The three studies in this dissertation examine the relationship between the decision of market participants to compete or collaborate on their innovation strategies and outcomes as well as the broader industry structure and technological progress. The first study analyzes the impact of modern patent pools on the innovative performance of firms outside the pool. Theories generally predict that modern patent pools have a positive impact on innovation by reducing the cost of access to the pool’s technology, but recent empirical research suggests that patent pools may actually decrease the innovation rate of firms outside the pool. Using a difference-in-difference-with-matching methodology, I find a substantial decline in outsiders’ patenting rate after the pool formation. However I find that the observed reduction is mainly due to a shift in firms’ investment from additional patentable technological exploration toward implementing the pool technology in their products. The results shed light on how the interaction between cooperation, in the form of patent pooling, and competition shapes firms’ innovative strategies by enabling opportunities for application development based on the pooled technologies. In the second study, I examine the impact of restrictive stem cell policies introduced by George W. Bush in 2001 on the U.S. scientists’ productivity and collaboration patterns. Employing a difference-in-differences methodology, I find that the 2001 Bush policy led to a decline in the research productivity of U.S. scientists. However, the effect was short-lived as U.S. scientists accessed non-federal funds within the United States and sought funds outside the United States through their international ties. The results suggest that scientists may use international collaborations as a strategic means to deal with uncertainties in their national policy environment. In the third study, I examine the effects of the fragmentation of patent rights on subsequent investment in new inventions. Using a theoretical model and an empirical analysis of the semiconductor industry, I seek to shed light on the contingency factors that shape the role of technological fragmentation in explaining the investment decisions and appropriation strategies of firms. The results provide a dynamic explanation of the interplay between firms’ R&D investment, their patenting strategies, and technological fragmentation.

The three studies in this dissertation examine the relationship between the decision of market participants to compete or collaborate on their innovation strategies and outcomes as well as the broader industry structure and technological progress. The first study analyzes the impact of modern patent pools on the innovative performance of firms outside the pool. Theories generally predict that modern patent pools have a positive impact on innovation by reducing the cost of access to the pool’s technology, but recent empirical research suggests that patent pools may actually decrease the innovation rate of firms outside the pool. Using a difference-in-difference-with-matching methodology, I find a substantial decline in outsiders’ patenting rate after the pool formation. However I find that the observed reduction is mainly due to a shift in firms’ investment from additional patentable technological exploration toward implementing the pool technology in their products. The results shed light on how the interaction between cooperation, in the form of patent pooling, and competition shapes firms’ innovative strategies by enabling opportunities for application development based on the pooled technologies. In the second study, I examine the impact of restrictive stem cell policies introduced by George W. Bush in 2001 on the U.S. scientists’ productivity and collaboration patterns. Employing a difference-in-differences methodology, I find that the 2001 Bush policy led to a decline in the research productivity of U.S. scientists. However, the effect was short-lived as U.S. scientists accessed non-federal funds within the United States and sought funds outside the United States through their international ties. The results suggest that scientists may use international collaborations as a strategic means to deal with uncertainties in their national policy environment. In the third study, I examine the effects of the fragmentation of patent rights on subsequent investment in new inventions. Using a theoretical model and an empirical analysis of the semiconductor industry, I seek to shed light on the contingency factors that shape the role of technological fragmentation in explaining the investment decisions and appropriation strategies of firms. The results provide a dynamic explanation of the interplay between firms’ R&D investment, their patenting strategies, and technological fragmentation.

