World history has been punctuuted by cycles of violence, regardless of time, region or race. Genocide. which is the worst form of violence has always led to horrible impacts of a social, economic and environmental nature. The last decade of the 20th Century was the most turbulent Rwanda has ever seen. The country was ravaged by civil war,genocide, mass migration. economic crisis. diseases, return of refugees and deforestation. Almost all Rwandan families were affected wherever they were and at multiple levels, by outcomes such as death, disease, disability, poverty, loss of dignity and imprisonment. Fortunately, the people of Rwanda have chosen the path of peace. but arc still faced with a huge task of dealiing with the impacts or the genocide and prior conflicts in the region. This dissertation attempts to investigate the socio-economic impacts of the genocide on current development in Rwanda using primClry and secondary data obtained from fieldwork undertaken in Cyangugu and Rutare Towns. The conceptual basis for the study was the Geography of Conflict, The general conclusion reached was that the causes and consequences of the Rwandan genocide are multidimensional. The Rwandan genocide did not originate from the "ancient hatred" between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, but from the manipulation of history and bad leadership. Also. the main impacts of genocide in Rwanda are the destruction of human resources. social and cultural structures in the country, especially the relationship between the Hutus and Tutsis ethnic groups. In the same way the genocide resulted in destruction of infrastructure. development facilities and natural resources, However. the effort for reconstruction and development undertaken after the genocide shows that rcconciliation is possible in long term despite what happened. The lasting solution for Rwanda is definitely national reconciliation and its success will depend mainly on good governance, human resource development and poverty alleviation. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville, 2008.

In 1994, almost a million Tutsi and some Hutu were massacred in Rwanda during the 100 day genocide. Between 1995 and 1998, nearly the same number of Hutu and some Tutsi died, while in flight, primarily in the former Zaire. In the years following genocide, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans have been accused of genocide related crimes. There is not a person in Rwanda who is not directly affected by past violence and the country is in a process of healing and reconciliation. Much of the violence in Rwanda can be traced to perceptions of history and identity. This thesis seeks to unearth narratives of history and identity as a way of exploring possibilities for healing and reconciliation. Through an in-depth examination of four life stories, interviews with leaders in the field of reconciliation in Rwanda and informal interviews with a broad spectrum of Rwandans, this research sheds light on the challenges and opportunities in terms of healing. It finds that through critical engagement with our own and broader socio-political narratives we can expand the possibilities of our own narratives, allowing scope for personal healing as well as leading to a deeper understanding of the other. This can form the basis for sustainable reconciliation. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville, 2010.

In April 1994 Rwanda encountered the most gruesome political conflict, which was widely motivated by decades of ethnic tension, and resulted in the massive participation of ordinary Hutus slaughtering Tutsis, who are a minority along with the so-called moderate Hutus. Large numbers of ordinary Rwandans became killers, some willingly and some by force. About one million Rwandans, mostly Tutsis, lost their lives during the killings. Hence this historic event was declared to be genocide. The post-genocide government of Paul Kagame has been faced with the mission not only to reconcile the nation but also to forge a justice system that will assure Rwandans and those who committed crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity will be punished appropriately. It is outmost important to note that emphasis on justice in cases such as Rwandan genocide might be seen to be most desirable to victims in particular. This idea can be more dangerous particularly if the process takes place in an atmosphere which is characterised by political environment which is oppressive and autocratic. Realising the complexity of the conflict and inability of the conventional justice system to in dealing with the massive cases of people alleged to have participated in the killings or committed crime of genocide. The victims impatiently sought not only justice but answers to what has happened to their loved ones. On the other hand those labeled as perpetrators also wanted to clear their names since some of them believed that they were wrongfully accused and the process was taking too long. The Rwandan government was left with no option and decided to reintroduce the traditional justice system called the Gacaca. The Gacaca system was not only pioneered to render justice to the victims and those wrongfully accused but to reconcile as well as bring peace to the Rwandan society. This study is therefore aimed at providing a comprehensive and compelling explanation of the process and the operations of the Gacaca tribunals. Thus by means of both historical and empirical analysis, the study hopes to determine the challenges confronting the system and the promise it holds, if any, and to recommend the need to adopt and adapt to an approach which is wider and more integrated in dealing with reconciliation in the region. To accomplish this study, data was predominantly sourced from primary sources such as media reports and personal interviews with Rwandan community living in Durban, South Africa. The study revealed that the Rwandan genocide was marked by overwhelming public participation which makes Rwandan conflict even more complex. Killing was seen as work, as well as fulfilling the country's duty. On the other hand not killing was viewed as betrayal especially for thousands of peasants. Almost the entire population took part in the killings. The Gacaca is a unique approach of trying genocide perpetrators adopted in Rwanda. In this thesis I argue that it is through examination of different historical and social factors that the relevance of the Gacaca can be assessed. Furthermore my argument is that Rwanda needs a multi-faceted approach to confront complex problems that it faces politically and socially. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2008.

