Em seu Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron apresenta o que denomina de uma teoria democrática do direito, uma teoria normativa sobre a autoridade do direito baseada em sua legitimidade democrática. Para Waldron é a legitimidade do direito enquanto fruto de um processo de deliberação e votação majoritária que sustenta sua autoridade. Esse trabalho busca explicar a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron apresentando-a no contexto do liberalismo e do positivismo normativo. Dada a importância da legitimidade para a autoridade do direito em Waldron, esse trabalho discute também o que Waldron entende por legitimidade e sua distinção em relação à justificação, e defende a teoria de Waldron acerca da legitimidade como superior a outra teoria semelhante, defendida por John Simmons. Esse trabalho apresenta a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron no contexto das denominadas circunstâncias da política – a necessidade sentida de uma decisão comum e o desacordo sobre qual deve ser essa decisão. Essa tese defende que Waldron apresenta dois argumentos distintos em defesa de sua teoria: a) um argumento epistêmico, baseado na tese da justificação normal da autoridade, de Joseph Raz, adaptada ao contexto das decisões majoritárias, e que está suscetível a certos tipos de crítica, e b) um argumento de equidade, que recorre à igual consideração e respeito nas circunstâncias da política, o qual está suscetível a outros tipos de crítica. Essa tese defenderá que, dependendo do argumento, a posição de Waldron levará a distintos resultados teóricos e práticos (normativos). / In his Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron presents what he names a democratic jurisprudence, a normative theory about the authority of law based in his democratic legitimacy. To Waldron, it is the legitimacy of law as a result of a process of deliberation and majoritarian voting that sustains its authority. This work seeks to explain Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence presenting it in the context of liberalism and normative positivism. Since legitimacy is important to the authority of law, this work also discuss what Waldron understands by legitimacy and its distinction from justification, and defends that Waldron’s theory about legitimacy is superior to another similar theory, defended by John Simmons. This work presents Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence in the context of the said circumstances of politics - the felt need for a common decision and the disagreement about what ought to be this decision. This thesis defends that Waldron presents two distinct arguments in defense of his theory: a) an epistemic argument, that is based on the normal justification thesis of Joseph Raz adapted to the context of majoritarian decision, and that is susceptible to certain kinds of critic, and b) an argument of fairness, that calls for equal considerations and respect in the circumstances of politics, and that is susceptible to other kinds of critic. This thesis will defend that, depending on the argument, Waldron’s position will lead to distinct theoretical and practical (normative) results.

Em seu Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron apresenta o que denomina de uma teoria democrática do direito, uma teoria normativa sobre a autoridade do direito baseada em sua legitimidade democrática. Para Waldron é a legitimidade do direito enquanto fruto de um processo de deliberação e votação majoritária que sustenta sua autoridade. Esse trabalho busca explicar a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron apresentando-a no contexto do liberalismo e do positivismo normativo. Dada a importância da legitimidade para a autoridade do direito em Waldron, esse trabalho discute também o que Waldron entende por legitimidade e sua distinção em relação à justificação, e defende a teoria de Waldron acerca da legitimidade como superior a outra teoria semelhante, defendida por John Simmons. Esse trabalho apresenta a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron no contexto das denominadas circunstâncias da política – a necessidade sentida de uma decisão comum e o desacordo sobre qual deve ser essa decisão. Essa tese defende que Waldron apresenta dois argumentos distintos em defesa de sua teoria: a) um argumento epistêmico, baseado na tese da justificação normal da autoridade, de Joseph Raz, adaptada ao contexto das decisões majoritárias, e que está suscetível a certos tipos de crítica, e b) um argumento de equidade, que recorre à igual consideração e respeito nas circunstâncias da política, o qual está suscetível a outros tipos de crítica. Essa tese defenderá que, dependendo do argumento, a posição de Waldron levará a distintos resultados teóricos e práticos (normativos). / In his Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron presents what he names a democratic jurisprudence, a normative theory about the authority of law based in his democratic legitimacy. To Waldron, it is the legitimacy of law as a result of a process of deliberation and majoritarian voting that sustains its authority. This work seeks to explain Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence presenting it in the context of liberalism and normative positivism. Since legitimacy is important to the authority of law, this work also discuss what Waldron understands by legitimacy and its distinction from justification, and defends that Waldron’s theory about legitimacy is superior to another similar theory, defended by John Simmons. This work presents Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence in the context of the said circumstances of politics - the felt need for a common decision and the disagreement about what ought to be this decision. This thesis defends that Waldron presents two distinct arguments in defense of his theory: a) an epistemic argument, that is based on the normal justification thesis of Joseph Raz adapted to the context of majoritarian decision, and that is susceptible to certain kinds of critic, and b) an argument of fairness, that calls for equal considerations and respect in the circumstances of politics, and that is susceptible to other kinds of critic. This thesis will defend that, depending on the argument, Waldron’s position will lead to distinct theoretical and practical (normative) results.

