This dissertation examines the behaviour of the Supreme Court of Canada in cases involving electoral/referendum laws and the alleged violation of freedom of expression and/or the right to vote. In 2007, it declared that the judiciary should adopt "a natural attitude of deference" towards Parliament's decisions about the democratic process when determining, under section one of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, whether the infringement is reasonable and justified. This declaration reflected institutional concerns about judicial competence to review legislative choices in this area of public policy and the democratic legitimacy of it doing so. It was made even though the Court had found laws unconstitutional in a majority of the cases that it had heard to date. Deference is often simply equated with government 'wins' in court. Such an equation ignores the effect that the decision has on judicial reasoning. It sets the standard of review the court uses when applying the Oakes test, the framework within which the section 1 analysis occurs. It also establishes the standard of proof that the Crown must meet to demonstrate that an infringement is justified. The outcome of constitutional disputes can turn on the decision about deference, pointing to a need for structure and coherence in the judiciary's approach. A review of the Court's jurisprudence shows that this need has not been met. In spite of its importance to constitutional adjudication, the analytical process by which the decision is made has garnered little attention from those who study the Charter. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by examining deference theory and the use of deference in disputes involving the democratic process and by proposing an approach for specific use in these cases. The approach links the decision to the nature of the legislation, the nature of the right and the nature of the parliamentary discourse that preceded the enactment or amendment of the impugned law. Before setting the standards of review and proof used during the Oakes test, courts should determine whether: they have the necessary competence and legitimacy to act; the right warrants stringent constitutional protection; and parliamentarians engaged in serious deliberations that included the Charter and the reasonableness of any infringements. / Thesis (Ph.D, Political Studies) -- Queen's University, 2011-12-23 12:12:53.51

The development of a platform for community involvement in the decisionmaking processes for municipal management in the Tshwane area. This will ultimately lead to ownership. / Dissertation (MArch(Prof))--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Architecture / unrestricted

This thesis focuses on analyzing social innovations like governance and with a democracy perspective. What the process in social innovation looked like and to what extend are they democratic. To fulfill the purpose of the study, two cases of social innovation have been selected.  The theoretical framework of the study is based on governance and democratic theory with focus on a democratic process. The method of the study is qualitative with focus on two interviews. To complement the interviews, written documents from the two social innovation studies have been used. The material has been analyzed based on the main mechanisms of governance and the criteria of a democratic process. The study shows that social innovations carries governance control and that the democratic quality in both cases have been weak. Thoughts and questions about democracy were only brought to light after the result were finalized. This because the main purpose of the social innovations seems to be social benefits and therefore the democracy perspective was left out.

During the last 50 years, western European societies have been successful in creating economic growth, a functioning democracy and uniting these with social welfare. At the same time, environmental problems have become a major political challenge. Although some measures have been taken to introduce environmental protection, there continue to be serious problems. These can be related to democratic priorities and public information in the sense that they may, amongst other things, be a result of misinformed democratic publics. Jürgen Habermas's work is important for our understanding of how environmental problems can be managed better than today if, contrary to the ecoauthoritarian ideas, we consider that the solution to these problems calls for more democracy and better democratic forms. One can argue that his theory of communicative action makes it difficult to ignore him in debates about today's environmental problems. There are, nevertheless, three difficulties associated with developing a model based on Habermas's theory. Critics argue that, firstly, his theory has theoretical weaknesses; secondly, it is formulated in a way which makes empirical analysis impossible; and, thirdly, it cannot explain the rise of environmental protests and environmental movements, even if Habermas has this ambition. In the thesis, it is considered that environmental problems are political-cultural questions. Accordingly, a political cultural theory is constructed to interprete Habermas's ideas and assess the arguments of his critics. This theory consists of assumptions about notions and types of language-use used in co-ordinating collective action. It is built on the following variables: view of knowledge, view of social values and nature, and view of language-use. It is argued that Habermas's ideas can be defended, if one elaborates a political subculture that is biocentric (nature-centred), as a complement to anthropocentrism (a human-centred view of nature). Thus, his theory of communicative action can be used to develop a cultural model for empirical studies of environmental policy processes. The model consists of three cultural ideal types: anthropocentric material; anthropocentric immaterial; and biocentric immaterial. Obstacles to social learning and public participation, such as forms and styles of reasoning and the exclusion of citizens, are brought into focus. Finally, the model functions as a criticism of a neo-liberal view of environmental problems. Such a view lacks concepts for understanding how individuals consciously can co-ordinate their ideas and individual actions into a collective action. / digitalisering@umu

