This paper explores the nonidentity problem, an influential puzzle in modern ethics which addresses the nature of our moral responsibilities towards future generations. I begin by laying out the two conflicting intuitions comprising the problem and providing several examples to illustrate how we conceive of the moral status of future people. I then examine two versions of consequentialism, averagism and totalism, which circumvent the nonidentity problem. However, these two solutions each pose their own respective problems; thus, I argue that a modification of totalism – the critical level view – is the most viable consequentialist answer to the nonidentity problem.

In this paper I argue that Liam Murphy’s collective consequentialism—emphasizing fairness instead of maximization of value—is not an adequate response to the demandingness objections levied at consequentialism. Especially since Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” many have objected that consequentialism is far too demanding, particularly concerning our obligations of assistance to those in extreme poverty. Murphy thinks that the problem is not that consequentialism is necessarily too demanding; it is that, in our nonideal world of partial compliance, consequentialism is too demanding on those who comply with its dictates. I hope to show that Murphy’s theory is unsatisfying. I will not defend any particular version of consequentialism over alternative consequentialist theories, nor will I defend consequentialism over alternative non-consequentialist moral theories. My aim is far narrower: To show that those who accept a broadly consequentialist account of morality have little reason to accept Murphy’s collective consequentialism.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle introduces his Doctrine of the Mean, where he argues that virtue is the mean between two extremes, the mean between excess and deficiency. However, Aristotle mentions actions whose wrongness does not seem to be explained in terms of excess and deficiency; rather, it seems that these actions are always wrong, regardless of whether they are excessive, deficient, or neither. Among such actions Aristotle mentions moicheia, androphonia, and klopê (usually translated "adultery," "theft," and "murder"). Thus, with such actions the main questions become, first, what, according to Aristotle, explains the wrongness of these actions, and second, what makes it the case that they are always wrong. With these questions in mind, I will take moicheia as a test case to come up with an account that can answer these questions. In order to build this account, I make use of an objection leveled by Rosalind Hursthouse against the Doctrine of the Mean and of Howard Curzer's response to this objection. Though I claim Curzer's account fails, I make use of Curzer's work in another context in order to respond to Hursthouse's objection. Ultimately, I will claim that the wrongness of actions like moicheia can be satisfactorily explained as failures of the virtue of justice in which the agent goes beyond what properly belongs to her, beyond her proper share. However, in order for this account to succeed, I must get clearer about what resources Aristotle might have to specify what properly belongs to an agent, or what makes for one's "proper share." This can be done by looking deeper at Aristotle's theory of justice. Making use of the work of Richard Kraut, I claim that the concept of proper share involves Aristotle's ideas of nomoi (laws), and the common good. Ultimately though, what will allow us to make sense of prohibitions against acts like moicheia being absolute will be Aristotle's claim that certain laws are based on phusis ("nature"). In the last analysis, it is Aristotle's concept of phusis as it relates to human beings that will be central to his account of absolute moral prohibitions.

My aim in this essay is wholly constructive: it is to present the lines along which a satisfactory utilitarianism may be developed. Such a theory is satisfactory in respect of its being able to over, come or evade objections to previous utilitarianisms, specifically, to previous act_utilitarianisms; I have picked several of these objections to form the rock upon which the strength of a utilitarian is to be tested. The objections in question all center around the question of whether, given his consequential account of rightness, an act_utilitarian can support the useful social rules and institutions of our society; or whether his position, because of its consequential account of rightness, commits him to acting in such a way as to undermine these rules and institutions. I shall argue that a new form of act_utilitarianism, which I call tempered act_utilitarianism, can both retain its consequential account of rightness and yet can (a) accommodate these rules and institutions within it, (b) allow its proponents on act_utilitarian grounds to advocate adherence to them, as providing us with the beet chance of doing the right or optimific thing, (c) cater to the views of the 'plain man' in this important respect, and (d) achieve all this without recourse to rule_utilitarianism.

Agent-centered restrictions are widely accepted both in commonsense morality and across social and legal institutions, making it all the more striking that we have yet to ground them in a compelling theoretical rationale. This dissertation amounts to an effort to fill that gap by seeking out a new principled basis for justifying such constraints. I devote each of the first three chapters, respectively, to the three established deontological normative ethical theories: Rossian intuitionism, Kantianism, and Neo-Thomism. In each of these chapters, I lay out the relevant portion of the view’s deontological apparatus, analyzing it both for its plausibility as a whole and for its ability to justify constraints of the appropriate shape. After assessing and rejecting all three approaches, I devote the next two chapters to developing a new rationale for grounding constraints—one that avoids the pitfalls indicated in the prominent historical alternatives. Specifically, I anchor constraints in the distinction between the agent-neutral and agent-relative points of view, basing them in the widely accepted psychological fact of the natural independence of the personal point of view.

