Magister Psychologiae - MPsych / The high statistics of rape in South Africa and the increasing percentage of sexual offenders in correctional services beseech urgent intervention with this population. Very little is known about the clinical reasoning that informs the planning of treatments for sexual offenders by the health professionals that work with them. In particular, research is needed on what health professionals perceive to be the curative factors in the treatment of sexual offenders. This study explores and describes health professionals’ views on the treatment of sexual offenders. The research is qualitative and exploratory in nature. The sample size consisted of seven health professionals including five social workers and two clinical psychologists who work or have worked specifically with sexual crimes. Permission to conduct the study was obtained from the Senate Research Committee of UWC (Ethics Clearance and Project Registration Number: 13/4/20) and all principles of ethics e.g. voluntary participation, confidentiality, anonymity and informed consent, were upheld. Data was collected through in-depth individual interviews. Interviews were transcribed and analysed by two researchers using thematic analysis. Data collection and analysis took place in parallel until saturation was reached. Trustworthiness of the findings was achieved through inter-rater comparison, respondent validation, debriefing and reflexivity. Findings revealed that sexual offender treatment needs to account for the heterogeneity of the population and that treatment providers need providers need to be open and flexible. Treating clinicians must also be prepared to draw on a range of theories to meet the unique needs of each offender. Several curative factors were identified by the participants, including comprehensive assessment, mentoring and supervision on multiple levels, admission of guilt by the sexual offenders, psycho-education and skills training, strong therapeutic alliance, as well as intervention for sexual offender's past / own victimization.

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(地球環境学) / 甲第23592号 / 地環博第219号 / 新制||地環||42(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院地球環境学舎地球環境学専攻 / (主査)教授 宇佐美 誠, 教授 佐藤 淳二, 教授 山村 亜希, 准教授 徳永 悠, 教授 服部 高宏 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Global Environmental Studies / Kyoto University / DGAM

Esta dissertação trata dos fundamentos teóricos da responsabilidade civil a partir da perspectiva exposta na obra de Emest Weinrib. A questão central do trabalho refere-se, de um lado, à discussão da abordagem formalista, que permite a compreensão do direito e de sua autonomia em relação a outras esferas - em especial à política - e, de outro lado, à relação entre o formalismo e a fundamentação da responsabilidade civil na justiça corretiva. Por fim, o trabalho analisa as críticas oferecidas ao arcabouço teórico weinribiano, procurando discutir os limites da obra de Weinrib e as possíveis falhas de interpretação dos próprios críticos. / This thesis examines the theoretical foundation of the concept of tort as presented in the work of Ernst Weinrib. It discusses both the formalist approach to torts, which allows for the understanding of Law as autonomous from other areas - notably, from politics - and, on the other, the connections between formalism and the theoretical foundation of the concept of tort from the standpoint of corrective justice. This thesis also analyses the criticism Weinrib\'s work has received, discussing the limits of Weinrib\'s contribution and the possible flaws of some critical approaches.

Esta dissertação trata dos fundamentos teóricos da responsabilidade civil a partir da perspectiva exposta na obra de Emest Weinrib. A questão central do trabalho refere-se, de um lado, à discussão da abordagem formalista, que permite a compreensão do direito e de sua autonomia em relação a outras esferas - em especial à política - e, de outro lado, à relação entre o formalismo e a fundamentação da responsabilidade civil na justiça corretiva. Por fim, o trabalho analisa as críticas oferecidas ao arcabouço teórico weinribiano, procurando discutir os limites da obra de Weinrib e as possíveis falhas de interpretação dos próprios críticos. / This thesis examines the theoretical foundation of the concept of tort as presented in the work of Ernst Weinrib. It discusses both the formalist approach to torts, which allows for the understanding of Law as autonomous from other areas - notably, from politics - and, on the other, the connections between formalism and the theoretical foundation of the concept of tort from the standpoint of corrective justice. This thesis also analyses the criticism Weinrib\'s work has received, discussing the limits of Weinrib\'s contribution and the possible flaws of some critical approaches.

