This is a study of how the United States has used different diplomatic strategies towards Iran and North Korea. The concept of coercive diplomacy is defined and explained, in or-der to see if it has been used by the United States, and if so, to what extent. After giving a brief historical background between the U.S and the two countries, the study will put a fo-cus on what and why the Bush administration has acted the way they have in their diplo-matic relation with Iran and North Korea. The study presents cases where you can see par-allels between strategies used, but also some significant differences. The latter part of the study will examine the reasoning behind the different strategies used. Conclusion drawn from this study was that, in the case of Iran, the United States has been forced to act in a certain way due to the other conflicts they are involved with in the region, i.e. the war in Iraq and the situation in Afghanistan. Due to the fear for North Koreas al-ready existing nuclear arsenal, the U.S. has shown a more restricted diplomatic policy to-wards the country, not wanting to push them towards starting a nuclear war.

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Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North Korea's record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most agree North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a solution. This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons: lack of trust, DPRK reluctance to permit transparency, and the difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive diplomacy. Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's question must be answered: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" If Washington is unwilling to back a threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy. Likewise, U.S. leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons. / Major, United States Air Force

強制外交（coercive diplomacy）的概念在一九七０年代由學者Alexander L. George首度提出，主張強制外交應屬於防守型的危機管理（defensive crisis management），亦有別於一般所謂的嚇阻（deterrence）與壓制（compellence）等策略。施行強制外交時，相關決策者透過威脅使用武力，或使用有限度的武力，以勸說對手停止或放棄現正從事的行動，並防止危機情勢的升高，及避免戰爭的發生。冷戰期間，美、蘇兩國的領導人對於該一策略的運用極為廣泛與普遍，甘迺迪政府對於古巴飛彈危機的處理便是著名的案例。冷戰結束，國際關係進入所謂的後冷戰時期，面對區域衝突、人道危機和恐怖主義威脅等問題，強制外交更常被相關決策者和國際組織所施行、採用，亦多次在國際間重大的衝突與危機處理過程中扮演著關鍵的角色，並展現其重要性和多元化的一面。因此，鑑於強制外交對於後冷戰時期之國際危機處理和衝突解決的重要性和必要性，本研究旨在透過強制外交相關理論的介紹與整理，以及後冷戰時期強制外交相關個案的研究分析，總結歷史的經驗與教訓，深入探討其施行現況與成效，並提出具體之研究發現與政策建議。期盼所得之研究成果能使吾人對於該策略有更深一層的認識與了解。 關鍵詞：強制外交、壓制、危機管理、後冷戰時期、區域衝突、人道干涉、反恐行動 / In the 1970s, Alexander L. George first introduced and defined the concept of coercive diplomacy. According to George, he claims that coercive diplomacy is a strategy of defensive crisis management. Besides, coercive diplomacy is also different from the strategy of deterrence or compellence. When policymakers and political elites decide to manipulate coercive diplomacy, they should employ threats and / or limited force to persuade opponents to call off or undo adverse actions, which are thought aggressive. Furthermore, the purpose of using coercive diplomacy is to prevent crisis situation from escalating or causing wars. During the Cold War era, leaders of United States and Soviet Union used this strategy intensively. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 can also be thought as a famous case of successful coercive diplomacy. When international relations enters into the post-Cold War era, coercive diplomacy still plays as important role in crisis management and conflict resolution. Policymakers of countries and international organizations, like the United Nations and the NATO, prefer to use coercive diplomacy to deal with regional conflicts, humanitarian intervention, and counterterrorism. Coercive diplomacy also demonstrates its necessity and significance of solving these problems. In order to give us a comprehensive understanding of coercive diplomacy, this thesis focuses on theories of coercive diplomacy and case studies, especially the experiences after the Cold War. Then, in final chapter of this thesis, the author generalizes lessons and experiences come from the cases analyzed and studied. In addition, the author also tries to make conclusions about the efficacy of coercive diplomacy and thus tries to offer some guidelines for policymakers. Keywords: coercive diplomacy, compellence, crisis management, post-Cold War era, regional conflicts, humanitarian intervention, counterterrorism

The following dissertation develops a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), and effectively manipulating the terrorist group’s (and its supporting elements’) decision-making calculus. In particular, the theory of strategic coercion has been chosen as a basis for formulating this framework, based upon: 1) the invaluable guidance it offers in dynamically drawing upon all instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, military, etc.—to accomplish politico-strategic objectives; and 2) the unique insights it provides into making strategic moves aimed at influencing the choices taken by an adversary. However, strategic coercion theory as it currently stands is inadequate for applications against substate terrorist organizations. As a quintessential cornerstone for prescriptive policy in strategic studies, such a looming deficiency vis-à-vis one the most important security threats of the modern age is unacceptable. The new theoretical framework established in this dissertation—entitled the Balance Theory of strategic coercion—addresses this deficiency. The Balance Theory stresses that three key coercive elements of strategic coercion are fundamentally important for successfully ending the hostilities posed by NSTOs, being: A) Isolation of external/international support; B) Denial; and C) Isolation of popular support. It posits that these three aspects of strategic coercion serve as the sine qua non for success in countering an NSTO’s campaign of violence and effectively manipulating its decision-making process. Implementation of these three elements, moreover, must be pursued in tandem, taking care so as not to sacrifice one aspect for the other. The Balance Theory is tested through the employment of case-study analysis. In pursuing this end, both cross-case and within-case analyses are performed, accompanied by the utilization of the methods of focused, structured comparison. The cases examined are those of: 1) The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007); and 2) Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present). The dissertation concludes with an examination of how the Balance Theory may provide insights for the formulation of counter-terrorism strategy against Al Qaeda in the current "War on Terror".