How would a housing system work in a just society? How do we account for differences in opportunity according to one’s birthplace? These two questions, both a result of our recent housing crisis, can be addressed through inquiries into policy, economics, history, or other forms of social sciences. In this paper I attempt to address these questions instead through a philosophical lens by examining the principles that guide the distribution of goods in our society. It is from such a theory that we can construct the fairest government or economic policies. Theories of distributive justice try to account for the fairest distribution of goods in a society. I take one such theory, John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, and apply it to the distribution of housing. I begin by deconstructing the core principles of Rawls’ theory and analyzing how each applies to housing. Then I make an argument about the fairness of these outcomes. My conclusion is, in fact, Rawls theory does not adequately account for the importance of housing in our society. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate the inequalities that face families throughout our society by illustrating the profound impact of housing on one’s well-being as well as one’s opportunity to succeed.

<p>I seek to answer a specific question of justice: namely, how to find an equitable division of the Earth’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases, here termed as the global carbon sink. The dominant approach to date has been a variation of equal per-capita emissions. My aim is to expand on the Rawlsian legacy by presenting a viable alternative to the dominant approach in the form of an adaptation of Rawls’s <em>difference principle </em>in the form of a <em>climatic difference principle</em>. The climatic difference principle takes the conceptual idea behind the difference principle – of justifying inequalities so long as they result in a compensating benefit for everyone, with a particular concern for the least advantaged – and applying it to the problem of how to divide the global carbon sink.</p> <p>I begin with a critique of the dominant approach in order rectify the lack of critical scrutiny that the scheme has enjoyed in order to illustrate that the scheme fails for two reasons: first, it violates the ideal that it purports to promote; second, the reasons to support the proposal rest on shallow, rather than deep, reasons alone. Next, I engage in a critique of past attempts to globalize the difference principle, for if it were possible to merely globalize the difference principle, we wouldn’t need a distinct principle to guide emissions allocations.</p> <p>The climatic difference principle itself takes the distributive outcomes of equal per-capita emissions, as measured on the Human Development Index (HDI), as a baseline to judge alternative schemes. My conjecture is that the way emissions are used will have an effect on the amount of net benefits that we can derive per unit of the global carbon sink. Shares of the global carbon sink can be used more or less efficiently, and incentives in the form of a greater share of the sink will spur technological innovation. However, Rawls was correct to insist that the most efficient scheme is not necessarily just.</p> <p>A division of the global sink is considered <em>just </em>if we can compensate everyone (in particular the least advantaged) for accepting an unequal share. Specifically, when judged by improvements from the baseline created by the distributive outcomes of equal per-capita emissions, as measured on the Human Development Index (HDI). In order to realize the distributive obligations of the climatic difference principle, a green-technology transfer program will be advanced along with other forms of aid and compensation.</p> / Master of Philosophy (MA)

