Credit rating agencies judge the creditworthiness of the debtors and debt obligations and the relative probability of their default. Credit rating plays a very important role in the financial markets. It influences the behavior of all participants (investors, debtors and regulators) of the market transactions. The first part of the thesis deals with definition and function of the credit rating. The main controversial points in the activity of the credit rating agencies will be discussed, as well as how the industry is regulated. In the second part it is claimed that the opinions of the credit rating agencies on sovereign bonds (sovereign rating) contribute to the overheating of the economies or to the deeper recession due to procyclicity of the rating. The actual credit rating of the country will be compared with a rating based on a theoretical model designed with publicly available economic data.

This thesis consists of four independent chapters on bank capital regulation and the issue of unsolicited ratings.<p> The first chapter is introductory and reviews the motivation for regulating banks and credit rating agencies while providing a detailed overview of the thesis.<p> The second chapter uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze how banks from six G10 countries adjusted their capital to assets ratios and risk-weighted assets to assets ratio between 1988 and 1995, i.e., just after passage of the 1988 Basel Accord. The results suggest that regulatory pressure brought about by the 1988 capital standards had little effect on both ratios for weakly capitalized banks, except in the US. In addition, the relation between the capital to assets ratios and the risk-weighted assets to assets ratio appears to depend not only on the level of capitalization of banks, but also on the countries or groups of countries considered.<p> The third chapter provides Monte Carlo estimates of the amount of regulatory capital that EMU banks must hold for their corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures both under Basel I and the standardized approach to credit risk in Basel II. In the latter case, Monte Carlo estimates are presented for different combinations of external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) that banks may choose to risk weight their exposures. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, although the use of different ECAIs leads to significant differences in minimum capital requirements, these differences never exceed, on average, 10% of EMU banks’ capital requirements for corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures. Second, the standardized approach to credit risk provides a small regulatory capital incentive for banks to use several ECAIs to risk weight their exposures. Third, the minimum capital requirements for the corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures of EMU banks will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I. I also show that the incentive for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the standardized approach to credit risk is limited.<p> The fourth and final chapter analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the rating outcome of banks. Using a sample of Asian banks rated by Fitch Ratings, I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observed bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information. As a result, they tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information.

Il rating creditizio è un elemento molto importante per le imprese in quanto ha impatto, ad esempio, sul costo del capitale (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Campbell and Taksler, 2003), sul prezzo delle azioni e dei titoli obbligazionari (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Hand et al., 1992). Anche le imprese che ottengono il rating per la prima volta, tipicamente soggetti di dimensioni più piccole e con una storia più recente, hanno molto interesse per il rating. Nel principale contributo della mia tesi (“Is Indebtedness always negative for Credit Ratings? Empirical evidence on Newly Rated Firms”), misuro empiricamente, per il periodo dal 1985 al 2013, se i soggetti che hanno ottenuto un rating per la prima volta ottengono una valutazione differente rispetto agli altri operatori. Dalle mie analisi emerge che i soggetti che hanno ottenuto un rating per la prima volta ottengono valutazioni lievemente più negative rispetto agli altri operatori ma, sorprendentemente, emerge che coloro che hanno un maggiore indebitamento hanno delle valutazioni migliori. Negli altri due articoli della mia tesi sviluppo ulteriori analisi sui rating. Nel primo articolo (“Credit Rating Agencies: a Review of Recent Academic Studies and Key Practical Implications”), presento una sistematizzazione della letteratura accademica sui rating e sulle agenzie di rating. Nel secondo articolo (“The Dynamics of Credit Rating Standards”), esamino se le agenzie di rating hanno modificato i propri standards nel corso del tempo. / Firms care deeply about their credit ratings, since ratings influence, for instance, firm’s cost of capital (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Campbell and Taksler, 2003), bond and stock market prices (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Hand et al., 1992). This is also true for newly rated firms, typically smaller, in a younger stage of their life cycle and with a shorter track record compared with other issuers to show to the external financial stakeholders. In the main paper of my thesis (“Is Indebtedness always negative for Credit Ratings? Empirical evidence on Newly Rated Firms”), I test the impact of being newly rated firms on credit ratings over the period from 1985 to 2013. I report a negative but pretty low effect on rating outcome for the entire sample of newly rated firms but, surprisingly, I find a strong positive relation between highly levered firms and credit rating. I develop additional research on credit rating in the other two papers of my thesis. In the first paper (“Credit Rating Agencies: a Review of Recent Academic Studies and Key Practical Implications”), I present a systematization of the latest academic contributions on credit ratings and credit rating agencies. In the second paper (“The Dynamics of Credit Rating Standards”), I examine long-term issuer credit ratings and I focus on the time variable to study how credit rating agencies have modified their standards over years.