This essay sets out to compare democratic legitimacy in three federal systems: United States of America (USA), European Union (EU) and Germany. The main question of the essay concerns the institutional design of the USA, EU and Germany's federal systems and how it is likely to affect democratic legitimacy. This main question is divided into four subqueries that lead the empirical analysis. These are: 1) What does the federal system's electoral process look like?, 2) How many voters do the federal systems have per mandate?, 3) In what ways do laws, rules and decisions create restrictions on the democratic process of the different systems?, and 4) Are there any changes and trends in development that may lead to weaker / stronger democratic legitimacy in the three federal systems? The essay is based on the assumption on legitimacy as a political concept and that it refers to whether people accept the political system's authority. The method for this essay is a comparative study using ‘most similar system design’. The empirical section includes collected material related to democratic legitimacy and the democratic process of the three federal systems, in relation to Robert Dahl's traditional democratic theory demonstrating five criteria a democratic process should achieve. It is difficult to measure to what extent the criteria in the traditional democratic theory are achieved, thus the empirical outcome is not comprehensive. However, it is possible to discuss the outcome and draw conclusions by studying the extent of legitimacy in the systems, in relation to each other. The empirical study thus shows that the German democratic process is more likely to fulfill a democratic process according to Robert Dahl’s democracy theory than the other two systems. USA tend to show more extensive restrictions for fulfilling the requirements of a democratic process than the other two systems. EU:s results is similar to USA, but does not have the same extensive restrictions. Therefore, Germany demonstrates a higher degree of democratic legitimacy than USA and EU do. USA demonstrates a lower degree of democratic legitimacy and EU:s democratic legitimacy is similar to USA. Our hypothesis, that the institutional structure of the system affects the outcome of democratic legitimacy, is thus confirmed in the study results.

This paper studies the need to overcome the procedural individualism embodied in a process model that is criticized. The research develops recognizing that the paradigms that have informed the industrial society are no longer sufficient to resolve the conflicts in society in recent decades. The process of classical institutes have long been powerless to show the protection of rights, especially the new collective rights. This bias is questioned whether the current process model is able to answer the collective demands. For development of this research will be used deductive approach method, as part of general issues such as the analysis of the evolution of civil procedure in the modern state, the individualistic procedural model to the collective civil procedure of the network society, then treat specific issues of civil procedure (collective) democratic judicial through the role of the Constitution. From the constitutionalization process is not seen in its formal aspect as a simple succession of acts essential to the jurisdictional function to incorporate an element of justice which makes it means by which promotes the achievement of values and constitutional principles. The collective process is perceived as a developer institute the democratic game, a "new" process model obtained by means of a "new" reading of the Constitution, it is possible from the recognition of the adversarial principle as the possibility of parties to influence the formation of critical and constructive manner, the content of judicial decisions (injunction Judgment of Origin), by means of a preliminary discussion of all participants. / O presente trabalho estuda a necessidade da superação do individualismo processual, consubstanciado em um modelo de processo que se critica. A pesquisa se desenvolve, reconhecendo que os paradigmas que informaram a sociedade industrial, já não são suficientes para resolver os conflitos da sociedade nas últimas décadas. Os institutos clássicos do processo, há muito se mostram impotentes para a tutela de direitos, especialmente os novos direitos coletivos. Nesse viés, se indaga se atual modelo de processo está apto a responder as demandas coletivas. Para desenvolvimento desta pesquisa será utilizado o método de abordagem dedutivo, uma vez que parte de questões gerais, tais como a análise da evolução do processo civil no Estado Moderno, do modelo procedimental individualista ao processo civil coletivo da sociedade em rede, para então tratar de questões específicas do processo civil (coletivo) jurisdicional democrático através do protagonismo da Constituição. A partir da constitucionalização, o processo deixa de ser visto no seu aspecto formal como uma simples sucessão de atos indispensável à função jurisdicional para incorporar um elemento de justiça que o transforma no meio pelo qual se promove a concretização dos valores e princípios constitucionais. O processo coletivo passa a ser percebido como um instituto fomentador do jogo democrático, um novo modelo de processo obtido por meio de uma nova leitura da Constituição, torna-se possível a partir do reconhecimento do princípio do contraditório como a possibilidade das partes de influir na formação, de forma crítica e construtiva, do conteúdo das decisões judiciais (Sentença Liminar de Procedência), por meio de um debate prévio de todos os participantes.