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This dissertation aims to show that the criticism of John Raws to utilitarianism and the proposition of his Theory of Justice, especially the difference principle, offer an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis for the welfare economics, by providing a safe way to arbitrate social and economic inequalities. According to the philosopher, by making the utility as the supreme good, utilitarianism concerns only with maximizing the total happiness, and disregards the way it is distribute among different individuals. When interpersonal utility comparisons were criticized for being considered normative, welfare economy found on the principle of efficiency considered one scientific way to assess the well-being and at the same time, keeping alive the utilitarian tradition. This principle, however, is also criticized by the author, since selects various positions as equally effective, and among which some people can live in abundance while others live in extreme poverty. In this sense, John Rawls proposes a theory of justice in an attempt to offer an alternative to utilitarian perspective. In this theory, individuals are driven to put in a hypothetical situation, called original position, which must decide on the principles that will govern the institutions of their society. The author states that the principles to be chosen in the original position would be, briefly, the principle of equal liberty and the principle of difference. According to the first principle, which has priority over the second, ensures an equal system of basic freedoms for all individuals and, according to the difference principle, social and economic inequalities are allowed only if they occur in favor of individuals less fortunate in society. It is argued that the Rawlsian theory, and especially the principle of difference, is an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis of welfare economics. This is because this principle ensures the well-being for all individuals in society, and not only that contribute most to the total satisfaction to increase, as proposed by utilitarianism. In this sense, if taken into account, these contributions would allow the welfare economy fill the gap left by the distributive utilitarianism, and to assess the well-being of individuals in order to guarantee them not only economic efficiency but also distributive justice. / A presente dissertação objetiva demonstrar que a crítica de John Raws ao utilitarismo e a proposição de sua Teoria da Justiça, sobretudo o princípio da diferença, oferecem uma alternativa ao utilitarismo enquanto base normativa da economia do bem-estar, ao proporcionar uma forma segura para arbitrar as desigualdades sociais e econômicas. De acordo com o filósofo, ao condicionar a utilidade como bem supremo, o utilitarismo importa-se apenas com a maximização da felicidade total, e desconsidera a forma pela qual ela é distribuída entre os diferentes indivíduos. Quando as comparações interpessoais de utilidade foram criticadas por serem consideradas normativas, a economia do bem-estar encontrou no princípio da eficiência uma forma considerada científica para avaliar o bem-estar e, ao mesmo tempo, manter viva a tradição utilitarista. Este princípio, porém, também é criticado pelo autor, uma vez que seleciona várias posições como igualmente eficientes, e dentre as quais algumas pessoas podem viver em grande abundância enquanto outras vivem na extrema miséria. Neste sentido, John Rawls propõe uma teoria da justiça, na tentativa de oferecer uma alternativa à perspectiva utilitarista. Nesta teoria, os indivíduos são levados a colocar-se em uma situação hipotética, denominada posição original, na qual devem deliberar sobre os princípios que irão regular as instituições de sua sociedade. O autor afirma que os princípios a serem escolhidos na posição original seriam, de forma sucinta, o princípio da liberdade igual e o princípio da diferença. De acordo com o primeiro princípio, que possui prioridade sobre o segundo, garante-se um igual sistema de liberdades básicas para todos os indivíduos e, de acordo com o princípio da diferença, as desigualdades econômicas e sociais são permitidas somente se ocorrerem em prol dos indivíduos menos favorecidos na sociedade. Argumenta-se que a teoria rawlsiana, e de modo especial o seu princípio da diferença, representam uma alternativa ao utilitarismo como base normativa da economia do bem-estar. Isto ocorre porque este princípio assegura o bem-estar a todos os indivíduos da sociedade, e não apenas aos que mais contribuem para aumentar a satisfação total, como proposto pelo utilitarismo. Neste sentido, se levadas em consideração, estas contribuições permitiriam que a economia do bem-estar preenchesse a lacuna distributiva deixada pelo utilitarismo, e avaliasse o bem-estar dos indivíduos de forma a lhes garantir não apenas a eficiência econômica, mas também a justiça distributiva.

[pt] A idéia inicial da justiça em Rawls é a de que todas as pessoas tenham direito a um igual conjunto de bens sociais primários, a partir do qual seja possível para cada uma delas buscar realizar os seus respectivos planos de vida. As pessoas estão sujeitas desde o seu nascimento às contingências naturais e sociais que afetam profundamente as suas perspectivas de vida, especialmente daquelas menos favorecidas. Rawls afirma que é preciso regular esse quadro de desigualdades moralmente arbitrárias e, para isso, elabora dois princípios de justiça. O princípio da igualdade garante o direito a um mais amplo possível sistema de liberdade igual para todas as pessoas. O princípio da diferença admite desigualdades econômicas entre as pessoas somente se tais desigualdades beneficiarem especialmente os menos favorecidos. Os povos também possuem diferentes níveis de riqueza entre si. A justiça entre os povos deve efetivar um princípio - o dever de assistência - pelo qual seja possível mitigar tal condição de desigualdade de modo a fazer com que os povos onerados façam parte da Sociedade dos Povos razoavelmente justa. Assim, a concepção rawlsiana de justiça com equidade é mantida no plano internacional quando é elaborado o Direito dos Povos. Em ambos os casos, as pessoas e os povos menos favorecidos natural e socialmente contam com um princípio que lhes garante dispor de uma condição social suficientemente necessária que os possibilite perseguir os seus planos de vida com dignidade e auto respeito. / [en] The conception of justice as fairness elaborated by John Rawls state the consideration about which terms of cooperation people consider as reasonably just to offer one another having in mind the society as a cooperative scheme for mutual advantage. The first idea is one that all people have a right to an equal set of primary social goods which makes possible for each one of them pursue their respective life plans. Nevertheless Rawls notes that people are exposed since they are born to natural and social contingencies and that mental and physical talents and abilities and conditions of wealth and social status are arbitrarily distributed. This affects profoundly peoples perspectives of life. Rawls afirms that is necessary regulate this scene of morally arbitrary inequalities and so he elaborates two principles of justice. The first - the equality principle - guarantees the right to an equal and most extensive system of liberties to all people. The second - the difference principle - admit economic inequalities only if these benefit especially those who are less favoured by the natural and social lucky. In the Rawlsian Society of Peoples there are different levels of wealth among peoples. So, the international justice must establish principles which struggle these inequalities so as to allow burned peoples to join well ordered peoples in the reasonably just Society of Peoples. It is the duty of assistance which makes it possible. So, the Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness is maintained when the law of peoples is elaborated so that the purpose to be reached by the difference principle in the closed system society is also reached in the Society of Peoples by the duty of assistance. In both cases the less natural and socially lucky persons and peoples rely on a principle which guarantee them a social condition sufficiently necessary that make possible for them to pursue with dignity and self-respect their life plans.

