This paper examines the changing nature of provincial constitutions in Canada. Provinces are granted the right to have their own constitutions by Sections 58-90 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and various sections of the Constitution Act, 1982. The substance of provincial constitutions includes various Acts of provincial parliaments, long-standing constitutional conventions, unwritten rules and principles and common law. With respect to the practice of responsible government, the provinces have long relied on the traditionally “flexible” nature of their largely unwritten constitutions. Using the case studies of statutes dealing with the executive and legislative branches of government in the provinces of British Columbia, Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador, this paper analyzes recent changes in the statutes (and therefore constitutions) of the provinces. The analysis shows that there have been many changes in provincial constitutions on the subject of responsible government. The constitutions increasingly recognize the role of the Premier and cabinets, to the detriment of the traditional roles of Lieutenant Governors and the legislatures. This is in line with general trends in Canada’s provinces toward increased executive dominance. The practice of codifying changes in provincial constitutions is also more in line with how constitutional change happens in the states of comparable federations such as Australia and the United States.

This paper examines the changing nature of provincial constitutions in Canada. Provinces are granted the right to have their own constitutions by Sections 58-90 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and various sections of the Constitution Act, 1982. The substance of provincial constitutions includes various Acts of provincial parliaments, long-standing constitutional conventions, unwritten rules and principles and common law. With respect to the practice of responsible government, the provinces have long relied on the traditionally “flexible” nature of their largely unwritten constitutions. Using the case studies of statutes dealing with the executive and legislative branches of government in the provinces of British Columbia, Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador, this paper analyzes recent changes in the statutes (and therefore constitutions) of the provinces. The analysis shows that there have been many changes in provincial constitutions on the subject of responsible government. The constitutions increasingly recognize the role of the Premier and cabinets, to the detriment of the traditional roles of Lieutenant Governors and the legislatures. This is in line with general trends in Canada’s provinces toward increased executive dominance. The practice of codifying changes in provincial constitutions is also more in line with how constitutional change happens in the states of comparable federations such as Australia and the United States.

After what happened in 1989, the doctrine states that we are now in the “World Time of the Constitutional State”. But what are the implicationsof this? How has this impacted on the dispute of the German doctrine about the right comprehensionof the nature of the Constitution? Which shouldbe the labor of a Public Law and International Law professor in this context?In the present article, the author comments the indicated phenomenon, and, in order to do this, he uses figures such as the Cooperative Constitutional State, or the living constitutions. Constitutions, he states, aren’t just a product of constitutionalism, but many other factor must be taken into account. / Tras lo sucedido el año 1989, la doctrina señala que nos encontramos en “la Hora Mundial del Estado Constitucional”. Pero ¿cuáles son las implicanciasde ello? ¿Cómo ha impactado ello en la disputa dela doctrina alemana por la correcta comprensiónde la naturaleza de la Constitución? ¿Cuál debe serla labor del profesor de Derecho Público y Derecho Internacional en este contexto?En el presente texto, el autor comenta el fenómeno señalado y, para ello, recurre a figuras como la del Estado Constitucional Cooperativo, o la de las constituciones vivas. Las constituciones, afirma, no son solo producto del constitucionalismo, sino que múltiples otros factores deben ser tomados en cuenta.

This paper examines the changing nature of provincial constitutions in Canada. Provinces are granted the right to have their own constitutions by Sections 58-90 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and various sections of the Constitution Act, 1982. The substance of provincial constitutions includes various Acts of provincial parliaments, long-standing constitutional conventions, unwritten rules and principles and common law. With respect to the practice of responsible government, the provinces have long relied on the traditionally “flexible” nature of their largely unwritten constitutions. Using the case studies of statutes dealing with the executive and legislative branches of government in the provinces of British Columbia, Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador, this paper analyzes recent changes in the statutes (and therefore constitutions) of the provinces. The analysis shows that there have been many changes in provincial constitutions on the subject of responsible government. The constitutions increasingly recognize the role of the Premier and cabinets, to the detriment of the traditional roles of Lieutenant Governors and the legislatures. This is in line with general trends in Canada’s provinces toward increased executive dominance. The practice of codifying changes in provincial constitutions is also more in line with how constitutional change happens in the states of comparable federations such as Australia and the United States. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I is an introduction to the field of study and comprises only one chapter. This chapter includes short accounts of the geographical positions and the inhabitants of Zambia and Malawi. Part II deals with the constitutional history of the two countries from the introduction of European administration in the last decade of the nineteenth century to their attainment of independence in 1964--a period of seventy years. Zambia and Malawi are new states and a study of their Constitutions would not be properly appreciated if it were not to cover fairly fully the past that bore the present. Part III, which is the main section of the study, deals with the provisions of the present Constitutions of the two countries. It is divided into sixteen chapters. / Public, Constitutional, & International Law / LLD (Constitutional Law, Public International Law and Labour Law)