Agent-centered restrictions are widely accepted both in commonsense morality and across social and legal institutions, making it all the more striking that we have yet to ground them in a compelling theoretical rationale. This dissertation amounts to an effort to fill that gap by seeking out a new principled basis for justifying such constraints. I devote each of the first three chapters, respectively, to the three established deontological normative ethical theories: Rossian intuitionism, Kantianism, and Neo-Thomism. In each of these chapters, I lay out the relevant portion of the view’s deontological apparatus, analyzing it both for its plausibility as a whole and for its ability to justify constraints of the appropriate shape. After assessing and rejecting all three approaches, I devote the next two chapters to developing a new rationale for grounding constraints—one that avoids the pitfalls indicated in the prominent historical alternatives. Specifically, I anchor constraints in the distinction between the agent-neutral and agent-relative points of view, basing them in the widely accepted psychological fact of the natural independence of the personal point of view.

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The American Association of Orthodontists(AAO) adopted its Code of Ethics and Code of Professional Conduct in May of 1994. This document is meant to provide guidelines for ethical behavior amongst orthodontic professionals. Its main purpose is to protect the public from ethically unsound actions that could be committed by members of the AAO. All members of the AAO agree to abide by the Code, as stated within its preamble: "By accepting membership, all members assume an obligation of self-discipline above and beyond the requirements of laws and regulations, in accordance with these Principles." This study represents a critique of the AAO Code. As the field of medical ethics evolves, so must the documents that govern ethical behavior. The last revision took place in May of 2009 and the wording of the current document can be misinterpreted or abused. The current code leans heavily towards an Agent/Commercial model of practice, where the Orthodontist's role is influenced greatly by patient request and business ambitions. The purpose of this study was to utilize accepted schools of thought in ethical literature to do the following: (1) Point out ethical flaws and weak points in the AAO Code. (2) Present corrections for the Code in order to clarify potential points of contention. These corrections will articulate rules that promote a partnership between practitioner and patient. To accomplish these goals, the Code will be analyzed, line by line, for redundancies, faults, or potential misinterpretations. Principles and Advisory Opinions which can be improved upon will be labeled as "weak." All weak statements will be reformed in a manner where the weak aspects no longer play a role in the Code. The reformed statements will promote the Partnership model of practice in favor of Agent and Commercial models. The Conclusions of the study are as follows: (1) Principle I can be improved by changing it to the following phrase: Members shall be dedicated to providing the highest possible quality orthodontic care to his/her patients within standards commensurate with the accepted science and techniques of orthodontics, the clinical aspects of the patient's condition, and with due consideration being given to the needs and desires of the doctor and patient within a relationship based on partnership. (2)Advisory Opinion IE. should be changed to the following: A second opinion should include a diagnosis and treatment plan recommended to the patient. It must be honest and focus on the facts presented. It is unethical to propound a specific technique, philosophy, training or ability as superior without presenting scientific literature, at least summarized or simplified, to the patient to support claims made. A second opinion must disclose to the patient any conflict of interest of the member providing the opinion. (3) The phrasing of Advisory Opinion IF. is made stronger with the following wording: Patients should be informed of their oral health status without disparaging comments about the patient's prior treatment.(4) The phrasing of Advisory Opinion IG. is made stronger with the following wording: Members should inform their patients of their prognosis, any proposed treatment, and any reasonable alternatives, so that the patient understands their treatment decisions. / Oral Biology

The use of reason appears to lead to divergent conclusions for what is right and what is good in human action. While reason is a central feature in ethical theory, there is a problem when that central feature does not lead to consistent conclusions about how to act in a given situation. Several philosophers have attempted to combine previous moral theories in order to provide a better template for human action. I contend that the use of reason is of vital import when determining the foundation for moral action and that moral theories, to be consistent with reason, should incorporate aspects of both non-consequentialist and consequentialist ethical theories. I argue that there is a unifying foundation presupposed by the moral theories of both Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Through the use of reason the theories of Kant and Mill can be reconciled to show that these theories can be combined when understanding the basic foundation that they share.

This thesis explores the strength of the two major theories of punishment, consequentialism and retributivism. It also explores the two most critiqued systems of punishment in the world: The U.S and Norway. By presenting the idea that retributivism is the only plausible theory that can morally justify the U.S. penal practises, I argue against the theory by incorporating various objections delivered by Antony Duff, Michael Zimmerman, and Jeffrie Murphy. I then explore the question of what could possibly ground the Norwegian justice system, for the answer to this is crucial, if we hope to demand prison reform and tailor our systems to resemble the Norwegian ideal. To answer this question, I present a theory that incorporates the ‘capabilities approach’ as developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, arguing that the Norwegian prison system is grounded in a hybrid theory of consequentialism that aims to enhance our human rights.