智慧財產權利人有多種方式利用其智慧財產權。最直接的方式是將智慧財產權出售予他人，以獲得價金之報酬。權利人透過一次獲得相當金額，而滿足其創新的對價；但也有可能由於創新尚未獲得市場肯定，而無法獲得他人提供足以滿足其目的之對價。另種方式是自行設廠製造，不過，一方面權利人未必有足夠的財力投資於生產，而另一方面權利人未必了解經營或未必有意願承擔經營之風險。折衷的方式就是將智慧財產權授權他人使用，而不移轉所有權，以獲得持續的報酬給付，並不喪失其最終的權利。 然而，智慧財產權具有排他效力，只有特定權利人可以使用，他人除非經過權利人同意，否則無法使用，限制或排除他人進入該智慧財產權所涉及之商品市場與權利人自由競爭，而形成限制競爭之效果。此種結果是賦予具有排他效力之智慧財產權所必然產生者，如果因而被認定違反競爭法，恐將導致智慧財產權之規範目的無法達成。因此，對於「智慧財產權法對於智慧財產權利人之保護」與「公平交易法對於公平交易秩序之維護」兩者界限該如何權衡，當為十分重要的課題。 本文經由探討美國、歐盟及日本等國家現行競爭法對於技術授權行為之規範：美國”Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property（1995）”、” Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition（2007）”，歐盟” Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements”及其Guidelines，日本2007年新修訂「知的財産の利用に関する独占禁止法上の指針」，以及參考我國公平會（Fair Trade Commission）執法實務之案例經驗，俾掌握技術授權行為如何在鼓勵創新與促進技術流通兩者間加以權衡題，進而試就我國技術授權協議案件處理原則（Fair Trade Commission Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements），提供具體修正建議： 一、適用範圍：歐盟及日本於新修訂的技術授權處理規範中，均將適用客體進一步擴大適用至新式樣專利與軟體著作權（software copyright）。然而，我國公平會目前相關案件量甚少，故是否要隨外國立法例擴大適用範圍，應視我國國情及執法實務加以考量，仍有斟酌餘地。 二、建立「安全區」：適度將對於市場競爭程度影響輕微之案件排除，不但增加執法透明度與明確性，同時避免行政資源錯置，應屬可行。衡諸國情及促進產業發展之考量，本文建議立法初期，針對公平交易法第19條限制競爭或妨礙公平競爭行為，於授權人市場占有率10%以下者，認定較無限制競爭或妨礙公平競爭疑慮，而不須加以審查。 三、不須區分黑（違法）、灰（可能違法）條款：現行技術授權處理原則第6點及第7點規定若從法律效果來看，應無區分必要，亦即無區分黑、灰條款之必要。若競爭法主管機關有意區別兩類行為之非難程度，則可在立法說明或處理原則中對於個別行為之競爭評價，詳為敘明，俾讓業者遵循。倘公平會對於特定行為欲採取較為嚴格的執法立場，採取當然違法之判斷者，條文用語應修改為「授權協議當事人○○行為時，即得認定該行為對特定市場供需功能產生影響…」，亦即不須判斷該行為對於市場競爭實質影響程度，只要當事人行為合致構成要件，即屬違法，如此始有區分規範之必要。 四、修正個別條款內容：針對現行第5點至第7點規定，「不構成違法」共11款，及修正後「可能構成違反公平交易法第19條第6款規定」共12款行為類型，就其條文內容或立法說明提供具體修正意見。 五、標準化與專利聯盟(standardization and patent pool)：從廣受各界關注的「飛利浦案」，公平會對於科技產業的標準化與專利聯盟情形，如何建構妥適的聯合行為管制模式，首要之務是要確立執法立場。對於專利聯盟可能存有惡性卡特爾之風險，一方面仍保有競爭法主管機關的介入空間，亦不能動輒讓產業承擔過高法律風險，導致阻礙創新或影響商機。美國、歐盟、日本立法例多肯定透過專利聯盟集中授權模式，有助減少交易成本等效益，亦建立不少規範與案例，可供公平會借鏡參考。然而，不能忽視的是我國廠商多處於被授權人地位，在高度仰賴技術輸入之現況，如何確保我國廠商得以在公平競爭環境，得以提升產業發展，競爭法主管機關於制定相關法規時，亦須一併加以重視。

近年來，台灣高科技廠商開始投注大量的心血在於專利申請上，由公告的美國專利數目，台灣專利權人2005年在美獲取專利數已位居美國以外國家的第三位，在這樣的數據下，應該值得驕傲，然若從訴訟案例來看，台灣廠商卻仍明顯處於被指控專利侵權的窘境，在光電產業、光儲存產業、半導體產業、IC設計業等，有相當多的案例說明台灣廠商雖然在專利的數量上已達一定的成效，但營運上卻因為專利議題而障礙重重。 許多專利聯盟案例的成功，如MPEG LA與DVD 6C都說明了以專利為基礎所產生標準後能帶來的龐大商業利益。使得標準之爭，成為國際級大集團的必爭之地。反觀台灣或是中國，近年來都有許多與標準相關的聯盟產生，但都未能為主流產品所遵循、參與。 本文藉由MPEG-2 的案例，對於技術、專利、產品、產業的相互關係作一實證的探討，並以國際級跨國公司的智權管理來分析其營運模鏈式。發現推動標準的領導廠商，在標準制訂過程中，積極地參與標準組織、轉化研發成果為專利；在專利的佈局上，也善用專利申請的技巧在各國廣佈專利；積極推廣標準成為主流後，再組成專利聯盟、訂立授權機制。 國內廠商，若要制訂標準、組成專利聯盟，應建立許多研發的配套機制，例如研發過程中，標準、產品與專利的結、產業上中下游價值鏈的安排、研發聯盟的組成等。 / Hi-tech companies in Taiwan have begun to focus their resources on patent prosecution and the added-value thereafter in recent years. According to the statistics of USPTO, Taiwan ranks 3th on the total patent granted to a foreign origin. This is clearly an achievement to be proud of. However, Taiwan companies are still subject to many infringement challenges, be they in the field of optoelectronics, optical storage, semi-conductor or IC design. Clearly the growing patent ownership has not quite resolved the intellectual property issues these companies must overcome. The success of patent pools can bring profit to companies. In cases of MPEG LA and DVD 6C, they makes standard war a critical issue to international companies. On the contrary in Taiwan and China, many alliances aiming to promote standard fail to become standard finally. The case of MPEG-2 is analyzed in the aspects of technology, patent, product, industry and also their interactions. In addition, the IP management of the business model is also discussed. We found the leading company of industrial standard are aggressively participating the standard organization and applying patents. In patent application, there were skillfully in filing patents in different countries. After the technology become dominant standards, they start to form patent pool and build the license mechanism. Domestic companies should establish the infrastructure of R&D before setting standard and forming patent pool. For example, the connections of standard, product development, patent application, industrial value chain and R&D alliance should be planed and established during R&D process.

