This dissertation interprets Brecht's Mutter Courage through its protagonist. Most interpreters have derived Courage's meaning from only one term of the contradiction of merchant and mother that constitutes her, either blaming the inhuman, war-mongering merchant for her participation in war, or defending the vital, productive, and nurturing mother for that same (unavoidable) participation. Some have stressed instead the unity formed by Courage's contradiction, without being able to elucidate its meaning. The present interpretation, proceeding from a clue given in scene 7 to the meaning of the text, draws parallels between the drama and Brecht's view of the world, and shows that the world of Mutter Courage is the symbolic representation of capitalism as Brecht knew it during the rise of fascism and the approach of the Second World War. Courage is then shown to be a concentrated form of this symbolic representation; indeed, she turns out to be a representation of capitalism in its "totality". This representation is inseparable from the invocation, through Courage, of the Great Mother archetype. The Great Mother describes a contradictory capitalism that is both a Good Mother in its promising productivity, and a Terrible Mother in its destructive warring and oppression; but she, as the symbol of Nature, also describes a capitalism that had begun to seem even to Brecht like a second Nature. Courage also represents the totality of capitalism (as the Marxist Brecht saw it) by embodying both its "affirmative" aspect (as a merchant who engenders soldiering sons), and (undermining the archetype of the Great Mother) its "critical" aspect as the representation of the resistance of the oppressed to their warring world (as the outlaw who engenders a daughter who rebels against war). The meaning of the drama, then, is the story of Courage as the incarnation of the dialectic of capitalism, a dark tale whose conditions seem eternal, but which contains the promise of something bet

This thesis contends that Sappho's Fr. 16 is intended to oppose the definition of the term Καλόѵ in Tyrtaeus' elegies 10 and 12. An analysis of Tyrtaeus 10 reveals the poet's attempt to institute a new civic courage in Sparta, one shaped by an understanding of honor and shame centered around the young man's willingness to fight and, if necessary, die in battle. Remarkably, the successful practitioner of this courage will literally come to sight differently in the eyes of his fellow citizens. In Tyrtaeus 12, this courage is more clearly defined as τò Καλλɪσɪoѵ, the focus of a new system of virtue that ranks the good of the common above all else, but that provides as much recompense for the warrior and his family as advantage for the city. Sappho's response in her Fr. 16 is to reject any understanding of the Καλόѵ that relies on convention, replacing it with the personal predilections of each individual. As she demonstrates, however, this view contains severe limitations and is inherently destructive of the city. The “debate,” conducted by both poets partly through Homeric allusions, continues the opposition between public and private begun in Homer.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 173-181). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2001. / "Doxa" and "parrhēsia" appear in Greek letters on t.p. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 77-84).

