La norme technique exige parfois de lui associer des innovations faisant l’objet de droits privatifs, au bénéfice de la réalisation de sa mission. De prime abord, la propriété intellectuelle apparaît comme étant un élément perturbateur, impliquant désormais d’examiner l’ « économie » de la norme au moment de son élaboration et de son utilisation et non plus uniquement la technique. Pour éviter la corruption de la norme par des droits privatifs trop contraignants, les organismes de normalisation exigent que seuls les droits privatifs « essentiels » soient associés à la norme. Les critères de l’adhérence réciproque de la norme et de l’innovation structurant leur association, justifient au nom de son « utilité sociale », une adaptation réciproque des régimes juridiques attachés à ses deux composantes. Ainsi l’ « utilité sociale » incarnée par la norme technique impose une adaptation du régime des droits de propriété intellectuelle. Symétriquement, l’innovation « essentielle » à la norme suppose une adaptation du régime de la norme technique à la propriété intellectuelle. Cela donne naissance à deux régimes juridiques substantiellement interpénétrés et structurellement interdépendants. D’une part, les droits privatifs étant « essentiels » à la norme, peuvent être considérés comme des « infrastructures essentielles », justifiant une érosion systémique de leur portée dans le cadre de leur association à la norme. Dans le cadre de l’application de règles de concurrence, cette érosion résulte d’une approche ex post à laquelle se conjugue une approche ex ante, conceptualisée par les conditions FRAND. D’autre part, l’association s’évalue également à l’aune de la propriété privée. Il apparaît que la norme technique devrait être considérée comme étant une chose commune imposant d’aménager, au bénéfice de ses utilisateurs, un accès et une utilisation libre. Cela suppose d’envisager alors l’émergence d’un droit d’utilisation de l’innovation associée à la norme technique. / Technical standards may sometimes be associated to innovations covered by proprietary rights. In this case, intellectual property appears to embody a quite disturbing component within the partnership between standardization and innovation. We are thus led to analyse the association economy ; it must be construed as of the creation and the use of the standard rather than to insist on its sole technical aspects. In order to avoid the corruption of the standard by over-restrictive IP rights, standard-setting-organizations require that only "essential" proprietary rights can be associated to a technical standard. Economical and technical criterias of the mutual adherence of the technical standard and the owned innovation – structuring their association – justify in the name of its "social utility", a mutual adaptation of their legal regimes. Therefore, the technical standard’s "social utility" requires an adaptation of the IP rights legal regime. Symmetrically, the essential innovation, included in the standard, requires its fitting to the technical standards legal regime. This results in the rise of two regimes naturally interpenetrated, and structurally interdependent. On the one hand, IP rights "essential" to the standard, can be considered as "essential facilities", justifying a systematic erosion of their spectrum. As part of competition rules implementation, this erosion results from an ex post approach as well as an ex ante approach conceptualized by FRAND terms. On the other hand, the association is also evaluated through the private property perspective. It appears that the technical standard should be considered as a "common", assuming a free access and a free use. It contributes to create a right of use of the owned innovations integrated in technical standard.

Diese Dissertation befasst sich in drei voneinander unabhängigen Kapiteln mit dem Forschungsfeld des ökonomischen Designs. Das "Design" von Situationen wirtschaftlicher Interaktion hat zum Ziel, den Verlauf und das Ergebnis der jeweiligen Interaktion zu steuern. In dieser Arbeit werden mathematisch-theoretische "Designs" zum einen formal entwickelt und diese zum anderen durch politische oder soziale Institutionen realisiert. Das erste Kapitel thematisiert die Implementierung von Sozialwahlfunktionen in einem kollusiven Umfeld. Es wird gezeigt, wie die gezielte Schaffung von asymmetrischer Information zwischen den kolludierenden Parteien deren Koordination erschweren und die Implementierung erleichtern kann. Im zweiten Kapitel wird dieser Ansatz im Kontext der Bestechlichkeit bei Finanzaudits angewendet. Korruption kann verhindert werden, wenn der bestechliche Akteure eine Warnung über anstehende Kontrollen erhält, nicht jedoch der bestechende Akteur. Das dritte Kapitel wiederum untersucht "Design" in Form von Markt- und Wettbewerbsregulierung. Eine Beschränkung des Wettbewerbs - durch eine Begrenzung der Zahl miteinander konkurrierender Firmen - kann entgegen der ökonomischen Intuition wohlfahrtsoptimierend sein. / This thesis contributes to the field of economic design in three independent chapters. Taking the perspective of a "designer", it derives formal solutions in the framework of economic theory and suggests political as well as social institutions to put these solutions to practice. The first chapter employs mechanism design to mitigate the problem of collusion. It shows how the implementation of social choice functions can be achieved by introducing asymmetric information into a system prone to collusion. In the second chapter, this methodology is applied to the context of corruption in auditing. Bribery is impeded by selectively warning one - and only one - of the corruptive parties about upcoming inspections. Finally, the third chapter studies market regulation as a means of "design". Contrary to economic intuition, it may be beneficial in terms of welfare to limit competition by restricting the number of firms allowed to enter a market.

