Denna studie syftar till att undersöka huruvida en kvinnlig VD påverkar företagets kapitalstruktur, samt om det finns ett samband mellan könsfördelningen i styrelsen och dess kapitalstruktur i onoterade bolag med en avgränsning till svenska onoterade bolag. Tidigare forskning kring ämnet har gjorts på noterade företag, varpå det blir intressant att genomföra denna forskning på onoterade bolag. Baserat på tidigare forskning har två hypoteser utformats vilket studien utgår ifrån. Studien utgår från ett positivistiskt perspektiv och tillämpar en kvantitativ metod med en deduktiv ansats. Den empiriska sekundärdata är inhämtad från databasen Retriever där finansiella data från onoterade bolags årsredovisningar samlas in för bokslutsåren 2012 - 2017. Sedan har korrelationsanalyser samt multivariata regressionsanalyser genomförts för att kunna upptäcka eventuella samband mellan studiens beroende variabel, kapitalstruktur, och studiens två oberoende variabler, kvinnlig VD och andel kvinnor i styrelsen. Studiens resultat visar ett svagt samband i de båda regressionerna och därmed förkastas studiens två nollhypoteser. Resultatet visar att det finns ett svagt positivt samband mellan kvinnlig VD och kapitalstruktur, och ett svagt negativt samband mellan andel kvinnor i styrelsen och kapitalstruktur. Dock är dessa samband mycket svaga, varpå det är svårt att säga om de oberoende variablerna har en betydlig påverkan på kapitalstrukturen i praktiken. Studiens resultat som visar ett positivt samband mellan kvinnlig VD och kapitalstruktur samt ett negativt samband mellan andelen kvinnor i styrelsen och kapitalstruktur, bidrar till den rådande forskningen kring kvinnors inverkan på risk, närmare bestämt onoterade företags finansiella risk. Studiens praktiska bidrag är att huruvida företagets VD är kvinna eller ej, samt hur könsfördelningen ser ut i företaget, kan påverka kapitalstrukturen i företaget baserat på män och kvinnors olika risktagande och tankar vid finansiella beslut. Denna studie tillämpar tvärsnittsdata vilket innebär att de data som analyseras är från en och samma tidpunkt vilket gör att vi inte kan undersöka ett kausalt samband, därmed skulle det vara intressant att studera flera fall över tid. Ett annat förslag är att undersöka detta samband utifrån ett kvalitativt perspektiv, det vill säga genom att intervjua verkställande direktörer och styrelsemedlemmar för att möjligen få en djupare insikt i deras tankar kring detta ämne. Ett tredje förslag är att genomföra en liknande undersökning fast på både onoterade och noterade bolag för att sedan göra en jämförelse mellan de olika bolagstyperna. / This study aims to investigate whether a female CEO affects the company’s capital structure, and whether there is a relationship between the gender distribution in the board and its capital structure in unlisted companies, with a delimitation to Swedish unlisted companies. Previous research on the topic has been done on listed companies, and therefore it will be interesting to carry out this research on unlisted companies. Based on the previous research, the study has designed two hypotheses on which the study is based. The study has a positivistic perspective and applies a quantitative method with a deductive approach. The empirical secondary data is obtained from the database Retriever where financial data from unlisted companies' annual reports are collected for the financial years 2012-2017. Then, correlation analyses and multivariate regression analyses have been carried out in order to be able to detect any connection between the study's dependent variable, capital structure, and the study's independent variables, female CEO and proportion of women on the board. The study's results show a weak connection in the two regressions and thus the study's two zero hypotheses are rejected. The results show that there is a weak positive correlation between female CEO and capital structure, and a weak negative correlation between the proportion of women on the board and capital structure. However, these relationships are very weak, and it is difficult to say whether the independent variables have a significant impact on the capital structure in practice. The study's results, which show a positive correlation between the female CEO and the capital structure, as well as a negative correlation between the proportion of women on the board and capital structure, contribute to the prevailing research on women's impact on risk, more specifically unlisted companies' financial risk. The study's practical contribution is that whether the company's CEO is a woman or not, and how the gender distribution looks in the company, can affect the capital structure of the company based on men and women's different risk-taking and thoughts on financial decisions. This study applies cross-sectional data, which means that the data analyzed is from one and the same time, which means that we cannot investigate a causal relationship, thus it would be interesting to study several cases over time. Another proposal is to investigate this connection from a qualitative perspective, ie by interviewing CEOs and board members in order to possibly gain a deeper insight into their thoughts on this subject. A third proposal is to conduct a similar survey on both unlisted and listed companies in order to then make a comparison between the different types of companies.