<p>With an estimated 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria, no doubt, has been grappling with the problem of pluralism of ethnic nationalities. It is not news in Nigeria that extreme ethnic consciousness of its citizens has led to the victimization of one ethnic group by another. This victimization has come in the form of exclusions in the distribution of both wealth and power in the country.</p><p>Amidst all the exclusions, the unity of the country has been ironically regarded as sacrosanct, and should not be negotiated. It is often said that fate brought all the ethnic nationalities in order to form one great country. I subscribe to this belief that fate brought us together for the above purpose, especially now that several countries around the world are merging in one way or the other to form a formidable force to reckon with both politically and economically. Hence, “(ethnic integration) is the integration of capabilities. It develops the capabilities of the workforce… it offers opportunities for better synergy of skills”. However, it would be ethically unhealthy for the unity of the country not to be compromised under the present dispensation, which has been compromising in turn the basic moral principle of social justice. There cannot be any moral basis for the continued existence of a country like Nigeria, which as it were, has thrown equality of all citizens to the dogs.</p><p>Should the country remain united, it must do so by imbibing the culture of regarding all citizens, as well as, all ethnic nationalities as equal, and none should have more privileges than the others. Therefore, how can a plural society like Nigeria remain united as one indivisible country?</p><p>Rawls has offered some solutions to the problem of stability engendered by the pluralism of ethnic groups in Nigeria. His idea of ‘overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ in his Political Liberalism is capable of bringing back the country to the state of stability. There will be stability, if all forms of exclusion seize to exist in the Nigerian polity.</p>

With an estimated 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria, no doubt, has been grappling with the problem of pluralism of ethnic nationalities. It is not news in Nigeria that extreme ethnic consciousness of its citizens has led to the victimization of one ethnic group by another. This victimization has come in the form of exclusions in the distribution of both wealth and power in the country. Amidst all the exclusions, the unity of the country has been ironically regarded as sacrosanct, and should not be negotiated. It is often said that fate brought all the ethnic nationalities in order to form one great country. I subscribe to this belief that fate brought us together for the above purpose, especially now that several countries around the world are merging in one way or the other to form a formidable force to reckon with both politically and economically. Hence, “(ethnic integration) is the integration of capabilities. It develops the capabilities of the workforce… it offers opportunities for better synergy of skills”. However, it would be ethically unhealthy for the unity of the country not to be compromised under the present dispensation, which has been compromising in turn the basic moral principle of social justice. There cannot be any moral basis for the continued existence of a country like Nigeria, which as it were, has thrown equality of all citizens to the dogs. Should the country remain united, it must do so by imbibing the culture of regarding all citizens, as well as, all ethnic nationalities as equal, and none should have more privileges than the others. Therefore, how can a plural society like Nigeria remain united as one indivisible country? Rawls has offered some solutions to the problem of stability engendered by the pluralism of ethnic groups in Nigeria. His idea of ‘overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ in his Political Liberalism is capable of bringing back the country to the state of stability. There will be stability, if all forms of exclusion seize to exist in the Nigerian polity.