This diploma thesis deals with the generation of the different drope stampings in industrial process in MBNS Kovárna Company. The main purpose of this thesis is analysis of the industrial process and finding the main factors influences on the process. It especially deals with forgings of the shafts and also flanges with the similar quality of material 42CrMo4. Reasons of the disagreements are focused on surface insensibilities of the forging - crack. First theoretic part introduces company, meaning of the quality of material and describes tools used for finding reasons of the generation of disagreements. In the second practical part is described the whole industrial process and determination of the reasons of disagreements. In concluding part the results are analyzed and some correctional recommendations are suggested.

This thesis deals with the evaluation of the control system outputs in the production of fire car. In the first part of thesis is evaluated control system by company THT, Ltd.. The second, theoretical part, describes the seven basic quality tools, which represents tools for detection and analyzing of quality problems. In the third, practical part, is describes the proposed program, which serves as a simple tool for identification of the most frequent disagreements in the fire engines. In the final part is evaluated implementation of the proposed program in the company.

This paper concerns the semantic branch of meta-ethics, and examines a version of so called semantic pluralism advocated by Michael Gill. Briefly put, Gill suggests that ordinary people’s usage of moral terms is rather messy in the sense that the meaning of moral terms can vary not only between different people, but also for one and the same person in different contexts. Such variability in word-meaning is explained by his assumption that people’s meta-ethical commitments are part of their moral thought and language, which is to say that their meta-ethical commitments have implications for the meaning of moral terms. In this paper I pursue two objectives. The first is exegetical and aim to clarify how Gill’s semantic pluralism in general, and his Indeterminacy- and Variability theses in particular, are intended to be understood—specifically in relation to the cognitivist/non-cognitivist debate. The second objective is argumentative. I first present and evaluate an objection to Gill’s semantic pluralism from Walter Sinnott-Armstrong who argue that Gill’s Variability thesis implies that interlocutors with different meta-ethical commitments are talking past each other rather than having genuine first order moral agreements and disagreements. I then argue that a similar problem occurs also for certain second order moral disagreements, particularly those in which moral terms are used rather than mentioned. I then argue that this is problematic not only on independent grounds, but also because it is inconsistent with the very assumptions Gill makes to support his view. My argument therefore appears forceful by Gill’s own lights. Combined, Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection and my own leads me to conclude that Gill’s semantic pluralism does not look promising.

The thesis deals with teachers' attitudes to changes in the education and the curriculum reform of regional education system in the Czech Republic. The curriculum reform is a significant change for the education policy and the teachers' attitudes are important for the reform implementation. The methodology is based on quantitative and qualitative data analysis. Theoretical basis are the theories about teachers' beliefs and attitudes and a belief system according to Paul A. Sabatier. The teachers' approach to the reform is defined as their acceptance of the reform and the extent of their activities in the reform. The teachers' acceptance of the reform is formulated in two dimensions. The first one is teachers' acceptance of the reform objectives. The other one is teachers' acceptance of the new teacher role as a co-creator of the curriculum. The teachers' attitudes appear to be mainly problematic in the second category which deals to formalism of the reform. As main reasons of teachers' disagreement on the reform were identified the problems in the reform implementation phase, teachers' ideological opposition to the reform, inadequate explanation of the reform meaning by central authorities, which leads to a misunderstanding of the reform objectives by teachers, and an implementation of the reform...

In dieser Dissertation schlage ich eine neue Erklärung dafür vor, warum es in der antiken Philosophie eine tiefe Meinungsverschiedenheit in Bezug auf das menschliche Gute gab. Die Erklärung lautet, dass verschiedene Autoren verschiedene Auffassungen über die Kontexte und die Ziele von Argumenten über das menschliche Gute vertraten. Daraus ergab sich, dass sie nicht dieselben Argumente als gültig anerkannten und daher verschiedene Theorien über das Gute als plausibel erachteten. Die Texte, mit denen sich in erster Reihe beschäftigt wird, sind: Platons Gorgias und Philebos; Aristoteles’ Topik und Nikomachische Ethik, Senecas Epistulae Morales 82, 83, 87 und 120; Epikurs Brief an Menoikeus, Lukrez’ De Rerum Natura, Sextus’ Grundzüge der pyrrhonischen Skepsis. / In this dissertation, I suggest a new explanation for disagreement about the human good (I.e what makes a human life good) in ancient philosophy: namely, that differing understandings of argumentation contexts and goals shaped selection of argument schemes, which in turn influenced which theories of the good seemed plausible. The texts I primarily deal with are connections between Plato’s Gorgias and the Philebus, Aristotle’s Topics and the Nicomachean Ethics, Seneca’s EM 82, 83, 87 and 120, Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus and Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, and Sextus’ Outlines of Skepticism.

