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董監事及重要職員責任保險承保範圍及相關問題之研究葉力旗 Unknown Date (has links)
今日企業規模逐漸擴大,公司內部結構更加複雜,且因經營與所有分離所產生之代理問題日益嚴重,經營者如果心懷不軌或公司對其疏於管控,極有可能造成公司股東、投資人,甚至社會大眾之巨大損失,故不得不加強保護投資人,但相對地,同時亦會加重公司經營者之法律責任風險,故在上開環境之推波助瀾之下,董監事及重要職員責任保險成為國內近年來責任保險保費進帳最大之險種之一。但於董監事及重要職員責任保險在我國蓬勃發展之同時,亦有論者指出董事、監察人及重要職員若有了董監事及重要職員責任保險做後盾,是否仍須負擔相關法規所規定之忠實義務、注意義務或其他法定之義務?因此,將保險公司所得承保之董事、監察人及重要職員可能負擔之法律責任加以釐清,將十分重要,否則社會大眾對於董監事及重要職員責任保險是否會破壞相關責任制度之疑慮,將不會停止,甚至將影響董監事及重要職員責任保險市場之發展。因此,本文欲將董事、監察人及重要職員在我國現行法制上面臨之法律責任風險明確化,進而將董監事及重要職員責任保險之承保範圍在學理上加以釐清,希望所得出之結果可作為保險業者承保或董事、監察人及重要職員投保時之參考。
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銀行董事及重要職員責任保險與公司治理之研究李欽財 Unknown Date (has links)
推動銀行公司治理與風險管理過程中,透過董事及重要職員責任保險機制,適切地降低及分散董事(監察人)及重要職員之責任風險,保障渠之財產權,避免因執行職務遭受第三人或團體起訴而引起之財務損失。使具有專業學識經驗之人士,有意願參與銀行之經營團隊,成為董事或獨立董事、監察人或重要職員,且勇於獨立履行其職責,落實銀行依銀行業公司治理之六大原則:□遵循法令並健全內部管理;□保障股東權益;□強化董事會職能;□發揮監察人功能;□尊重利益相關者權益;□提升資訊透明度。以提升銀行之競爭力及銀行之價值,確保股東及投資人之權益。 / In the process of promoting corporate governance and risk management in the banking industry, through the mechanism of Directors and Officers liability insurance, the risk associated with liability of company directors, supervisors, and officers is appropriately reduced and spread, personal property is protected, and the financial loss arising from lawsuit brought by third party or class action lawsuits against them as a result of carrying out their duties is mitigated.
Experienced professionals, willing to join a bank’s management team as its directors or independent directors and supervisors or officers, and able to independently perform their duties, will best ensure the six principles of corporate governance for the banking industry are observed:
1. Comply with pertinent laws and regulations, and establish sound internal controls,
2. Protect shareholders rights and interests,
3. Strengthen the powers of the Board of Directors,
4. Fulfill the functions of supervisors,
5. Respect stakeholders’ rights and interests, and
6. Enhance information transparency.
Following these principles of corporate governance will not only enhance a bank’s industry competitive position and increase stock values of the bank, but ensure the protection of the rights and interests of shareholders and investors.
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董事及重要職員責任保險之研究蔡佩君, Tsai, Pei-Chun Unknown Date (has links)
No description available.
