Abstract This dissertation assesses the potential impacts of corporate governance codes and legislation on Directors and Officers (D&O) Liability Insurance. Corporate failures lead to numerous losses for stakeholders especially shareholders. Worldwide including in South Africa, this has resulted in an increase in legal liability claims against directors and thus insurers. Often these failures are ascribed to corporate governance breaches giving rise initially to corporate governance codes and more recently many countries are legislating certain aspects of corporate governance; this includes a codification of director‟s duties. South Africa, in-line with the United Kingdom, Australia and to an extent the United States has followed suit with the Companies Bill of 2008. This dissertation seeks to assess the possible effects of the codes of practice and new Companies Act on Directors‟ and Officers‟ Liability insurance. This will be done by ascertaining what impact the new Act will have on directors‟ liability using inter alia the Delphi Technique.

Le présent mémoire analyse l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité sur le devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, devoir imposer aux administrateurs de compagnies par la législation corporative canadienne. L'objectif du mémoire est de déterminer un standard de conduite à être adopté par l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire. Dans un premier temps, comment peut-on définir ce que constitue le « meilleur intérêt de la compagnie» ? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que l'intérêt de la compagnie est au carrefour d'une communauté d'intérêts lui étant sous-jacents. L'intérêt de la compagnie, bien qu'indépendant de ces intérêts sous-jacents, ne peut s'analyser en faisant abstraction de ces derniers. La jurisprudence et la doctrine récentes laissent entrevoir que l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité se fait sentir sur la détermination de ces intérêts sous-jacents à celui de la compagnie susceptibles d'être affectés par la finalité poursuivie par la compagnie, finalité axée sur la maximisation des profits à partir des opérations de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, le créancier, à l'instar de l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, supporte le risque commercial résiduel et doit recevoir une attention appropriée par les administrateurs. Par conséquent, dans la détermination de ce que constitue le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, l'administrateur ne peut, lorsque la compagnie est insolvable, faire abstraction de l'intérêt des créanciers. Ainsi, dans un deuxième temps, qui sont les véritables bénéficiaires du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie dans un contexte d'insolvabilité? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que le créancier est un bénéficiaire indirect de ce devoir fiduciaire lorsque la compagnie est insolvable. Tout comme l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, le créancier doit être en mesure d'intenter un recours de nature dérivée en vue d'obtenir réparation, pour et au nom de la compagnie. Le contexte d'insolvabilité fait naître, à l'endroit des administrateurs, une obligation de nature fiduciaire de prendre en considération l'intérêt des créanciers tout en permettant à ces derniers d'intenter un tel recours dérivé en vue d'obtenir réparation à la suite d'une violation du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie. En plus d'être soutenue par une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine canadiennes, cette conclusion s'appuie sur une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine de certains pays du Commonwealth (Angleterre, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande) et des États-Unis, juridictions avec lesquelles le Canada entretient des relations privilégiés, historiquement ou économiquement. Finalement, que doit faire l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie? L'auteur arrive à la conclusion que cette obligation de prendre en considération l'intérêt du créancier dans un contexte d'insolvabilité se traduit par un exercice de conciliation entre les intérêts du créancier et ceux des actionnaires. Les paramètres de cet exercice de conciliation sont déterminés en fonction