Scholarship on youth in Africa has mostly focused on unemployed young people, portraying them as a lost generation and exploring how states have failed them. Literature on young employed Africans has been conspicuously absent. This research portrays how a group of young professional Rwandans who define themselves as “diaspora” living in post-genocide Kigali, are redefining national belonging in economic terms. Many young professionals have moved from the diaspora to Rwanda because the state offers them a platform where they can find employment or start their own business: an entrepreneurial citizenship. The city of Kigali is experiencing physical and social transformation, and these young professionals are driving such change. The young people in this study see Rwanda as a place where they can belong by being cosmopolitan, and especially by becoming entrepreneurs. They feel that in Rwanda they are able to be global citizens more easily than in the Diaspora. This feeling of global citizenship is, ironically, what inspires in them a sense of national identity. This research explores the youth in the broader sense of economic activity and time and their sense of belonging in everyday life, in the capital city of Kigali.

This Thesis is an analytical investigation of the i mpact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. It focuses on the vio lent conflicts and instability that marked the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), particularl y the eastern DRC region since 1996- 2006. The DRC hosted about 1.25 million Rwandan Hut u refugees (including the ex-Forces Armeés Rwandaises and Hutu militiamen) following the hundred atrocio us days of the 1994 genocide under Hutu-led government in Rwanda. This study assesses rigorously the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the eastern DRC c onflicts. The theoretical framework of this research is the E rvin Staub’s Basic Needs perspective. This theoretical model provides an analytical tool to ex amine a myriad of factors underlying mass violence and genocide. Factors such as difficult li fe conditions, group cultural history, social psychological factors and context create an enhance d potential for movement along a path of violent conflicts with hallmarks including moral ex clusion, stigmatization, dehumanization and impunity. The tool of qualitative textual analy sis of relevant scholarly and non-scholarly documents in the subject area is used. A whole rang e of issues comprising the conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC before and after the 1994 R wanda genocide is assessed: ethnicity, ideologies, refugees, rebel groups in DRC conflicts , socio-economical contexts. In analyzing the data I have employed content analysis. The results of this study point out that, factors s uch as difficult life conditions, ideologies of hatred, economical and political crises that marked the Great Lakes Region of Africa have created a climate conducive to conflicts. Furthermo re, the research shows that the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees, particularly the ex-FAR and Hutu militiamen, contributed in the escalation of violent conflicts in eastern DRC. Thi s corroborates the scholars finding that refugees are not only the unfortunate victims of co nflict and the by-product of war; they are also important political actors who can play an act ive role in conflict dynamics and instability (Salehyan 2007: 127; Collier in Furley 2006:2). The study ends with recommendations for peace and sustainable stability and development in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: comprehending and addressing thoroughly the roots c auses of conflicts, promoting and implementing policies and mechanisms for good gover nance, economic development, respect of human rights and justice, addressing effectively the issue of refugees and reconciliation. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2009.

No description available.