在智慧財產權受到高度重視的現代，加上科技的發展日新月異，企業需要投入的研發資源和面臨的風險愈來愈高；因此，過去企業獨立進行技術研發可能不再是一個最佳的策略，取而代之的是越來越多專利聯盟的出現，而專利聯盟又會涉及到法律與管理層面的議題。 過去在專利聯盟的研究中，有關專利聯盟與反托拉斯法之間的關係，一直是法律學者所關注的焦點；而專利聯盟也受到各國主管機關的高度管制，深恐專利聯盟的形成，會對技術市場和產品市場造成限制競爭的情形，給產業競爭帶來負面的影響。然而，無論是法律學者或主管機關，在討論專利聯盟帶來的影響時，主要仍以論理的方式進行，鮮少以實證研究來探討專利聯盟。植基於此，本研究擬以實證的方式討論專利聯盟對於企業研發績效之影響。 而在策略聯盟的相關理論中，企業形成策略聯盟的原因包括為了取得重要資源、分散研發風險等目的。專利聯盟係一種由技術所組成的策略聯盟，專利聯盟若無法帶給企業益處，則該聯盟不可能持續存在。本研究以 MPEG-4 Visual 專利聯盟為探討對象，將企業的研發能力、加入專利聯盟時間的長短與企業的規模做為研究變數，討論其對企業研發績效的影響。 本研究以 MPEG-4 Visual 專利聯盟內的21家企業做為研究樣本，蒐集這些企業在2004年至2011年之間的專利申請數量、企業營收等資料。研究結果發現，企業的研發能力與加入聯盟後的研發績效呈現正向關係，亦即企業加入專利聯盟後，透過關鍵技術的交換，確實能夠提升研發能力，而且本身研發能力愈好的企業，其研發績效也會愈好，至於企業加入專利聯盟後的時間愈久，其研發績效也會有顯著的提升。然而，企業的規模與研發績效之間則呈現負向關係，造成此現象的原因，推論係因為規模越大的企業在研發資源的分配上較為分散，故反而降低企業在該領域的研發績效。

The doctrine of intellectual property is based on the assumption that the exclusivity to commercialize a novel product granted to an inventor creates incentives to conduct research. In some areas, however, intellectual property can constitute a barrier to development of social welfare. In the area of access to medicines in developing countries, the intellectual property-related problem can take two forms. When needed products are not being developed and thus do not exist, lack of availability occurs. Lack of accessibility, on the other hand, arises when necessary medicines do exist, but their prices are prohibitive for people from resource-poor countries. Based on a detailed analysis of the patent and trade environment in the pharmaceutical sector, the thesis examines the potential of patent pooling as a joint intellectual property management strategy to increase access to medicines within the existing international intellectual property system. Particularly, it analyzes the effects of an existing pharmaceutical pool, the Medicines Patent Pool, on accessibility of antiretroviral medicines in low and middle income countries.

