Title: Protection against corruption and bribery and their prevention Abstract My diploma thesis should describe the contemporary issues of corruption and then it should show us the differences between corruption and lobbying. After that I would like to focus on the current legislation which mentions corruption. Finally, I would highlight the necessity of prevention. Initially, I would try to define corruption, describe the origin reasons of corruption and its dividing. The next part of the first chapter includes the methods of measurement, which are used for taking an imagination about the extent of the corruption in this age. The following chapter describes lobbying and the other terms which belong to it. The main goal is an effort to distinguish the situation when it is still lobbying and the situation when the legal line of lobbying is already broke. The next chapter includes current legislation which concerns the problem of corruption. Because of the quite extensive legislation I try to focus on the regulation in the criminal law and in the business law. One part of this chapter discusses the effective repentance, which could again appear in our legislation. The fourth chapter points to necessity of prevention in this issue. Corruption is a global problem and the solving of problem with corruption is...

The topic of this diploma work is "Effective repentance and bribery". Effective repentance is a reason which causes an extinction of punish ability. There are two kinds of effective repentance. The first is a general effective repentance. The second is a specific effective repentance. General effective repentance causes impunity when offender of criminal act of listed crimes retrieved injury by his own will, or announced criminal act to prosecutor or police officer in time when should be injury retrieve. Specific effective repentance is codified for just a few crimes. One of these crimes, where specific effective repentance was codified is bribery. Bribery effective repentance means, that the offender of bribe giving will not be penal responsible if he gives or promises bribe, just because he was asked for bribe and if he (by his own will and immediately) announced this to a prosecutor or a police officer. In the past since 1950 we have had this specific repentance in criminal law. Since 1/1/2010 we have got a new criminal law no 40/2009 Sb. New codex no. 40/2009 Sb. despite original legislative proposal does not codify specific effective repentance in corruption cases. It was tried to describe historical aspects of effective repentance in context with development of criminal law in our country. In my...

Thesis describes often mixed terms of corruption and lobbying, tries to distinguish them and explain why there is a crucial difference between disruptive corruption and legitime lobbying, which is one of the key stones of modern demorcracy. The first chapter deals with the general term of corruption, its typology and bribery. The second chapter describes corruption criminal offenses in the czech criminal code and divides them into general and special ones. The third chapter deals with the term of lobbying, and the history of lobbying in the United States of America from the begining of lobbying in 19. century described as influencing politicans by powerful and influential individuals using all aviable techniques and corruption, through advancing regulation by the state. The next part of the chapter is dedicated to lobbying and corruption in the Czech Republic. It gives a few examples on which there is possible to demonstrate the level of current legal regulation, which does not allow transparent control of public on decision making of the public officials. The last part of the chapter shows most serious reasons for appearance of corruption in lobbying, which need to be cleared. The fourth chapter is about analysis of the regulation of lobbying in the United States of America and the United Kingdom....

The aim of this research is to understand how corruption affects the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Studies of corruption and its relationship with FDI have yielded mixed results; some have found that corruption deters FDI others have found no relation between the two factors, while others have found a positive one. In order to further the knowledge of how corruption affects FDI this study argues that it is not only the level of corruption what might affect FDI but also the distance between host and home countries. This study presents two sections, the first one concentrates on a macroeconomic level analysis of corruption and how it affects FDI to Latin America. The second section analyses how corruption affects the decision-making process of allocating FDI to a highly corrupt host country at the firm-level. After controlling for institutional and transaction cost variables, results show that corruption distance has an asymmetrical impact. Host countries enjoying “positive” corruption distance compared with home countries as sources of FDI experience no significant increases or reductions in levels of inward FDI. However, “negative” corruption distance suffered by host countries is associated with significantly lower levels of inward FDI. Conversely, firms from home countries with high corruption are undeterred by high corruption in host countries. This study also analysed how corruption affected foreign investors at the firm level. To do so, this study researched the decision making process of allocating FDI into a highly corrupt host country. The results of the analysis show that corruption amongst bureaucrats, judges, and members of the government elite do not seem to have an impact on the decision making process of allocating FDI in the country because foreign investors are aware of the problem. However, firms from more corrupt countries seem to have an advantage when operating in a highly corrupt foreign location because they may possess knowledge of how to cope with the arbitrariness dimension of corruption. High corruption levels in the host country seem to have an effect on the entry mode utilised by firms from countries with lower levels of corruption. Based on the results presented on this study, MNEs from less corrupt countries might opt to enter a highly corrupt host country via wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) rather than joint ventures (JVs). This might be explained by the fact that these investors prefer to have more control over their firms’ operations in a highly corrupt country. Also, these managers need to protect their image and not to be associated with local partners that are perceived as corrupt. Finally, even though this study found evidence that all firms operating in Guatemala might participate in corrupt deals, those headquartered in highly corrupt countries are more willing to do so. This claim is based on the fact that firms from less corrupt countries might face stronger pressures from their headquarters to not engage in corrupt deals, whereas firms from more corrupt countries might not encounter such pressures.

