Engaging a determined enemy across a broad range of conditions, the U.S. Army in World War II's Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) played an important role in the defeat of Japan. How units fought and learned in SWPA and how they adapted to the evolving challenges of their environment is the focus of this dissertation. The subject remains largely unexplored, especially in contrast to the attention the European theater has received. An examination of the 112th's performance not only illuminates an understudied area in the historiography of World War II but also offers relevant lessons for contemporary military organizations. Mining a rich collection of primary sources, this study analyzes the development of the 112th Cavalry Regiment and sheds light on how American units in SWPA prepared for and conducted combat operations. A National Guard unit federalized in 1940 and sent to the Pacific theater in 1942, the 112th performed garrison duties on New Caledonia and Woodlark Island and eventually fought in New Britain, New Guinea, and the Philippines. Before deactivating, the regiment also served in Japan during the first months of the occupation. Concentrating on one unit illustrates the extent to which ground forces in SWPA were driven to learn and adapt. The 112th had mixed success when it came to carrying out its assigned missions effectively. The same was true of its efforts to learn and improve. The unit's gradual introduction to combat worked to its advantage, but learning was not simply a matter of building on experience. It also involved responding to unexpected challenges. Experience tended to help, but the variety of circumstances in which the cavalrymen fought imposed limits on the applicability of that experience. Different situations demanded that learning occur in different ways. Learning also occurred differently across the organization's multiple levels. Moreover, failure to learn in one area did not, as a matter of course, undermine advancement in all. Much depended on the presence of conditions that facilitated or disrupted the learning process, such as the intricacy of the tasks involved, the part higher headquarters played, and the enemy's own responses to the changing environment.

The nation-state of Texas was forged in the crucible of frontier warfare. From 1822 to 1836, the embattled Anglo-American settlers of Colonial Tejas and the Texas Revolution formed an adaptive mounted arms tradition to facilitate territorial defense and aggression. This evolution incorporated martial influences from the United States, Mexico, and Amerindians, as the colonists first adapted tactically as mounted militia in Anglo-Indian warfare, and then adapted organizationally as nationalized corps of rangers and cavalry during the Texan War for Independence. While the colonial conflicts centered exclusively on counterguerrilla interdiction and expeditions against Native opponents, the revolutionary contest included simultaneous engagement in unconventional and conventional campaigns against tribal warriors and the Mexican Army. These combat experiences resulted in a versatile frontier cavalry tradition based in mobility, firepower, and tactical adaptation, which subsequently served Texas throughout a century of border and wartime conflicts. / text

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abstract: Ancient Mediterranean cultures incorporated equine iconography into their artistic repertoires, demonstrating the horse's importance not only as a beast of burden and war, but also as a visual symbol of wealth and prestige. Interaction between man and horse appears in clay as early as the third millennium BC, along with the early development of ancient Near Eastern cultures. Tactical evolution in Near Eastern warfare, particularly the eclipse of chariot forces by the rise of cavalry, coincided with the emergence of equestrian terracotta figurines and facilitated the popularity of horse and rider imagery. Cyprus' many city-kingdoms have yielded a vast, coroplastic corpus in both votive and mortuary contexts, including figurines of equestrian type. These terracottas are an important contribution to the understanding of ancient Cypriote cultures, cities and their coroplastic oeuvre. While many studies of excavated terracottas include horse and rider figurines, only a limited number of these publications dedicate adequate analysis and interpretation. Ancient Marion is one of the Cypriote city-kingdoms producing a number of equestrian terracottas that are in need of further examination. By focusing on the unpublished horse and rider figurines from Marion, this paper will add to the conversation of Cyprus' inclusion of equestrian iconography in coroplastic production. Through thorough analysis of the horse and rider terracottas, specifically their plastic and stylistic components, this thesis establishes typologies, makes visual comparisons and demonstrates Marion's awareness of an equine vogue both in contemporary Cyprus and abroad. The horse and rider figurines of Marion are an important contribution to the better understanding of the city-kingdom and exemplify the inclusion of equestrian imagery within the context of ancient societies. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Art History 2014

Por meio do estudo de algumas das tópicas medievais a presente dissertação se propõe a analisar o lai do trovador Joan Lobeyra intitulado Canção de Leonoreta. O desenvolvimento do trabalho levou à busca de diversas reinterpretações dadas à canção em diferentes momentos da histórias do mundo ibérico. Desse modo, o caminho percorrido conduziu à análise da reescritura da canção na novela de cavalaria intitulada Amadis de Gaula, na obra dos poetas portugueses Affonso Lopes Vieira e Silva Tavares e, finalmente, na obra da poetisa brasileira Cecília Meireles / By the study of some medieval topics, the current dissertation purposes to analyse \"The Chant of Loroneta\" by Joam Lobeira troubadour, the development of such a work led to the search for several interpretations given to the chant in different periods in iberian world history, in this view, the way followed was the one led to the analysis of the knight-errantry tale chant entitled Amadis de Gaul in Afonso Lopes Vieira and Silva Tavares\'s writings, both portuguese poets, in the writing of brazilian poetess Cecília Meireles