信用評等機構對於企業與市場投資者而言有著重要且無可取代的功能，其所提供之信用評等資訊應當是許多市場投資者所仰賴的重要決策依據，但近年來，卻有許多外界聲浪質疑信評機構評等之準確性，本論文之研究目的即是希望從錨定效應此一行為偏誤之觀點切入，探討國內信評機構在對企業評等時，是否會受到錨定效應影響，導致評等調整不正確或是評等落後其他財務指標等現象發生。 研究結果顯示，國內信評機構對受評企業之過往財務資訊存在錨定現象，但不至於大幅影響整體違約風險之準確性，且信評機構對受評企業財務之惡化較為敏感。另一方面，本研究也發現，信評機構對於非上市櫃公司、金融業以及初次評等等級在「twAA」以上企業之評等，存在較為明顯之錨定現象。 / Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) play a major role in the financial market. Credit rating purport to provide investors with valuable information they need to make decisions about investing, but the accuracy of the rating itself has been called into question by many investors in recent years. The purpose of this study is to examine the anchoring effect on CRAs while the rating is being given. The results indicate that domestic CRAs tend to be anchored on the past financial information of the issuers. But the impacts are very slightly. Besides this, CRAs seem relatively sensitive to the financial deterioration. Moreover, the anchoring effect are much more significant when the debt issuers are private firms, financial institutions or the companies with greater or equal to twAA initial credit rating.

Orientador: Murilo Gaspardo / Resumo: Este trabalho objetiva investigar como a “colonialidade do poder” do mercado de classificação de risco de crédito limita a soberania brasileira, e a existência ou não de alternativas institucionais que possam contribuir para o enfrentamento desta questão. Para tanto, estuda de que modo as Três Grandes contaram com o domínio econômico e político dos Estados Unidos para se consolidarem no domínio do mercado, e como seus saberes impactam o preço dos ativos no mercado financeiro, configurando suas “autoridades epistêmicas”. Posteriormente, examina de que maneira seus saberes apresentam semelhanças prejudiciais ao Brasil e a outros países subdesenvolvidos em, pelo menos, dois campos: teto e rating soberanos. Dessa forma, analisa como há um enredamento entre domínio econômico-político e epistêmico, característicos da “matriz colonial de poder”, que limita ainda mais a soberania do Brasil e de outros países subdesenvolvidos, além de prejudicar seus “fins” de Estado. Diante desse quadro, pesquisa alternativas institucionais disponíveis ao país para lidar com esse assunto e com outros problemas da ordem econômica atual. / Abstract: This paper aims to investigate how the credit rating market’s “coloniality of power” limits the brazilian sovereignty, and the existence or not of institutional alternatives that might contribute to face this issue. In order to achieve this, it studies how the Big Three counted on the United States’ economic and political domination to consolidate their market’s domination, and how their knowledges impact assets prices on financial market, settling their “epistemic authorities”. Afterwards, it examines how their knowledges present harmful similiarities to Brazil and other developing countries on, at least, two fieds: sovereign ceiling and rating. Thus, it analyzes how there is an entanglement between economic-political and epistemic domination, typical from “colonial matrix of power”, that limits even more the sovereignty of Brazil and other underdeveloped countries, aside from prejudicing its State’s “ends”. Before this framework, it searches for available institutional alternatives for Brazil to cope with this issue and other problems of the current economic order. / Mestre