du scénario envisagé par les administrateurs face à la situation d'insolvabilité. Plus le scénario se rapproche d'une liquidation plus ou moins formelle des actifs tangibles et facilement dissociables de la compagnie, moins cet exercice en sera un de conciliation et plus l'intérêt du créancier devra recevoir une attention prépondérante. À l'opposé, plus le scénario en est un de restructuration fondée sur une relance de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie insolvable, plus l'intérêt de l'actionnaire devra recevoir une attention particulière. / The following thesis analyses the impact of a company's insolvency on the fiduciary duties of its directors and officers, as imposed by Canadian corporate law. More specifically it shall examine the repercussions of an insolvency on management's fiduciary duty to act in accordance with the company's best interests. The objective shall therefore be to assess the extent of such fiduciary duty in the context of an insolvency and to establish a guideline to be followed by directors and officers in view of complying with said duty. Firstly, what constitutes the "best interests of the company"? The author concludes that a company's interests are comprised of a community of underlying interests. Although the interests of the company remain independent, it cannot be determined without taking into account said underlying interests. Amongst this community of underlying interests, shareholders and creditors, members of such community that supports the financing of the company's operations, occupy a predominant place. Recent case law and doctrinal authorities have concluded that the impact of a company's insolvency does not affect the ultimate objective pursued by the company, i.e. the maximisation of profit, but rather affects the determination of the members of the community of underlying interests that shall be affected by the pursuit of such finality. As such, in a context of insolvency, creditors, similar to shareholders in a context of solvency, are the residual risk-bearers of the company's commercial expenditure. Consequently, in view of determining what constitutes the best interests of the company, when it is insolvent, directors and officers may not ignore the creditors' interests. Secondly, who are the real beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty to act in a company's best interests when it becomes insolvent? The author concludes that creditors are indirect beneficiaries of such fiduciary duty in a context of insolvency. Similarly to shareholders in a context of solvency, creditors must be entitled to institute a derivative claim against directors and officers in order to obtain, in the name and for the company, compensation for the violation of said fiduciary duty. Insolvency triggers the existence of an obligation, fiduciary in nature, to take into account the creditors' interests. As such, directors and officers are to consider the creditors' interests in exercising their fiduciary duty to act in strict compliance with the best interests of the company. This conclusion is based on a review of the Canadian statutory law, jurisprudence and doctrinal authorities. Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by a review of same from certain Commonwealth jurisdictions (England, Australia and New-Zealand) and from the United States of America, jurisdictions with whom Canada has a privileged relationship, historically and/or economically. Finally, how does the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests translate in practice for directors and officers of an insolvent company? The author concludes that the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests is, in reality, an obligation to reconcile the shareholders' and creditors' interests with that of the company's best interests. The parameters of such obligation shall be determined with respect to the scenario conceived by directors and officers in order to effectively manage a situation of insolvency. Should such scenario focus on the liquidation of the core assets of the company, then the interests of the shareholders shall be subjugated to that of the creditors'. Conversely, should such scenario focus on the reorganisation of the company's commercial expenditures, based on the company's existing structures, then the shareholder's interest shall receive a more extensive attention by directors and officers.