La norme technique exige parfois de lui associer des innovations faisant l’objet de droits privatifs, au bénéfice de la réalisation de sa mission. De prime abord, la propriété intellectuelle apparaît comme étant un élément perturbateur, impliquant désormais d’examiner l’ « économie » de la norme au moment de son élaboration et de son utilisation et non plus uniquement la technique. Pour éviter la corruption de la norme par des droits privatifs trop contraignants, les organismes de normalisation exigent que seuls les droits privatifs « essentiels » soient associés à la norme. Les critères de l’adhérence réciproque de la norme et de l’innovation structurant leur association, justifient au nom de son « utilité sociale », une adaptation réciproque des régimes juridiques attachés à ses deux composantes. Ainsi l’ « utilité sociale » incarnée par la norme technique impose une adaptation du régime des droits de propriété intellectuelle. Symétriquement, l’innovation « essentielle » à la norme suppose une adaptation du régime de la norme technique à la propriété intellectuelle. Cela donne naissance à deux régimes juridiques substantiellement interpénétrés et structurellement interdépendants. D’une part, les droits privatifs étant « essentiels » à la norme, peuvent être considérés comme des « infrastructures essentielles », justifiant une érosion systémique de leur portée dans le cadre de leur association à la norme. Dans le cadre de l’application de règles de concurrence, cette érosion résulte d’une approche ex post à laquelle se conjugue une approche ex ante, conceptualisée par les conditions FRAND. D’autre part, l’association s’évalue également à l’aune de la propriété privée. Il apparaît que la norme technique devrait être considérée comme étant une chose commune imposant d’aménager, au bénéfice de ses utilisateurs, un accès et une utilisation libre. Cela suppose d’envisager alors l’émergence d’un droit d’utilisation de l’innovation associée à la norme technique. / Technical standards may sometimes be associated to innovations covered by proprietary rights. In this case, intellectual property appears to embody a quite disturbing component within the partnership between standardization and innovation. We are thus led to analyse the association economy ; it must be construed as of the creation and the use of the standard rather than to insist on its sole technical aspects. In order to avoid the corruption of the standard by over-restrictive IP rights, standard-setting-organizations require that only "essential" proprietary rights can be associated to a technical standard. Economical and technical criterias of the mutual adherence of the technical standard and the owned innovation – structuring their association – justify in the name of its "social utility", a mutual adaptation of their legal regimes. Therefore, the technical standard’s "social utility" requires an adaptation of the IP rights legal regime. Symmetrically, the essential innovation, included in the standard, requires its fitting to the technical standards legal regime. This results in the rise of two regimes naturally interpenetrated, and structurally interdependent. On the one hand, IP rights "essential" to the standard, can be considered as "essential facilities", justifying a systematic erosion of their spectrum. As part of competition rules implementation, this erosion results from an ex post approach as well as an ex ante approach conceptualized by FRAND terms. On the other hand, the association is also evaluated through the private property perspective. It appears that the technical standard should be considered as a "common", assuming a free access and a free use. It contributes to create a right of use of the owned innovations integrated in technical standard.