- 1 - Abstract of Jan Horník's dissertation "Criminal law application of corruption and bribery" This dissertation, as it follows from its title, deals with the issues of corruption and bribery, mainly from the perspective of criminal substantive law. The author emphasises the fact that corruption has been discussed as an adverse social phenomenon which has for a long time constituted an issue of not only national dimension, but has been the object of activities of numerous international or multinational organisations due to its diversity and wide spread. Since the media cover corruption-related cases on an almost-daily basis (and we will leave it to the reader whether or not to believe the saying that everyone is corruptible, what only matters is the amount of the bribe offered and the circumstances under which it is offered), the author of this dissertation decided to highlight and explain the aspects related to corruption, and in that context to analyse the applicable laws of the Czech Republic. The aim of this dissertation is to introduce the reader to the general principles of the law applicable to penalisation of corruption, particularly from the perspective of criminal substantive law, and also from the perspectives of criminology and international law. The dissertation offers a general introduction...

The aim of this thesis was to test whether the protestant faith or the protestant tradition is the cause of the protestant suppressive effect on corruption and whether this effect prevails on an individual level. This was done using multilevel hierarchical regression models and over 350 000 survey questionnaires to avoid bias as well as national and cultural effects. This thesis shows that identifying oneself as protestant has a significant effect on ones tolerance of corruption, but this effect is severely reduced when controlling for socioeconomic and political factors. We further show that the level of religiosity is a relevant predictor in individual tolerance for corruption for protestants. The individual religious identity is, however, not as strong a predictor as documented aggregated levels of Protestantism, indicating that, while still relevant, national factors are more important in explaining variation in corruption. / <p>2019-06-04</p>

Esta dissertação estuda a corrupção política e o Caixa 2 de campanhas eleitorais no Brasil, avaliando o seu impacto na qualidade da democracia, em especial na responsividade dos governos às preferências da maioria dos cidadãos. Com base em observações descritivas a partir de depoimentos, notícias de jornal e dados de pesquisa, busca-se investigar como os fenômenos estudados afetam o funcionamento do accountability vertical e distorcem a competição eleitoral. / This dissertation studies political corruption and slush funds in electoral campaigns in Brazil, assessing their impact in the quality of democracy, specially on the responsiveness of governments to the preferences of the majority of the citizens. Based on descriptive observations from public statements, newspaper articles and existing research data, an attempt is made to investigate how these phenomena affect the proper functioning of vertical accountability and distort electoral competition.

Thesis advisor: Richard, S.J. McGowan / The Natural Resource Curse literature proposes to explain why and to what extent resource-wealthy countries have poor economic growth outcomes. Most research focuses on direct economic explanations, considering the role of governing institutions exogenously if at all. One emerging branch of explanations attempts to address this shortcoming, focusing on the indirect effects of institutional deterioration on economic outcomes in resource-rich countries. I add to this emerging literature by performing an econometric analysis of 16 oil-producing nations, examining the impact of national oil rent dependency on 12 dimensions of government quality from 1987-2008. I find that oil dependency has a significant negative impact on government quality in 11 of the 12 dimensions. I also find that controlling for preexisting levels of democracy does not significantly mitigate institutional resource curse effects. This runs counter to findings about economic effects, which tend to disappear when democracy levels are high. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics Honors Program. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Economics.

