Text in Afrikaans / Die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg word bespreek. Hierdie verweer is van onlangse oorsprong en verskil van die verwere van ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid as gevolg van jeugdigheid en geestesongesteldheid soos in artikel 78(1) van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 uiteengesit word. Die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid dek gevalle waar dit deur faktore soos emosionele spanning veroorsaak is. Hierdie verweer staan ook as die algemene ontoerekeningsvatbaarheidsverweer bekend. In 'n aantal beslissings, soos onder andere, S v Arnold 1985 (3) SA 256 (C); S v Campher 1987 (1) SA 940 (A) en S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A), word die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid wei in die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg bestaansreg het. Ten einde met 'n verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid te slaag, is die blote ipse dixit van die beskuldigde onvoldoende. 'n Behoorlike grondslag vir die verweer moet gele word. Die bewyslas in die geval van 'n verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid word bespreek. / The defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity in the South African criminal law is discussed. It is a relatively new defence and should be distinguished from the defences such as youth and mental illness set out in section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This defence covers cases in which criminal capacity is excluded by factors such as intoxication and emotional stress. It is also known as a general defence of criminal incapacity. In a number of cases, inter alia in S v Arnold 1985(3) SA 256 (C); S v Campher 1987 (1) SA 940 (A) and S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1 097 (A) the conclusion is reached that the defence, non-pathological criminal incapacity, does have a right of existence in the South African criminal law. In order to successfully raise the defence on non-pathological criminal incapacity, the mere ipse dixit of the accused is insufficient. A proper foundation for the defence must be laid. The onus of proof is discussed. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL. M.

Text in Afrikaans / The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 that took effect from 27 April 1994, gave an accused a constitutional right to legal representation. Although the right of an accused to be legally represented formed an integral part of the South African Law, the Constitution gave him the further right ofbeing provided with legal representation at the cost of the State . For the practical implementation ofthe Constitution extensive changes to the current Legal Aid Scheme are essential . This work is an investigation of the justification of an accused's right to legal representation and the right to be provided with legal representation at the expense of the State . The practical implementation of the Constitution is discussed and suggestions are made that might be a solution to the current problem of the provision of legal aid at the State's expense. / Die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 200 van 1993 wat op 27 April 1994 in werking getree het, het konstitusionele erkenning verleen aan 'n beskuldigde se reg op regsverteenwoordiging . Alhoewel die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging inherent deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg was het die Grondwet verder gegaan en 'n beskuldigde die reg gegee om op staatskoste van regsverteenwoordiging voorsien te word . Om die Grondwet prakties uitvoerbaar te maak sal ingrypende veranderings aan die huidige Regshulpskema noodsaaklik wees . Hierdie werk behels 'n regshistoriese - en regsvergelykende studie van die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging en die reg om op staatskoste van regshulp voorsien te word . Die praktiese uitvoerbaarheid van die Grondwet word bespreek en voorstelle word aan die hand gedoen om die huidige situasie, wat betref die verskaffing van regshulp op staatskoste, te verbeter . / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL. M.

Text in Afrikaans / Die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg word bespreek. Hierdie verweer is van onlangse oorsprong en verskil van die verwere van ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid as gevolg van jeugdigheid en geestesongesteldheid soos in artikel 78(1) van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 uiteengesit word. Die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid dek gevalle waar dit deur faktore soos emosionele spanning veroorsaak is. Hierdie verweer staan ook as die algemene ontoerekeningsvatbaarheidsverweer bekend. In 'n aantal beslissings, soos onder andere, S v Arnold 1985 (3) SA 256 (C); S v Campher 1987 (1) SA 940 (A) en S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A), word die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid wei in die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg bestaansreg het. Ten einde met 'n verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid te slaag, is die blote ipse dixit van die beskuldigde onvoldoende. 'n Behoorlike grondslag vir die verweer moet gele word. Die bewyslas in die geval van 'n verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid word bespreek. / The defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity in the South African criminal law is discussed. It is a relatively new defence and should be distinguished from the defences such as youth and mental illness set out in section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This defence covers cases in which criminal capacity is excluded by factors such as intoxication and emotional stress. It is also known as a general defence of criminal incapacity. In a number of cases, inter alia in S v Arnold 1985(3) SA 256 (C); S v Campher 1987 (1) SA 940 (A) and S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1 097 (A) the conclusion is reached that the defence, non-pathological criminal incapacity, does have a right of existence in the South African criminal law. In order to successfully raise the defence on non-pathological criminal incapacity, the mere ipse dixit of the accused is insufficient. A proper foundation for the defence must be laid. The onus of proof is discussed. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. M.