Dans ma thèse j’étude la normativité monastique et les aspects institutionnels de l’Ordre de Vallombrosa entre le XIème et le XVème siècle. L’étude a apporté de nouveaux résultats et il est divisé en trois parties :Dans la première j’introduis le lecteur aux sources et à l’historiographie sur le sujet.Dans la deuxième je déroule le thème de la normativité. Pour les origines j’approfondis le lien entre les sources hagiographiques, le mouvement réformateur de Florence, les premiers moines et l’institutionnalisation en congregatio de Vallombrosa. Je discute d’une façon systématique et textuelle le problème de la datation des coutumiers, des rédactions des constitutions et la diffusion et l’usage des constitutions et des statuts.Dans la troisième j’étude les institutions de l’Ordre singulièrement avec l’aide des sources normatives et du contexte historique, en vérifiant leurs changements ou cours des siècles. Les chapitres sont dédiés aux principales institutions de l’Ordre, c’est-à-dire l’abbé général, le chapitre général et les visiteurs.Enfin la thèse est dotée d’importantes annexes où on peut trouver : l’édition critique des constitutions à partir du 1323 jusqu’au 1455, des tables de concordances des normes du XIème siècle jusqu’à l’an 1310, et celles de statuts de Vallombrosa (1323-1455). / In my thesis, I study the monastic normativity and the institutional aspects of the Vallombrosa Order between the 11th and the 15th centuries. The study has brought new results and it is divided into three parts:In the first part I introduce the reader to sources and to historiography on the subject.In the second I develop the theme of normativity. For the origins, I explain the connections with the hagiographic sources, the reforming movement in Florence, the first monks and the institutionalization in congregatio of Vallombrosa. I discuss in a systematic and textual way the dating’s problem of the customary, the writing of the constitutions and the diffusion and the use of the constitutions and statutes.In the third I study the institutions of the Order with the help of normative sources and the historical context, by checking their changes through the centuries. The chapters are devoted to the main institutions of the Order, that is the Abbot General, the General Chapter and the Visitors.Finally, the thesis is completed with important appendices where one can find: the critical edition of the constitutions from 1323 to 1455, the tables of the concordances of the norms from the 11th century until 1310, and those of Statutes of Vallombrosa (1323-1455).

The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I is an introduction to the field of study and comprises only one chapter. This chapter includes short accounts of the geographical positions and the inhabitants of Zambia and Malawi. Part II deals with the constitutional history of the two countries from the introduction of European administration in the last decade of the nineteenth century to their attainment of independence in 1964--a period of seventy years. Zambia and Malawi are new states and a study of their Constitutions would not be properly appreciated if it were not to cover fairly fully the past that bore the present. Part III, which is the main section of the study, deals with the provisions of the present Constitutions of the two countries. It is divided into sixteen chapters. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LLD (Constitutional Law, Public International Law and Labour Law)