No description available.

金融海嘯至少證明了兩件事：1.企業沒有不倒神話、2.看不見的風險才是風險。前者尚未結束，後者還在發生。 美國在1934年賣出第一張「董監事與重要職員責任險」保單（Directors and Officers’ Liability Insurance，簡稱D&O Insurance），到我國1996年10月9日財政部核准由外商(美國環球產物保險公司)推出第一張D&O，中間相距了近62年，而我國推出上開保單的前三年間僅不過十七家公司投保，其漠視之程度與曲高和寡之現象可見一般。 根據投資人保護中心的統計，到2008年6月底為止，投保中心替投資人提出集體訴訟向問題公司求償金額已達240億元，而參加集體訴訟求償的投資人也高達六萬四千人。然而按保險公會統計資料顯示，國內的董監責任險投保規模尚不大，在2003年總投保的保費規模只有2.49億元，到了2007年總投保的保費規模也才6.23億元，但是國內的董監責任險賠款率的比重卻直線上升，2003年這項賠款率才只有0.59％，但近年則已跳升直逼12％，等於保險業每承做十件董監責任險，就有一件多會面臨求償。 2001年美國安隆案（Enron）爆發金融危機（西北大學教授說：『這是有史以來美國人對資本主義比對政治信心還低落的時刻』），此為「公司治理」這門近年顯學正式拉開序幕，之後接二連三金融醜聞、財務弊案不斷，迫使政府、大眾投資人與企業高度警覺的至少對三個議題感到興趣：一是「企業內部資訊必須透明化」；二是「代理問題下經理人應該受到監督」；三是「盡責的董監事與重要職員應該受到保護」。 2003年敝人因工作關係向企業界登門推廣D&O Insurance，儘管從簡報的過程與互動中清晰可見D&O Insurance被需求的殷切，但往往在論及保單條款複雜的設計與風氣未開的雙重前題下，2002年我國通過「證券投資人暨期貨交易人保護法」、2003年成立投資人保護中心(僅需20位投資人授權即可由投資人保護中心提出團體訴訟)、投資人保護中心所提之訴訟，訴訟標的一億元以上免裁判費（2009年4月29日下修為一千萬，以一審裁判費需繳1％計算，即繳交裁判費由一百萬元大幅降至十萬元）、及免擔保假扣押等有利武器下，無異對投資人興訟撞開方便之門，同時為董監事及重要職員投下一顆不定時的深水炸彈、2006年證券交易法修正（要求公開發行公司應設立獨立董事、主張舉證責任之倒置---舉證責任由投資人轉移至經營管理階層。使經營管理層陷入「舉證之所在，敗訴之所在」的下風。）、令人聞之色變的「內線交易」定義模糊不明及罰則的大大加重（證交法第157條）--如果因為內線交易而「損及證券市場穩定者，加重其刑二分之一」，最高可以判20年有期徒刑，外加7.5億元罰金。這個刑度是我國除了死刑、無期徒刑以外最重的罪，和美國內線交易罪的25年有期徒刑也很接近（賴英照說法—從內線交易到企業社會責任第14頁），在如此種種足以為「董監事暨重要職員責任保險」推波助瀾的具體氛圍下，2009年止本國上市櫃公司投保者仍只有區區六百多家之譜，相較於英美國家90%的投保率相去甚遠。顯見D&O Insurance在我國未來的發展空間仍大，也可說，待努力及探討的地方甚為遼闊。 董事、監察人與重要職員肩負了許多證券交易法、公司法及民刑法上的責任與義務，而敵意併購中目標公司為了捍衛經營權，在策略應用上為了出奇不意的效果，往往需要機密性地進行，以免增加更多風險，而就在董監事與重要職員最需要D&O Insurance給予適時的倚靠與保障時，這張保單是否不負所託的展現它存在的價值？本文以實務個案探究之。 從敵意併購中目標公司的角度檢視D&O Insurance，本文提及諸多觀點，提綱挈領地針對公司治理、保單條款、及企業責任等部分提出建議，期能使保險公司從「保費低廉、理賠迅速」轉為「積極輔導、降低風險」的經營模式，提高相關人員對本保單接受度，進而由被動的接受到主動的保單設計，共創更完善的金融保險體制。 / The financial tsunami had proved that there is no corporation can exist forever and the invisible risk is the most important kind of risk. Until now, they are still occurring. The first Directors and Officers’ Liability Insurance policy (D&O Insurance) was sold in U.S.A. 1934. In Taiwan, the first D&O Insurance was sold in October 9, 1996. We can find out that D&O Insurance is ignored in Taiwan. Based on the data of Investor Protection Center in June 2008, the amount of the claims which were aroused by it can reach NT 240 billion. And the number of the investors can reach 64,000 people. Besides, based on the data of Insurance Association, the insurance premium in 2003 reached 249 million, in 2007 reached 623 million. Thus we can find out that D&O Insurance is not popular in Taiwan. But the loss run is getting more and more. For example, in ten policies, there is a one case will make a claim. In other words, the compensation rate can reach 12%. Since 2001, the Enron case aroused attention of the government, the investment and operators in U.S. Furthermore, the government had promoted related rules to increase the directors’ and officers’ liability. In 2003, I had visited corporations and promoted D&O Insurance. Although the process of briefing and interaction can find out the strong demand of policy, but they had lower will to buy it. It might content several reasons, for examples, clauses are too complex and difficult to understand. Rising claims activity, including lawsuits by investors, tougher policy standards and coverage disputes, is the latest developments in the D&O insurance arena. As a result, some carriers have added limits to policies. The directors and officers bear liability of Securities and Exchange Act, Company Act, Civil Code. When the target company tries to protect the right of management against the hostile takeover action, they sometimes have to take any tactic in private and might also be faced more risk. Could D&O Insurance distribute the risks which are aroused from the defense in the hostile takeover action? This article will study on the case and try to find the answers. We use the angle of the target company to inspect the function of D&O Insurance and hopefully try to amend it with the suggestion in the context. The function of D&O Insurance could be the key of corporate governance or distribution risks. For example, when the carriers provide the policy, we truly hope they could also provide positive solution to help the target company. Furthermore, the target company could participate in the design of policy.