This thesis examines short- and long-term decision making, CEO-remuneration and its effects on company performance measured as return on assets during a time-period containing market up- and downturns with regards to company resilience. We examined this in a Swedish context by looking at listed companies on the Stockholm stock exchange during the period 2004 to 2014. The research was conducted using a multiple regression analysis to capture relationships between the dependent variable, the independent- and control variables over the observed time-period. We measure short-term action as decreases in R&D-spending, CapEx and number of employees, that can create short-term profits, whilst long-term actions is the opposite which are expected to generate a high level of company performance in the long run. In our observed population we find that companies who balance short- and long-term actions have a higher company performance, thus deviating from previous research. We also find that an increase in CEO-remuneration will not yield higher company performance when regarding firm size. The results of the study indicate that the companies in our sample have a goal alignment between the CEO and owners, although it shows tendencies of risk adversity in decision making. We find there is a more complex relationship between decision making, the CEO, and company performance than first expected.

Abstract Background: Following the financial crisis in 2008, a debate concerning excessive compensation of CEOs in retail banks arose. Previous studies have examined the association between CEO compensation and different factors namely, firm performance, board characteristics and firm size. Although the literature regarding the impact of the financial crisis and government intervention on CEO compensation is still to be empirically explored.   Purpose: To examine if the determinants of CEO compensation in retail banks have changed following the 2008 financial crisis and to determine if government intervention of retail bank have influenced the CEO compensation.   Method:  To achieve the purpose, the thesis takes on a deductive, quantitative research approach through the use of a multiple linear regression model. The multiple regression implements previously established determinants of executive compensation (Randoy & Nielsen, 2002). The regressions use accounting- and non-financial data that is collected from annual reports published by a sample of eight retail banks listed on the Stockholm- and London Stock Exchange over 16 years between 2002-2017.   Conclusion: The thesis finds that the financial crisis had little impact on the determinants of the CEO compensation. Although, the thesis is able to conclude that the government intervention of the retail banks in Sweden and United Kingdom follow the expectations stated beforehand, since the result show that the compensation of the CEO is reduced in those banks affected by government intervention.

A firm’s participation in cartel depends upon the potential problems that may arise due to price fixing and the incentives provided to the management. The top levels of management such as the board of directors and the CEO are responsible for deciding if the firm will participate in the cartel and manage the corporate governance activities of collusive price fixing agreements. This study aims to identify which characteristics of the participating firms’ boards of directors and CEOs are associated with cartel formation. It analyses the empirical investigation of cartel participation of firms, taking into account corporate governance characteristics as such as board of directors’ characteristics, ownership structure, CEO characteristics, and CEO compensation scheme. The study is focused on UK cartel firms which has the highest representation in the sample. A total number of 150 cartel firms in 52 cases from all around the world between the years 1990 to 2008 are involved in this study, of which 114 are UK firms. Therefore, this study is dominated by UK firms. The challenge of this study is that the personal attributes of CEOs and boards can make a significant contribution to the risk profile of a cartel being formed. This indeed would be to ‘diagnose’ organisational culture in a quite radical direction. The study suggests and finds that some corporate governance attributes are associated with cartel formation. The results reveal consistency with prior researches, that cartel firms have different corporate governance relative to a control sample in the three years prior to cartel formation. Specifically, the study concludes that UK-based cartel firms characterised by having larger board size compared to non-cartel firms; lower percentage of independent directors (non-executive); higher average of board remuneration; less likely that cartel is formed by family-owned and controlled firm (large shareholders); having older CEOs represented on the board; having CEO who served a less number of years as a director; less likely to have a female CEO represented; more likely to have CEOs who’s combined CEO-chairman position; and a higher average of CEOs bonuses and compensation packages.