This research study is about the process of democratization currently taking place in Libya. For decades, the now dead dictator Muammar Gaddafi has ruled Libya, himself as the central power. Under his rule, he led a policy that deinstitutionalized the country. When the dictatorship was overthrown, there were hopes that the country would begin its democratization. Now when democratization has started, free and known elections have taken place and a constitution has been formed. The constitution guarantees the most basic human rights and that the country will eventually become a democracy. New data show that the civil war and the absence of institutions makes it impossible to achieve the goal of democracy. This study aims to problematize the absence of institutions in order to achieve consolidated democratization. The starting point for the study is to assume the basis of the theoretical framework's criteria on what a consolidated democratization is. One assumption in the study is that public institutions are absolutely necessary in order for a consolidated democratization to be achieved.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-02-09T11:23:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Júlio César Maggio Stürmer_.pdf: 2323770 bytes, checksum: fdfa09d6e4ea4c23c8913aba6208b4bf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-09T11:23:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Júlio César Maggio Stürmer_.pdf: 2323770 bytes, checksum: fdfa09d6e4ea4c23c8913aba6208b4bf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-12 / Nenhuma / O presente trabalho pretende, a partir da Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito de Lenio Streck, que tem por base uma visão hermenêutico-filosófica do Direito, estudar o processo, estabelecendo uma nova concepção teórica e prática. Para tanto, foi investigado como o processo é compreendido e manejado no Direito brasileiro, em especial no tocante às suas eventuais amarras ao direito privado (instrumento) e ao trato regionalizado (divisão por ramos), confrontando esses elementos com a ideia de unidade ou núcleo fundamental existente no processo. Essa unidade fundamental, cujo conteúdo é atravessado por elementos paradigmáticos, é apresentada como o ponto a partir do qual se deve pensar o processo. Assim, sob aportes filosóficos de Heidegger e Gadamer, procura-se demonstrar que a compreensão é um fenômeno que ocorre de forma única, partindo da pré-compreensão do intérprete, que é povoada por pré-conceitos, alguns legítimos (devem ser considerados), outros não. Fazendo a conexão entre Filosofia e Direito, sustenta-se que é preciso atribuir um sentido adequado ao processo, como processo democrático. Trata-se de uma concepção de processo que respeita os paradigmas entregues pela tradição (jurídica e filosófica). São eles que darão o mundo inserido no qual o intérprete deve compreender adequadamente o processo (direitos, garantias etc.) para a obtenção de repostas (decisões/interpretações) adequadas, na linha defendida por Lenio Streck. Aliado a essa nova visão teórica, tem-se o aspecto prático daí decorrente, em relação ao qual se entende que é necessária a existência de critérios ou de filtros que orientem o intérprete em sua atividade, permitindo que, em sua reflexão, ao “se dar conta de seus pré-juízos”, possa avaliá-los como legítimos ou ilegítimos. Da mesma forma, tais critérios/filtros irão permitir que, além do decisor, os demais membros da comunidade jurídica – partes e doutrina, por exemplo – possam avaliar a adequação da decisão, viabilizando o “constrangimento” (Streck) em busca da resposta adequada. Defende-se, assim, que: a) o processo democrático deve ser considerado como elemento da pré-compreensão e, portanto, condição de possibilidade de toda e qualquer compreensão; b) o processo jurisdicional (seja civil, penal, trabalhista etc.) possui uma unidade – ou núcleo fundamental –, pensada a partir dos paradigmas entregues pela tradição e que dão sentido ao que se nomina de processo democrático. Portanto, considerando o