In the decades after attaining independence from its colonial masters, Rwanda’s two principal ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, suffered worsening tensions which often resulted in the perpetration of atrocities. Peace agreements brokered by the international community did not ease these ethnic tensions. In April 1994, the ethnic crisis took a different dimension following the assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. A full-blown genocide was committed by the Hutus who targeted their Tutsi and Hutu-moderates victims because of their ethnic identity and tolerant political views respectively. In a hundred days, about a million Tutsis and Hutu-moderates were massacred. Gross violations of human rights had been committed. The planning, preparation and execution of these atrocities were done by almost everyone within the Hutu majority: the leadership (both civilian and military), business men, the clergy, artists, professors, journalists, militias, the commoners, and other civil society actors. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under the leadership of General Paul Kagame overthrew the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) and brought the genocide to an end. In an effort to build a government of national unity, the Government of Rwanda under the leadership of President Paul Kagame requested the United Nations Security Council to establish a tribunal for the trial of persons who bear responsibility for the atrocities committed in Rwanda. In response to this request, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 955 (8 November 1994) creating the second United Nations’ ad hoc international criminal tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Annexed to Resolution 955 was the Statute of the ICTR. The Statute gave the Tribunal jurisdiction over three crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. Amongst other things, it also defined on which individuals it would impose criminal responsibility. The definition of genocide and the punishable acts as contained in the Statute of the ICTR (Article 2) were simply imported from the United Nations’ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948 (Article III). One of these punishable acts is direct and public incitement to commit genocide (Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute of the ICTR). As seen in Article 6(1) of the Statute of the ICTR, there are five different modes of participation that would lead to the imposition of criminal responsibility: planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting. Instigation is one of these modes of participation. An examination of the jurisprudence of both the Trial and Appeal Chambers of the ICTR reveals that there is an overlap between direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) and instigation as a mode of participation under Article 6(1). The Trial and Appeal Chambers have contributed enormously to the development of the jurisprudence of direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c). Now settled as an inchoate crime in international criminal law, criminal responsibility is imposed irrespective of whether the direct and public incitement successfully results in the commission of genocide. On the other hand, instigation is one of the modes of participation which would lead to the imposition of criminal responsibility. Participation under Article 6(1) is not limited to any particular crime, but extends to all the crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction – genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. The jurisprudence of the Trial and Appeal Chambers on Article 6(1) states that criminal responsibility can only be imposed where it is proved that the accused’s mode of participation substantially contributed to the commission of the crime. Therefore, instigation, which is one of the modes of participation, must be shown to have substantially contributed to the commission of the crime for criminal responsibility to be imposed. In my opinion, this requirement of substantial contribution for the imposition of criminal responsibility is wrong. It emanates from a poor understanding of Article 6(1) and the construction of the words therein. It is a judicial invention which does not square with established principles of criminal responsibility in general and inchoate crimes in particular. This thesis critiques the jurisprudence of the ICTR on instigation as a mode of participation under Article 6(1). Instigation is a recognised mode of participation in international crimes. Under the common law system, it is also an inchoate crime. International instruments and the jurisprudence of the Trial and Appeal Chambers have recognised the inchoate nature of incitement. However, in the construction of Article 6(1) wherein instigation features as a mode of participation, the Trial and Appeal Chambers erred. I illustrate in this thesis that a correct construction and understanding of Article 6(1) shows its inchoate and bifurcated character: first, any of the modes of participation must lead to any of the stages of any of the crimes (planning, preparation or execution). These modes of participation are not limited to any particular crime. Therefore, if instigation leads to the planning or preparation of any of the crimes, that renders it inchoate (which is understood to mean a criminal activity that is incomplete, still at its initial stage). Second, the imposition of criminal responsibility is bifurcated. In other words, it must go through two stages: first, there must be a mode of participation, and second, it must lead to any of the stages of the crimes. Third, the substantial contribution requirement does not square with a strict construction of Article 6(1). In articulating the different stages that a mode of participation must lead to, it states ‘planning, preparation or execution’ of any of the crimes. The use of a disjunctive word ‘or’ rather than a conjunctive word ‘and’ suggests that any of the modes of participation that leads to any of these stages (planning, preparation or execution) of any of these crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II) would suffice. Therefore, to require that there must be a substantial contribution to commission of a crime before criminal responsibility can be imposed under Article 6(1) is a clear limitation to the last stage of the crime, which is execution (or commission). As evidenced by the cases tried at the Tribunal, Article 2(3)(c) which addresses the inchoate crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide and Article 6(1) which deals with the imposition of criminal responsibility, do overlap. In other words, incitement that qualifies as direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) may as well qualify as instigation to any of the crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction under Article 6(1). From the delivery of its first judgment in the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu,1 the Trial Chambers did not recognise the confluence 1 Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4. T. Ch. I, 2 September 1998. between these two Articles. However, in the case of The Prosecutor v Callixte Kalimanzira,2 the Trial Chambers made this observation, and outlined a set of guidelines on how to resolve cases of overlap. Though a colossal step in fixing this problem, the guidelines are faulted because they repeat the same mistakes made by previous Trial Chambers: first, they limit instigation only to genocide even under Article 6(1); second, they still hold that criminal responsibility can be imposed under Article 6(1) only when it is proved that the mode of participation substantially contributed to the commission of the crime. While it resonates with conventional wisdom today that incitement, synonymous with instigation, is limited to the crime of genocide, this thesis critiques the jurisprudence of both the Trial and Appeal Chambers of the ICTR and argues that instigation is a mode of participation in crimes against humanity following a strict construction of Article 6(1). Furthermore, incitement that qualifies as ‘direct and public incitement’ to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) may also qualify as instigation to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, or both under Article 6(1). Third, ‘direct and public incitement’ to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) is limited to the crime of genocide, and must fulfil the caveats of ‘direct’ and ‘public’. Meanwhile, instigation under Article 6(1) does not need to meet any requirement as long as it leads to the ‘planning, preparation or execution’ of any of the crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction. The poor construction of Article 6(1) has resulted in huge controversies about instigation as a mode of participation in crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction under Article 6(1). More specifically, instigation, which is one of the modes, overlaps with the wording of Article 2(3)(c) which deals with the inchoate crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The substantial contribution requirement is a judicial invention which does not align squarely with established principles of criminal responsibility for inchoate crimes. It is the unfortunate outcome of a poor construction of Article 6(1) and has orchestrated a confused understanding of instigation as a mode of participation. It has blurred and obfuscated instigation as a mode of participation in crimes against humanity; stagnated the evolution of the jurisprudence on instigation to 2 Judgment, Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, T. Ch. III, 22 June 2009. commit crimes against humanity; and above all, propelled international criminal law on an ambitious and controversial mission from which it must retreat