En mettant l'accent sur la résilience des Présidents Directeur Généraux, cette thèse contribue au courant de recherche « upper echelons » et met en lumière une capacité, qui est cruciale en période d’incertitude, de changement rapide et de pression. Adoptant un format en trois essais (deux essais empiriques et un essai théorique), elle questionne l’influence et la diffusion de cette résilience au plus haut niveau. Afin de contextualiser mes travaux, je propose tout d'abord une revue de littérature des contributions « upper echelons » ayant trait aux caractéristiques des dirigeants et des recherches afférentes au concept de résilience. Le premier essai documente ensuite l’impact de la résilience des dirigeants sur la performance de leur entreprise et corrobore l’existence d’une relation curvilinéaire de forme concave, relation modérée par de niveau de réserve financière de l’entreprise et le niveau de complexité de son secteur d’activité. Le second essai corrobore l’existence d’une relation curvilinéaire de forme convexe entre résilience du dirigeant et degré de dynamisme stratégique et établit le rôle de médiateur de ce-dernier dans la relation résilience du dirigeant-performance de l’entreprise. Le troisième essai, de nature conceptuelle, propose un modèle de diffusion interne et externe de la résilience du dirigeant en temps de crise. Dans le chapitre de conclusion de ma thèse, après avoir souligné quelques limites de mon approche et proposé des pistes de recherche, je fournis quelques implications managériales de mes travaux. / Focusing on CEO resilience, this dissertation contributes to the upper echelons or strategic leadership research tradition and highlights a capacity, which is crucial in times of uncertainty, rapid change and pressure. Adopting a three essay format (two empirical and one theoretical pieces), it questions the influence of CEO resilience. The first chapter contextualises my work by reviewing previous "upper echelons" contributions pertaining to CEO characteristics and resilience literature. The first essay then investigates the impact of CEO resilience on firm performance and demonstrates the existence of a bell shape curvilinear relationship, relationship moderated by financial slack and industry complexity. The second essay confirms the existence of a U shape curvilinear relationship between CEO resilience and strategic dynamism and establishes the mediating role of strategic dynamism in the CEO resilience-company performance sequence. The third essay, which is conceptual, provides a model for internal and external diffusion of CEO resilience in times of crisis. Finally the concluding chapter of my thesis stresses some limitations, proposes future research avenues, and put forward some managerial implications.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-12-20T16:38:59Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Kélim Bernardes Sprenger_.pdf: 631926 bytes, checksum: 252828806d3d6757ac0475db132cf8b0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-20T16:38:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Kélim Bernardes Sprenger_.pdf: 631926 bytes, checksum: 252828806d3d6757ac0475db132cf8b0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-11-18 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos / Tendo em vista que o resultado de uma entidade impacta na decisão dos investidores, no mercado e na administração da empresa, determinados gestores podem se utilizar da discricionariedade no processo de mensuração e evidenciação contábil para gerenciar os resultados. Visando compreender as circunstâncias que estão atreladas à essa prática no Brasil, esta pesquisa teve como objetivo analisar a relação entre as características do Chief Executive Officer (CEO) e o gerenciamento de resultados em empresas listadas na BM&FBovespa. Para a consecução deste estudo, foram coletadas as informações do CEO de cada empresa, como idade, gênero, experiência anterior, nível de escolaridade e área de formação, bem como sua forma de eleição e os cargos por ele ocupados, no período de 2010 a 2015, por meio do Formulário de Referência. Para detectar o gerenciamento de resultados, foram utilizados os modelos de Jones (1991) e de Jones Modificado (1995), cujos resíduos representam os accruals discricionários, vistos pela literatura como proxy do gerenciamento de resultados. Dessa forma, para cada empresa e em cada ano, foram estimados os accruals discricionários e estes foram considerados como a variável dependente de uma regressão múltipla elaborada para estabelecer uma relação entre as características do CEO e o gerenciamento de resultados. Os dados foram organizados e estimados em poll de cross section. Os principais resultados indicam que quanto maior a medida de remuneração por desempenho (MRD) do CEO, menor será o uso de accruals discricionários na empresa e, consequentemente, haverá menor nível de gerenciamento de resultados. Também se verificou que há relação entre a idade e o gênero do CEO com o gerenciamento de resultados, indicando que quanto maior a idade do CEO, menor é o gerenciamento