L'objectiu d'aquesta tesi és analitzar com s'han de concebre les polítiques fiscals i monetàries en un context en què els polítics tenen problemes de credibilitat. Es desenvolupen metodologies i aplicacions per mostrar com diferents graus de credibilitat de les institucions polítiques afecten la determinació d'impostos, deute públic, instruments monetaris i, en general, els resultats econòmics. En el primer capítol - Loose commitment (Compromís Dèbil) -, s'introdueix una nova metodologia per resoldre problemes de política òptima tenint en compte que els polítics podrien no complir les seves promeses, i analitza els efectes de la credibilitat sobre la imposició sobre el capital i sobre el treball. El segon capítol - Political Disagreement Lack of Commitment and the Level of Debt (Desacord Polític, Falta de Compromís i el Nivell de Deute) - considera un cas en què la credibilitat es limitada per el fet d'haver-hi alternança entre polítics amb objectius diferents. En particular, es mostra com l'alternança política i la falta de compromís afecten el nivell de deute públic. Finalment, el tercer capítol - The Macroeconomic Effects of Unstable Monetary Policy Objectives (Els Efectes Macroeconòmics de la Inestabilitat dels Objectius de Política Monetària) - analitza com la possibilitat de canvis en els objectius influeixen en les decisions de política monetària. / El objetivo de esta tesis es analizar cómo se deben concebir las políticas fiscales y monetarias en un contexto en que los políticos tienen problemas de credibilidad. Se desarrollan metodologías y aplicaciones para mostrar cómo diferentes grados de credibilidad de las instituciones políticas afectan la determinación de impuestos, deuda pública, instrumentos monetarios y, en general, los resultados económicos. En el primer capítulo - Loose commitment (Compromiso Débil)-, se introduce una nueva metodología para resolver problemas de política óptima tomando en cuenta que los políticos podrían no cumplir con sus promesas, y analiza los efectos de la credibilidad sobre la imposición sobre el capital y el trabajo. El segundo capítulo - Political Disagreement Lack of Commitment and the Level of Debt (Desacuerdo Político, Falta de Compromiso y el Nivel de Deuda) - considera un caso en que la credibilidad está limitada por el hecho de que hay alternancia entre políticos con distintos objetivos. En particular, se muestra cómo la alternancia política y la falta de compromiso afectan el nivel de deuda pública. Por último, el tercer capítulo - The Macroeconomic Effects of Unstable Monetary Policy Objectives (Los Efectos Macroeconómicos de la Inestabilidad de los Objetivos de Política Monetaria) - analiza cómo la posibilidad de cambios en los objetivos influye en las decisiones de política monetaria. / The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how fiscal and monetary policies should be designed in a context where policymakers have credibility problems. Methodologies and applications are developed to show how different degrees of policymakers' credibility affect the determination of policy choices, such as taxes or monetary instruments, and more generally the economic outcomes.The first chapter - Loose Commitment -, introduces a new methodology to solve optimal policy problems taking into account that policymakers may not fulfill their promises, and analyzes the effects of policymakers' commitment on capital and labor taxation. The second chapter - Political Disagreement, Lack of Commitment and the Level of Debt - considers a case where commitment is limited by the fact that policymakers with different objectives alternate in office. In particular, it is shown how lack of commitment and political turnover affect the level of public debt. Finally, the third chapter - The Macroeconomic Effects of Unstable Monetary Policy Objectives - analyzes how the possibility of changes in policy objectives influences monetary policy choices.

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)

In dieser Dissertation schlage ich eine neue Erklärung dafür vor, warum es in der antiken Philosophie eine tiefe Meinungsverschiedenheit in Bezug auf das menschliche Gute gab. Die Erklärung lautet, dass verschiedene Autoren verschiedene Auffassungen über die Kontexte und die Ziele von Argumenten über das menschliche Gute vertraten. Daraus ergab sich, dass sie nicht dieselben Argumente als gültig anerkannten und daher verschiedene Theorien über das Gute als plausibel erachteten. Die Texte, mit denen sich in erster Reihe beschäftigt wird, sind: Platons Gorgias und Philebos; Aristoteles’ Topik und Nikomachische Ethik, Senecas Epistulae Morales 82, 83, 87 und 120; Epikurs Brief an Menoikeus, Lukrez’ De Rerum Natura, Sextus’ Grundzüge der pyrrhonischen Skepsis. / In this dissertation, I suggest a new explanation for disagreement about the human good (I.e what makes a human life good) in ancient philosophy: namely, that differing understandings of argumentation contexts and goals shaped selection of argument schemes, which in turn influenced which theories of the good seemed plausible. The texts I primarily deal with are connections between Plato’s Gorgias and the Philebus, Aristotle’s Topics and the Nicomachean Ethics, Seneca’s EM 82, 83, 87 and 120, Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus and Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, and Sextus’ Outlines of Skepticism.