Cette thèse propose une théorie de la peine formulée dans les termes d’une conception de la justice corrective. L’idée de justice corrective et la théorie qu’on en propose trouvent leurs sources dans la pensée éthico-politique d’Aristote. On a choisi de restreindre l’espace d’application de la conception corrective aux systèmes juridiques contemporains des États-Unis et de la France. Le principe de justice corrective, tel qu’on l’interprète ici, pose que les peines peuvent être justes si elles tentent de rétablir une égalité de droits fondamentaux entre la victime et l’auteur d’une infraction conçue comme violation de ces mêmes droits. La conception corrective marque une rupture importante par rapport aux principales conceptions alternatives – rétributiviste et distributiviste – de la punition, en ceci qu’aucune de ces deux approches ne repose essentiellement sur la primauté normative de la relation entre victime et infracteur et que l’égalité des droits fondamentaux n’y est envisagée, dans l’ordre de la justice, comme une raison nécessaire et suffisante pour punir. Est juste, d’abord, la sanction pénale orientée vers l’égalisation des droits fondamentaux et la rectification des injustices commises par des personnes contre d’autres personnes. Du point de vue de la justice corrective, c’est dans la relation qui lie la victime à son infracteur que se déploie la justice des peines. Du point de vue de la conception corrective, la justice pénale ne peut se réaliser qu’en tenant compte du caractère central de la bilatéralité de la justification des peines. Que l’intervention punitive contribue à faire souffrir le coupable - comme dans les conceptions rétributives - ou qu’elle produise des effets socialement bénéfiques - comme dans les conceptions distributives -, ce sont là des considérations complémentaires qui ne relèvent pas nécessairement de la justice des peines. / This dissertation provides a theory of punishment that is formulated by means of a conception of corrective justice. The concept of corrective justice and its corresponding conception draw on the ethical and moral theory of Aristotle. The corrective conception is meant to apply to the contemporary legal systems of France and the United States. As interpreted here, the principle of corrective justice argues that punishment is justified when and insofar as it tends to rectify a specific, inter-personal inequality resulting from a violation of the basic rights of the victim by the offender. Corrective justice thus pertains to the domain of interpersonal injustices. Aristotle was the first one to formulate the concept of corrective justice in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. It was also Aristotle who, for the first time, made a connection between the norms of corrective justice and the practice of punishment. The corrective conception takes its distance from the two main alternative conceptions of punishment, which are based on the idea of distributive and retributive justice. Neither of these two latter conceptions views the relationship between the individual victim and the individual offender as normatively prior; nor do they see basic rights as necessary and sufficient grounds for punishing. Seen from a corrective standpoint, penal justice is strictly located at the level of the relationship that connects the offender to his or her victim. Unlike its main contenders, corrective justice is deeply anchored in a bilateral justificatory structure. The suffering of the offender advocated by retributive conceptions or the existence of socially beneficial effects defended by distributive theories can arguably be interpreted or explained as side-effects of legal punishment, but they cannot offer a normative basis for punishing.

This thesis presents an account of attribution in unjust enrichment. Attribution refers to how and when two parties – a claimant and a defendant – are relevantly connected to each other for unjust enrichment purposes. It is reflected in the familiar expression that a defendant be 'enriched at the claimant's expense'. This thesis presents a structured account of attribution, consisting of two requirements: first, the identification of an enrichment to the defendant and a loss to the claimant; and, secondly, the identification of a connection between that enrichment and that loss. These two requirements must be kept separate from other considerations often subsumed within the expression 'enrichment at the claimant's expense' which in truth have nothing to do with attribution, and which instead qualify unjust enrichment liability for reasons that should be analysed in their own terms. The structure of attribution so presented fits a normative account of unjust enrichment based upon each party's exchange capacities. A defendant is enriched when he receives something that he has not paid for under prevailing market conditions, while a claimant suffers a loss when he loses the opportunity to charge for something under the same conditions. A counterfactual test – asking whether enrichment and loss arise 'but for' each other – provides the best generalisation for testing whether enrichment and loss are connected, thereby satisfying the requirements of attribution in unjust enrichment. The law is stated as at 15 March 2014.