在知識經濟時代，智慧財產權在企業發展與競爭力提升上具有相當影響力，其重要性已不言可喻。近年來越來越多的關注焦點落在技術標準的發展上，蓋技術標準是技術成果的規範化、規則化，對企業而言，唯有引領標準，掌握制定規則的權力，才能形成真正的競爭優勢，否則就可能永遠受制於人。而對產業整體而言，技術標準對經濟及科技之發展有相當貢獻，蓋一旦標準形成，產品與零組件間相容性問題就可被解決，製造商之生產成本也可降低。一般認為技術標準的形成是大勢所趨且有利多於弊的效果，然在技術標準的制定與後續相關專利的實施過程，卻可能衍生出許多與反托拉斯法相關之爭議。美國司法部與聯邦交易委員會曾在1995年共同發表「智慧財產授權之反托拉斯準則」，表達對智慧財產權授權行為可能引發競爭法問題之看法，在相隔十二年後，於2007年4月間，又共同發表了「反托拉斯法執行與智慧財產權報告」，當中對技術標準與專利聯盟所牽涉的競爭法議題做了深入探討。 技術標準制定過程中引貣競爭法上疑義的行為態樣有專利劫持及抵制技術標準制定之情形。美國聯邦交易委員會已於2006年8月Rambus一案中，確立專利劫持行為違反聯邦交易委員會法第五條與休曼法第二條規定，聯邦上訴巡迴法院也於2007年6月Qualcomm v. Broadcom一案中，表示專利權人違反FRAND授權原則將形同從事專利劫持之效果，構成休曼法第二條規定之違反。至於抵制技術標準制定情形，法院已於2006年2月在Golden Bridge Technology v. Nokia一案中表示確有違反休曼法第一條規定之見解。 目前各技術標準組織紛紛藉由:1.制定揭露政策，亦即要求成員揭露與欲採定為標準之技術相關之專利權，或2.訂定FRAND政策，要求成員同意未來將在符合公平、合理且無歧視原則下進行授權等方式，以避免專利劫持情形發生。惟由 於技術標準組織除在了解相關技術是否存在專利權之外，需進一步知悉未來專利授權條件，以做為是否將特定專利技術採為技術標準之參考，再加上FRAND字義上不易做成精確解釋，易生文義操弄之空間，仍無法解決專利劫持之問題，因此近期部分技術標準組織漸發展出事先授權條件揭露之政策，例如VITA及IEEE組織，要求欲參與技術標準制定之成員，必須事先揭露將來擬授權金額之上限或授權條件的最嚴苛限度。此外也有論者提出事先多方進行授權條件協商之可行性。 關於事先單方揭露授權條件政策之適法性，美國反托拉斯主管機關已表明不予質疑之立場，並肯定事先單方揭露授權條件有促進技術標準制定效率之優點。至於在事先多方協商授權條件政策方面，反托拉斯主管機關雖強調其對於技術標準組織是否應進行事先協商授權條件並未設立立場，但基本上仍肯定事先授權條件協商具減少專利劫持並達到促進競爭效果之優點，故傾向適用合理原則作為判斷是否違反反托拉斯法規定的依據。惟若專利權人以事先協商授權條件作為掩護，實際上共同約定以標準技術製造生產之下游產品的銷售價格(naked price fixing)，此時仍難逃被認定構成當然違法行為。 在藉由專利聯盟實施技術標準之過程，亦可能有構成競爭法上聯合行為與獨占行為之情形發生。相關引發違法疑慮之行為態樣包括:專利聯盟中包含替代性專利、競爭性敏感資訊之流通、排除他人加入專利聯盟、專屬授權、回饋授權、權利金約定、拒絕部分授權等。惟應注意的是，美國法院及反托拉斯主管機關認為，有鑑於專利聯盟具促進授權活動進行效率之特性，有助於技術提升及產業發展，因此傾向以合理原則判斷專利聯盟限制條款約定之合法性，而不當然認為此等行為態樣違反反托拉斯法相關規定。 在台灣喧騰一時的飛利浦光碟案主要亦是涉及技術標準實施過程產生是否違反公平交易法之疑義，九十六年四月間最高行政法院作出最終判決，纏訟已久的紛爭於是落幕。對於本案衍生問題思考，首先，本文認為公平會或許應審慎思考是否進一步制定有關技術標準與專利聯盟之特別處理準則。公平會似可參酌美國等先進國家之例，詳細規範技術標準的制定與發展，及專利聯盟的形成、對參與者的限制、關鍵性專利的決定、授權管理、授權條件的審查等各項問題。其次，在技術市場的界定與聯合行為的認定上，應回歸專利技術內容與專利技術間的關係加以分析；存在互補關係之技術，彼此間沒有制衡或牽制力量，不應被劃定在同一技術市場，也就不會成立聯合行為。而在獨占地位的認定上，應認為只要擁有製造某一產品之部分關鍵性專利技術，足以專利法所賦予之權利牽制他人對該產品之製造、銷售等行為，而該產品在相關產品市場可被認為具獨占地位，即應可認定專利技術擁有者之獨占地位成立。最後，在獨占地位濫用之救濟措施方面，公平會應依公平法第41條規定，妥善運用法律所賦予之裁量權限，縝密思索對於該當具體事案最為合理、適當的救濟措施，給予當事人最直接有效的救濟，而非僅消極地命令其不得繼續從事違法行為或處以罰鍰，對於事態之解決，並無法有效發揮回復市場競爭應有狀態之公平法規範目的。美國聯邦交易委員會於Rambus案及其他相關案例中極富創意地提出消極、積極的更正措施交錯運用模式，當可作為我國公平會未來對類似案件處理之參考。 為了成功地制定技術標準以引領產業發展，本文認為，有志於參與技術標準活動業者，在這個主要由歐美大廠主導技術標準制定的產業環境中，應注意歐美等國法規範內容與法院、相關主管機關之實務見解，才能知悉特定行為之法律風險以避免誤觸法網，並適當主張自己的權利。其次，可善用技術標準組織政策訂定方式解決專利劫持問題。再者，在技術標準制定之高度角力競爭下，必須培育跨領域人才參與技術授權談判才能增加脫穎而出之機會。而若欲藉由成立專利聯盟方式進行專利交互授權或對外授權，專利聯盟的組成與授權進行至少應符合本 文第七章所歸納的幾個基本要件，始不易產生違反競爭法之疑慮。至於在被控專利侵權業者方面，在面對專利侵權訴訟而進行訴訟攻防時，可朝專利權人參與技術標準或專利聯盟活動的行為是否違反反托拉斯法規定之方向加以思考，以冀增加勝訴之機會。 / In this era of knowledge-economy, intellectual property plays an important role in business developments. The significance of standard setting is thus much emphasized in recent years. It is generally recognized that standard setting brings many benefits to industries, such as costdown of manufacturing process and improvement of product compatibility, and patent pools can help to decrease transaction costs of licensing negotiations and to mitigate royalty stacking problems. However, disputes regarding the violation of antitrust law can be caused in the process of setting standards and the formation and the operation of patent pools. The U.S. DOJ and the U.S. FTC has discussed about antitrust issues related to standard setting and patent pools in “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” in April 1995 and “Antitrust Enforcement And Intellectual Property Right：Promoting Innovation and Competition” in April 2007. Patent holdup and group boycott are controversial in standard setting. In August 2006, the U.S. FTC ruled in In re Rambus that patent holdup would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act. In June 2007, the Federal Circuit also ruled in Qualcomm v. Broadcom that patent owner who has broken one’s previous commitment on FRAND licensing would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. As to group boycott, the court opinioned in Golden Bridge Technology v. Nokia that group boycott in the process of setting standard could be per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Many standard setting organizations (SSOs) have tried to avoid patent holdup by making patent disclosure and FRAND licensing policies. Recently