Le présent mémoire analyse l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité sur le devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, devoir imposer aux administrateurs de compagnies par la législation corporative canadienne. L'objectif du mémoire est de déterminer un standard de conduite à être adopté par l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire. Dans un premier temps, comment peut-on définir ce que constitue le « meilleur intérêt de la compagnie» ? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que l'intérêt de la compagnie est au carrefour d'une communauté d'intérêts lui étant sous-jacents. L'intérêt de la compagnie, bien qu'indépendant de ces intérêts sous-jacents, ne peut s'analyser en faisant abstraction de ces derniers. La jurisprudence et la doctrine récentes laissent entrevoir que l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité se fait sentir sur la détermination de ces intérêts sous-jacents à celui de la compagnie susceptibles d'être affectés par la finalité poursuivie par la compagnie, finalité axée sur la maximisation des profits à partir des opérations de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, le créancier, à l'instar de l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, supporte le risque commercial résiduel et doit recevoir une attention appropriée par les administrateurs. Par conséquent, dans la détermination de ce que constitue le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, l'administrateur ne peut, lorsque la compagnie est insolvable, faire abstraction de l'intérêt des créanciers. Ainsi, dans un deuxième temps, qui sont les véritables bénéficiaires du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie dans un contexte d'insolvabilité? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que le créancier est un bénéficiaire indirect de ce devoir fiduciaire lorsque la compagnie est insolvable. Tout comme l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, le créancier doit être en mesure d'intenter un recours de nature dérivée en vue d'obtenir réparation, pour et au nom de la compagnie. Le contexte d'insolvabilité fait naître, à l'endroit des administrateurs, une obligation de nature fiduciaire de prendre en considération l'intérêt des créanciers tout en permettant à ces derniers d'intenter un tel recours dérivé en vue d'obtenir réparation à la suite d'une violation du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie. En plus d'être soutenue par une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine canadiennes, cette conclusion s'appuie sur une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine de certains pays du Commonwealth (Angleterre, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande) et des États-Unis, juridictions avec lesquelles le Canada entretient des relations privilégiés, historiquement ou économiquement. Finalement, que doit faire l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie? L'auteur arrive à la conclusion que cette obligation de prendre en considération l'intérêt du créancier dans un contexte d'insolvabilité se traduit par un exercice de conciliation entre les intérêts du créancier et ceux des actionnaires. Les paramètres de cet exercice de conciliation sont déterminés en fonction du scénario envisagé par les administrateurs face à la situation d'insolvabilité. Plus le scénario se rapproche d'une liquidation plus ou moins formelle des actifs tangibles et facilement dissociables de la compagnie, moins cet exercice en sera un de conciliation et plus l'intérêt du créancier devra recevoir une attention prépondérante. À l'opposé, plus le scénario en est un de restructuration fondée sur une relance de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie insolvable, plus l'intérêt de l'actionnaire devra recevoir une attention particulière. / The following thesis analyses the impact of a company's insolvency on the fiduciary duties of its directors and officers, as imposed by Canadian corporate law. More specifically it shall examine the repercussions of an insolvency on management's fiduciary duty to act in accordance with the company's best interests. The objective shall therefore be to assess the extent of such fiduciary duty in the context of an insolvency and to establish a guideline to be followed by directors and officers in view of complying with said duty. Firstly, what constitutes the "best interests of the company"? The author concludes that a company's interests are comprised of a community of underlying interests. Although the interests of the company remain independent, it cannot be determined without taking into account said underlying interests. Amongst this community of underlying interests, shareholders and creditors, members of such community that supports the financing of the company's operations, occupy a predominant place. Recent case law and doctrinal authorities have concluded that the impact of a company's insolvency does not affect the ultimate objective pursued by the company, i.e. the maximisation of profit, but rather affects the determination of the members of the community of underlying interests that shall be affected by the pursuit of such finality. As such, in a context of insolvency, creditors, similar to shareholders in a context of solvency, are the residual risk-bearers of the company's commercial expenditure. Consequently, in view of determining what constitutes the best interests of the company, when it is insolvent, directors and officers may not ignore the creditors' interests. Secondly, who are the real beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty to act in a company's best interests when it becomes insolvent? The author concludes that creditors are indirect beneficiaries of such fiduciary duty in a context of insolvency. Similarly to shareholders in a context of solvency, creditors must be entitled to institute a derivative claim against directors and officers in order to obtain, in the name and for the company, compensation for the violation of said fiduciary duty. Insolvency triggers the existence of an obligation, fiduciary in nature, to take into account the creditors' interests. As such, directors and officers are to consider the creditors' interests in exercising their fiduciary duty to act in strict compliance with the best interests of the company. This conclusion is based on a review of the Canadian statutory law, jurisprudence and doctrinal authorities. Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by a review of same from certain Commonwealth jurisdictions (England, Australia and New-Zealand) and from the United States of America, jurisdictions with whom Canada has a privileged relationship, historically and/or economically. Finally, how does the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests translate in practice for directors and officers of an insolvent company? The author concludes that the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests is, in reality, an obligation to reconcile the shareholders' and creditors' interests with that of the company's best interests. The parameters of such obligation shall be determined with respect to the scenario conceived by directors and officers in order to effectively manage a situation of insolvency. Should such scenario focus on the liquidation of the core assets of the company, then the interests of the shareholders shall be subjugated to that of the creditors'. Conversely, should such scenario focus on the reorganisation of the company's commercial expenditures, based on the company's existing structures, then the shareholder's interest shall receive a more extensive attention by directors and officers.