Text in Afrikaans / The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 that took effect from 27 April 1994, gave an accused a constitutional right to legal representation. Although the right of an accused to be legally represented formed an integral part of the South African Law, the Constitution gave him the further right ofbeing provided with legal representation at the cost of the State . For the practical implementation ofthe Constitution extensive changes to the current Legal Aid Scheme are essential . This work is an investigation of the justification of an accused's right to legal representation and the right to be provided with legal representation at the expense of the State . The practical implementation of the Constitution is discussed and suggestions are made that might be a solution to the current problem of the provision of legal aid at the State's expense. / Die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 200 van 1993 wat op 27 April 1994 in werking getree het, het konstitusionele erkenning verleen aan 'n beskuldigde se reg op regsverteenwoordiging . Alhoewel die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging inherent deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg was het die Grondwet verder gegaan en 'n beskuldigde die reg gegee om op staatskoste van regsverteenwoordiging voorsien te word . Om die Grondwet prakties uitvoerbaar te maak sal ingrypende veranderings aan die huidige Regshulpskema noodsaaklik wees . Hierdie werk behels 'n regshistoriese - en regsvergelykende studie van die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging en die reg om op staatskoste van regshulp voorsien te word . Die praktiese uitvoerbaarheid van die Grondwet word bespreek en voorstelle word aan die hand gedoen om die huidige situasie, wat betref die verskaffing van regshulp op staatskoste, te verbeter . / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. M.

A brief analysis of South African Law relating to intoxication as a defence prior to 1988 is given. This is followed by an in-depth discussion and evaluation of the statutory crime created by section 1 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988. Various points of criticism against the wording of section 1 (1) as well as the problems with regard to its application in practice are set out. In conclusion a draft for a new, more effective wording for section 1 (1) is given / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)

Text in Afrikaans / Alhoewel die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika die bestaande reg op regsverteenwoordiging uitgebrei het tot sy logiese eindpunt, is daar geen vaste inhoud aan hierdie reg gegee nie en sal die howe die omvang daarvan moet ontwikkel. Hierdie reg kan weens die heersende sosiale en ekonomiese omstandighede nie 'n absolute reg wees nie. Indien 'n beskuldigde nie 'n regsverteenwoordiger kan bekostig nie, sal een op staatsonkoste aan horn verskaf word, maar slegs indien <lit andersins tot wesentlike onreg sal lei. In so 'n geval het die beskuldigde nie die reg op 'n regsverteenwoordiger van sy keuse nie. Effektiewe regsverteenwoordiging word ook nie gewaarborg nie. Daar word derhalwe steeds nie aan die sine qua non van 'n volledige strafregplegingstelsel soos <lit oor tyd in die Verenigde State van Amerika ontwikkel het, <lit is die verskaffing van kostelose regsverteenwoordiging aan elke behoeftige persoon beskuldig van 'n emstige misdaad, voldoen nie / Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has extended the existing right to legal representation to its logical conclusion, no definitive substance has been given to this right and the courts will have to develop the purview thereof. This right cannot be an absolute right because of ruling social and economic circumstances. Should an accused not be able to afford a legal representative, one will be supplied to him at state expense, but only if substantial injustice would otherwise result. In such an event the accused is not entitled to a legal representative of his choice. Effective legal representation is also not guaranteed. There is therefore still not compliance with the sine qua non of a comprehensive criminal justice system as has developed over time in the United States of America, that is the provision of free legal representation to every indigent person accused of a serious crime / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Straf en Prosesreg)

A brief analysis of South African Law relating to intoxication as a defence prior to 1988 is given. This is followed by an in-depth discussion and evaluation of the statutory crime created by section 1 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988. Various points of criticism against the wording of section 1 (1) as well as the problems with regard to its application in practice are set out. In conclusion a draft for a new, more effective wording for section 1 (1) is given / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)