de resultados e que os homens fazem mais uso dos accruals discricionários. Identificou-se ainda que as empresas cujo controle acionário é estrangeiro estão menos relacionadas com o gerenciamento de resultados. / Considering that the outcome of a company affects the investors’ decision in the market and in the company’s management, some managers may use the discretion in the measurement and accounting disclosure process to manage the results. To further understand the circumstances linked to this practice in Brazil, this study aimed to analyze the relationship between the characteristics of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and earnings management in companies listed on the BM&FBovespa. To achieve this study, each company CEO’s information was collected, such as age, gender, previous experience, level of education and area, as well as their form of election and positions held by them in the period 2010-2015, through the Formulário de Referência (reference form). In order to detect earnings management, Jones model (1991) and Jones Modified model (1995) were used, which residues represent discretionary accruals, considered in the literature as earnings management’ proxy. Thus, for each company and each year, discretionary accruals were estimated and considered as a dependent variable in a multiple regression designed to establish a relationship between the CEO characteristics and earnings management. Data were organized and estimated at pool of cross-section. The main results indicate that the higher the payment for performance measurement (MRD) of the CEO, the lower the use of discretionary accruals. Consequently, there will be a lower level of earnings management. It was also found that there is a relationship between the age and gender of the CEO with the management results, indicating that the higher the age of the CEO, the lower the earnings management, and that men make more use of discretionary accruals. It also identified that companies with foreign stock control are less related to earnings management.

This thesis consists of three essays and studies CEO compensation and mergers and acquisitions in empirical corporate finance. The first essay is sole-authored and is titled ‘The Effect of Social Interactions on Executive Compensation.' The second essay ‘The Role of Investment Banker Directors in M &A: Can Experts Help?' is a joint work with Qianqian Huang, Erik Lie, and Ke Yang. The third essay is titled ‘The Strategic Use of CEO Compensation in Labor Contract Negotiations' and is coauthored with Erik Lie and Tingting Que. In the first essay, I examine how executives' social interactions affect their compensation. Using the social networks among 2,936 chief executive officers (CEOs) during 1999-2008, I report that the compensation of a pair of socially connected CEOs is significantly more similar than that of a pair of non-connected CEOs. I further find that CEO compensation responds to a peer's change in pay caused by industry performance, especially if that change in pay is positive rather than negative and when the firm is suffering from weak corporate governance. I interpret these results as consistent with the notion that relative earnings concerns within social networks affect negotiations about compensation. Finally, I find that the past practice of backdating stock option grants spread across social networks, suggesting that social networks serve as a conduit for interpersonal information flow about compensation practices. Taken together, I show that CEOs' peer interactions have a substantial impact on executive pay. In the second essay, we examine how directors with investment banking experience affect firms' acquisition behavior. We find that firms have a higher probability of acquisition when an investment banker is a director. Furthermore, acquirers with investment banker directors on the board have significantly higher announcement returns, especially if the deal is relatively large and the bankers' experience and/or network is current. We also find evidence that investment banker directors help reduce the takeover premium and advisory fees paid to outside consultants. Finally, the presence of investment banker directors is positively related to long-run operating and stock performance. Lastly, in the third essay, we study whether firms strategically alter CEO compensation to improve their bargaining position with labor unions. We conjecture that (i) firms in heavily unionized industries offer lower compensation packages to their CEOs than do their non-union counterparts, (ii) unionized firms temporarily curtail CEO compensation before union contract negotiations, and (iii) the curtailment in compensation is most pronounced for option grants due to their discretionary nature. Our results support these conjectures. We also find that CEOs are more likely to sacrifice compensation if they hold a relatively large stake in the company whose value depends on the contract negotiations. Finally, we report evidence that curtailing CEO compensation helps reduce the negotiated salary growth.