Under det nyligen avslutade kriget i Irak, 2003, har kriget inom den fjärde arenan,informationsoperationer, blivit påtaglig. Vilken kapacitet har Ryssland inom denna arena?Syftet med uppsatsen är att lägga en grund till fördjupad kunskap om ryskainformationsoperationer, dels vad doktrinerna uttrycker men även praktiskt genomförande.Uppsatsen inleds med en analys av det första Tjetjenienkriget 1994 – 1996 och däreftermilitära doktrinen samt doktrinen om informationssäkerhet, båda undertecknade år 2000.Genom en analys av det andra Tjetjenienkriget, 1999 – , redovisas vilken ”Lessons Learned”som har skett mellan de två krigen via doktrinerna. I min påföljande diskussion och syntesredovisas vilken kurs Ryssland har lagt ut för informationsoperationer.I arbetet utnyttjar jag en deskriptiv metod med induktiv slutledning. Beskriven teori,manöverteorin, samt analysverktyg, OODA-loopen, och de där dragna slutsatser kommer attutnyttjas i en diskussion om det resultat som min kvalitativa textanalys ger. I min diskussionsvarar jag på ställda frågor och verifiera eller falsifierar de i utredningen ställda hypoteserna. / During the last war in Iraq, the war of Information Operations has been evident.What capacity does Russia have in this arena?The purpose of this essay is to lay the foundations for deeper knowledge about theRussian information operations, in doctrines as well as in reality. This is donethrough an analysis of the 1st Chechnya War 1994-96. Thereafter, the militarydoctrine and the doctrine of information security are analysed, both signed in2000. Through an analysis of the 2nd Chechnya War, one can clearly see theprogress, lessons learned, from the 1st War to the 2nd based on the doctrines. In thefollowing discussion and synthesis, I account for the policy Russia has takenregarding Information Operations.During my essay, I use a descriptive method with an inductive conclusion.Described theory, manoeuvre theory and a tool of analysis (the OODA-loop) withconclusions will be used in a discussion about the result of my qualitative textualcommentary. The discussion will answer questions asked and verify or falsify thestipulated hypothesis. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 01-03

Large-scale humanitarian crises in foreign countries raise the question of whether or not other countries have a duty to alleviate that suffering. In extreme cases, humanitarian intervention, that is: military intervention for the purpose of alleviating human suffering, is sometimes advocated as the morally required course of action. This thesis suggests that while the international community has a general moral responsibility to prevent and ameliorate humanitarian crises there is no simple duty of military humanitarian intervention. Hitherto, the question has typically been treated as a matter of either moral or legal principle. This thesis argues that empirical factors, which affect the international community's ability to carry out interventions effectively, have not been given their due weight in the debate. On the basis of evaluations of international responses to crises in Somalia and Rwanda, 1992 - 1994, it is suggested that a range of factors undermine the efficacy of humanitarian interventions. These factors include the impact of state interests, the effects of domestic politics in intervening states and, contrary to expectations, the role of humanitarian considerations in decision making on intervention. By showing the limitations of a simplistic view of a duty of humanitarian intervention the thesis seeks to contribute to reconciling idealism with realism in international crisis-responses. Based on sound moral and political judgment military interventions in humanitarian crises would hopefully be less ambitious and ultimately more effective.

Thesis (M.Th.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2007.