Cette recherche qualitative examine le processus d’enquête publique de la Commission d’enquête sur l’octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l’industrie de la construction1 au Québec. Le principal objectif est de comprendre comment la CEIC construit, pendant ce processus d’enquête, le rôle des agents économiques dans le scandale de corruption et de collusion dans la Ville de Montréal. Notre cadre théorique s’inscrit dans le constructivisme modéré et part de l’idée que les individus appréhendent la réalité sociale et la construisent à partir des représentations et significations qu’ils apprennent et développent lors de la socialisation et des expériences quotidiennes. Leurs activités sont déterminées par ce rapport qu’ils entretiennent avec le monde et par les rapports de pouvoirs entre les individus et groupes sociaux. Les divers documents utilisés ou produits pour et par la commission ont été soumis à une analyse critique du discours. Nous cherchions à comprendre comment par l’utilisation du langage, et à partir de ce qui est dit ou non dans les documents produits par la CEIC, le rôle des entreprises est construit en défendant les intérêts de certains acteurs au détriment des autres. Notre analyse a mis en évidence que les conclusions de la CEIC correspondent à la réponse que le gouvernement lui suggère, de manière assez discrète, dans le mandat. Le rôle des compagnies a été construit à l’aide de trois stratégies adoptées tout au long des travaux. La CEIC réoriente son mandat en définissant les termes après avoir complété l’enquête, en changeant l’ordre des volets et l’objet de son enquête. Ainsi, son enquête porte sur l’obtention des contrats publics et non sur leur octroi : les compagnies sont les principaux acteurs du scandale. Elle décriminalise2 certains comportements et utilise le bouc émissaire fourni dans le mandat, à savoir le crime organisé, pour blanchir les cols blancs et surtout les fonctionnaires et hommes politiques le plus haut placés. Pour y parvenir, elle doit cependant contredire ses propres définitions des termes du mandat. La peur collective envers la violence et la perception de la mafia par les citoyens ont facilité cette décriminalisation sélective des comportements. Finalement, les compagnies sont présentées comme ayant été contaminées par l’infiltration du crime organisé dans l’industrie et cette contamination, ces compagnies l’ont transmise à quelques fonctionnaires. Nous sommes arrivés à la conclusion que le rôle des entreprises n’a pas été construit en partant de l’interprétation du mandat, comme le suggère notre question de recherche, mais de manière à calquer les conclusions qui y étaient suggérées : les crimes en col blanc s’expliquent par l’infiltration de la mafia dans l’industrie. En procédant ainsi, la CEIC a contribué à la sauvegarde et au renforcement du statu quo.

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第22948号 / 経博第623号 / 新制||経||294(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 諸富 徹, 教授 矢野 剛, 教授 劉 徳強 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DFAM

Charles University in Prague Faculty of Social Sciences Institute of Economic Studies MASTER THESIS An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for Spectrum Auctions with Communication Channels Author: Bc. Jindřich Matoušek Supervisor: PhDr. Lubomír Cingl Academic Year: 2013/2014 Abstract The multi-unit auction mechanisms are one of the most important instruments used for the allocation of spectrum licenses, airport time slots, delivery routes, networking or furniture allocation. This thesis experimentally examines the attributes of complex multi-unit auction mechanisms (Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction and its combinatorial extension Simultaneous Multi-Round Package Bidding) in the presence of an opportunity to collude among the bidding participants due to a provision of a simple communication channel - a chat window. The results suggest that in our parameter setting, the combinatorial bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Interestingly, allowing for communication increases efficiency in both examined auction formats. Bidders are able to split the auctioned goods in a collusive agreement, which results in a better allocation compared to the auction formats without the communication channel. Combinatorial bidding on packages probably makes the decision-making problem of bidders hard to process...