The topic of the submitted diploma thesis is the directors and officers liability insurance of members of a joint stock company bodies and its aim is to analyze this insurance product and to evaluate possibilities of its use in domestic conditions. This theme is topical because of the recent financial crisis as well as with regard to the recodification of the Czech private law which resulted in demanding more requirements on members of a joint stock company bodies during performance of their office and most importantly the danger of guaranty for obligations of company in accordance with the provision § 68 of the law on commercial corporations constitutes a really big threat for members of a joint stock company bodies. In order to understand the dangers from which the insurance should protect, first of all the first chapter is dedicated to basic characteristics of joint stock company and mainly to duties of members of a joint stock company bodies which are divided into two groups in this thesis - fiduciary duties (duty of due care, duty of loyalty, duty of secrecy, prohibition of competition, duty of personal performance of office) and so called "technical" duties. In the next chapter there is briefly examined the legislation of liability and compensation for damage where these issues are consulted...

本研究針對國內2008至2012年非金融業之上市上櫃公司，探討董監事及重要職員責任保險之需求因素，並研究這些需求因素之彼此關連性，形成董監事責任保險之需求因素路徑分析，最後根據實證結果建立路徑圖。 研究結果顯示，股東總數、公司規模、董監事持股比例、外部持股比例和獨立董監事比例，對董監事責任保險金額呈顯著正相關；董事長兼任總經理與董監事責任保險金額呈顯著負相關。經理人持股比例、資產報酬率和負債比率因樣本分配較分散，迴歸分析受極端值影響，導致在統計結果中不顯著。此外，董監報酬若對董監事責任保險金額採單一迴歸時，具有顯著相關。但在路徑分析中，會因受其他變數影響，導致不具相關性。 / Based on a sample of firms, except for financial companies, listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange and Gre Tai Securities Market over the period of 2008-2012, this study examines the determinants of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and the cause-effect relations among these determinants which are presented by path diagram. The empirical result indicates that the number of shareholders, size, directors’ and supervisors’ ownership, outsider ownership, and percentage of independent directors and supervisors in the board of directors are positively related to the amount of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. The chief executive officer as the chairman of the board is negatively associated with the amount of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. The manager ownership, return on asset, debt ratio and the directors’ and supervisors’ reward are not related to the amount of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:25:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Shirley M M F Oliveira.pdf: 1043551 bytes, checksum: 336fbc6a82875debf7c286437235844f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-05-07 / This dissertation addresses the effects of globalization on the civil liability of directors & officers of joint-stock companies. Starting with the evolution of capitalization until the consolidation of a new world economic order, this work elaborates on one of the most relevant effects of the latest developments in international trade: the competition among domestic and international companies. Within this context, the pursuit of new markets by global companies and their concern with investment costs have stood out. Going public as a means of surviving fierce competition is analyzed, followed by an overview of the capital market and its recent growth. To that end, the evolution of the capital market and of companies is given due consideration. It is thus shown that investors and stakeholders have become increasingly knowledgeable and demanding in terms of greater business security and transparency. This growing awareness has evolved into the so-called corporate governance, which instituted duties, obligations and above all the liability of directors & officers. As this dissertation develops, it will also focus on the duties of directors & officers and on the evolution of civil liability, always demonstrating that legal changes have come in the sway of the globalization of economies / Discutem-se neste trabalho os reflexos da globalização na responsabilidade civil dos administradores das sociedades anônimas. O enfoque parte da evolução do capitalismo até a criação da nova ordem econômica mundial. Passa-se então