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從敵意併購探討董監事與重要職員責任保險 / Study on directors & officers’ liability insurance from hostile takeover legal risk exposure view白永昌, Pai, Yung Chang Unknown Date (has links)
金融海嘯至少證明了兩件事:1.企業沒有不倒神話、2.看不見的風險才是風險。前者尚未結束,後者還在發生。
美國在1934年賣出第一張「董監事與重要職員責任險」保單(Directors and Officers’ Liability Insurance,簡稱D&O Insurance),到我國1996年10月9日財政部核准由外商(美國環球產物保險公司)推出第一張D&O,中間相距了近62年,而我國推出上開保單的前三年間僅不過十七家公司投保,其漠視之程度與曲高和寡之現象可見一般。
根據投資人保護中心的統計,到2008年6月底為止,投保中心替投資人提出集體訴訟向問題公司求償金額已達240億元,而參加集體訴訟求償的投資人也高達六萬四千人。然而按保險公會統計資料顯示,國內的董監責任險投保規模尚不大,在2003年總投保的保費規模只有2.49億元,到了2007年總投保的保費規模也才6.23億元,但是國內的董監責任險賠款率的比重卻直線上升,2003年這項賠款率才只有0.59%,但近年則已跳升直逼12%,等於保險業每承做十件董監責任險,就有一件多會面臨求償。
2001年美國安隆案(Enron)爆發金融危機(西北大學教授說:『這是有史以來美國人對資本主義比對政治信心還低落的時刻』),此為「公司治理」這門近年顯學正式拉開序幕,之後接二連三金融醜聞、財務弊案不斷,迫使政府、大眾投資人與企業高度警覺的至少對三個議題感到興趣:一是「企業內部資訊必須透明化」;二是「代理問題下經理人應該受到監督」;三是「盡責的董監事與重要職員應該受到保護」。
2003年敝人因工作關係向企業界登門推廣D&O Insurance,儘管從簡報的過程與互動中清晰可見D&O Insurance被需求的殷切,但往往在論及保單條款複雜的設計與風氣未開的雙重前題下,2002年我國通過「證券投資人暨期貨交易人保護法」、2003年成立投資人保護中心(僅需20位投資人授權即可由投資人保護中心提出團體訴訟)、投資人保護中心所提之訴訟,訴訟標的一億元以上免裁判費(2009年4月29日下修為一千萬,以一審裁判費需繳1%計算,即繳交裁判費由一百萬元大幅降至十萬元)、及免擔保假扣押等有利武器下,無異對投資人興訟撞開方便之門,同時為董監事及重要職員投下一顆不定時的深水炸彈、2006年證券交易法修正(要求公開發行公司應設立獨立董事、主張舉證責任之倒置---舉證責任由投資人轉移至經營管理階層。使經營管理層陷入「舉證之所在,敗訴之所在」的下風。)、令人聞之色變的「內線交易」定義模糊不明及罰則的大大加重(證交法第157條)--如果因為內線交易而「損及證券市場穩定者,加重其刑二分之一」,最高可以判20年有期徒刑,外加7.5億元罰金。這個刑度是我國除了死刑、無期徒刑以外最重的罪,和美國內線交易罪的25年有期徒刑也很接近(賴英照說法—從內線交易到企業社會責任第14頁),在如此種種足以為「董監事暨重要職員責任保險」推波助瀾的具體氛圍下,2009年止本國上市櫃公司投保者仍只有區區六百多家之譜,相較於英美國家90%的投保率相去甚遠。顯見D&O Insurance在我國未來的發展空間仍大,也可說,待努力及探討的地方甚為遼闊。
董事、監察人與重要職員肩負了許多證券交易法、公司法及民刑法上的責任與義務,而敵意併購中目標公司為了捍衛經營權,在策略應用上為了出奇不意的效果,往往需要機密性地進行,以免增加更多風險,而就在董監事與重要職員最需要D&O Insurance給予適時的倚靠與保障時,這張保單是否不負所託的展現它存在的價值?本文以實務個案探究之。
從敵意併購中目標公司的角度檢視D&O Insurance,本文提及諸多觀點,提綱挈領地針對公司治理、保單條款、及企業責任等部分提出建議,期能使保險公司從「保費低廉、理賠迅速」轉為「積極輔導、降低風險」的經營模式,提高相關人員對本保單接受度,進而由被動的接受到主動的保單設計,共創更完善的金融保險體制。 / The financial tsunami had proved that there is no corporation can exist forever and the invisible risk is the most important kind of risk. Until now, they are still occurring.
The first Directors and Officers’ Liability Insurance policy (D&O Insurance) was sold in U.S.A. 1934. In Taiwan, the first D&O Insurance was sold in October 9, 1996. We can find out that D&O Insurance is ignored in Taiwan.
Based on the data of Investor Protection Center in June 2008, the amount of the claims which were aroused by it can reach NT 240 billion. And the number of the investors can reach 64,000 people. Besides, based on the data of Insurance Association, the insurance premium in 2003 reached 249 million, in 2007 reached 623 million. Thus we can find out that D&O Insurance is not popular in Taiwan. But the loss run is getting more and more. For example, in ten policies, there is a one case will make a claim. In other words, the compensation rate can reach 12%.