Este trabalho trata da relação entre a teoria formalista do direito elaborada por Ernest Weinrib e sua teoria de fundamentação da responsabilidade civil derivada do formalismo. O objetivo do trabalho é mostrar que, apesar de o formalismo apresentar uma formulação distintiva e inovadora de racionalidade jurídica, que enfatiza a relação entre forma e conteúdo do direito, o modelo de racionalidade jurídica do formalismo não fornece uma explicação adequada para algumas áreas do direito e, especificamente no caso da responsabilidade civil, da responsabilidade objetiva, que, nessa visão, é considerada um erro jurídico. O formalismo jurídico weinribiano é um projeto teórico ambicioso que a um só tempo procura rechaçar posições céticas como os estudos críticos do direito (critical legal studies) e posições instrumentalistas, especialmente a análise econômica do direito e o positivismo jurídico. Ele apresenta uma teoria geral que mostra o direito como um lócus de racionalidade moral imanente e um método, fundado na inteligibilidade imanente, para compreender essa racionalidade e ver o direito como um fenômeno autônomo em relação à política e a outras esferas de racionalidade. O método formalista permite a intelecção do direito como um fenômeno imanentemente coerente por meio da apreensão das estruturas organizadoras e justificadoras implícitas nos arranjos jurídicos, isto é, as formas da justiça corretiva e da justiça distributiva. Com base nisso, o formalismo sustenta que a forma imanente ao direito privado e, consequentemente, à responsabilidade civil é a justiça corretiva. Este trabalho reconstrói criticamente as principais teses que integram o formalismo e que são fundamentais para entender a rejeição à responsabilidade objetiva, considerada uma monstruosidade conceitual, com especial ênfase na premissa epistemológica formalista da inteligibilidade imanente como a melhor maneira de se compreender o direito e na premissa da coerência estrutural que os arranjos jurídicos devem apresentar. A tese discute o modo como o formalismo jurídico se insere no debate metodológico contemporâneo, definindo o formalismo jurídico como uma teoria de avaliação e justificação jurídica e, portanto, dotada de uma dimensão prescritiva, e apresentando o impacto dessa definição na postura que o formalismo assume em relação à responsabilidade objetiva. A tese ainda analisa a relação entre essa dimensão prescritiva e o posicionamento do formalismo em relação à responsabilidade objetiva, rotulando-a de erro jurídico, e conclui com uma discussão sobre as razões desse posicionamento que, argumentase, é equivocado , que se baseiam na assunção das premissas da inteligibilidade imanente e do critério de coerência estrita que marcam o método de conhecimento formalista. / This dissertation focuses on the relationship between juridical formalism as elaborated by Ernest Weinrib and his theory of the foundation of tort law. The dissertation argues that despite formalisms distinctive and innovative account of legal rationality that emphasizes the relationship between laws form and substance, this account does not provide an adequate explanation for specific areas of law. Particularly in the case of tort law it does not adequately explain strict liability, which is deemed a juridical error. Weinribs juridical formalism is an ambitious theoretical project that challenges: skeptical accounts of law, such as critical legal studies; instrumentalists account of law exemplified by economical analysis of law; and juridical positivism. Weinribs theory attempts to explain law as a locus of immanent moral rationality. The theory is based on a methodology that adopts the premise of immanent intelligibility as a way to comprehend this rationality. This approach allows the theorist to grasp law as a phenomenon autonomous from politics and other spheres of rationality. The formalist method allows the intelligibility of law as an immanently coherent phenomenon through the apprehension of the organizing and justifying structures implicit in juridical arrangements, i.e., the forms of corrective justice and distributive justice with which formalism argues that the immanent form of private law and, therefore, of tort law is corrective justice. This dissertation reconstructs critically the main theses that support formalism, which are essential to understanding its rejection of strict liability considered a conceptual monstrosity. This dissertation focuses on the formalist epistemological assumption of immanent intelligibility as the best way of comprehending law and on the premise of internal structural coherence that juridical arrangements should display. This thesis discusses the way in which juridical formalism can be located within the contemporary methodological debate, and defines formalism as an evaluative and justificatory juridical theory. As such, formalism encompasses a prescriptive dimension. This dissertation also identifies how the definition of formalism as a prescriptive theory impacts on its analysis of strict liability. The dissertation then analyses the relationship between this prescriptive dimension and the formalist position regarding strict liability. It concludes that formalisms mistake regarding strict liability can be traced back to its epistemological assumptions regarding immanent intelligibility and coherence.