Text in Afrikaans / Alhoewel die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika die bestaande reg op regsverteenwoordiging uitgebrei het tot sy logiese eindpunt, is daar geen vaste inhoud aan hierdie reg gegee nie en sal die howe die omvang daarvan moet ontwikkel. Hierdie reg kan weens die heersende sosiale en ekonomiese omstandighede nie 'n absolute reg wees nie. Indien 'n beskuldigde nie 'n regsverteenwoordiger kan bekostig nie, sal een op staatsonkoste aan horn verskaf word, maar slegs indien <lit andersins tot wesentlike onreg sal lei. In so 'n geval het die beskuldigde nie die reg op 'n regsverteenwoordiger van sy keuse nie. Effektiewe regsverteenwoordiging word ook nie gewaarborg nie. Daar word derhalwe steeds nie aan die sine qua non van 'n volledige strafregplegingstelsel soos <lit oor tyd in die Verenigde State van Amerika ontwikkel het, <lit is die verskaffing van kostelose regsverteenwoordiging aan elke behoeftige persoon beskuldig van 'n emstige misdaad, voldoen nie / Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has extended the existing right to legal representation to its logical conclusion, no definitive substance has been given to this right and the courts will have to develop the purview thereof. This right cannot be an absolute right because of ruling social and economic circumstances. Should an accused not be able to afford a legal representative, one will be supplied to him at state expense, but only if substantial injustice would otherwise result. In such an event the accused is not entitled to a legal representative of his choice. Effective legal representation is also not guaranteed. There is therefore still not compliance with the sine qua non of a comprehensive criminal justice system as has developed over time in the United States of America, that is the provision of free legal representation to every indigent person accused of a serious crime / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M. (Straf en Prosesreg)

« Le juge des libertés et de la détention ». A l’oxymore de son appellation répond l’ambivalence de l’institution dans le procès pénal. Créé par la loi du 15 juin 2000 renforçant la protection de la présomption d’innocence et les droits des victimes, le magistrat s’impose, à l’origine, comme le compromis attendu entre la nécessité d’un nouveau contrôle de la détention provisoire et l’attachement français à l’institution du juge d’instruction. Investi d’un rôle central en la matière, le juge judiciaire a également vocation à intervenir dans le cadre de mesures diverses, que son contrôle irrigue les enquêtes pénales ou qu’il s’étende à d’autres contentieux, comme en matière de privation de liberté des étrangers, de visites et saisies administratives ou encore de l’hospitalisation sans consentement. La succession de modifications sporadiques de ses pouvoirs confirme sa fonction malléable, au service d’une quête pérenne : la protection des libertés, l’équilibre de l’avant-procès. Au rythme des louvoiements du législateur, le magistrat peine, pourtant, à s’identifier dans le processus pénal : hier au service des libertés, aujourd’hui de la coercition. Alors que l’institution semble poser les sédiments d’une nouvelle perception de la phase préparatoire du procès, l’évolution de son rôle préfigure d’autres mutations : de la justice pénale, des acteurs judiciaires, l’esquisse, enfin, d’une équation processuelle singulière. La présente recherche propose ainsi de situer ce magistrat au coeur de ces évolutions, comme la trame embryonnaire d'un "renouveau" de la phase préparatoire du procès. / « The Judge for freedom and detention » [Le juge des libertés et de la détention]. The oxymoron of its name reflects the ambivalence of this institution in criminal matters. Founded by the June 15, 2000 statute which reinforces the protection of presumption of innocence as well as the victims’ rights, this magistrate originally imposed itself as the expected compromise between the necessity of a new control over custody and ties of the French to the institution of the investigating judge [juge d‟instruction]. Empowered with a central role in this matter, the judiciary judge must also intervene when various measures are considered, both during criminal investigations and other types of litigations, such as those depriving foreigners of their freedom, administrative search and seizures or hospitalization without consent. The succession of the sporadic modifications of its powers only confirms the flexible nature of its function to serve a never ending quest: the protection of civil liberties and the balance of the pre-trial. As the legislator hedges, the institution struggles to find its place within the criminal process. Yesterday dedicated to civil liberties, today to coercion. Whilst the institution seems to set the basis for a new perception of the pre-trial phase, the evolution of its role announces further transformations: to criminal justice, to the judiciary actors and finally, the preparation of a singular equation in the litigation process. The present paper offers to locate this magistrate within these evolutions as the embryonic plot of a “new era” in the pre-trial phase.