A tese procura relacionar os conceitos de critica e autonomia na filosofia de Immanuel Kant por meio do seguinte recorte: a noção de forma legislativa, analisada à luz dos juízos determinante e reflexionante, permite vislumbrar um caráter positivo para a critica, para além do costumeiro caráter negativo a ela sempre atrelado. Com isso, é a própria idéia de autonomia que, extrapolando o seu \"lugar de origem\" na arquitetônica da razão, passa a ser a chave de interpretação de tal caráter positivo. Para isso, é necessário a este trabalho três passos argumentativos: analisar, em primeiro lugar, o próprio conceito kantiano de filosofia a partir da relação entre os conceitos acadêmico e mundano, definidos por Kant na Lógica. Em segundo lugar, trata-se de analisar uma possível vinculação entre o conceito de finalidade e as relações entre forma e reflexão, inerentes a possíveis representações da natureza. Por fim, através dos conceitos de fundamentação e aplicação, procura-se redimensionar o conceito de autonomia que se encontra na Critica da razão pratica. / This work aims to establish a relationship between the concepts of critique and autonomy in Immanuel Kant\'s philosophy, through the notion of legislative form. In regard to determining and reflecting judgments, that notion makes it possible to notice a positive aspect of the critique, going beyond the usually recognized negative aspect. Therewith, it is the idea of autonomy that, beyond its \"original place\" in the architectonic of reason, becomes the interpretive key to such a positive aspect. In order to show it, this work is divided into three steps: firstly, it must analyse Kant\'s concept of philosophy having in view the relationship between the academic and the wordly concepts of philosophy as defined by Kant in his Logic. Secondly, it must discuss a possible bond between the concept of finality and those of form and reflection which are inherent to possible representations of nature. Thirdly, it must, through the concepts of foundation and application, reconsider the concept of autonomy from the Critique of practical reason.

Depuis les dernières décenies, la critique théâtrale perd de la place dans les médias traditionnels, remplacée par des rubriques et agendas de services qui priorisent, surtout, les aspects comerciaux. Pendant ce temps, le théâtre a subit des extraordinaires transformations et les propositions céniques ont abrité à part le texte, beaucoup d'autres éléments céniques, plutôt visuels, ce qui difficulte et exige l'approfondissement de son analyse. L'apparition de l'internet a permis la propagation d'une grande quantité d'opinions sur le faire artistique théâtral. Chaque jour, des nouveaux blogs et sites se mélangent à la manière comme les gens produisent et recherchent des renseignements culturels et, puisque les moyens virtuels ne présentent ni censure ni les mêmes restrictions de ceux de la presse, les possibilités de dialogue s'élargissent. Cette recherche vérifie de quelle manière les tecnologies les plus récentes interfèrent dans l'élaboration de critiques, identifie les espaces qui leur sont destinées et investigue les opinions des profissionnels de théâtre et de tecnologie de l' information au Brésil, aussi bien que des critiques sur son extention et instantanété dans le web. / Nas últimas décadas, a crítica teatral perdeu espaço nos meios tradicionais de comunicação, substituída por colunas de serviços ou meras indicações de roteiro que priorizam, sobretudo, os aspectos comerciais. Neste mesmo período, o teatro sofreu extraordinárias transformações e as propostas cênicas passaram a abrigar além do texto, muitos outros elementos cênicos, com reforço da visualidade, dificultando e tornando necessário o adensamento de sua análise. O surgimento da internet permitiu a propagação de uma grande quantidade de opiniões sobre o fazer artístico teatral. A cada dia, novos blogs e sites se misturam a maneira como as pessoas produzem e pesquisam informações culturais e, visto que os meios virtuais não apresentam nem a censura, nem as mesmas restrições da imprensa, dilatam, assim, as possibilidades de diálogo. Esta pesquisa verifica de que forma as recentes tecnologias interferem na elaboração de críticas, identifica os espaços a estas destinados no Brasil e investiga as opiniões dos profissionais de teatro e de tecnologia da informação, bem como dos críticos, sobre sua abrangência e instantaneidade na web.