Consumers of digital contents are empowered with numerous technologies allowing them to produce perfect copies of these contents and distribute them around the world with little or no cost. To prevent illegal copying and distribution, a technology called Digital Rights Management (DRM) is developed. With this technology, consumers are allowed to access digital contents only if they have purchased the corresponding licenses from license issuers. The problem, however, is that those consumers are not allowed to resell their own licenses- a restriction that goes against the first-sale doctrine. Enabling a consumer to buy a digital license directly from another consumer and allowing the two consumers to fairly exchange the license for a payment are still an open issue in DRM research area. This thesis investigates existing security solutions for achieving digital license reselling and analyses their strengths and weaknesses. The thesis then proposes a novel Reselling Deal Signing (RDS) protocol to achieve fairness in a license reselling. The idea of the protocol is to integrate the features of the concurrent signature scheme with functionalities of a License Issuer (LI). The security properties of this protocol is informally analysed and then formally verified using ATL logic and the model checker MOCHA. To assess its performance, a prototype of the RDS protocol has been developed and a comparison with related protocols has been conducted. The thesis also introduces two novel digital tokens a Reselling Permission (RP) token and a Multiple Reselling Permission (MRP) token. The RP and MRP tokens are used to show whether a given license is single and multiple resalable, respectively. Moreover, the thesis proposes two novel methods supporting fair and secure digital license reselling. The first method is the Reselling Deal (RD) method which allows a license to be resold once. This method makes use of the existing distribution infrastructure, RP, License Revocation List (LRL), and three protocols: RDS protocol RD Activation (RDA) protocol, and RD Completion (RDC) protocol. The second method is a Multiple License Reselling (MLR) method enabling one license to be resold N times by N consumers. The thesis presents two variants of the MLR method: RRP-MR (Repeated RP-based Multi-Reselling) and HC-MR (Hash Chain-based Multi-Reselling). The RRP-MR method is designed such that a buyer can choose to either continue or stop a multi-reselling of a license. Like the RD method, the RRP-MR method makes use of RP, LI, LRL, and the RDS, RDA, and RDC protocols to achieve fair and secure reselling. The HC-MR method allows multiple resellings while keeping the overhead on LI at a minimum level and enable a buyer to check how many times a license can be further resold. To do so, the HC-MR utilises MRP and the hash chain cryptographic primitive along with LRL, LI and the RDS, RDA and RDC protocols. The analysis and the evaluation of these three methods have been conducted. While supporting the license reselling, the two methods are designed to prevent a reseller from (1) continuing using a resold license, (2) reselling a non-resalable license, and (3) reselling one license a unauthorised number of times. In addition, they enable content owners of resold contents to trace a buyer who has violated any of the usage rights of a license bought from a reseller. Moreover, the methods enable a buyer to verify whether a license he is about to buy is legitimate for re-sale. Furthermore, the two methods support market power where a reseller can maximise his profit and a buyer can minimise his cost in a reselling process. In comparison with related works, our solution does not make use of any trusted hardware device, thus it is more cost-effective, while satisfying the interests of both resellers and buyers, and protecting the content owner's rights.