some SSOs have implemented policies of ex ante unilateral announcement of licensing terms by patent holders or ex ante multilateral licensing negotiation between patent holders and SSO members to deal with patent holdup problems. These ex ante approaches facilitate competition between patent holders on licensing terms and allow SSOs to gain more information on patents. In light of the competitive effects these ex ante approaches generate, FTC and DOJ declared that they will review related policies and conduct under the rule of reason. But any efforts to reduce competition by using ex ante disclosure or negotiation process as a cover to fix downstream prices of products would be reviewed a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The standard patent licensing by patent pools could also give rise to cautions of violating antitrust law. Certain behavior in patent pools can be deemed controversial, such as including substitute patents, exchanges of competitively sensitive information, exclusive membership, exclusive license, grantback license, package license, and so on. The DOJ and the FTC expressed that they will examine similar behavior in patent pools under the rule of reason, since patent pools provide a more efficient way for patent licensing, which help to improve technology qualities and industry developments. The case, Philips v. Fair Trade Commission, R.O.C., also involved some disputes of violating Fair Trade Act. From the case, the thesis claims that first, there is a need for FTC to enact a guideline regarding standard setting and patent pools for the industries to follow. Second, while defining technology markets and concerted actions, one should analyze the relationship between patents. Complementary patents belong to different technology markets, so it would be impossible for complementary patent owners to collude with each other. Third, to identify monopolization, the thesis asserts that the patent owner of technology essential for certain product will acquire monopoly positions in certain product market, and thus will be deemed as monopolists in the related technology market. Last but not the least, the thesis proposes that the FTC should not only passively prohibit the abuse of monopoly position and issue punishments, but also come up with some proper solutions, such as compulsory license, to actively maintain fair competition in the market. Some measures delineated by the U.S. FTC in In re Rambus can be referred for future cases in Taiwan. To successfully participate in standard setting and patent pool activities, the thesis proposes certain suggestions. First, because most SSOs are led by U.S. and European enterprises and most SSOs are subject to U.S. and European legal jurisdiction, it is important to follow up to U.S. and European law and legal developments to avoid legal risks. Second, properly structuring SSO patent policies might enable SSOs to mitigate patent holdup problems. Third, the cultivation of inter-disciplinary professionals of technology, law, finance, and business management can be significant for industries in the standard setting competition. The thesis as well indicates several principles that might help to avoid the risks of violation of antitrust law during the formation and operation of patent pools. On the other hand, those who are accused of patent infringement might gain a better chance to win the lawsuit, if the violations of antitrust of patent owners in standard setting and patent pools are taken into consideration.