This thesis consists of three essays and studies CEO compensation, asset sales and takeovers and investment under uncertainty in empirical corporate finance. The first essay is a joint work with Qianqian Huang, Feng Jiang and Erik lie, titled `The effect of labor unions on CEO compensation'. The second essay `. Union Concessions following Asset Sales and Takeovers' is a joint work with Erik Lie. The third essay is titled `The Effect of Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk on Investment and R&D' and is sole-authored. In the first essay, we document evidence that labor unions compel firms to curtail CEO compensation. First, we find that firms with strong unions pay their CEOs less. Further, firms curb CEO compensation, especially the part that is discretionary, prior to union contract negotiations. Finally, we report that curbing CEO compensation mitigates the chance of a labor strike, thus providing a rationale for firms to pay CEOs less when facing strong unions. In the second essay, we document that the likelihood of asset sales increases with union wages. Furthermore, the acquiring firms gain significant concessions from the incumbent union following asset sales. Finally, the anticipation of union concessions helps explain the excess stock returns around asset sale announcements. We find no comparable effects for takeovers. We conclude that asset sales, but not takeovers, are partially motivated by the potential to extract concessions from unions. Finally, in the third essay, in an attempt to shed some light on the puzzling positive sensitivity of investment to systematic volatility documented in Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012), we decompose systematic volatility into a firm's systematic risk exposure (beta) as well as the market and industry portfolio volatility. Surprisingly, we find a positive response of investment to a firm's systematic risk exposure. R&D expenditure is employed as an alternative form of investment. Our results show that idiosyncratic risk actually encourages firms to engage in R&D spending, in contrast with its depressing effect on capital expenditure; whereas systematic volatility depresses R&D in contrast with the positive sensitivity of capital expenditure to systematic volatility.

Previous literature have documented that the independent directors play a crucial goal in corporate governance but the research on the firm value and board independence remains inconclusive. In my dissertation, I examine the impact of independent directors' geographic proximity to corporate headquarters on the effectiveness of corporate boards and the motivations of board directors. Using a large sample of directors trading, I show that independent directors who live close to headquarters ("local director") earn higher abnormal returns on their trades than other directors, and that this advantage is stronger in small firms. Further, I find an inverse relationship between the number of local independent directors on the board and firm value. Companies with fewer local independent directors also have higher ROA ratios, lower abnormal CEO compensations, and higher CEO incentive compensations. Collectively, the findings suggest that local independent directors are more informed but less effective monitors. I also provided evidence that firms with a higher proportion of directors' incentive compensation are more likely to manage earnings. Directors are more likely to exercise options in the year following the firms' earnings management being in the top tercile of the sample. The results are robust after controlling for self-selection bias. Taken together, the evidence suggests that director incentive pay is more likely to align directors' interest with the CEO's, rather than to induce the directors to act in the best interest of the shareholders.

This dissertation examines the effects that intangible capital and diversity reputation have on firm performance. In Chapter 1, entitled “CEO Overconfidence and Intangible Corporate Investments,” we extend the corporate investment and CEO overconfidence literature by examining how CEO overconfidence affects investment-cashflow sensitivity using a new measure of Tobin’s q and cashflow. Specifically, we incorporate intangible capital, which neo-classical investment theory mostly ignores, in the empirical analysis. We develop three overconfidence measures and their interaction with the respective standard and new cashflow settings to capture the investment-cashflow sensitivity effect of CEO overconfidence. We use three investment measures (physical, intangible, and total investments) and find that the effect of managerial overconfidence on investment-cashflow sensitivity is more prominent for corporate intangible investments than physical investments. Moreover, our results show that the standard measure of physical capital weakly explains the intangible investment-cashflow density. Our study offers useful insights in that it explains the reason why investment-cashflow sensitivity has been weaker in recent years. We also show that investment-cashflow sensitivity is stronger when intangible capital is incorporated into the analysis. Chapter 2 is entitled “Diversity Reputation and Firm Performance.” The modern American workplace is a microcosm of modern American society. The increasing diversity of the American workforce has made the increasing diversity of the American workplace a necessity. We explore the impact of diversity reputation on firm performance. We measure a firm’s diversity reputation by its inclusion in DiversityInc’s list of Top 50 Companies for Diversity. We measure firm performance by various accounting measures (return on assets, return on investment, and return on sales) as well as one market-based measure, Tobin’s Q. We find that firms that have a better diversity reputation outperform firms that do not.