Diese kumulative Dissertation besteht aus drei Abschnitten.                                 I. Geopolitics, Aid and Growth Wir untersuchen den Effekt kurzfristiger politischer Motive auf die Effektivität von Entwicklungshilfe. Dabei testen wir, ob der Effekt der Hilfe auf Wirtschaftswachstum reduziert wird durch den Anteil der Jahre während der Hilfsvergabe, die ein Land temporäres Mitglied des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen war. Diese Mitgliedschaft sorgt für eine quasi zufällige Variation in der Höhe der vergebenen Hilfsgelder. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen Hilfe und Wachstum schwächer und niedriger ist für Hilfe, die während der temporären Mitgliedschaft vergeben wurde. Unsere zwei Schlussfolgerungen sind: Erstens, der Einfluss politischer Motive untergräbt die Effektivität der vergebenen Hilfsgelder. Zweitens, Variablen die politisches Interesse widerspiegeln sind ungeeignet als ökonometrische Instrumente für Entwicklungshilfe. Dies weckt Zweifel an einer großen Anzahl existierender Forschungsergebnisse. II. Is there a Home Bias in Sovereign Ratings? Kreditratingagenturen werden oftmals für angeblich verzerrte Länderratings kritisiert. Dieser Abschnitt diskutiert, wie das Heimatland einer Ratingagentur deren Ratingentscheidungen aufgrund polit-ökonomischer Einflüsse und kultureller Unterschiede beeinflussen kann. Mithilfe von Daten über neun Agenturen aus sechs unterschiedlichen Ländern testen wir, ob die Agenturen bessere Ratings an ihr Heimatland oder mit ihnen ökonomisch, politisch oder kulturell verbundene Länder vergeben. Unsere Ergebnisse liefern Belege für die Existenz einer Verzerrung zugunsten des jeweiligen Heimatlandes, kulturell ähnlicher Länder, und von Ländern, in denen die Banken des Heimatlandes größeren Risiken ausgesetzt sind. Dabei scheint die linguistische Ähnlichkeit der Sprache die Haupterklärung für den gemessenen Vorteil des Heimatlandes zu sein. III. Crime, Incentives and Political Effort: A Model and Empirical Application for India Der große Anteil an Politikern, gegen welche kriminelle Vorwürfe erhoben werden, hat eine öffentliche Debatte und eine Literatur über dessen Gründe und Auswirkungen ausgelöst. Um die Auswirkungen von Kriminalität abzuschätzen, entwickeln wir ein Modell über die Anreize, welchen Abgeordnete ausgesetzt sind wenn sie entscheiden ob sie sich für ihren Wahlkreis engagieren sollen. Wir nutzen drei direkte und gut messbare Maße für das Engagement der Abgeordneten in der vierzehnten Lok Sabha während der Legislaturperiode von 2004-2009: Anwesenheitsquoten, Aktivität im Parlament und die Nutzungsrate eine Fonds für lokale Entwicklungsprojekte. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe dass kriminelle Abgeordnete im Schnitt ungefähr 5% niedrigere Anwesenheitsquoten haben, und niedrige Nutzungsraten des Fonds, aber sich nicht bezüglich der Aktivität im Parlament unterscheiden. Diese Unterschiede hängen vom ökonomischen Entwicklungsstand des Wahlkreises, einem Proxy für Möglichkeiten illegale Renten zu extrahieren und für die Intensität der Überwachung des Abgeordneten durch die Wähler, sowie von der Definition von Kriminalität ab. Wir nutzen beobachtbare Kontrollvariablen, Matchingtechniken und „Treatment Effect“ Regressionen, um zu zeigen, warum diese negativen Koeffizienten eine Obergrenze für den tatsächlich wohl noch größeren negativen Zusammenhang darstellen. Darüber hinaus analysieren wir, warum es unwahrscheinlich ist, dass Selektionsprobleme aufgrund unbeobachtbarer Einflussfaktoren unsere Ergebnisse vollständig erklären können.