「被忽視」的熱帶疾病(NTDs)中的寄生蟲疾病(Parasitic Diseases; PDs)除對非洲人群健康之危害甚鉅外，並進而對非洲地區社經體系造成嚴重衝擊與造成巨大的「失能調整人年」損失。由於不易取得治療PDs傳統基本藥物的問題，許多非洲民眾便以其部落社區的傳統治療師所採用的傳統草藥來進行PDs的治療，雖然這些傳統草藥容易取得，但是成分的內容和藥效品質甚或產生嚴重的致命副作用。雖然TRIPS協定第31條和杜哈宣言的第五和第六段對於製藥能力不足或大部分皆無製藥能力的貧窮國家，可以基於「國家緊急危難或其它緊急狀況」的事由，以強制授權方式取得專利藥或較便宜的學名藥以解決造成國家危難的特定公共健康事件，但是國際大藥廠認為無利可圖，不願意花費資金投注於預防或治療此類疾病藥物的相關研發外，高收入的國家為保護其大藥廠的藥物專利，也往往使用一些經濟制裁手段逼迫上述國家就制定國內專利法以保護其藥物專利。雖然經杜哈宣言修正TRIPS協定第31(f)條有關強制授權對外出口的障礙，但是出口國對於強制授權程序與是否能取得政治上和藥廠業者的支持，仍充滿困難。應用「專利池」可以減少交易成本或法律爭議而可調和「強制授權」與解決「權利耗盡」的爭議，有助於解決非洲開發中國家取得專利藥物的困境。PDs造成非洲開發中國家民眾失能等長期痛苦與健康生活損失，類推適用SARS模式，可依TRIPS協定第31條(b)與杜哈宣言第五段(c)將之視為「造成國家緊急危難或其它緊急狀況」的重大公共健康的事由而可行使強制授權。雖然「生醫專利池BVGH」的「非獨家個別授權與免授權費」的操作模式與傳統電信技術專利池不盡相同，但因藥廠不願投入治療PDs的傳統基本藥物存在的副作用與抗藥性的新藥研發，為鼓勵對治療PDs的藥物進行創新研發， BVGH彈性的授權方式與免繳交授權費，將有利於解決開發中國家未來取得新專利藥的困境。除BVGH外，建議結合全球獎勵基金以「激勵拉拔」的方式獎助願意投入治療PDs新藥研發並將專利自願授權給BVGH的藥廠。鑒於全球暖化與最近中東難民潮大量湧進歐洲，罕見的PDs可預期會大量傳播開來，將嚴重衝擊歐洲等先進國家良好的公共衛生體系，而使得「NTDs尤其是PDs不再只是專屬於貧窮國家的疾病，亦將常現於富有的先進國家」。這些NTDs疾病將提供藥廠進行新藥研發的利基，然而在未來可能產生專利池的反競爭問題，導致支配市場獨占性的隱憂值得關注。 / Parasitic diseases (PDs) not only cause the huge health hazards to African populations, but also they further severely impact on African socio-economic system as resulting in huge economic and health losses as assessed by disability adjusted life-years. Since it is not easy for Africans to access the essential medicine to treat PDs, many of them will seek for the help of local healers in tribal communities to treat PDs. Although these traditional herbs are readily available, the content and quality of drug ingredients may even cause serious fatal side effects. Poor countries with insufficiencies or lacks of the pharmaceutical capacities may still access the patented medicines or cheaper generics to solve the national crisis caused by the specific public health events through compulsory licensing (CL) based on "national emergency or the other emergency situations" according to TRIPS Article 31 and Doha Declaration on the fifth and sixth paragraph due to that the large international pharmaceutical companies consider unprofitable, unwilling to spend money to invest on the research and development (R&D) of new drugs for prevention or treatment purpose. Moreover, the high-income countries also tend to exert some of the economic sanctions to force those poor countries to enact national patent law in order to protect drug patents. Furthermore, the mandatory obstacle of exportation authorized by CL from the amended TRIPS Agreement Article 31 (f) by the Doha Declaration has been improved; nevertheless, it is still fraught with difficulties in utilization of CL for the exporting countries because this should be dependent on whether they may actually get the supports from political and the pharmaceutical industry. Application of patent pools model may benefit to reduce transaction costs or legal dispute thus reconciling and resolving issues related to CL as well as doctrine of patent exhaustion and that it is beneficial to help solve dilemma for African countries to access patented drugs. Because Africans severely suffer from disabled caused by PDs thus leading to long-term pain and health life losses, African countries can grant CL as PDs may be regarded as national crisis like SARS causing "national emergency or the other emergency situations" as authorized from TRIPS Agreement Article 31 (f) and Doha Declaration paragraph 5 (c). Although the practice of individual licensing with royalty-free for BVGH is somewhat different from that of traditional patent pools, this licensing practice mode is beneficial to innovation in new drugs R&D to improve the side effects and drug-resistance of traditional essential medicines and help African countries to access patented new drugs in the future. Finally, it is recommended to cooperate with Award Foundation to encourage incentive for pharmaceutical companies which contribute most to new drugs R&D and voluntary licensing to BVGH. Owing to global warming and recent emergence of huge refugees into Europe rare PDs will be obviously spread out thus causing severe impacts on well-established public health system as leading to emergence of PDs in developed countries like Europe. Altogether, such situations definitely provide a good incentive in new drugs R&D for pharmaceutical companies; however, it guarantees concerns on anti-competitive and monopoly issues derived by biomedical pools in the future.