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La théorie de l'agence a offert une analyse approfondie des conditions sous lesquelles les incitations parviennent à réconcilier les intérêts divergents du principal et de l'agent. Les essais présentés dans cette thèse évaluent la pertinence empirique de ces résultats face à l'intervention d'une tierce partie dans trois situations-types : le comportement de corruption, les choix de pratique des médecins spécialistes et la demande de travail au noir

Les caractéristiques de l'offre de gaz en Europe et les spécificités du marché gazier ont conduit les régulateurs à adopter des régulations asymétriques, prenant la forme de gas release et d'objectifs de pertes de parts de marché. Les expériences empiriques montrent, en accord avec la théorie économique, que ces mesures rendent des concurrents actifs sur le marché et ne découragent pas les investissements. En terme de concurrence, les effets sont plus mitigés. Certains effets positifs trouvent certainement leur cause dans la croissance de la consommation qui est parfois exponentielle ou le développement des infrastructures d'importation et de transport. Ces mesures peuvent cependant favoriser les comportements collusifs, les stratégies d'écrémage ou de « reverse cherry picking », ainsi que des entrées inefficaces, rendues possibles car le concurrent est protégé pour une période de temps donnée. Un gas release crée une relation commerciale entre l'opérateur historique et son concurrent, ainsi qu'un système de contraintes sur les capacités de chacun. Les stratégies de prix ou de quantités sont alors modifiées. Les prix d'équilibre sont plus volatils et peuvent s'éloigner nettement du « mark-u p » de concurrence. De même, les stratégies d'un modèle de COURNOT se complexifient. L'opérateur historique, si les quantités rétrocédées sont fortes et ses approvisionnements faibles, peut laisser augmenter volontairement ses coûts pour accroître ses profits. Cette stratégie d'augmentation des coûts des rivaux est d'autant plus possible que le prix de rétrocession est proche de ses coûts d'approvisionnement. Elle ne détériore pas le surplus des consommateurs mais diminue le bien-être. Le régulateur peut restaurer l'incitation à l'efficacité en fixant une proportion rétrocédée en fonction du niveau des approvisionnements observé. Cette proportion ne doit pas être trop faible pour faire bénéficier le marché de l'incitation à l'efficacité de l'opérateur historique et des ventes plus importantes des deux opérateurs. Dans un même temps, une proportion trop élevée accentue les possibilités d'augmentation des coûts des rivaux ou de collusion.

Financial intermediaries are recognized to promote the efficiency of resource allocation by mitigating problems of incentives, asymmetric information and contract incompleteness. The role played by financial intermediaries is perceived so crucial that these institutions have received all over the world the greatest attention of regulators. Differences in regulatory regimes as well as in the real economies have produced a large variety in the characteristics of financial sectors and of individual intermediaries. In particular, in different places and times it is possible to observe banking sectors more or less competitive, populated by credit intermediaries of different sizes and with different levels of specialization. This variety of institutions raises interesting questions about the features of a well functioning financial intermediation sector. These questions have inspired an important body of economic literature which, however, is still inconclusive in many aspects. This dissertation includes three studies all intending to contribute in this direction. Chapter 2 Recent empirical works have found evidence consistent with larger banks having lower incentives to collect soft information and, in particular, to lend to small firms which are typically regarded as relatively opaque borrowers. Another market segment affected by relatively high levels of opaqueness is that of long-term loans and the reason is that, as emphasized in the corporate finance literature, short-term maturities are useful for the purpose of screening and monitoring investment projects. It is therefore interesting to assess whether large and small banks differ in their propensity to issue long-term loans, a type of investigation which has not been conducted yet. The reason why small and large banks might be expected to have a different propensity to issue long-term loans has to do with two notions. First, the effectiveness of a short-term maturity as a screening and monitoring device is preserved only if parties anticipate that, when payments are due, the lender will not be willing to extend the maturity, otherwise the initial short-term loan is de facto a long-term one. The problem may rise if the liquidation of insolvent firms produces lower payoffs than their refinancing: under these circumstances, as suggested by theories on renegotiation, liquidation is not implemented no matter what is written on the contract (parties can easily avoid the inefficiency that would result from liquidation, for example by simply granting a new loan). Second, at a more specific level theories on renegotiation suggest that the ability to commit to not extend thematurity decreases with bank size.1 Small banks are therefore predicted to issue shorter-term loans and to make a better selection of projects. The results are consistent with this prediction. Controlling for other characteristics of both the demand- and the supply-side as well as for the type of guarantee supplied, small banks have lower proportions of long-term loans to total loans and lower proportions of non performing loans to total loans. It should be pointed out that this does not imply that small banks are necessarily more efficient since short-term maturities also have costs; in particular, short-term maturities can interfere with the incentives of good types by inducing short-termism (the inflation of shortterm results at the expenses of total profitability). Moreover, beyond the ability to commit other supply-side features are shown to be relevant in the determination of the maturity, at least with specific classes borrowers. In particular, the findings are also consistent with the presence of economies of scale in lending at long maturities to firms in more