Este trabalho trata da relação entre a teoria formalista do direito elaborada por Ernest Weinrib e sua teoria de fundamentação da responsabilidade civil derivada do formalismo. O objetivo do trabalho é mostrar que, apesar de o formalismo apresentar uma formulação distintiva e inovadora de racionalidade jurídica, que enfatiza a relação entre forma e conteúdo do direito, o modelo de racionalidade jurídica do formalismo não fornece uma explicação adequada para algumas áreas do direito e, especificamente no caso da responsabilidade civil, da responsabilidade objetiva, que, nessa visão, é considerada um erro jurídico. O formalismo jurídico weinribiano é um projeto teórico ambicioso que a um só tempo procura rechaçar posições céticas como os estudos críticos do direito (critical legal studies) e posições instrumentalistas, especialmente a análise econômica do direito e o positivismo jurídico. Ele apresenta uma teoria geral que mostra o direito como um lócus de racionalidade moral imanente e um método, fundado na inteligibilidade imanente, para compreender essa racionalidade e ver o direito como um fenômeno autônomo em relação à política e a outras esferas de racionalidade. O método formalista permite a intelecção do direito como um fenômeno imanentemente coerente por meio da apreensão das estruturas organizadoras e justificadoras implícitas nos arranjos jurídicos, isto é, as formas da justiça corretiva e da justiça distributiva. Com base nisso, o formalismo sustenta que a forma imanente ao direito privado e, consequentemente, à responsabilidade civil é a justiça corretiva. Este trabalho reconstrói criticamente as principais teses que integram o formalismo e que são fundamentais para entender a rejeição à responsabilidade objetiva, considerada uma monstruosidade conceitual, com especial ênfase na premissa epistemológica formalista da inteligibilidade imanente como a melhor maneira de se compreender o direito e na premissa da coerência estrutural que os arranjos jurídicos devem apresentar. A tese discute o modo como o formalismo jurídico se insere no debate metodológico contemporâneo, definindo o formalismo jurídico como uma teoria de avaliação e justificação jurídica e, portanto, dotada de uma dimensão prescritiva, e apresentando o impacto dessa definição na postura que o formalismo assume em relação à responsabilidade objetiva. A tese ainda analisa a relação entre essa dimensão prescritiva e o posicionamento do formalismo em relação à responsabilidade objetiva, rotulando-a de erro jurídico, e conclui com uma discussão sobre as razões desse posicionamento que, argumentase, é equivocado , que se baseiam na assunção das premissas da inteligibilidade imanente e do critério de coerência estrita que marcam o método de conhecimento formalista. / This dissertation focuses on the relationship between juridical formalism as elaborated by Ernest Weinrib and his theory of the foundation of tort law. The dissertation argues that despite formalisms distinctive and innovative account of legal rationality that emphasizes the relationship between laws form and substance, this account does not provide an adequate explanation for specific areas of law. Particularly in the case of tort law it does not adequately explain strict liability, which is deemed a juridical error. Weinribs juridical formalism is an ambitious theoretical project that challenges: skeptical accounts of law, such as critical legal studies; instrumentalists account of law exemplified by economical analysis of law; and juridical positivism. Weinribs theory attempts to explain law as a locus of immanent moral rationality. The theory is based on a methodology that adopts the premise of immanent intelligibility as a way to comprehend this rationality. This approach allows the theorist to grasp law as a phenomenon autonomous from politics and other spheres of rationality. The formalist method allows the intelligibility of law as an immanently coherent phenomenon through the apprehension of the organizing and justifying structures implicit in juridical arrangements, i.e., the forms of corrective justice and distributive justice with which formalism argues that the immanent form of private law and, therefore, of tort law is corrective justice. This dissertation reconstructs critically the main theses that support formalism, which are essential to understanding its rejection of strict liability considered a conceptual monstrosity. This dissertation focuses on the formalist epistemological assumption of immanent intelligibility as the best way of comprehending law and on the premise of internal structural coherence that juridical arrangements should display. This thesis discusses the way in which juridical formalism can be located within the contemporary methodological debate, and defines formalism as an evaluative and justificatory juridical theory. As such, formalism encompasses a prescriptive dimension. This dissertation also identifies how the definition of formalism as a prescriptive theory impacts on its analysis of strict liability. The dissertation then analyses the relationship between this prescriptive dimension and the formalist position regarding strict liability. It concludes that formalisms mistake regarding strict liability can be traced back to its epistemological assumptions regarding immanent intelligibility and coherence.

