven till handelsbolags val av frivillig revision. Författarna utforskar ytterligare hur externa parter, såsom kreditgivare samt skatteverket, granskar och ser på handelsbolag som inte upprättar revision på sin verksamhet. Metod: Författarna genomförde en förstudie i form av en telefonenkät, för att försäkra sig om att denna studie är genomförbar. För att erhålla en professionell åsikt kring ämnet i fråga, har denna studie till största del bestått av kvalitativa intervjuer med respondenter från delägare av handelsbolag, banker och skatteverket. Tidigare studier är även presenterade för att tillföra debatten ett bredare perspektiv. Referensram: Författarna ger en omfattande beskrivning av redovisning och revision. Intressentmodellen och agentteorin har tillämpats i syfte att underlätta förståelsen av relationen mellan företag och dess intressenter. Dessutom beskrivs för- och nackdelar av revision för att underlätta diskussionen kring motiven till frivillig revision i handelsbolag. Slutsats: Författarna har efter omfattande forskning fastställt de troligaste motiven till frivillig revision samt fått en djupare förståelse för bankernas och skatteverkets ståndpunkt och granskning av handelsbolag som inte är revisionspliktiga. Sammanfattningsvis kan författarna hävda att grundmotiven till frivillig revision är värdet som den tillför, då bolagen erhåller professionell samråd som höjer redovisningens trovärdighet i bolaget. Revision underlättar för delägarna då de inte behöver ta på sig bördan av att tillägna tid och kraft på att själva utföra bokföringen. Detta tillåter delägarna i sin tur att ägna mer tid till själva kärnverksamheten. Genom revision, fullgörs delägarnas strävan efter ordning och reda i bolaget. För övrigt har man sett indikationer på att delägarna är positivt inställda på att frivilligt upprätta revision i handelsbolagen, då revisionen bidrar till att de erhåller en känsla av trygghet. Ett annat motiv, är att revisionen försäkrar dem om det inte förekommer väsentliga felaktigheter eller misstag i boksluten. Delägarnas främsta avsikt till användandet av revision kan i det stora hela summeras till att de får en översiktsbild av sina bolag, såväl som att de erhåller en kvalitetsstämpel och därmed en förhöjd bild av bolaget utåt sett. Kreditgivare är angelägna över bolagens återbetalningsförmåga. Därför kräver banken att nystartade bolag ska framföra sin årsredovisning, budget och framtida prognoser, för att försäkra sig om och fastställa deras återbetalningsförmåga. Skatteverket mottar årsredovisningar från revisorer, som med fördel förser skatteverket med råd och vägledning kring eventuell vidare granskning i bolagen. Skatteverket utför därtill skatterevision, genom att de granskar bolagen i syfte att intyga att de presenterade räkenskaperna och rapporterna överensstämmer med det som har deklarerats och kommit till skatteverkets förfogande.