O presente trabalho é uma investigação histórica, genética e sistemática sobre as metáforas jurídicas da Crítica da Razão Pura, contidas, implicita ou explicitamente, na imagem do tribunal da crítica como tribunal da razão. O objetivo de fundo é analisar como a terminologia jurídica e a jurisprudência influíram na estrutura metodológica da Crítica da Razão Pura e em seu surgimento no desenrolar da tradição filosófica da modernidade e, de forma mais específica, no desenvolvimento do pensamento do próprio Kant. De modo a investigar como as múltiplas metáforas jurídicas da Crítica da Razão Pura apontam, todas, para uma origem metodológica jurídica do criticismo, o presente trabalho divide-se em três grandes partes, cada uma delas abordando um dos três aspectos interpretativos mencionados, a saber, o histórico, o genético e o sistemático. Na primeira parte é apresentada a história das fontes e dos conceitos determinantes para a compreensão jurídica da Crítica, a saber, a ideia de um tribunal e legislação da razão e os conceitos jurídicos de dedução e de antinomia. Na segunda parte é esboçada uma reconstrução da história de surgimento da filosofia crítica cujo objetivo é ressaltar a gênese de alguns motivos críticos que dizem diretamente respeito à constituição jurídica da Crítica e se ligam à preocupação metodológica nela envolvida, a saber, a representação de um juiz que julga imparcialmente sobre as pretensões de conhecimento e a ideia de uma nomotética da razão pura. Na terceira e última parte do trabalho empreende-se uma análise sistemática da metafórica jurídica da Crítica cujas raízes históricas e genéticas foram reveladas anteriormente. Mediante a interpretação da Disciplina da Razão Pura, da dedução metafísica e transcendental como procedimento jurídico de justificação de pretensões além da resolução da antinomia como pressuposto para a validade da legislação da razão, mostra-se como a investigação sistemática das metáforas jurídicas da Crítica da Razão Pura permite compreender a filosofia crítica como a exposição da legislação negativa e ao mesmo tempo positiva da razão. / This thesis provides a historical, genetic and systematic study of the legal metaphors in the Critique of Pure Reason, which are, implicitly or explicitily, contained in the image of the Tribunal of the Critique as the Tribunal of Reason. The main purpose of this work is to examine how legal terminology and jurisprudence influenced the methodological framework of the Critique of Pure Reason. Furthermore, this study seeks to address how these elements played a role in the emergence of the Critique in the course of the philosophical tradition of modernity and, more specifically, in the development of Kants thought. In order to investigate how the legal metaphors in the Critique of Pure Reason indicate a legal methodological origin of criticism, this work is divided into three parts. Each one of these parts addresses one of the three interpretative aspects mentioned above, namely, the historical, genetic and systematic. The first part deals with a history of the sources and of the concepts which underlie the legal understanding of criticism, namely, the idea of a tribunal and legislation of reason as well as the legal concepts of deduction and antinomy. The second part reconstructs the emergence of the critical philosophy. In this part, the goal is to highlight the genesis of some critical motives which have a bearing on the legal constitution of the Critique and express its methodological concern. More specifically, it addresses both the representation of a judge which reaches an impartial verdict on the pretensions of knowledge and the idea of a nomothetic of pure reason. The third and final part of the work undertakes a systematic analysis of the legal metaphors in the Critique relying on the historical and genetic roots described in the previous parts. It provides an interpretation of the Discipline of Pure Reason as the methodological core of the Critique, of the metaphysical and transcendental deduction as a legal procedure and of the resolution of the antinomy as a precondition for the validity of the legislation of reason. By doing so, this part shows how the systematic investigation of the legal metaphors of the Critique of Pure Reason allows for the understanding of the critical philosophy as the exposition of the negative and positive legislation of reason.

Discussion of the artist statement and critique.