a analisar um dos mais importantes efeitos do desenvolvimento do Comércio Internacional: a competição entre as empresas nacionais e internacionais. Com isso, destaca-se a procura de novos mercados pelas empresas e a preocupação com o custo de seus investimentos. Pondera-se a respeito da abertura do capital social como forma de ganhar força na competição acirrada, e, portanto, do crescimento do mercado de capitais. Diante disso, estuda-se a evolução do mercado de capitais e das sociedades. Buscamos demonstrar que os investidores e os terceiros com o tempo foram se tornando mais conscientes e exigindo garantias, como segurança e transparência na condução dos negócios. Surge então um movimento conhecido como governança corporativa, que institui deveres, obrigações e acima de tudo responsabilidades aos administradores. Por fim, trataremos dos deveres dos administradores e da evolução da responsabilidade civil, procurando sempre demonstrar que as alterações da legislação foram reflexos da internacionalização das economias

此論文包含三大部分。第一部分探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險(D&O保險)的需求因素與公司治理等企業特徵間的關係，配合2003-2007年台灣上市上櫃公司的資料，研究影響公司是否購買D&O保險、保險限額與保險費的決策因素。實證結果證明，大型公司較需要D&O保險保障，且公司的董監事與利害關係人間存在代理成本問題。本文亦發現董監事獨立性等公司治理因素，對D&O保險購買行為有顯著影響，再則，公司的成長性及經理人風險趨避態度，都會影響保險限額的決定。本文結論進一步顯示訴訟風險對保險限額的決定有正向顯著的影響，而財務風險對D&O保險需求亦有若干影響力。第二及第三部分則進一步探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險對公司的行為或策略是否有影響。實證結果顯示D&O保險確實會影響公司風險承擔策略及公司財報方法的穩健性。 / This thesis is comprised of three essays on directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance, one interesting but little explored research area. Based on an unbalanced panel data set of public Taiwanese corporations in years 2003-2007, the first essay investigates the relationship between directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance demand and firm characteristics, especially corporate governance. The results suggest that large firms are more likely to purchase D&O insurance, and that there exists agency cost between directors/officers and stakeholders. The findings indicate that corporate governance, such as board independence, has an important impact on D&O insurance demand. Besides, the results show that growth opportunity or managerial risk aversion can affect the D&O insurance coverage amount. The litigation risk also has a positive and significant impact on the D&O insurance amount, and bankruptcy risk weakly influences the D&O insurance demand. In the second essay, I provide evidence regarding corporate business strategy by investigating the relation between directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance and risk taking behavior. This essay tries to test (a) whether firms are more active to adopt risk-taking strategies when their directors and top managers are covered by D&O insurance coverage; (b) whether the quality of corporate governance has influence on firm’s risk-taking behavior; and (c) whether insurers can distinguish D&O insurance purchases decision driven by managerial risk-taking behavior and charge adequate premium rate for such behavior. The empirical evidence suggests that D&O insurance coverage has a positive impact on firm risk-taking behavior. In addition, the results indicate that board composition may remarkably influence corporate risk-taking behavior. The preliminary findings also show that insurers can assess the induced risk-taking behavior ex ante and charge adequate premiums rate accordingly. In the third essay, I investigate whether the legal liability coverage result in the propensity of less conservatism and aggressive managerial behavior/strategy. More specifically, this study tests managerial opportunism behavior by examining whether the purchase of D&O insurance coverage is associated with more aggressive financial reporting strategy (i.e., less accounting conservatism). The empirical evidence suggests that D&O liability insurance purchase decision is positively associated with accounting conservatism. That is, firms with insurance coverage tend to recognize bad news in a timely manner, i.e. more earning conservatism. However, there is no significant relation between accounting conservatism and D&O insurance amount. In addition, the evidence shows that firms with strong board structure recognize good news faster than those with weak governance structure.