O presente trabalho tratou das sentenças aditivas e das sentenças substitutivas no Direito italiano e no Direito brasileiro (mais especificamente, na jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal). Tais técnicas alternativas (ou “atípicas”) de decisão no controle de constitucionalidade foram criadas pela Corte Constitucional na Itália e, com o tempo, passaram a ser utilizadas por outros tribunais ao redor do mundo, inclusive – conforme a doutrina mencionada no trabalho – pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal no Brasil. O objetivo do trabalho foi analisar como tais modelos (ou tipos) decisórios são utilizados pela Corte Constitucional na Itália e como foram “importados” para o Brasil pela jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Inicialmente, estudou- se, de modo detalhado, o controle de constitucionalidade na Itália, que é exercido pela Corte Constitucional por via incidental (ou por via de exceção) ou por via principal (ou por via de ação). Em seguida, abordou-se o “arsenal” de modelos (ou tipos) decisórios da Corte Constitucional no controle de constitucionalidade, do qual fazem parte as sentenças aditivas e as sentenças substitutivas. Por fim, examinaram- se algumas decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal que – de acordo com a doutrina mencionada no trabalho – são tidas como exemplo de sentenças aditivas e de sentenças substitutivas. Verificou-se que o Supremo Tribunal Federal não utiliza as fórmulas que, na Itália, são encontradas no dispositivo das sentenças aditivas e das sentenças substitutivas da Corte Constitucional nem admite expressamente – no dispositivo das decisões – que emprega sentenças aditivas e sentenças substitutivas, o que pode indicar que tais modelos (ou tipos) decisórios não precisam ser “importados” para o Brasil. Constatou-se, ainda, que as referências às sentenças aditivas, do modo como são feitas pelos Ministros nas decisões do Tribunal, representam grave violação à ideia de segurança jurídica, que está contida no princípio do Estado de Direito, e vulneram, pois, a própria Constituição. / The present essay adressed the additive sentences and the substitutive sentences in Italian Law and in Brazilian Law (more especifically, in the Federal Supreme Court jurisprudence). Such alternative (or “atypical”) techniques of decision in judicial review were created by the Constitucional Court in Italy and, with time, started being used by other courts around the world, including – according to the doctrine mentioned in this essay – the Federal Supreme Court in Brazil. The goal of this essay was to analise how these decision models (or types) are used by the Federal Supreme Court. Initially, the judicial review in Italy, which is exercised by the Constitutional Court by incidental via (or exceptional via) or by mainly via (or through action), was studied, in detail. Then, the “arsenal” of models (or types) of decision of the Constitutional Court in judicial review, which comprises the additive sentences and the substitutive sentences, was approached. Lastly, some decisions of the Federal Supreme Court that – according to the doctrine mentioned in this essay – are considered as example of additive sentences and of substitutive sentences were examined. It was found that the Federal Supreme Court does not use the formulas that, in Italy, are found in the device of the additive sentences and of the substitutive sentences of the Constitutional Court, nor expressly acknowledges – in the device of decisions – that employs additive sentences and substitutive sentences, which may indicate that such models (or types) of decision-making do not need to be “imported” to Brazil. It was also found that the references to the additive sentences, the way they are made by Justices in the Court’s decisions, represent a serious violation of legal certainty idea, which is contained in the Rule of Law principle, and undermines, therefore, the Constitution itself.

Are social, economic and cultural rights really enforceable rights? Is their nature different from those of the civil and political rights? What does our Constitution   state on the matter? What is the posture that national and international jurisprudence have adopted regarding the issue?In the article at hand, the  authors challenge the common conception about those rights, and analyze the work done by the Peruvian Constitutional Court on the matter. / ¿Son los derechos económicos, sociales y culturalesexigibles realmente? ¿Su naturaleza es distinta a lade los derechos civiles y políticos? ¿Qué establece nuestra Constitución al respecto? ¿Cuál ha sido lapostura de la jurisprudencia nacional e internacional sobre la materia?En el presente artículo, los autores cuestionan la concepción que normalmente se tiene de dichos derechos, y analizan la labor que ha desarrollado el Tribunal Constitucional peruano al respecto.