L’ambition initiale de Rawls est de présenter une analyse de la justice distributive supérieure à la conception utilitariste, incapable, selon lui, de fournir une base satisfaisante de la justice dans le cadre d’une démocratie. Pour ce faire, Rawls mobilisera, dans son principal ouvrage Théorie de la Justice [1971], des idées empreintes de la philosophie politique et morale anglosaxonne mais également de très nombreux concepts forgés par les économistes. Cet ouvrage devient ainsi une référence incontournable pour la philosophie politique contemporaine mais aussi pour les théories économiques de la justice sociale. Notre thèse se propose de reconstruire la théorie de Rawls dont les études, nombreuses mais morcelées, ont donné lieu à des interprétations très contradictoires. Etudier la pensée de l’auteur à l’aune de l’économie sert à donner une cohérence d’ensemble à la justice comme équité, depuis sa genèse jusqu’à ses derniers développements. Cette méthodologie, en effet, nous permet de montrer qu’au-delà de l’indétermination du principe de différence – qui peut justifier tant une politique ultralibérale qu’une politique inspirée des idéaux socialistes – l’amélioration de la situation des plus défavorisés passe par le dépassement du système capitaliste. Ce système n’est pas à même de répondre aux exigences des principes de justice défendus par Rawls. / Rawls’ first ambition is to present an analysis of social justice superior to utilitarian conception, enable, according to him, to provide a satisfactory account of justice in the context of democracy. In order to do that, Rawls took, in his main book A Theory of Justice [1971], ideas imprinted of moral and political philosophy but also many concepts built by the economists. This work became consequently the reference to contemporary political philosophy and also to economic theory of social justice. Our thesis proposes to reconstruct the theory of Rawls. Indeed many but fragmented researches gave rise to conflicting interpretations of this theory. So studying Rawls’ thought regarding economics allows us tobring an overall consistency to the justice as fairness, from its genesis to its last developments. Our methodology aims to show, that beyond the indetermination of the Difference principle – which can either supply an ultraliberal policy or a policy inspired by socialist ideals – the improvement of the situation of the least advantaged required to go beyond capitalism. This system is enable to answer to the requirements of the principles of justice defended by Rawls.

This thesis attempts to provide a coherent view of the idea of ‘justice as fairness’ and, in particular, the ‘difference principle’ expressed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. The main focus of the thesis is the difference principle and its limits. Rawls’s conception of ‘justice as fairness’ is based on the thought experiment of the ‘original position’ in which people, considered as free and equal, deliberate under an imagined ‘veil of ignorance,’ i.e. not knowing which social roles or status they would occupy in their society. Rawls then argues that in the original position people come up with two major principles of justice, understood as principles that would be acceptable to people treated as free and equal. The second principle entails the so-called ‘difference principle,’ according to which the inequalities of, say, wealth and authority are just and fair only if they lead to compensating benefits for everybody and particularly the least advantaged. The thesis proceeds, then, by probing whether compared with other theories, , including a discussion of Dahl’s theory of democracy, Rawls’s difference principle could be a proper answer to one of the main questions of social justice. The questions is: how the economic fortune in a society should be distributed among citizens. However, despite Rawls’s aim to develop the difference principle as a practical normative theory, it fails to give us a pragmatic answer. The reason is: the statement of the difference principle fails to take into account one crucial point: to wit, the matter of time. The thesis develops two empirical economic scenarios to illustrate that there is a trade-off between the interests of the poor in short and long period of time. However, this important issue is not considered and discussed by Rawls which makes the theory inapplicable.

Modern democracies rest on a foundation of values essential to their prosperity. Two of those values are freedom of speech and political equality. To many, these values appear to coexist effortlessly. However, what this thesis aims to expose are some of the problems that quickly arise when attempts to interpret the values fail. The thesis investigates a specific US Supreme Court ruling called Citizens United. The ruling enabled corporations and unions to use their own treasuries for unlimited independent political expenditures. Previous laws that prohibited such corporate and union expenditures were deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court for violating the First Amendment’s right to freedom of speech. The ruling also paved the way for another court ruling in the US called SpeechNow.org. Facilitated by the two court rulings the so called Super PACs and 501(c)(4) organizations could receive and spend unlimited money to expressly support or oppose political candidates and parties in American elections. With an analytical framework consisting of John Rawls’s theories the Veil of Ignorance and the Difference Principle a conclusion concerning Citizens United’s righteousness can be made. The thesis concludes that the Supreme Court based its ruling on a misinterpretation of the value of freedom of speech and that Citizens United resulted in greater political inequality in the US.