專利聯盟（patent pools）可以創造龐大的促進競爭效益，但是同時也可能產生妨礙競爭與創新之疑慮，若法律完全不對專利聯盟之運作進行規範，專利權人將得以利用專利聯盟制度作為提昇自己市場獨占力量，抑制市場競爭，甚至是濫用專利排他權的工具。為了畫下專利權人正當行使權利之界限，維護專利制度的政策目的，以規範專利聯盟所產生之專利權濫用問題，美國的法制上遂逐漸發展出以專利權濫用原則（patent misuse doctrine）與競爭法（即美國之反托拉斯法），對專利聯盟進行管制的結構。美國法上之專利權濫用原則創設之初係為了限制輔助侵權理論之適用，此理論最初與競爭法制並無交集，判斷的重點在於專利權人是否逾越其權限，之後隨著1988年美國專利法之修正，以及學理實務的改變，現今專利權濫用原則的認定已牽涉競爭法「合理原則」之判斷，然而，許多爭議也逐漸浮現，例如應如何判斷專利權人在專利聯盟中所為之限制競爭行為是否成立濫用，專利權濫用原則與競爭法之間之關係為何，甚至專利權濫用原則本身是否仍有必要存在，這些問題都尚待解決，因此現今正是對專利權濫用理論進行全面檢討之時機。 本文以下將針對專利聯盟所涉及之專利權濫用問題進行研究，對於實務上專利權人利用專利聯盟所進行之搭售、包裹授權、聯合訂價、競業禁止條款等行為進行觀察，並對其所涉及之專利權濫用問題進行初步分析。基於此一研究所獲得之基礎，本文將嘗試指出專利權濫用理論值得檢討之處，並指出專利權濫用理論兼具專利制度和競爭法制之特質，也反映了兩者間之衝突，其亦具有能夠與時俱進，以及反映專利制度政策公益之特質，因此仍有繼續存在價值。尤其係在專利聯盟成員利用彼此間競業禁止協議抑制新生替代性技術發展之情形，法院在適用競爭法合理原則時，往往因為專利聯盟所創造的促進競爭效益，以及新生技術未來發展的不確定性，而傾向認定此種契約條款為合法，忽略其所產生之抑制創新問題，此時即有適用專利權濫用原則之空間。此外，更可以考慮以我國民法第148條所規範之誠信原則與權利濫用原則作為將專利權濫用理論引入我國法之基礎，而在尚未引入以前，對於專利聯盟所涉及之專利權濫用問題，我國實務可以將美國法專利權濫用原則之理論基礎作為操作民法第148條、專利法第60條、公平交易法第18條及第19條以及其他相關規定時之指導原則。本文之意旨並非在完全以專利權濫用原則取代競爭法規範的角色，而係期待實務上應當設法對專利權濫用原則之價值進行重新評估，以賦予專利權濫用原則嶄新之生命，讓專利權濫用原則與競爭法共同形成一個完善、合理的專利權行使規範體系。 / Patent pool licensing can both create enormous pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects. Without legal intervention, the patentee would be able to manipulate the patent pool system as a mean to increase his own monopoly power, suppress competition in the market, and even misuse his patent exclusive power. In order to prevent the misuse of patent rights, protect patent policy and regulate patent misuse issues in patent pools, the U.S law system employs the “patent misuse doctrine” and competition law (antitrust law) to deal with the above issues. The patent misuse doctrine was initially designed to limit the overexpansion of the contributory infringement theory and has no relationship with competition law. The essential factor to constitute patent misuse is that the patentee extends the patent monopoly over the statutory scope of his patent right. Nevertheless, in pace with the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988 and the conversion of the legal practice, the patent misuse doctrine has begun to intertwine with competition law’s “rule of reason” analysis. Gradually, many disputes have emerged, such as how to determine whether the patentee’s conduct constitutes patent misuse in patent pools, what is the relationship between the patent misuse doctrine and competition law, and whether the patent misuse doctrine itself is necessary to exist. Therefore, it is high time to conduct a comprehensive review of the patent misuse theory. This article will provide insights to patent misuse issues in patent pool licensing, such as tie-in arrangement, package licensing, price fixing, non-competition agreements, etc, and review the theoretical basis of the patent misuse doctrine. This article will also submit that the patent misuse doctrine is a doctrine which has both the characteristics of patent law and competition law and can compromise the interests of these two areas of regulations. It can also reflect patent policy and grow and change with time. Therefore, it is a doctrine which should continue to exist. Particularly, in the situation which patent pool members use non-competition agreements to suppress the development of nascent substitute technologies, courts would often consider this kind of agreement to be legal because of the enormous pro-competitive effects created by the patent pool and the uncertainty of the future development of the nascent technology. At this moment, it is necessary to apply the patent misuse doctrine to deal with the problem. In addition, the principle of good faith which is encoded in article 148 of the civil code may be an appropriate medium to introduce the patent misuse doctrine into our legal system. Even if it is not yet introduced into our system, the patent misuse doctrine could be the guiding principle for our legal practitioners to apply article 148 of the civil code, article 60 of the patent act, article 18 and article 19 of the Fair Trade Act in order to deal with patent misuse issues in patent pool licensing. This article supports that the patent misuse doctrine should be refined and cooperate with competition law in order to form a complete regulation of patent misuse conducts, but it does not submit that current competition law should be entirely replaced by the patent misuse doctrine.