All legislative acts shall have continuity in time. However, sometimes these acts contain defects that cause their unconstitutionality and the subsequent expulsion from the legal order. The important  question that arises is: When can a legislative act be declared unconstitutional? Whichare the defects that cause the expulsion of a law from the legal system?In this article, the author seeks to address these questions through a presentation of the legal defects that cause the invalidity of an act. The author pays special attention to the discussed legislative power excess defect, contrasting foreign case law with jurisprudence from the Peruvian Constitutional Court to determine if it is enough for  an  act  to  have  this  defect to be declared unconstitutional. / Los actos legislativos deben tener continuidad enel tiempo. Sin embargo, muchas veces estos actos contienen vicios que ocasionan su inconstitucionalidad y consecuente expulsión del ordenamientojurídico. La gran pregunta que surge entonces es: ¿Cuándo un acto legislativo puede ser declaradoinconstitucional? ¿Cuáles son los vicios que causanla expulsión de una ley del sistema normativo?En el presente artículo, el autor busca responder estas interrogantes mediante la presentación de los vicios de la ley que ocasionan la invalidez de ésta. El autor presta especial atención al discutido vicio de exceso de poder legislativo, contrastando jurisprudencia extranjera con aquella del Tribunal Constitucional peruano para determinar si basta que una ley tenga este vicio para que pueda ser declarada inconstitucional.

Can the decisions of a Constitutional Court or Supreme Court be unconstitutional? The answers found in the doctrine and even on constitutionalcase law are not uniform, becoming this question a controversial theme, although   extremely important for Constitutional Law.In this article, the author, considering that the Constitutional Court is the supreme interpreter and controller of the Constitution and, as such, creates Constitutional Law, maintains that the decisions which the Constitutional Court takes can be unconstitutional. Focusing on the Peruvian legal system, the author also presents alternatives to solve the problem these unconstitutional decisions cause. / ¿Pueden ser inconstitucionales las decisiones de unTribunal Constitucional o de una Corte Suprema?Las respuestas de la doctrina y de la propia juris-prudencia constitucional no son uniformes, convirtiéndose éste en un tema controvertido, pero sumamente importante para el Derecho Constitucional.En el presente artículo, el autor, considerando que el Tribunal Constitucional es el supremo intérprete y controlador de la Constitución, y que, como tal, crea Derecho Constitucional, sostiene que sí es posible que las decisiones que toma éste sean inconstitucionales. Enfocándose en el ordenamiento peruano, el autor también presenta alternativas para resolver la problemática de estas decisiones inconstitucionales.