technical and innovative industries. Since providing the right incentives to high quality entrepreneurs and to firms in innovative sectors is more likely to be a priority in more advanced countries, a policy implication is that these economies need more the presence of large credit institutions and the more so if venture capital and stock market are of limited size. Chapter 3 As already emphasized, theories on renegotiation suggest that the ability of banks to commit to a given course of action is an important factor for efficiency and that such ability depends on observable characteristics, like bank size. An important aspect which has not been analyzed in the theoretical literature is the effect that competition among banks exert on their ability to commit. The theoretical model presented in chapter 3 tries to provide an answer to this question. More specifically, the model studies the effects of competition among banks when these are subject to dynamic commitment problems which may result in excess refinancing of insolvent borrowers (soft budget constraint) as well as in excess termination of profitable ones (ratchet effect and short-termism). The building assumption is that, because of priority schemes and relationship lending, competition is harsher for new lending than for lending to ongoing projects. The main conclusion is that there exists a trade-off between the benefits that competition brings by disciplining low quality borrowers and the costs implied by worsening the incentives of good ones. The model also allows to look at the effects of competition on stability. This is done in two ways by looking at the extent to which competition interferes with the procyclicality of the banking sector and by studying if competition may eliminate or add inefficient equilibria. The main policy implication is that the optimal level of competition of a banking system is positively related to the quality of the underlying economy. If taken together, the results of chapters 2 and 3 also provide a theory about local or regional banks which is not based on any aprioristic assumption about the technology of these type of intermediaries. As long as these institutions can be seen as banks with a relatively high market power and a relatively small size (they are often important players at a local level although of limited size), both chapters 2 and 3 suggest that these intermediaries can more easily commit to a tough stance at the refinancing stage, with positive effects on their ability to screen out bad projects but with negative effects on their ability to incentivize good types and to fund more technical and innovative firms. In other words, these institutions might promote growth at earlier stages of development, although they are not sufficient to address the incentive issues of more advanced economies. Interestingly, this interpretation of the role of local banks is totally distinct from the traditional one which is based on the aprioristic assumption that these banks are good in doing relationship lending. Chapter 4 Conflicts of interest of economic institutions carrying out a variety of functions are considered a widespread phenomenon severely limiting the efficiency that can be achieved. These worries are often taken as justification for regulations imposing transparency requirements or tougher measures like separation of functions. At the same time, contract theory suggests that the effects of opportunistic behavior can be limited by adopting appropriate incentive schemes. The third study, chapter 4, tries to understand from a theoretical point of view to what extent the use of incentive schemes can address the distortions posed by the presence of conflicts of interest. The universal bank is regarded as a (common) agent serving different clients with potentially conflicting interests: for example, it may buy assets on behalf of investors and sell assets on behalf of issuing firms. The clients offer incentive schemes to the bank and they behave non-cooperatively. The bank decides a level of effort and, when firewalls are absent, a level of collusion, modelled as a costly and unproductive redistribution of wealth among the clients (for example, the banks can at no cost sell the securities it is underwriting to the funds it manages and can do so at the price it likes). Firewalls are defined as all legal or economic devices imposing a real separation of functions and therefore preventing the bank from colluding as specified above. The main conclusion is that in the absence of firewalls the equilibrium incentive schemes are steeper. This means that the equilibrium level of effort is higher and may compensate the (ex post) inefficiency of collusion. In other words, not only appropriate incentive schemes can eliminate the distortions posed by conflicts of interest but, at least in principle, their presence may even be necessary for efficiency (this happens if effort is a public good for the two principals so that the allocation without firewalls is characterized by under-provision of effort). At the same time, the allocation without firewalls is shown to be the least efficient in the presence of one naive player who does not recognize the existence of the conflict of interest. As long as transparency requirements can be considered tools to improve market participants’ sophistication, these results suggest why and how this type of regulation can work. Moreover, the model allows to draw conclusions about the desirability of tougher regulation prescribing a more or less neat separation of functions. With sophisticated economic agents, who can address the distortions posed by conflicts of interest by choosing appropriate incentive schemes, separation of functions is unnecessary or even detrimental for efficiency. On the other hand, more or less powerful firewalls are desirable if market participants are not considered sufficiently sophisticated to be able to react to the presence of conflicts of interest and if transparency requirements cannot increase their sophistication. In few words, the optimal regulation of conflicts of interest is softer in situations involving professionals who are more likely to realize and to react by choosing an appropriate incentive scheme or, more generally, for institutions operating in advanced economies where the average level of market participants sophistication is higher.