This thesis is a study of outdoor education, in the deliberative tradition of curriculum inquiry. It examines the intentional generation and distribution of knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes through organised outdoor activities, both as a research interest, and as a critical perspective on outdoor education discourse. Eight separate but interrelated research projects, originally published in 11 refereed journal articles, develop and defend the thesis statement: The problem of determining what, if any, forms of outdoor experience should be educational priorities, and how those experiences should be distributed in communities and geographically – that is who goes where and does what – is inherently situational. The persistence of a universalist outdoor education discourse that fails to acknowledge or adequately account for social and geographic circumstances points to serious flaws in outdoor education research and theory, and impedes the development of more defensible outdoor education practices. The introduction explains how the eight projects cohere, and illustrates how they may be linked using the example of militaristic thinking in outdoor safety standards. Chapters 1 and 2 defend and elaborate a situationist approach to outdoor education, using the examples of outdoor education in Victoria (Australia), and universalist approaches to outdoor education in textbooks respectively. Chapters 3 and 4 expand on some epistemological implications of the thesis and examine, respectively, the cultural dimensions of outdoor experience, and the epistemology and ontology of local natural history. Chapters 5 and 6 apply a situationist epistemology to personal development based outdoor education. Traditions of outdoor education that draw on person-centred rather than situation-sensitive theories of behaviour are examined and critiqued. Alternatives to person-centred theories of outdoor education are discussed. Chapters 7 and 8 use situationist outdoor education to provide a critical reading of nature-based tourism. Chapters 9, 10, and 11 return to the theme of safety in the introduction and Chapter 1, and examine the safety implications of a situationist epistemology. Closing comments briefly draw together the conclusions of all of the chapters, and offer some directions for future outdoor education research.

Corydon est un essai dans lequel André Gide soutient une nouvelle théorie de l'amour"pédérastique normal". Il y défend sa position tout en esquissant son identité, et en s'efforçantde faire reconnaître celle-ci à travers son oeuvre. Il répond ainsi à l'inquiétude de toute sagénération, ou au moins d'une élite de cette génération. Gide le dit : Corydon est un livre parlequel il veut " gêner ".La thèse suit les transformations de la réception de Corydon depuis sa publication et étudie lesdifférentes étapes de la lecture de cette oeuvre. À la parution de Corydon en 1924 les critiquesfurent très violentes et portèrent dans la plupart des cas sur l'aspect moral du livre.Les amis de Gide avaient essayé de le dissuader de publier Corydon. Mais malgré leurstentatives Gide n'y renonça pas. Pourtant, il ne laissa paraître Corydon qu'en 1924, après deuxpublications clandestines et anonymes en 1911 et en 1920. Il expliqua ensuite ce délai enécrivant qu'il craignait de "contrister" sa femme. Gide comptait sur l'Amérique pour faire sortir Corydon de dessous "le boisseau" où il était maintenu en France. Et c'est justement des États-Unis qu'il recevra la première propositionde publier Corydon, précisément le 8 novembre 1924. Mais l'édition américaine ne paraîtraqu'en 1949. Les prises de positions vont varier selon les époques et selon les changements des moeurs quiles accompagnent. Certains critiquent le ton militant de Gide, d'autres encore lui reprochent lastructure dialogique du texte qui lui permettait de se cacher derrière Corydon et son médecinau lieu de prendre la parole en son nom. On trouve aussi des critiques qui défendent Corydonsoit par tolérance à l'égard de l'homosexualité, soit parce qu'ils apprécient le livre du point devue humain et de la défense des droits universels de citoyenneté des homosexuels. D'autresvalorisent l'audace et admirent le courage de Gide de s'engager à titre personnel. En suivant l'évolution de la réception de Corydon, nous constaterons donc qu'il est impossible pour les critiques de séparer l'aspect littéraire de l'aspect moral de l'oeuvre. Mais au fil des années, les critiques vont évoluer, parallèlement aux transformations éthiques etpolitiques de la société, puis en relation avec le développement des études gays et lesbiennes et des théories queer. Ces critiques vont s'arrêter de plus en plus sur l'aspect littéraire du livrede Gide. Les questions relatives au genre et à l'homosexualité vont y être mises en reliefcomme thème littéraire, et seront aussi invoquées comme le motif de nécessairestransformations stylistiques. Il y a une relation réciproque entre l'évolution des cultural studies et l'évolution des critiquesde Corydon. Se développent des formes d'écriture subjectives, qui parlent de questionsspécifiques. Les apparitions multiples de personnages homosexuels dans la littérature vontouvrir la question de l'existence d'une littérature homosexuelle, gay ou lesbienne. De leurcôté les réflexions sur le thème du mariage homosexuel amèneront nécessairement à repenserla relation nature-culture que Gide envisage dans Corydon. À son époque Gide est l'écrivain qui fait entendre la mise en cause de la famille, devançantainsi les théories plus récentes des Gender studies. " Familles, je vous hais ! Foyers clos ;portes refermées ; possessions jalouses du bonheur.1 " À travers Corydon, Gide veutcombattre les préjugés, le mensonge et faire reconnaître en chacun la particularité la plusauthentique de sa nature. Il écrit à ce propos : " J'estime que mieux vaut encore être haï pource que l'on est, qu'aimé pour ce que l'on n'est pas. Ce dont j'ai le plus souffert durant ma vie,je crois bien que c'est le mensonge. Libre à certains de me blâmer si je n'ai pas su m'ycomplaire et en profiter. Certainement j'y eusse trouvé de confortables avantages. Je n'enveux point."