O presente trabalho tratou das sentenças aditivas e das sentenças substitutivas no Direito italiano e no Direito brasileiro (mais especificamente, na jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal). Tais técnicas alternativas (ou “atípicas”) de decisão no controle de constitucionalidade foram criadas pela Corte Constitucional na Itália e, com o tempo, passaram a ser utilizadas por outros tribunais ao redor do mundo, inclusive – conforme a doutrina mencionada no trabalho – pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal no Brasil. O objetivo do trabalho foi analisar como tais modelos (ou tipos) decisórios são utilizados pela Corte Constitucional na Itália e como foram “importados” para o Brasil pela jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Inicialmente, estudou- se, de modo detalhado, o controle de constitucionalidade na Itália, que é exercido pela Corte Constitucional por via incidental (ou por via de exceção) ou por via principal (ou por via de ação). Em seguida, abordou-se o “arsenal” de modelos (ou tipos) decisórios da Corte Constitucional no controle de constitucionalidade, do qual fazem parte as sentenças aditivas e as sentenças substitutivas. Por fim, examinaram- se algumas decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal que – de acordo com a doutrina mencionada no trabalho – são tidas como exemplo de sentenças aditivas e de sentenças substitutivas. Verificou-se que o Supremo Tribunal Federal não utiliza as fórmulas que, na Itália, são encontradas no dispositivo das sentenças aditivas e das sentenças substitutivas da Corte Constitucional nem admite expressamente – no dispositivo das decisões – que emprega sentenças aditivas e sentenças substitutivas, o que pode indicar que tais modelos (ou tipos) decisórios não precisam ser “importados” para o Brasil. Constatou-se, ainda, que as referências às sentenças aditivas, do modo como são feitas pelos Ministros nas decisões do Tribunal, representam grave violação à ideia de segurança jurídica, que está contida no princípio do Estado de Direito, e vulneram, pois, a própria Constituição. / The present essay adressed the additive sentences and the substitutive sentences in Italian Law and in Brazilian Law (more especifically, in the Federal Supreme Court jurisprudence). Such alternative (or “atypical”) techniques of decision in judicial review were created by the Constitucional Court in Italy and, with time, started being used by other courts around the world, including – according to the doctrine mentioned in this essay – the Federal Supreme Court in Brazil. The goal of this essay was to analise how these decision models (or types) are used by the Federal Supreme Court. Initially, the judicial review in Italy, which is exercised by the Constitutional Court by incidental via (or exceptional via) or by mainly via (or through action), was studied, in detail. Then, the “arsenal” of models (or types) of decision of the Constitutional Court in judicial review, which comprises the additive sentences and the substitutive sentences, was approached. Lastly, some decisions of the Federal Supreme Court that – according to the doctrine mentioned in this essay – are considered as example of additive sentences and of substitutive sentences were examined. It was found that the Federal Supreme Court does not use the formulas that, in Italy, are found in the device of the additive sentences and of the substitutive sentences of the Constitutional Court, nor expressly acknowledges – in the device of decisions – that employs additive sentences and substitutive sentences, which may indicate that such models (or types) of decision-making do not need to be “imported” to Brazil. It was also found that the references to the additive sentences, the way they are made by Justices in the Court’s decisions, represent a serious violation of legal certainty idea, which is contained in the Rule of Law principle, and undermines, therefore, the Constitution itself.

Cette recherche espère apporter quelques éléments nouveaux à la réflexion critique sur les migrations forcées intra-muros. Ce phénomène a été défini par la Cour Constitutionnelle comme une émergence sociale, et, par la littérature internationale et nationale, comme un problème des droits de l’homme et de droit international humanitaire. Notre étude concerne le rôle de la Cour Constitutionnelle face au déplacement colombien en tant que régulatrice des politiques publiques: il s’agit de démontrer que le juge constitutionnel colombien joue un rôle sui-generis, par rapport au traditionnel travail mis en place par le juge constitutionnel dans les systèmes de Western Legal Tradition. L’idée principale de ce travail est celle de souligner son hyper activisme, dans le cadre d’une démocratie qui fait face à un conflit armé interne. Cette compétence, qui avec le temps s’est consolidée dans la pratique constitutionnelle colombienne, peut être expliquée au travers du manque de volonté politique des autres pouvoirs de l’Etat pour mettre en place des politiques publiques dans certains domaines, davantage dans le domaine économique que dans celui des droits sociaux. Cette expérience pourrait envisager une nouvelle conception de démocratie à niveau global, dans laquelle la Cour Constitutionnelle fait pression sur les autres pouvoirs publics afin d’avancer, de facto, sur le plan de la protection des droits fondamentaux des victimes des violations des droits, et pourrait être un modèle pour d’autres pays qui vivent le drame du déplacement forcé. / The thesis’ aim is to focus on the subject of internally displaced persons, IDPs, in Colombia. In particular, this paper seeks to underline the special role played by the Constitutional Court in defending the fundamental rights of IDPs, both as a judge and a public political actor. Colombia has the second highest number of IDPs in the world, making it a crucial social problem for human rights and humanitarian law. The Colombian constitutional judge declared the « estado de cosas inconstitucional » vis-à-vis the IDPs situation: this refers to the fact that internal displacement is a dramatic situation that needs the intervention of many public institutions to be solved. In this thesis I’ll state that Colombian Constitutional court became, de facto, a sort of public policies maker, in order to guarantee the rights to be effective. In particular, since 2004 it is becoming a real policy maker, editing a log of follow-up decisions to the T! -025 sentence, including specific orders to the local and national authorities, to protect the IDPs’ rights. In particular, the Constitutional court stated a « special constitutional protection » for victims of displacement including children, women, afro Colombian community, indigenous communities, and disabled people. We consider Colombia a relevant case of study, with both a well-developed legal system of protection of IDPs and a sui generis Constitutional judge hyperactivisme that may be considered as a model for others countries dealing with an internal conflict, but relying on a firm institutional framework.