Competitive power markets from different countries exhibit a common market design, especially because of the nature of electricity (lack of storage, inelastic load, and strong seasonal effects on multiple time scales). For example, a majority of countries have created a spot market where electricity is traded hourly. The design of the spot markets reflected an ambition of providing strong incentives for efficient and least-cost production. Subsequently, the spot market price has been considered as a reference price for other existing electricity markets such as the contract market or the real-time market. However, empirical studies on electricity markets find some evidence of abnormally high markups. The literature on the electricity spot market mainly focuses on the producers' pricing decisions. The present thesis argues that quantity choices, both in terms of available as well as contracted quantities, are crucial for understanding market power in electricity markets. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2003 [4], iii, [1] s., s. 1-6: sammanfattning, s. 7-119, [5] s.: 4 uppsatser

This dissertation consists of four self-contained essays primarily concerned with incorporating the objectives of real world top managers, as revealed by the available empirical evidence, in supergame-theoretic analyses of long-term competition between oligopolistic firms. The first essay, "Ownership, Control, and Collusion", considers how the separation between ownership and control affects firms' competitive attitudes when top managers have the preference for smooth profit streams revealed by the evidence on "income smoothing" and when managerial compensation has the low pay-performance sensitivity found in many empirical studies. In a similar fashion, the second essay, "Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition", deals with the effects of the apparently more aggressive managerial incentives linked to stock price (e.g. stock options), which have become increasingly common in the U.S., on long-term oligopolistic competition. In the third paper, "Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device", shareholders’ commitments to reduce conflicts with debtholders by choosing a top manager with a highly valuable reputation or with "conservative" incentives are considered. These forms of commitment have been shown to reduce the (agency) cost of debt finance; this paper characterizes their effects on the relation between firms' capital structure and product market competition. The fourth paper, "Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion", addresses the relation between multimarket contact and firms’ ability to sustain collusive behavior in repeated oligopolies. It explores how this relation is affected by the strict concavity of firms’ objective function induced by managerial objectives and by other features of reality, discusses the effects of conglomeration and horizontal mergers, and extends the results to non-oligopolistic supergames. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1999</p>

Lo scopo della nostra ricerca è di proporre un modello dell'intervento pubblico che differisce dall'approccio standard e di valutare le sue implicazioni in termini di benessere. Noi sosteniamo che in molte circostanze la regolamentazione risulta essere un processo di "give-and-take" pittosto che di "take-it-or-leave-it". Più precisamente, la nostra idea è che la politica regolamentatoria possa essere più generalmente modellizzata come il risultato di un processo di contrattazione, che normalmente implica la partecipazione attiva di ciascun agente coinvolto nell'interazione regolamentatoria. Nel Capitolo 1, seguendo l'intuizione di Spulberg, la regolamentazione è modellizzata come un processo di negoziazione tra i gruppi di interesse dei consumatori e delle imprese, con l'agenzia nel ruolo di mediatore. La nostra analisi mostra che l'impresa regolamentata sfrutta il suo potere contrattuale per ottenere un sussidio, il quale è più elevato che con un'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it" di un meccanismo che massimizza il benessere sociale. L'eccessiva sussidiazione dell'impresa penalizza i consumatori ed implica una perdita di benessere sociale. Noi troviamo altresì che, con informazione asimmetrica sui costi, l'intervallo di tipi dell'impresa che partecipano in equilibrio all'interazione regolamentatoria può essere più grande con la politica negoziata che con la politica "take-it-or-leave-it". Vorremmo sottolineare che il Capitolo 1 è introduttivo