No description available.

The problem of disarmament is the problem of the effective management of power within international society. Force cannot be eliminated as a factor in international relations, but it can be controlled. And a disarmament convention - an agreement to limit and perhaps reduce national armaments - can secure this control by stabilizing the configuration of world power. The obstacles to the negotiation of a disarmament convention are political rather than technical, and at the World Disarmament Conference of 1932-4, the major problem was the reconciliation of French and German claims. Germany, disarmed by the Peace Treaty of 1919, demanded "equality of rights" with other nations while France demanded additional security guarantees before she would agree to limit her arms. The reconciliation of French and German claims was in Britain's interest, because her security depended, in part at least, on a stable and peaceful Continent. Yet the British Government followed a policy that was not conducive to a reconciliation. British Ministers refused to offer France security guarantees to compensate for the inevitable increase in German power accompanying a grant of equality of rights and this refusal was the major factor leading to the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference in 1934. The main reason for the refusal was that British Ministers subscribed to the putative existence of an international "harmony of interests". They assumed that each state had a common interest in peace and that this common interest was compatible with the pursuit of the national interest, and they therefore hoped that international problems could be settled without recourse to force or threat of force. This was a delusion. Although professing a desire to achieve their objectives by peaceful means, "revisionist" states - including Germany - were not averse to using or threatening force if it would lead to the fulfilment of their national ambitions. "Harmony of interests" was a very self-serving doctrine. It permitted Britain to exert a large measure of influence on the Continent with very few commitments and at little cost, allowing the Government to concentrate on defending Britain's more immediate interests - the security of the Empire and the protection of her trade routes. Thus, the various disarmament schemes put forward by the Government at Geneva were based almost solely on Britain's immediate interests and made little attempt at trying to reconcile the interests of France and Germany – the main problem facing the Disarmament Conference. The British public came to believe in the premise of a "harmony of interests" and in consequence, despite its overwhelming majority in the Commons, the Government found it difficult - or chose to find it difficult – to deviate from its policy of "no commitments". Britain was even averse to mediating between France and Germany. Although the two Continental Powers looked to Britain for help in solving their problems, the British Government refused to play the role of "honest broker" - except when the role was inescapable — and thus failed to take advantage of many excellent opportunities for concluding a Franco-German settlement. By adopting a policy which offered short-term advantages but little hope of a long-term settlement of European problems, Britain was instrumental in causing the failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. This study is based on the records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and the published diplomatic documents of Britain, France, Germany, America, and Belgium. Memoir sources, in general, were unhelpful, but did provide some useful information, as did a few unpublished documents from the Public Record Office, London provided by Dr. F. Marzari. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

This study investigates how the PRC, during the three decades since its establishment, has responded to international politics involving arms control and disarmament (ACD) issues, and explores the essence of China's approach to concepts of arms control and disarmament. The central finding is that, despite its seeming relaxation of hostility towards international ACD activities, and the more active and flexible part it has played in them at the UN since the mid-1970s, China remains unconvinced of the value of these activities. This does not make it dangerous, irrational or immature. Chapters Two to Five provide a comprehensive account of the history of Chinese ACD policy between 1949 and 1978. Each chapter represents a distinctive period of Chinese arms control policy. Although more interested in the banning of the use, rather than the possession, of atomic weapons, the PRC behaved at first as an uncritical disciple of Soviet ACD positions (Chapter Two). During the second period (Chapter Three), China became increasingly uneasy about international ACD efforts and began to deviate from the Soviet stance. Moscow's denial of concrete assistance to China's nuclear weapons development, and the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, eventually led the PRC into a period (Chapter Four) of open hostility towards nearly all international ACD initiatives. Then, in 1964, China's first nuclear test likewise radically changed its outlook on ACD matters. The final period (Chapter Five) examines its record at the UN in this regard, showing how the PRC was persuaded to commit itself to the Tlatelolco Treaty and to the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament. In conclusion, however, there is no evidence to suggest that the PRC has been committed to the concept of a disarmament process through arms control which both the US and the USSR, in their very different ways, have accepted. China has participated in international ACD negotiations while not really believing in their objectives, based as these are on a permanency of two superpowers. It is to be hoped that China's increasing involvement in the UN disarmament negotiation machinery will feed back into PRC policy-making and lead to a more positive and more willing participation in these ACD negotiations.