What is the normative status of a treaty in Peruvian domestic law? What would happen at theinternational level if the Peruvian ConstitutionalCourt declared  a treaty to be unconstitutional? How to interpret Peruvian maritime domain, asrecognized in our Constitution, after the ruling of the International Court of Justice on the maritimedifferendum with Chile?These issues don’t only concern Constitutional Law; thus, in this interview, the renowned professor provides us with, from the standpoint of International Law, answers about these and other issues, but he also illustrates us about the implications for Peru of the aforementioned Court’sruling, delivered more than a year ago. / ¿Cuál es el rango normativo de un tratado en el Derecho interno peruano?  ¿Qué ocurriría en el ámbito internacional si el Tribunal Constitucional peruano  declarara inconstitucional un tratado?¿Cómo entender el dominio marítimo del Perú, reconocido en nuestra Constitución, luego del fallode la Corte Internacional de Justicia sobre el diferendo marítimo con Chile?Estas cuestiones no pertenecen únicamente al Derecho Constitucional; por ello, en la presente entrevista, el reconocido profesor nos brinda desde el Derecho Internacional respuestas sobre estos y otros temas, así como también nos ilustra acerca de las implicancias para el Perú del mencionado fallode la Corte, a más de un año de haber sido dictado.

The right to inclusive education Abstract The thesis deals with the issue of inclusion in education, especially its legal protection and the assessment of the extent to which the right to inclusive education can be characterized as a fundamental human right. After the introduction, definition of the subject and object of the right to inclusive education (including the international context), description of its legal provision and some circumstances in relation to its implementation in the Czech Republic, the right to inclusive education is evaluated in relation to the constitutional order of the Czech Republic. The international human rights treaties are studied in the following two chapters. Special attention is paid in this context to the issue of the so-called bankruptcy judgement of the Czech Constitutional Court and the rarely concerned question of its temporal scope. In addition to positive law, some decisions of the Constitutional Court and Czech general courts are also taken into account. In relation to international human rights treaties, significant attention is also paid to the decisions of international bodies, in particular the European Court of Human Rights. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights not only provides many arguments in relation to the assessment of the existence of the...

This study examines the effect of judicial protection of minority rights on the Constitutional Court’s legitimacy. The framing of the Marriage Act shows that Parliament intended marriage to be between a man and a woman. By nullifying section 30(1) of the Act and making the order above, the Court fulfilled its constitutional mandate of upholding fundamental human rights. At the same time, it negated the intention of Parliament which represents majoritarian interests. The Constitutional Court is, in contra-distinction with Parliament, unelected. By voiding section 30(1) of the Marriage Act and arousing public opposition to legal recognition of same-sex unions, it raised a ‘countermajoritarian difficulty.’ This ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ has elicited intense scholarly debate.17 The study examines how the Court’s negation of majoritarian interests in order to protect minority rights affects its legitimacy. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2007. / A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Associate Prof. Tamale Sylvia of the Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

in the English language: The Political Character of Constitutional Review. In this thesis, we tried to find out whether constitutional review in the Czech Republic has at least partially a political character. In the Czech Republic, constitutional review is exercised by the Constitutional Court in two types of proceedings: (a) proceedings on derogation of statutes and other regulations (laws) and (b) proceedings on constitutional complaints against decisions or other interferences of public authorities in constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights or freedoms. In proceedings on derogation of laws, we found that judicial decision-making behaviour has at least partially a political character. The reason is, in particular, that (a) judges decide in favour of proposals for derogation of laws filed by legislators (deputies or senators) of the same political affiliation as the judges' appointing president more often than when the legislator's political affiliation is the opposite; (b) ideological assessment of the analysed decisions shows that ideological aspects of the decision-making of judges significantly correlate with the presumed ideology of their appointing president. Moreover, the differences in judicial activism are smaller than the differences between legislators of opposite political...