Since 2001, the Enron case aroused attention of the government, the investment and operators in U.S. Furthermore, the government had promoted related rules to increase the directors’ and officers’ liability. In 2003, I had visited corporations and promoted D&O Insurance. Although the process of briefing and interaction can find out the strong demand of policy, but they had lower will to buy it. It might content several reasons, for examples, clauses are too complex and difficult to understand. Rising claims activity, including lawsuits by investors, tougher policy standards and coverage disputes, is the latest developments in the D&O insurance arena. As a result, some carriers have added limits to policies. The directors and officers bear liability of Securities and Exchange Act, Company Act, Civil Code. When the target company tries to protect the right of management against the hostile takeover action, they sometimes have to take any tactic in private and might also be faced more risk.
Could D&O Insurance distribute the risks which are aroused from the defense in the hostile takeover action? This article will study on the case and try to find the answers. We use the angle of the target company to inspect the function of D&O Insurance and hopefully try to amend it with the suggestion in the context. The function of D&O Insurance could be the key of corporate governance or distribution risks. For example, when the carriers provide the policy, we truly hope they could also provide positive solution to help the target company. Furthermore, the target company could participate in the design of policy.
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董監事暨重要職員責任保險與資訊不對稱之關聯性分析 / Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and Information Asymmetry黃隆建, Hwang, Long Jainn Unknown Date (has links)
本研究探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險(簡稱:董監責任險)與資訊不對稱之間的關係。過去文獻關於購買董監責任險所獲得的利益以及所需付出的代價有許多的辯論。其中一種觀點認為購買董監責任險可以提供公司治理的監督機制以降低資訊不對稱程度,因此對股東有利。但是另一種觀點認為購買董監責任險會以減少董監事面臨訴訟時自己必須負擔的損失,因而可能會出現管理者機會主義行為而導致更多的道德風險問題。本研究採用股票市場中的優勢資訊交易機率(probability of information-based trading,簡稱PIN)當成企業資訊不對稱程度的直接衡量,以了解購買監責任險與資訊不對稱之間的關係。以2008年至2013年台灣上市公司為樣本之實證結果發現,整體而言,有購買董監責任險的公司,有較低的PIN值(也就是資訊不對稱程度較低),基本上支持購買董監責任險確實可以提供公司治理的監督機制。然而在進一步比較有購買董監責任險公司以及沒有購買董監責任險的公司之後,結果顯示可能不太需要購買董監責任險的公司(以迴歸模型估計購買機率較低者)但實際上卻有購買時,相較於需要購買且實際上也有購買董監責任險的公司,會有相對比較高的PIN值(較高的資訊不對稱)。此結果顯示股票市場的PIN值確實會反應企業的投機行為,因此支持購買董監責任險依然會有出現道德風險問題的可能。本研究提供的證據顯示整體而言購買董監責任險具有公司治理的監督機制功能,但是道德風險問題還是可能會出現在某些購買董監責任險的企業。
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董監事暨重要職員責任保險與公司行為分析 / Essays on Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Firm Behavior張瑞益, Chang,jui i Unknown Date (has links)
此論文包含三大部分。第一部分探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險(D&O保險)的需求因素與公司治理等企業特徵間的關係,配合2003-2007年台灣上市上櫃公司的資料,研究影響公司是否購買D&O保險、保險限額與保險費的決策因素。實證結果證明,大型公司較需要D&O保險保障,且公司的董監事與利害關係人間存在代理成本問題。本文亦發現董監事獨立性等公司治理因素,對D&O保險購買行為有顯著影響,再則,公司的成長性及經理人風險趨避態度,都會影響保險限額的決定。本文結論進一步顯示訴訟風險對保險限額的決定有正向顯著的影響,而財務風險對D&O保險需求亦有若干影響力。第二及第三部分則進一步探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險對公司的行為或策略是否有影響。實證結果顯示D&O保險確實會影響公司風險承擔策略及公司財報方法的穩健性。 / This thesis is comprised of three essays on directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance, one interesting but little explored research area. Based on an unbalanced panel data set of public Taiwanese corporations in years 2003-2007, the first essay investigates the relationship between directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance demand and firm characteristics, especially corporate governance. The results suggest that large firms are more likely to purchase D&O insurance, and that there exists agency cost between directors/officers and stakeholders. The findings indicate that corporate governance, such as board independence, has an important impact on D&O insurance demand. Besides, the results show that growth opportunity or managerial risk aversion can affect the D&O insurance coverage amount. The litigation risk also has a positive and significant impact on the D&O insurance amount, and bankruptcy risk weakly influences the D&O insurance demand.