lugar de fala desta tese (paradigmático, como já exposto), a ideia de processo democrático deve atravessar, com todo seu conteúdo, qualquer perspectiva disciplinar de processo, informando, também, o intérprete/aplicador do direito; c) O processo democrático, cujo conteúdo paradigmático é uniforme em todas as áreas do Direito, é um pré-conceito legítimo que deve ser considerado pelo intérprete para que se obtenha uma resposta constitucionalmente adequada. Caso o intérprete não se dê conta desse pré-conceito, ou não o aceite, decidindo sem considerá-lo, a resposta judicial será marcada pela arbitrariedade; d) É necessária a existência de critérios ou de filtros que orientem o intérprete em sua atividade, permitindo que, em sua reflexão, ao “se dar conta de seus pré-juízos”, possa avaliá-los como legítimos ou ilegítimos, contribuindo para a interpretação/resposta adequada. / From Lenio Streck’s Hermeneutical Critique of Law and its hermeneutical-philosophical reading of Law, the present study seeks to study the legal process, establishing new theoretical and practical conceptions. In order to do that, this work investigates how the legal process actually works in the Brazilian legal system, especially regarding its possible bindings to private law (instrumental) and its separation into branches, confronting these elements to an idea of unity and fundamental core to legal procedures. This fundamental unity and its content crossed by paradigmatic elements is presented as the starting point from which the legal process must be thought. This way, under philosophical insights from Heidegger and Gadamer, this study aims to show that the process of understanding is a phenomenon that happens in a unique way, starting from the interpreter’s pre-understanding and its pre-judgments (some of them are legitimate and should be considered, while others should not. Connecting Philosophy and Law, this work seeks to establish an adequate conception of legal process as a democratic process, a conception that respects the paradigms that come from the legal and philosophical tradition. These are the paradigms that will support the world in which the interpreter shall adequately understand the process (its rights, guarantees, etc.) in order to reach adequate interpretations and decisions. From this new theoretical conception, the consequent practical aspect is the need for criteria and filters that guide the interpreters and their activity, allowing them to understand their own pre-conceptions and therefore evaluate them as legitimate or illegitimate. In the same way, such criteria/filters allow not only the judge, but all the legal community – the parties and legal scholars, for instance – to evaluate if a sentence is adequate, making it possible for a public “constraint” (Streck) in search of an adequate decision. This study defends that: a) the democratic process should be considered an element of the pre-understanding step, and therefore condition of possibility of every understanding; b) the legal process has a unity – or fundamental core – established by the paradigms of tradition that give significance to the conception of a democratic process. Therefore, considering the paradigmatic role of this thesis, the idea of a democratic process shall be present with all of its content in any legal process approach by the Law interpreter. c) The democratic process, and its paradigmatic content that is uniform to all legal areas, is a legitimate pre-conception and must be considered by the interpreter in order to obtain a decision according to the Constitution. If the judge/interpreter does not consider such pre-conception, or does not accept it, deciding a case without considering it, arbitrariness will taint the legal decision. d) It is necessary to establish criteria and filters that guide the legal interpreters in their activity, allowing them to understand their own pre-conceptions and therefore evaluate them as legitimate or illegitimate, contributing to an adequate interpretation and one right answer in the legal decision.