e costituisce un passo preliminare per la nostra ricerca. Aldilà dei risultati analitici, il suo contributo è duplice. Innanzitutto, esso descrive le strutture basilari di una politica regolamentatoria negoziata e le sua implicazioni in termini di benessere. In secondo luogo, esso mostra che l'approccio basato sulla contrattazione rappresenta effettivamente un'estensione piuttosto che una negazione dell'approccio standard. In particolare, la contrattazione su una politica regolamentatoria può essere interpretata come un modello generale che include l'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it" come caso limite, che si verifica quando l'impresa è privata di qualsiasi potere di contrattazione durante le negoziazioni. La discussione nel Capitolo 2 sviluppa la struttura precedente e considera un'agenzia che è delegata dal Congresso a rappresentare gli interessi dei consumatori nel precesso di contrattazione con l'impresa sulla politica regolamentatoria. L'esistenza di un'attività di negoaziazione tra l'agenzia e l'impresa è stata largamente ignorata dalla letteratura economica, con la principale eccezione rappresentata dai contributi di Scarpa. Comunque, Armstrong e Sappington, nella loro rassegna sui recenti sviluppi nella teoria della regolamentazione, hanno riconosciuto che la formulazione standard, la quale alloca tutto il potere di contrattazione al regolamentatore, è adottata per convenienza tecnica piuttosto che per realismo. Mentre l'agenzia è stata precedentemente raffigurata come un arbitro imparziale, nel Capitolo 2 supponiamo che essa rappresenti una parte contrattuale, la cui natura può essere benevolente od egoista. In questo contesto, noi studiamo la possibilità di collusione tra l'agenzia regolamentatoria e l'impresa regolamentata, un fenomeno che spesso si verifica in una relazione regolamentatoria. La contrattazione "a latere" tra i due partner colludenti è modellizzata come un processo di negoziazione (eventualmente illegale)parallelo alla negoziazione sulla politica regolamentatoria. La nostra analisi mostra che i consumatori sono penalizzati dalla corruzione, in quanto essi interamente sussidiano il guadagno totale dalla collusione. Inoltre, il nostro modello suggerisce che un'agenzia più forte nel processo di contrattazione rende più desiderabile per il Congresso (cioè per i consumatori)consentire la collusione in equilibrio. Nei primi due capitoli, noi abbiamo considerato l'esistenza di solamente un mercato monopolistico. Il Capitolo 3, che ha beneficiato del contributo fondamentale di Carlo Scarpa, estende l'impianto precedente ed esamina la regolamentazione di due mercati interdipendenti quando i beni sono sostituti. Questo è il caso, per esempio, nelle industrie del gas naturale e dell'elettricità o delle ferrovie e autostrade. Noi ci focalizziamo sul progetto della struttura regolamentatoria. In particolare, noi intendiamo determinare se è meglio per il benessere dei consumatori avere un'autorità unica per entrambi i mercati o suddividere la giurisdizione regolamentatoria tra due differenti agenzie. Quando la politica regolamentatoria è il risultato di un'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it", la nostra analisi mostra che due agenzie - ciascuna massimizzante il surplus totale nel suo proprio mercato - impongono prezzi che sono più bassi di quelli derivanti da centralizzazione regolamentatoria. Al contrario, quando la politica regolamentatoria è il risultato di un processo di contrattazione, noi troviamo che un regolamentatore unico, che sequenzialmente contratta con entrambe le imprese, dà ai consumatori un livello di benesere più elevato, purchè il costo ombra dei fondi pubblici, attraverso i quali la produzione è sussidiata, sia sotto una certa soglia. Dunque, in presenza di negoziazioni, il nostro modello suggerisce che la centralizzazione dovrebbe essere la migliore struttura regolamentatoria per i consumatori nei paesi sviluppati, ove la raccolta fiscale non è troppo distorsiva. Se il costo ombra è sopra questa soglia, come spesso accade nei paesi in via di sviluppo, decentralizzare la struttura regolamentatoria risulta in un miglioramento del benessere sociale. / The aim of our research is to propose a pattern of government intervention which differs from the standard approach and to assess its welfare implications. We argue that in many circumstances regulation turns out to be a process of give-and-take rather than take-it-or-leave-it. More precisely, our idea is that the regulatory policy can be more generally modelled