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)

This dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts: ‘subjective' evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as 'Beetroot is delicious' or 'Skydiving is fun', and first-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as 'I am hungry' or 'I have been fooled.' The dissertation defends of a novel form of relativism about truth - the idea that the truth of some (but not all) perspectival thought and talk is relative to the perspective of an evaluating subject or group. In Part I, I argue that the realm of ‘subjective' evaluative thought and talk whose truth is perspective-relative includes attributions of knowledge of the form 'S knows that p.' Following a brief introduction (chapter 1), chapter 2 presents a new, error-theoretic objection against relativism about knowledge attributions. The case for relativism regarding knowledge attributions rests on the claim that relativism is the only view that explains all of the empirical data from speakers' use of the word "know" without recourse to an error theory. In chapter 2, I show that the relativist can only account for sceptical paradoxes and ordinary epistemic closure puzzles if she attributes a problematic form of semantic blindness to speakers. However, in 3 I show that all major competitor theories - forms of invariantism and contextualism - are subject to equally serious error-theoretic objections. This raises the following fundamental question for empirical theorising about the meaning of natural language expressions: If error attributions are ubiquitous, by which criteria do we evaluate and compare the force of error-theoretic objections and the plausibility of error attributions? I provide a number of criteria and argue that they give us reason to think that relativism's error attributions are more plausible than those of its competitors. In Part II, I develop a novel unified account of the content and communication of perspectival thoughts. Many relativists regarding ‘subjective' thoughts and Lewisians about de se thoughts endorse a view of belief as self-location. In chapter 4, I argue that the self-location view of belief is in conflict with the received picture of linguistic communication, which understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. I argue that understanding mental content and speech act content in terms of sequenced worlds allows a reconciliation of these views. On the view I advocate, content is modelled as a set of sequenced worlds - possible worlds ‘centred' on a group of individuals inhabiting the world at some time. Intuitively, a sequenced world is a way a group of people may be. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on sequenced worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. In chapter 5, I show that one of the advantages of this model is its compatibility with both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism about taste. I argue in chapters 5 and 6 that the empirical data from eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement cases supports a relativist completion of the model, and I show in detail how to account for these phenomena on the sequenced worlds view.

Un regard sur l’actualité de cette Église laisse apparaître que la collaboration entre autorités magistérielles et théologiensparticipant à la tâche d’enseignement doctrinal et catéchétique de l’Église catholique romaine connaît quelques difficultés, a fortiori dans des sociétés davantage pluralistes et sécularisées. Parfois les recherches théologiques contribuent à mettre en péril la communion ecclésiale ou sa cohésion quant à la foi et à la théologie morale. L’instruction de la Curie romaine Donum veritatis du 24 mai 1990 intervient en doctrine et en procédure de régulation de l’exercice de la liberté et de la responsabilité du théologien catholique et les critères d’ecclésialités à respecter pour garantir la pleine communion. Ce sont les critères d’orthodoxie, d’orthopraxie, d’adhésion et de communion ecclésiale.La question du statut canonique du théologien est débattue et l’autorité catholique a dû préciser la doctrine et le statut du théologiencatholique. Le code de droit canonique latin de 1983 prévoit-il des dispositions pour la régulation de la mission du théologien enfonction de l’exigence de pleine communion ecclésiale ? Une thèse en droit canonique était nécessaire pour proposer un premierbilan sur la vocation du théologien catholique, sur l’institution de la théologie catholique, et sur l’état de vie canonique de théologiencatholique. Comment la canonicité accompagne-t-elle un fidèle qui, par l’acquisition de compétences reconnues, veut devenir unthéologien catholique ? Comment analyser l’idonéité du postulant ? Comment lui octroyer, puis si nécessaire lui retirer un mandatcanonique concernant cette mission d’Église ? Comment garantir la conscience et la liberté du théologien catholique ? En cas dedissentiment-désaccord, comment qualifier cette situation ? Donc, le théologien jouit des libertés reconnues par son Eglise mais dansles limites du devoir de communion dont traite le canon 209 §. 1 du Code latin de 1983 et le canon 12§. 2 du Code des Canons desÉglises Orientales. / A glance of the current events of this Church brings to light that the collaboration between magisterial authorities and theologians involved with the task of doctrinal and catechetical education of the Roman Catholic Church experiences some difficulties, especially in more diverse and secularized societies. Sometimes theological research contributes to put the endangerment of the ecclesial communion or its cohesiveness with regard to the faith and moral theology. The instruction of the Roman Curie Donum veritatis of May 24th, 1990 enters in doctrine and in the procedure of regulation of the exercise of the freedom and the responsibility of the catholic theologian and the ecclesiastic to be met to ensure full communion. They are the criteria of orthodoxy, orthopraxy, ecclesial membership and communion.The question of the canonical status of theologians is debated and the catholic authority is obliged to specify the doctrine and the status of the catholic theologian. Does the code of Latin canon law of 1983 foresee rules for the regulation of the mission of the theologian according to the requirement of full ecclesial communion? A thesis in canon law was necessary to provide an initial assessment of the vocation of the catholic theologian, the institution of catholic theology, and the status of catholic theologians under Canon law. How does canonicity assist a faithful who, by the acquisition of recognized skills, wants to become a catholic theologian? How does one evaluate the suitability of the applicant? How to grant a candidate the status of theologian under Canon law and, if necessary, withdraw such status for the good of the Church? How does one guarantee the consciousness and the freedom of the catholic theologian? In case of differences of opinion or disagreement, how does one qualify this situation? Thus, the theologian enjoys liberties recognized by his Church but within the limits of the duty of communion described in canon # 209 § 1 of the Latin Code of 1983 and canon # 12 § 2 of the Code of the Oriental Churches’ Canons.