本論文主要研究台灣學生本土宣言與香港學生宣言的相似處，且提供了此兩社群跨國界合作的機會。香港與台灣兩地的活動家在西元2014年1月13日正式接洽。香港及台灣泛民主團體的學生與政治家在台北舉行為期一周的會談，標誌著倡議民主的雙方首次接觸。 本次爭議以地方來說，主要是反對當地政府，以國際來講，則是反對中華人民共和國。此活動有利於民主、自決與身分認同。因此，兩次社會運動與兩方社群推行相似的目標及面對共同的敵人。會談後，雙方新階段的合作展現於台灣「太陽花學運」和香港「讓愛與和平佔領中環活動」。世界正在目睹跨國家社會運動間，為了加強其宣言力量而興起的趨勢。 本研究論點是基於社會運動影響理論，隨機在羅伯特·普特曼雙層賽局理論中，採用了道格·麥克亞當的集體行動間動態交互模型。該理論框架指出，一個國家的社會運動（香港或台灣）可以作為另一個社會的參考，尋求由地方政府創造「國際機會」（如：反對地方政策或一個國家：中華人民共和國）。這種情況已經出現於2014年9月28日，在香港突然出現的抗議活動。而且，幾乎立刻，近4000人聚集在台北的自由廣場以表支持。這樣一大群人，他們大多數為學生，在如此短的時間內聚集，此現象提供了本論文研究基礎，探討是否此情緒也在台灣學生中蔓延。 / The present thesis argues that the resemblance found between Taiwanese students in their local claims and those of Hong Kong students, has provided an opportunity for both societies to start collaborating at a transnational level. The first formal approach between Hong Kong and Taiwan activists came in January 13, 2014. Pro-democracy groups of students and politicians from Hong Kong and Taiwan gathered in Taipei for a weekend of talks. This marked the first real approach between both democratic advocates. Locally the struggle was directed at the governments and internationally against the PRC. The objectives of these movements favor democracy, identity and self-determination. Therefore, both social movements and societies push for similar objectives and share a common foe. After the meeting a new level of cooperation was reached between the two sides that was shown during the Sunflower movement in Taiwan and the Occupy the Central with Love and Peace OCLP in Hong Kong. The world is witnessing the dawn of a cross-national approach between social movements that seek to strengthen the force of their claims. The argument of the present study is based on the Social Movements Impact theory, using Professor’s Doug McAdam’s dynamic interactive model of a collective action, in a Robert Putman’s "Two Level-game" case of opportunity. This theoretical framework suggests that a social movement of one country (Hong Kong or Taiwan) can be used as a reference the society of another to renew the “international opportunity” (rejection of a local policy or a country: PRC) created by the local government. This case was seen on the on September 28, 2014 when abruptly emerged the protests in Hong Kong and, almost immediately, near four thousand people gathered at Taipei’s Liberty Square to show their support. The fact that such a large group of people, most of them students, gathered in so short period of time, provides the ground for the present study to explore if the sentiment is spread in the Taiwanese student community.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-07T14:27:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1995204 bytes, checksum: 633f21a0b6ae7bab0d65d109081c52e7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-03-21 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The traditional understanding of the concept of citizenship recognizes rights and obligations by reason of the attachments of certain groups of individuals to a State law order. This notion distinguishes between individuals who are or are not citizens of one State, as if they possessed certain equal status. It overlooks, however, rooted internal discriminations that distinguish citizens gradually, due to its more or less correspondence to homogeneous parameters and their belonging to social classes. Accordingly, even supposedly democratic states oppress qualitative minorities in veiled manner, defying human rights and disregarding duties that are internationally recognised. The study discussed in this dissertation is based on such statement, and admits the existence of graduated citizenship even among Brazilians. Furthermore, this study proposes to analyse the specific contribution of the Brazilian Judiciary in maintaining the limitations of citizenship in the country, either through direct violation, or through simple connivance. Thus, the dissertation starts with the following question: the role of the national Judiciary has contributed to the perpetuation of the limitation of citizenship rights for marginalized groups even while seeking parity of into-the-process conditions? The hypothesis of this study is that it is up to the courts to ensure the observance of these rights and duties, and if different degrees of citizenship in Brazil can still be found, the parameters and actuation on behalf of