Do conjunto dos chamados primeiros diálogos de Platão, o Protágoras destaca-se como a obra em que é apresentada mais sistematicamente a doutrina conhecida como intelectualismo ético. Grosso modo, trata-se de compreender os temas éticos, como as virtudes ou excelências morais (justiça, piedade, sabedoria, temperança e coragem), exclusivamente como resultado de um processo cognitivo; em outros termos, trata-se de afirmar que os assuntos éticos para uma correta apreciação exigem a consideração de um tipo de conhecimento, que, sob esse diapasão, mostrar-se-á como o conhecimento do bem. O final do Protágoras apresenta esse ponto com clareza. Ali, as virtudes discutidas ao longo do diálogo são, a rigor, uma só coisa, a saber, conhecimento. A doutrina ética intelectualista conduz a consequências que não deixaram de ser exploradas por Platão nos primeiros diálogos, notadamente no Protágoras. Primeiramente, reduz-se com isso a multiplicidade das manifestações da excelência humana à posse de um conhecimento, problema que deixará sua herança à literatura antiga e que chega aos estudos eruditos contemporâneos como a questão da unidade das virtudes; em segundo lugar, o papel destacado do conhecimento na compreensão da vida ética requer a compreensão da relação deste com outros elementos fundamentais e reconhecidos, igualmente decisivos para a alma humana e para determinação das ações, como os apetites e as paixões. Este último ponto surge devido à constatação abundante nos diálogos da primeira fase de Platão, corroborada exemplarmente pelo Protágoras, de que o conhecimento é condição não apenas necessária, mas também suficiente para a obtenção e o exercício das virtudes, de modo que nenhum elemento extracognitivo (como o são paixões e apetites) é capaz de desviar a rota de ação indicada pelo conhecimento. Sendo o conhecimento do bem que caracteriza a virtude, hegemônico quando presente na alma humana, qual papel, portanto, seria reservado para paixões e apetites na ética dos primeiros diálogos? Uma doutrina que articula esses dois pontos é avançada no Protágoras, sendo este o diálogo que sistematiza e aprofunda as teorias socráticas presentes nos demais diálogos do conjunto. Nesse sentido, proponho um exame da relação entre virtude e conhecimento no Protágoras, dividido em duas partes: a primeira parte lidando mais diretamente com o problema da unidade das virtudes, enquanto a segunda investigará o sentido do intelectualismo ético segundo a relação entre conhecimento e elementos não cognitivos, parte na qual o exame de uma virtude particular receberá destaque: a coragem. / Among Platos first dialogues, the Protagoras stands out as the work in which the so called ethical intellectualism is exposed in the most systematic manner. Roughly, in ethical intellectualism, ethical themes such as virtues or moral excellences (justice, piety, wisdom, temperance and courage) are defined exclusively as the result of a cognitive process; in other terms, for ethical matters to be correctly understood, a certain knowledge must be considered; in this case, knowledge of the good. This point is made clear at the end of the Protagoras: all virtues discussed throughout the dialogue are strictly one thing, namely knowledge. The consequences of the intellectualist ethical doctrine were also explored by Plato in his first dialogues, especially in the Protagoras. First, the multiplicity of different manifestations of human excellence are thus reduced to the possession of a knowledge, a problem that was thoroughly explored in ancient literature and resulted, contemporarily, in the question of the unity of virtue. Secondly, the central role of knowledge in the comprehension of the ethical life requires the comprehension of the relation between knowledge and other admittedly fundamental aspects such as appetites and passions that are decisive to the human soul and crucial to determine ones actions. This latter point arises from the abundant observation in Platos first dialogues, especially in the Protagoras, that knowledge is not only a necessary condition but also a sufficient condition to obtain and exercise virtue in such a way that no extracognitive element (such as passions and appetites) is able to interfere in the path of action indicated by knowledge. If knowledge of the good is what defines virtue and if it is hegemonic when present in the human soul, what role is left to passions and appetites in the ethics of the first dialogues? These two points are articulated in the doctrine that is exposed in the Protagoras, a dialogue that deepens and systematizes Socrates theories discussed in the other dialogues from this period. Therefore, I intend to examine the relation between virtue and knowledge in the Protagoras. This work is divided in two parts: in the first, I deal with the problem of the unity of virtues; in the second part, I investigate the meaning of ethical intellectualism in view of the relation between knowledge and non-cognitive elements, and one particular virtue shall be examined: courage.

My study investigated the effects of abusive supervision on work and family outcomes including supervisor-directed and organization-directed deviance and spousal undermining. Using a moderated-mediation model, the relationship of abusive supervision on outcome variables was proposed to be mediated by moral courage and moderated by leader-member exchange (a-path) and work and family role quality (b-path). Two separate studies were conducted using a sample (N=200) recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and through relatives of students at a large US public southeastern university (N=150 dyads). Results confirm the effects of abusive supervision on work and family outcomes while analyses of contextual and conditional factors are mixed. Confirmatory factor analyses, factor loadings, and model fit statistics are provided and implications for research and practice are discussed.

Då det verkar finnas begränsat med forskning kring människors upplevelse av ”att följa sitt hjärta”, samt hinder och förutsättningar för det, syftade denna studie till att hitta de gemensamma dragen för detta fenomen. En kvalitativ metod med induktiv ansats användes för att studera respondenternas livsvärld. Åtta djupintervjuer och två skriftliga intervjuer genomfördes med fem män och fem kvinnor. Analysen resulterade i sex centrala komponenter, fenomenets essens. En individ som följer sitt hjärta är (1) närvarande i nuet och (2) har modet att våga och då (3) känns det rätt. Om den låter sig hindras av (4) stress och sina (5) rädslor (6) mår den dåligt. En förhoppning är att resultatet skulle kunna leda till ett mentalt uppvaknande samt bidra till ett ökat psykiskt välbefinnande i samhället.

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I argue that Aristotle aids in understanding the tension between the political art and moral virtue through his examination of courage in The Nicomachean Ethics. The end of the political art is to habituate the city and citizens towards "the good." Aristotle examines five held opinions of non-courage, requiring that we reflect on our own vices. I describe how Aristotle prepares his readers for the task of examining the political art. I then view courage found in the citizen and spiritedness as an example of two common opinions where individuals are inclined towards pleasure, as opposed to being inclined to the noble. To conclude, I show that Aristotle provides opinions of non-courage to emphasize how institutions are, and must remain, a foundational part of society.