In the second essay, I provide evidence regarding corporate business strategy by investigating the relation between directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance and risk taking behavior. This essay tries to test (a) whether firms are more active to adopt risk-taking strategies when their directors and top managers are covered by D&O insurance coverage; (b) whether the quality of corporate governance has influence on firm’s risk-taking behavior; and (c) whether insurers can distinguish D&O insurance purchases decision driven by managerial risk-taking behavior and charge adequate premium rate for such behavior. The empirical evidence suggests that D&O insurance coverage has a positive impact on firm risk-taking behavior. In addition, the results indicate that board composition may remarkably influence corporate risk-taking behavior. The preliminary findings also show that insurers can assess the induced risk-taking behavior ex ante and charge adequate premiums rate accordingly.
In the third essay, I investigate whether the legal liability coverage result in the propensity of less conservatism and aggressive managerial behavior/strategy. More specifically, this study tests managerial opportunism behavior by examining whether the purchase of D&O insurance coverage is associated with more aggressive financial reporting strategy (i.e., less accounting conservatism). The empirical evidence suggests that D&O liability insurance purchase decision is positively associated with accounting conservatism. That is, firms with insurance coverage tend to recognize bad news in a timely manner, i.e. more earning conservatism. However, there is no significant relation between accounting conservatism and D&O insurance amount. In addition, the evidence shows that firms with strong board structure recognize good news faster than those with weak governance structure.
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論公司經營者法律責任之風險管理楊瑩潔 Unknown Date (has links)
隨著現代企業規模逐漸擴大,內部結構分工複雜,為了控制經營與所有分離所產生之代理問題,公司經營者被賦予越來越繁多的法律義務,一旦不慎違反,可能招致沈重的法律責任,而使其個人財產暴露於賠償責任損失風險之下。承擔公司營運職責之經營者,一般負有忠實義務及注意義務,其執行職務行為必須遵守法令、公司章程以及股東會決議,若有違反,受到求償的來源則可能包括公司股東、投資人、受僱人,乃至於消費者及行政監理機關。移轉公司經營者法律責任風險之機制,目前以公司補償制度及董監事及重要職員(D&O)責任保險為主,兩者架構雖有差異,但均為保障公司經營者之個人財產而設,具有互補輔助的功能。我國目前並未採用公司補償制度,然而D&O責任保險近年來已快速發展,本文就其於我國之適用情況進行探討,並分別對於公司經營者、保險業者以及政府主管機關提出建議,作為將來持續推動公司治理措施與公司經營者法律責任風險管理架構之參考。
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董監事及重要職員責任保險之市場研究龐嘉慧 Unknown Date (has links)
本研究以整體性的方式來分析目前國內在董監事及重要職員責任保險的市場發展情況。分別就目前的環境與法令制度、董監事及重要職員責任保險之供給情形、以及董監事及重要職員責任保險之需求等三方面,做進一步的分析探討。透過整合性的分析可以瞭解國內企業對於董監事及重要職員責任保險的真正需求,同時將分析的結果提供作為參考的依據。
本文首先歸納摘要環境與法令制度,其次針對董監事及重要職員責任保險之供給面進行實際訪談;而在董監事及重要職員責任保險需求方面,則建立三項實證分析模型。模型一是以購買D&O保險之保險金額為依變數與自變數之間的關係;模型二是以購買D&O保險之保險費為依變數與自變數之間的關係,來探討董監事及重要職員責任保險之需求情形。模型三是以D&O保險之保險費除以保險金額,即保險費率為依變數與自變數間的關係。自變數方面則分成三大類,分別為公司特色、代理問題、以及財務結構等三項進行迴歸分析。
結果顯示國內D&O保險需求的最主要影響因素為股東總數與內部董事持股數兩項顯著變數。在保險費率釐訂方面,影響費率的主要因素為資本額(Capital)與董監事報酬(D&O payments)兩項變數。透過實證分析結果可知董監事及重要職員責任保險除了供給與需求兩方面外,也必須有環境因素與法令規定等因素的考量,彼此間環環相扣下,才能詳盡地瞭解國內董監事及重要職員責任保險。
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