Le mercredi 15 mai 1940, dans le petit village ardennais de La Horgne à l’ouest de Sedan, les cavaliers de la 3e Brigade de Spahis (2e Régiment de Spahis Algériens de Tlemcen et 2e Régiment de Spahis Marocains de Marrakech) tentent d’arrêter une partie de la plus moderne Panzer-Division de la Wehrmacht. L’histoire commémorative a retenu que la 3e Brigade de Spahis aurait été tout simplement « anéantie » en une dizaine d’heures de combats, non sans avoir auparavant mis hors de combat un bon millier de soldats allemands. De son côté, l’histoire scientifique dénombre 50 Spahis et 31 soldats allemands tués. Plus de 76 ans après les faits, il est plus que temps d’en finir avec la légende du « massacre inutile de 700 Spahis chargeant à cheval les chars allemands à La Horgne ». / Wednesday, May 15, 1940, in the small Ardennes village of La Horgne, west of Sedan, the troopers of the 3rd [Cavalry] Brigade of Spahis (2nd Regiment of Algerian Spahis from Tlemcen and 2nd Regiment of Moroccan Spahis from Marrakech) try to stop a part of the most modern Panzer-Division of the Wehrmacht. Commemorative History has focused on a 3rd Brigade of Spahis that was simply "annihilated" in about ten hours of fighting, but not before putting out of action a thousand German soldiers. For its part, the scientific History takes into account 50 Spahis and 31 German soldiers killed in action. More than 76 years after the fact, it is more than time to put an end to the legend of the "useless slaughter of 700 Spahis charging German tanks on horseback at La Horgne".

Inom krigsvetenskapen har relativt lite forskning ägnats åt vad taktik är och vad som påverkar militära chefer i deras taktiska beslutsprocess. Detta arbete ämnar bidra till det rådande forskningsläget genom att använda sig av teori kring taktisk kultur och ge läsaren och den militära professionen en djupare förståelse för hur taktisk kultur påverkar militära chefers beslutsfattande. En sådan process kan synliggöras genom en teoriprövande fallstudie som påvisar hur den taktiska kulturen påverkade amerikanska förband under striderna i Ia Drang-dalen, 1965. Processen utgår ifrån en kvalitativ textanalys av dokument från den aktuella tidsperioden, samt sentida litteratur som beskriver skeendet. Teorin om taktisk kultur ger ett antal indikatorer, eller källor, som används i analysen av materialet. Resultatet visar att det taktiska beslutsfattandet under striderna främst baserades på förbandschefens personliga uppfattningar. Vidare var säkerhet och uthållighet tydliga källor för förbandets taktiska kultur. Slutligen förs ett resonemang kring teorins operationalisering och användbarhet, samt huruvida analysen påvisar tecken på en sund eller destruktiv taktisk kultur i det valda fallet.

This study examines the operational history of the First Cavalry Divisions conquest of the Admiralty Islands during World War Two as the final phase of Operation Cartwheel. Cartwheel called a two pronged attack; one prong in New Guinea, by-passing large Japanese garrisons and the other in the northern Solomon Islands with the goal the isolation of the strong point at Rabaul. The material is drawn primarily from U.S. Army records held by the National Archives at College Park, Maryland, records from the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama and other reports. The study concludes that the conquest of the Admiralty Islands allowed the by-pass of Rabaul and Wewak, New Guinea. The Admiralty Islands served as a base for future operations carried out against the Japanese.

En 1954, l’Arme Blindée et Cavalerie (ABC) est une arme qui monte en puissance pour faire face à la menace soviétique en Europe. Le général inspecteur de cette arme voit s’achever la guerre d’Indochine avec un soulagement car il pense pouvoir se consacrer pleinement à cette tâche. Aussi, est-ce avec une certaine réticence, qu’à partir de 1955, il fournit à la Xe région militaire (Algérie) les renforts qu’elle réclame. L’organisation opérationnelle des corps, l’instruction du personnel et le programme d’équipement s’en trouvent très perturbés. Voulant à la fois maintenir sa capacité opérationnelle en Europe et faire face aux besoins de l’Algérie, le commandement désorganise l’ABC. Les unités blindées ne sont adaptées ni à un conflit de type insurrectionnel, ni au terrain particulier de l’Algérie. Pourtant, à partir de 1958, elles donnent satisfaction. Leur composante portée s’est développée, leur puissance de feu et leur mobilité sont mises pleinement à profit sur les barrages, et les unités à cheval, qui ont refait leur apparition, sont employées plus judicieusement sur des terrains favorables. Mais cette adaptation s’est faite au prix de grands sacrifices. Le vieux matériel américain n’est remplacé que très progressivement soit par des engins français modernes (EBR ou AMX 13), que le commandement a le sentiment de gaspiller, soit par des nouveaux matériels (Ferret, AML 60, ou AMX 13 à tourelle de M24) qui ne peuvent être employés qu’en Algérie et dont l’acquisition se fait au détriment du char de 25 t dont doit pourtant être équipée l’ABC d’urgence. En somme, l’ABC aurait rencontré les pires difficultés si le conflit avait dû se prolonger au-delà de 1962. / In 1954, the French Armored Cavalry was a corps that was aiming to get stronger to face the Soviet threat in Europe. The Inspector General of this corps was relieved when the war in Indochina ended because he thought he could rededicate himself to this task. So it was with some reluctance, that from 1955 on wards, he provided the tenth military region (Algeria) with the reinforcements it required. The operational organization of the units, personnel training and equipment program found it very disturbing. Seeking both to maintain its operational capacity in Europe and meet the needs of Algeria, the command reorganized the Armored Cavalry. Armored units were not adapted neither to counter-insurgency, neither to the particular terrain in Algeria. Yet in 1958, they gave satisfying result. The vehicle-mounted infantry had been expanded, their firepower and mobility were expertly used over fences; and horseback units were re-created and deployed more wisely on a favorable terrain. But this re-organization cost very much. The old American equipment was only gradually replaced by French modern equipment (EBR or AMX 13), the command considering this equipment was being wasted. The new materials (Ferret, AML 60, or AMX 13 with M24 turret) could only in Algeria and their acquisition was at the expense the 25 ton tank. However, the French Armored Corps urgently needed this battle tank. To sum up, the Armored Cavalry would have encountered severe difficulties if the conflict had been extended beyond 1962.