Thesis advisor: Fabio Ghironi / This dissertation is a collection of three essays which examine issues at the intersection of international economics, political economy, and macroeconomics. A common theme which emerges in the subsequent chapters is a reliance on intuitive models of economies populated by rational agents engaging in both political and economic decisionmaking. Each chapter also presents empirical evidence using aggregate data to highlight new angles on issues related to macroeconomic development policy. Concurrent cross-country political change, such as the recent ``Arab spring" revolutions in the Middle East, the experience of South American military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, and political transition in former Soviet-bloc countries at the end of the Cold War, suggests that global forces impacting multiple countries can serve as a trigger for intrastate conflict. A common conjecture is that economic forces have been a primary impetus for such episodes. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of worldwide commodity price fluctuations in generating political conflict in developing countries. I develop a simple model to show that shocks to both the level and uncertainty of commodity export prices can elicit conflict events in developing countries. Econometric evidence from a dataset combining major intrastate political resistance campaigns and global food commodity price data lends support to this hypothesis. In the second chapter, I examine whether corruption within one country affected by corruption within another. Understanding the interactions between political-economic culture across countries can allow us to better grasp the implications of greater global and regional integration in recent history. Until now, few studies have examined this question in detail due to the difficulty of measuring corruption and paucity of consistent data over an adequate time span. I use a panel dataset of countries in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East over a span of fifteen years to examine how domestic corruption reacts to the culture of corruption in the region in which the country is located. Contrary to the results of past literature, I find evidence that a reduction in regional corruption can actually lead to a worsening of corruption within a country, and vice versa. If in an open economy, regional graft lowers the level of income that a rent-seeking government can tax, a reduction in regional corruption can increase the marginal benefit of imposing a more extractive domestic policy by increasing the pool of exploitable funds. My results offer an economic reason for why corruption will be an enduring institution in a more interconnected world. Finally, are less democratic governments more apt to intervene in the prices of imported goods than exported goods? In the third chapter of this dissertation I offer an explanation for why this might be the case, focusing on a government's choice between two alternative interventionist trade policies: import tariffs and export subsidies. If governments have incentives to exploit their political power to extract rents from citizens, they can achieve this by taxing imports rather than subsidizing exports. However, if citizens are able to discipline their governments through elections, the extent of this rent-seeking behavior can be constrained. I present a model that captures this behavior, distinguishing between the level of electoral accountability of a government and the level of bargaining power that citizens have in negotiations. Preliminary empirical evidence is presented which suggests that more authoritarian countries spend greater amounts on import tariffs than on export subsidies. These findings give insight into some of the challenges in establishing free trade amongst countries with different attitudes toward democratic institutions, both on a bilateral basis and within multilateral organizations. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

O objetivo deste artigo é avaliar se o Programa de Fiscalização de Municípios Pequenos e Médios através de Sorteios Públicos foi eficaz para atingir seu propósito, a redução das irregularidades cometidas pelos municípios na execução dos programas federais sob sua responsabilidade. O artigo se diferencia assim do restante da literatura que procura estabelecer uma relação entre as irregularidades (corrupção e má gestão) encontradas a partir da avaliação dos relatórios das auditorias e alguma variável de interesse. Para atingir este objetivo são usadas duas alternativas. A primeira compara os municípios que foram afetados pelo Programa (grupo de tratamento) e os municípios que não foram afetados pelo Programa (grupo de controle), antes e depois da adoção do Programa em 2003. A segunda compara os municípios que foram sorteados mais de uma vez, a fim de verificar se houve mudança de comportamento entre uma fiscalização e outra. A evidência empírica obtida indica que a fiscalização não exerceu impacto significativo. Esse resultado pode ser atribuído ao aumento inexpressivo na probabilidade de ser pego trazido pelo Programa (na maioria dos casosinferior a 3% ) e também decrescente devido à redução no número de sorteios realizados. / The purpose of this paper is to evaluate if Programa de Fiscalização de Municípios Pequenos e Médios através de Sorteios Públicos reached its goal, the reduction on the number of irregularities made by municipalitis in the execution of federal programmes under their responsibility. The article therefore departs from the rest of the literature that intends to establish a relationship between the irregularities (corruption and mismanagement) described by the audit reports and some variables of interest. In order to reach these goals two alternatives are used. The first one compares muncipalities affected by the Program (treatment group) with municipaliteis not affected by the Program (control group), before and after the adoption of the Program in 2003. The second one compares the municipalities that were audited twice, in order to verify if there was a change in their behavior in the meantime. The empirical evidence suggests that the audit program had no significant impact. This result can be explained by the low probability of being caught brought by the Program (in most cases less than 3% ) and also declining given the reduction in the number of lotteries made.