No description available.

The international community adopted DDR programs at the end of the Cold War in 1989 as a means to end violent conflicts in various parts of world. The traditional DDR programs were designed either to disband the defeated enemy forces, or to integrate excombatants where the fighting has not been conclusive. Exclusion of ex-combatants has resulted in renewed conflict. This thesis argues that conventional DDR has neglected two important aspects that are crucial for sustainable stability and societal reconciliation: military integration and a sensitization program. In contrast, an approach that integrates former enemy forces and equally reintegrates ex-combatants and government forces into civilian society not only ends violent conflict, but also bridges the social gap among ethnic groups and, consequently, enhances societal reconciliation. The Rwandan DDRI program considers integration/reintegration of ex-combatants that precedes the sensitization phase that takes 3-4 months; this has led to stability and reconciliation after the 1994 genocide. Ingando is a reconciliation tool that transforms negative perceptions that cause ethnic hatred; mitigates conflict influence factors; and manages defeat, shame, and remorse on the part of the loser. Therefore DDRI programs that integrate a sensitization program and exit strategy lead to sustainable stability and reconciliation.

This thesis sets out to explore the processes of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of female ex-combatants in Sierra Leone within the context of post-conflict peace building. International and local stakeholders including the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation Reintegration (NCDDR) and World Bank were responsible for DDR. The DDR of female adult combatants and girl soldiers was essential as part of the broader strategies to prevent the reoccurrence of violence and creating conditions for sustainable peace and development. It was aimed at transforming female ex-combatants into a civilian status congruent with peace after eleven years of horrific civil war in Sierra Leone that involved rebel forces, principally the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the government‘s Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The DDR process has been criticized in that female ex-combatants were often invisible and their needs disregarded. This study investigates the role of women in post-conflict peace building efforts, specifically DDR in Sierra Leone. Its nub is to critically assess the design, implementation and impact of the DDR of female ex-combatants. It focuses particularly on how female combatants are affected by current gender, security and international relations discourses. It assesses the progress made by the relevant international and local institutions in implementing international policies and guidelines on the DDR of female ex-combatants, in Sierra Leone; draws wider conclusions about achievements made and suggests lessons that may be applicable widely.

Abschaffen oder reformieren? Egal, wie die Frage beantwortet wird, die Zeit für die „alte“ NATO ist abgelaufen. Ob ihr ein strategischer Relaunch für das 21. Jahrhundert gelingt oder ob sie in den Bergen Afghanistan allmählich zerbröselt – das ist noch offen. Sicher ist jedoch, es bedarf der Debatte über die Zukunft dieser politisch-militärischen Organisation, von den Bürgern in allen NATO-Ländern und damit auch hier. Afghanistan, Abrüstung und Afrika sind weitere Themen dieses Heftes, das erneut zeigt, dass WeltTrends eine solide Plattform für streitbare Diskussionen um die deutsche Außenpolitik ist.

Mit diesem Appell unterstützen die ehemaligen Präsidenten Polens Lech Wałęsa und Aleksander Kwaśniewski sowie der ehemalige polnische Ministerpräsident Tadeusz Mazowiecki den Abrüstungsappell des neuen US-Präsidenten Barack Obama. Dieser hat das Ziel einer atomwaffenfreien Welt wieder auf die internationale Agenda gehoben. Angesichts ihrer historischen Erfahrungen befürworten die Polen diese Anti-Atomwaffen-Initiative. Um dieser mehr Rückenwind zu verleihen, könnte auch ein stärkeres Engagement führender deutscher Politiker nicht schaden.

<p>Översättning från engelska till italienska av Davide Ponzini.</p><p>Svensk titel i översättning: Återanvändningen av ett kasernområde i Sverige: Visborg, Gotland</p>

Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Canterbury, 2007. / Typescript (photocopy). "February 2007." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 219-237). Also available via the World Wide Web.