equality have not been sufficient to solve the problem. It may lead to the need to revise the paradigms that shape the self-understanding of Justice and how it sees the Brazilian citizen. From the answer of this problem, the dissertation intends to contribute to studies on citizenship and access to justice in Brazil from the joint analysis of these themes - which though commonly operated in isolated way, they act in synchrony on implementation and violation of human rights in Brazil. For this, this study adopts legal pluralism as a theoretical framework that uses primarily the method of dialectical approach, analysing the Law as part of the social totality. The results indicate the need to revise the procedural instrumentalism and reinforce the understanding of the process as subjective right to be satisfied from the dialogical participation. The study criticizes the limitations of the socialization process theory, among which the politicization of the Judge, the procedural slowness and the pursuit of efficiency of the Judiciary according to business criteria. Then, the dissertation proposes the adoption of a qualified democratic process that is timely, effective, appropriate and dialogical. Finally, it also recognizes the need to modify the parameter self-centered that understands the Law, going to examine in different kinds of ways according to the multicultural and multilegal state and through the democratic process. / Segundo a compreensão tradicional, o instituto da cidadania reconhece direitos e obrigações fundamentais em razão da vinculação de determinados grupos de indivíduos a uma orde m jurídica estatal. Essa noção distingue os indivíduos entre aqueles que são ou não cidadãos de dado Estado, como se concidadãos fossem dotados de certo status de igualdade. Olvida, contudo, discriminações internas enraizadas que distinguem os cidadãos de maneira gradual, em razão de sua maior ou menor correspondência a parâmetros homogêneos e seu pertencimento a classes sociais. Assim, mesmo Estados pretensamente democráticos oprimem de modo velado minorias qualitativas, afrontando direitos humanos e descumprindo deveres reconhecidos internacionalmente. O presente estudo parte dessa constatação, admite a existência de graduação de cidadania mesmo entre nacionais e propõe-se a analisar a contribuição específica do Judiciário brasileiro na manutenção das limitações de cidadania no país, seja por meio de violação direta, seja por intermédio de simples conivência. Desse modo, parte do seguinte questionamento: a atuação do Judiciário nacional tem contribuído na perpetuação da limitação de direitos de cidadania para grupos marginalizados mesmo enquanto busca a paridade de armas endoprocessual? Considera-se a hipótese de que se cabe ao Judiciário garantir a observância desses direitos e deveres e continua sendo possível constatar a existência de diferentes graus de cidadania no país, os parâmetros e a atuação em prol da isonomia não têm sido suficientes para solucionar o problema, o que pode ensejar a necessidade de rever os paradigmas que moldam a autocompreensão da Justiça e a forma como esta vê o cidadão brasileiro. Com isso, pretende-se, respondendo o problema, contribuir para os estudos sobre cidadania e acesso à justiça no Brasil, a partir da análise conjunta desses temas que, embora costumeiramente explorados de maneira isolada, atuam com sincronia na concretização e na violação dos direitos humanos no Brasil. Para tanto, adota-se o pluralismo jurídico como marco teórico e utiliza-se prioritariamente o método de abordagem dialético, analisando o Direito como parte da totalidade social. Os resultados alcançados indicam a necessidade de rever o instrumentalismo processual e reforçar a compreensão do processo como direito subjetivo, a ser satisfeito a partir da participação dialógica. Critica-se as limitações da teoria socializadora do processo, dentre as quais a politização do juiz, a morosidade processual e a busca pela eficiência do Judiciário segundo critérios empresariais. Propõe a adoção de um processo democrático qualificado e, por isso, tempestivo, efetivo, adequado e dialógico. Reconhece, também, a necessidade de modificar o parâmetro autocentrado com que se compreende o Direito, passando a analisá-lo de maneira plural, segundo o Estado plurijurídico e multicultural, e por intermédio do processo democrático.