as the outcome of a bargaining process, which normally entails the active participation of each agent involved in the regulatory interaction. In Chapter 1, following Spulber’s intuition, regulation is modelled as a negotiation process between the consumers’ and firm’s interest groups, with the agency in the role of mediator. Our analysis shows that the regulated firm exploits its bargaining power to obtain a subsidy which is higher than under a take-it- or-leave-it offer of a total surplus maximizing mechanism. The oversubsidization of the firm penalizes consumers and entails a total surplus loss. We find also that, under asymmetric cost information, the range of the firm’s types participating in equilibrium in the regulatory interaction may be wider under the negotiated policy than under the take-it-or- leave-it policy. We would like to stress that Chapter 1 is introductory and constitutes a preliminary step for our research. On top of the specific analytical results, its contribution is twofold. First, it describes the basic features of a negotiated regulatory policy and its welfare implications. Second, it shows that the bargaining approach to regulation actually represents an extention rather than a negation of the standard approach. In particular, the bargaining over a regulatory policy may be interpreted as a general set-up which includes the take-it-or-leave- it offer as a limit case, that occurs when the firm is deprived of any bargaining power during negotiations. The discussion in Chapter 2 develops the previous framework and considers an agency which is delegated by Congress to represent consumers’ interests in the bargaining process with the firm over a regulatory policy. The existence of a negotiation activity between the agency and the firm has been by and large ignored by the economic literature, with the main exception represented by Scarpa’s contributions. However, Armstrong and Sappington, in their review on the recent developments in the theory of regulation, have recognized that the standard formulation, which allocates all the bargaining power to the regulator, has been adopted for technical convenience rather than for realism. While it has been previously depicted as an impartial arbitrator, the agency is assumed in Chapter 2 to represent a bargaining party, whose nature may be either benevolent or self-interested. In this setting, we study the potential for collusion between the regulatory agency and the regulated firm, a phenomenon which often occurs in a regulatory relationship. The side contracting between the two colluding partners is modelled as a (possibly illegal) negotiation process parallel to the bargaining over the regulatory policy. Our analysis shows that consumers are penalized by corruption, since they entirely subsidize the total stake in collusion. Furthermore, our model suggests that a stronger agency in the bargaining process makes it more desirable for Congress (i.e. for consumers) to allow collusion in equilibrium. In the first two chapters, we have considered the existence of just one monopolistic market. Chapter 3, which has benefited from the fundamental contribution of Carlo Scarpa, extends the previous setting and examines the regulation of two interdependent markets, whose goods are substitutes. This is the case, for instance, in the industries of natural gas and electricity or railroads and motorways. We focus on the design of the regulatory structure. In particular, we intend to determine whether it is better for consumers’ welfare to have a unique authority for both markets or to split the regulatory jurisdiction between two different agencies. When the regulatory policy is the outcome of a take-it-or-leave-it offer, our analysis shows that two agencies - each maximizing total surplus in its own market - set prices which are lower than those arising under regulatory centralization. On the contrary, when the regulatory policy is the outcome of a bargaining process, we find that a unique regulator, which sequentially bargains with both firms, gives consumers a higher welfare level, as long as the shadow cost of public funds, through which production is subsidized, is below a certain threshold. Hence, under negotiations our model suggests that centralization should be the best regulatory pattern for consumers in developed countries, where tax collection is not too distortionary. If the shadow cost is above that threshold, as it often happens in developing countries, decentralizing bargaining turns out to be consumers’ welfare improving.