Économiquement et politiquement, la société occidentale est menée par deux ensembles que sont l’Union européenne et les États-Unis d’Amérique. D’un point de vue juridique, cette distinction répond à une autre qu’est celle entre les États de tradition romano-germanique et ceux de common law. Aujourd’hui, cette distinction s’estompe tant ces deux systèmes juridiques se confondent. Sur la forme d’abord, les droits de common law recourent de manière croissante aux droits statutaires, et inversement les droits continentaux laissent une place grandissante à la jurisprudence et notamment à celle de la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne. Sur le fond ensuite, ces deux systèmes juridiques et leurs pendants économiques s’unifient autour d’une économie de marché qu’ils souhaitent protéger des comportements nuisibles aux consommateurs, aux concurrents, et donc in fine au marché lui-même. Or, cette protection nécessite, notamment, d’imposer une loyauté lors de l’emploi de pratiques commerciales par des professionnels vis-à-vis de consommateurs.C’est pourquoi, le 11 mai 2005, a été promulguée une directive relative aux pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises vis-à-vis des consommateurs qui harmonise de façon maximale la qualification de ces pratiques sans traiter de leur régime juridique. Dès lors, il semble nécessaire de comparer les systèmes européen et anglo-américain, notamment par la considération de la théorie des economic torts, afin d’étudier si ces derniers pourraient s’enrichir l’un de l’autre. Il sera ainsi démontré que si la qualification poursuit les mêmes raisonnements, la réaction face à de tels comportements est quant à elle plus nuancée. / Economically and politically, the Western society is led by two main sets which are the European Union and the United States of America. Juridically, this distinction matches with a more general one wich can be observed between traditional romano-germanic states and those submitted to the common law. Nowadays, this distinction tend towards disappearance because of the intermingling of these two legal systems. Indeed, regarding the form first, common law states resort more and more to statutory laws, and conversely, traditional romano-germanic laws leave a growing room for the case law, and especially, for the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. In substance then, because those two legal systems correspond to two economic systems unified around a market economy. They want to protect it against damaging behaviours for consumers, competitors, and in fine for the market itself But this protection require in particular to order fairness during the use of business-to-consumer commercial practices. That is why, the European Parliament and the Council, announced a directive concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, which contains maximum harmonisation provisions about unfair commercial practices, but without provisions about their juridical regime. Then, it seems necessary to compare the European system with the American one, especialy with the consideration of the theory of the economic torts, in order to study if these two can enrich each other. So, it will be demonstrated that if the classification follows the same arguments on either side of the Atlantic, the responses to those behaviours is more contrasted.

Dos teorías dominantes en el ámbito académico se atribuyen la mejor explicación de la responsabilidad extracontractual. El análisis económico sostiene que los conceptos fundamentales de la práctica cobran su mayor sentido cuando se los inter¬preta a la luz del objetivo social de mantener el coste de los accidentes en un nivel óptimo. Para los partidarios de la justicia correctiva, en cambio, la responsabilidad extracontractual regula las interac¬ciones privadas de los indi¬viduos imponiendo al causante del daño la obligación de indemni¬zar de modo que se rectifiquen a la vez las pérdidas y las ganancias injus¬tas. Argumentaré que la responsabilidad extracontractual es una práctica mucho más compleja de lo que estas dos teorías suponen. Su estructura está con¬formada tanto por principios correctivos como distributivos. A su vez, la noción de derechos y deberes de indemnidad permite comprender de qué manera estos principios están articulados. / Two important theories claim to provide the best explanation of tort law. The Law and Economics movement holds that the fundamental concepts of the practice are best understood when they are interpreted in light of the social goal of maintaining the costs of accidents at an optimal level. According to corrective justice proponents, on the other hand, tort law regulates the private interactions of persons imposing the duty to compensate upon the causal agent of the harm, in order to rectify at the same time wrongful gains and losses. I will argue that tort law is a much complex practice that these two theories assume. Its structure is conformed both by corrective and distributive principles. In turn, the notion of indemnity rights and duties allow us to understand the way these principles are articulated.