This master thesis is based on analyses of the Cypriot banking sector from 2010 to 2016. The aim is to describe the effects of the recent financial crisis in Cyprus to locally operating banks, to assess the assistance provided to Cypriot banks and especially to analyze the development of systemically important Cypriot banking institutions, namely the Bank of Cyprus Group, Cooperative Central Bank, Hellenic Bank and RCB Bank Ltd with emphasis on the most important banking institution in Cyprus. The work draws mainly from published financial results of the systemic banks and from the Central Bank of Cyprus representing the consolidated banking sector. Furthermore, for the purpose of this study was used the Eurostat database, EBA and the IMF periodicals, along with the websites of the credit rating agencies.

This thesis deals with the action and impact of the credit rating agencies in the capital markets during the financial crisis. The work is divided into two parts; the first part stresses the importance of a proper understanding of the rating, its characteristics, functions, users and the rating process. The emphasis is put on the market analysis of ratings and rating agencies in the U.S. and European market. The second part of this work is devoted to examining the issue of rating agencies during the crisis, which contributed to the spread of the financial crisis, criticism relevant issues and regulatory arrangements.

Cette thèse s’intéresse à la comptabilisation de la dette publique sous trois angles distincts et complémentaires. Tout d’abord, nous étudions les normes de comptabilité des retraites publiques. Nous développons une grille théorique d’analyse comparée et diachronique s’appuyant sur un examen des pratiques existantes. Notre analyse met en évidence que les dispositifs existant en Europe sont incompatibles avec le modèle d’épargne individuelle tel que promu par la norme IPSAS 25. Ensuite, nous analysons la relation entre comptabilité de la dette et milieu politique, et en particulier l’hypothèse d’une sous-estimation de la dette en période d’élection. Notre analyse des révisions comptables permet de valider cette hypothèse et indique que les pays en développement sont les plus affectés par cette sous-estimation. Enfin, nous analysons l’impact du caractère sollicité ou non d'une notation sur celle-ci, ainsi que sur l’évaluation de la dette publique par les agences de notation. Notre analyse de Moody’s, Fitch, et S&P indique que les agences favorisent les pays qui sollicitent leur notation par rapport à ceux qui ne la sollicitent pas. / This thesis deals with the accounting of public debt from three distinct and complementary analytical perspectives. First, we study the accounting standards for retirement obligations. We develop a theoretical evaluation grid using a comparative and diachronic analysis based on the review of existing practices. Our analysis highlights that the existing pension schemes in Europe are incompatible with the individual savings model as promoted by the IPSAS 25 norm. Second, we analyze the relationship between debt accounting and the political environment, and test the hypothesis of an underestimation of debt levels around elections. Results allow us to validate our hypothesis and indicate that developing countries are most affected by this underestimation. Third, we examine the impact of the solicitation status of a sovereign rating on the rating itself and on the public debt level assigned by rating agencies. Focusing on Moody’s, Fitch, and S&P, our findings indicate that agencies favor countries soliciting their rating comparing to those who do not solicit them.

The thesis focuses on the role of rating agencies in the financial crisis. The aim of the thesis is to judge a rate how much rating agencies contributed to give rise to last financial crisis, began by fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008. A main question is whether rating agencies acted inadvertently or on purpose and which all factors contributed most to result in financial crisis and as well how the rating agencies could influence and cope with these factors. The thesis deals with regulation of rating agencies and their appropriateness too. Rating and its aspects in theoretical way are described in the first part of the work. The real situation of rating industry prior to and in financial crisis is described in the second practical part of the thesis.