Can a constitution commit suicide? How should a liberal democratic state respond when social movements threaten war with one another and against the state itself? How should liberal democrats respond when extremist parties are strong enough to cooperate in parliament and obstruct essential legislation? Can an illiberal antidemocratic party legitimately obtain power through elections and then kick the ladder down by legally amending democracy and liberalism out of the constitution entirely? Beginning in 1929, theoretical questions like these suddenly became both practically and existentially relevant for Weimar Germany. The share of the vote Nazis and Communists received in elections swelled until, combined, they were the majority. Neither movement accepted the legitimacy of liberal democracy and both were explicit that their only goal in running for seats in parliament was to gain a strong enough majority to amend the Weimar Constitution out of existence. Until then, they cooperated across the aisle, so to speak, to constitute negative majorities and prevent the SPD, Zentrum, and other parties from being able to pass legislation to respond to the economic, social, and political crises Weimar faced. By 1932, the Nazis held a plurality. In January 1933, exhausted with alternatives, Hindenburg appointed Hitler Chancellor. This dissertation extrapolates Carl Schmitt's state theory and looks at how it was conceived in response to Weimar's legitimation crisis. It shows how Schmitt looks back to the tradition of state theory to address this crisis. In particular, it shows how he models his solution on Thomas Hobbes, whose Leviathan was also a response to civil war and the breakdown of political order. This dissertation argues Schmitt updates Hobbes' state theory to respond to the unique problems of the 20th century, especially modern mass democracy. Modern mass democracy was the product of universal suffrage, mass media, and advances in psychology. Disingenuous social movements exploited the media and whipped up an emotionally charged base, obtaining for themselves a veneer of democratic legitimacy and the means to parliament. Once in parliament, they exacerbated Weimar's crises and struggled against each another to advance their particular goals. Schmitt saw these conflicts as the 20th century equivalent of the Confessional Civil Wars and he saw himself as the 20th century Hobbes. He theorized ways to neutralize those conflicts and restore the state's sovereign authority. But, besides that, Schmitt thought these issues begged the basic question of constitutionalism: are there any objective limits to a goal "the people" want, even if 99 percent of citizens support that goal? Can "the people" legitimately be bound to the mast? Can democracy be tyrannical? Schmitt's peers, such as Hans Kelsen and Richard Thoma, answered in the negative and argued that there was no basis to deny a democratic will that had formed through proper procedures. Schmitt disagreed. He argued the constitution imposed hard limits on democracy. Through this answer, this dissertation argues Schmitt's state theory anticipated what is today known as militant democracy. Militant democracy is a type of liberal democratic constitution that guards against certain forms of popular sovereignty and prevents constitutional suicide. Its institutional mechanisms include the entrenchment of core constitutional principles, such as basic rights, and political bans on certain illiberal and antidemocratic parties. Although one finds militant democracy embedded in constitutions around the world today, it has been undertheorized. Because Schmitt's theory of militant democracy rests on his substantive state theory, this dissertation concludes he offers us a foundation for developing a normative theory of militant democracy - something invaluable for making sense of its legitimacy and its limits today.

Modern states are committed to the implicit assumption that one generation has the normative power to bind later generations through laws and contracts. My dissertation explores this assumption through two case studies: constitutions and sovereign debt contracts. I show that in both cases the assumption of transgenerational binding shapes the legal practices and doctrines of modern states. It informs, for instance, the ratification of eternity clauses, the interpretation of constitutions, and the doctrines of sovereign immunity and odious debt. But although these practices of transgenerational binding are prevalent in modern states, they stand in tension, I argue, with the liberal moral commitments of these states. Liberals are committed to moral individualism, according to which only individual human beings (and some nonhuman animals) are moral persons. Moral individualism, I show, is incompatible with the assumption of transgenerational binding and its accompanying practices and doctrines. By contrast, moral statism, according to which states themselves are moral persons, can easily justify those transgenerational practice. But moral statist justifications are illiberal because they assign states intrinsic moral status above and beyond individual human beings. I argue that liberals must engage in revisionism whichever theory of political obligation they pick - whether it is a theory of agreement, restitution, justice, reciprocity, or instrumentalism. If liberals assume moral individualism and combine it with any of these theories, they will be forced either to declare some transgenerational practices and doctrines illegitimate or to revise the justification and scope of transgenerational binding in light of instrumentalism. If liberals choose moral statism, they will be able to justify the transgenerational doctrines and practices of constitutions and sovereign debt contracts - but only at the cost of illiberalism. The dissertation's analysis thus shows that liberals face a trilemma between illegitimacy, instrumentalism, and illiberalism.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1968. / Vita. Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.