The purpose of this thesis is to trace Marx&rsquo / s critique of Hegel from the beginning to the end and to draw attention to his continuous dialogue with Hegel, which results in Marx&rsquo / s appropriation of Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic in all its aspects. To this aim, we will focus on the texts in which Marx criticizes Hegel and try to understand how he develops his position against Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy. Marx has always become in a critical relationship with Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy and considered it as a philosophy which must be transcended since it, for Marx, amounts to justify the present reality which, in Marx&rsquo / s eyes, constitutes a great barrier for human freedom. However, Marx also regards Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy, in which dialectic occupies a central place, as one which includes the most developed conception of science and the true scientific method, and attempts to use Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic in his critique of political economy. In this thesis, by following Marx&rsquo / s critique of Hegel, we will try to show that Marx comes closer to Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic even when he criticizes Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy.

The purpose of this thesis is to trace Marx&rsquo / s critique of Hegel from the beginning to the end and to draw attention to his continuous dialogue with Hegel, which results in Marx&rsquo / s appropriation of Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic in all its aspects. To this aim, we will focus on the texts in which Marx criticizes Hegel and try to understand how he develops his position against Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy. Marx has always become in a critical relationship with Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy and considered it as a philosophy which must be transcended since it, for Marx, amounts to justify the present reality which, in Marx&rsquo / s eyes, constitutes a great barrier for human freedom. However, Marx also regards Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy, in which dialectic occupies a central place, as one which includes the most developed conception of science and the true scientific method, and attempts to use Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic in his critique of political economy. In this thesis, by following Marx&rsquo / s critique of Hegel, we will try to show that Marx comes closer to Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic even when he criticizes Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy.

Visually, Baldessari’s art mirrors the schoolroom chart, the cinematic storyboard, the Surrealist collage, the sensationalist graphics of the tabloid, and the grid format of the textbook. Black and white photography, performance, collage, bright prints, film, drawing, and painting: Baldessari has done it all. The artist has consistently demonstrated an inventiveness and sense of play in his work, and it is unlikely that he would stick to any one mode of artmaking for an extended period of time. It is probable that the explicit critique of contemporary Conceptualists of the text paintings mellowed because Baldessari had moved on to new questions. While he continues to examine the trope of the artistic outsider despite his commercial success, it is always with a wink. As Baldessari’s use of his own image in Portrait (Self) demonstrates, he has encouraged his audience to interrogate any artistic self-representation as a purposeful construct. Unlike the majority of his fellow Conceptualists, Baldessari’s serious goals are couched in a selfmocking attitude and in the colorful, playful style he has made his own.

Although feminists resist accounts that define women as having certain features that are essential to their being women, feminists are also guilty of giving essentialist definitions. Because women are extremely diverse in their experiences, the essentialist critics question whether a universal (non-essentialist) account of women can be given. I argue that it is possible to formulate a valuable category of woman, despite potential essentialist challenges. Even with diversity among women, women are oppressed as women by patriarchal structures such as rape, pornography, and sexual harassment that regulate women’s sexuality and construct women as beings whose main role is to service men’s sexual needs.