The liberal peace approach guided the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes under the auspices of the United Nations. While both practitioners and policymakers recognised that context fitted approaches are required, which resulted in the revision of DDR policy and practice, the driving principle approach remained the liberal peace theory, which creates a hierarchical relationship between the intervener and the intervened. I argue that applying the relational sensibility concept that places relations, dialogue, and hybridity in its focus can (potentially) contribute to a more effective locally designed, led, and implemented reintegration programme that is owned by the different stakeholders instead of imposed. Most reintegration programmes focused on the economic reintegration of ex combatants yielding limited results. I argue that social development for not only former combatants but also for youth at-risk of criminalisation is an essential element of reintegration. I probe the applicability of an alternative peace-building approach to the liberal peace that prioritises actions over relations by reviewing past DDR programmes and a specific case study in Somalia. I establish that an inclusive, community-based reintegration programme that focuses on the social rehabilitation and integration of vulnerable and at-risk youth by strengthening their social and spiritual capitals, as well as promotes restorative justice, can contribute to the decreased level of aggression at the individual level and the perceptions of the increased level of community security in Somalia. I conclude that DDR programmes both policy and practice, should look into more community-based approaches, inclusivity, and balancing between social and economic development opportunities.

The recent developments in negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe mark a watershed in attitudes towards nuclear deterrence and security. On the one side lie all the old beliefs and assumptions about nuclear defence and security that have been common parlance for the last forty years and more. On the other side lies a unique opportunity to develop a new relationship of increased mutual trust between East and West that could ultimately lead to substantial reductions in the world's nuclear arsenal. The object of this thesis is to establish how much information already exists about attitudes towards nuclear deterrence and the processes of attitude change. From there, to extend these boundaries of knowledge in the belief that if we are able to understand more exactly what people think about nuclear deterrence, why they hold these attitudes and how attitudes change then we will be in a better position to ease the transitional stage between one set of attitudes and another. / Barrow and Geraldine S. Cadbury Trust

This thesis examines the evolution of international humanitarian concern culminating in adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) banning these weapons in May 2008. It is based on systematic analysis of official documents, extensive interviews, participant-observation, and several bodies of international relations (IR) theory. Part I explains the research methodology and discusses the theoretical context for the thesis. It is argued that several core assumptions of rationalist-materialist approaches to IR theory impede understanding of the CCM¿s emergence, and thus the thesis adopts an interpretivist framework. The four chapters of Part II analyse international efforts on cluster munitions including prior, failed attempts to restrict cluster munitions, the emergence of an international campaign from 2003, ensuing activity involving states, international organisations and civil society, and the CCM¿s eventual negotiation involving more than 100 states. Part III marries this empirical account to theoretical analysis of four thesis propositions. It is concluded that non-state actor-engendered processes of evidence collection and analysis, learning and frame alignment were central to the Oslo process¿s emergence. The Oslo Declaration¿s particular humanitarian framing (to ban cluster munitions causing unacceptable harm to civilians) and the structure of the subsequent ¿define-and-ban¿ discourse permitted convergence between states over prohibiting these weapons. Nevertheless, they contain implications for other international efforts aimed at controlling means of armed violence.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for ex-combatants have become an important component of many, if not most, post-conflict stabilisation, peace-building and recovery programmes over the 15 – 20 years. They are specifically focussed on ‘ex-combatants’, a category which for DDR purposes includes direct ex-combatants and those closely associated with them including spouses, ‘camp followers’ and dependents. The experience with DDR has provided many lessons. International standards and good-practice guidelines for DDR have become relatively highly elaborated in recent years. The UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-Integration Standards (IDDRS) represent the fullest expression of this, composed of some 800 pages of detailed guidance to practitioners, as distilled by a special UN Inter-Agency Working Group and the work of dozens of international experts.1 Such standards are recently developed, and their adoption and usefulness has yet to be fully tested. One overall aim of this project is to critically examine the understandings informing such standards, and clarify how they may be revised or developed. It is clear that there are continuing problems in practice. For example, several recent UN-mandated DDR programmes have seriously struggled to establish an effective focus, and have in some cases had to be re-launched several times. Haiti and Southern Sudan provide two examples of this. Part of the problem is that DDR programmes are continuing to be mandated as if they can in themselves address much of a war-torn country’s post-conflict security building needs. In fact, DDR needs to be co-ordinated with a range of other post-conflict security building programmes, including Security Sector Reform (SSR), wider arms collection and management programmes, transitional justice, peace-building and reconciliation processes. DDR needs to be one of several peace and security-building programmes, all co-ordinated within the overall framework of a broad peace-building and recovery strategy and process.

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants constitutes one of the most crucial activities in a post-conflict peacebuilding context with important effects upon the wider transitional process from war to peace. The efficient implementation of DDR programmes can reassure belligerent parties of the possibility of a permanent cessation of hostilities, as they are often the most visible element of the peace agreement. Moreover, a well-planned and flexible reintegration process can also promote the viability of long-term peace locally, nationally and internationally.1 Since the end of the Cold War, DDR initiatives have been undertaken in more than 25 war-to-peace transition contexts: Afghanistan, Aceh, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), El Salvador, Eritrea, East Timor, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Liberia, Mindanao, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan and Uganda. In 2007, over 1,129,000 combatants were taking part in DDR programmes in 20 countries at an estimated cost of US$ 2 billion; one estimate suggests that it worked out to be around US$1,686 per ex-combatant. Some 2/3 of former combatants were from African countries; 42% were members of the armed forces and 58% belonged to armed militias, guerrilla groups and paramilitary groups. Of this statistic, nearly 10% were child soldiers.

This working paper explores reinsertion and reintegration processes and how these connect (or are expected to connect) with donor-led strategies for post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development. DDR has long been recognised as essential for post-conflict stability, but in the 2000s, there has been emphasis on enhancing the linkages between short-term, time-bound DDR process and long-term reconstruction and development programmes and processes in post-conflict states. The importance of situating reintegration into the wider context of long-term development has been stressed by the UN, whose best practice guidelines emphasise that reintegration should: 'support a broader national strategic plan for reconciliation, reconstruction and development.' This does not suggest a restructuring of DDR activities, which aim to establish an environment conducive to long-term economic development rather than fostering long-term development, but a bridging of short- and long-term agendas.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) have become a key component of the postconflict peacebuilding orthodoxy. Therefore, this study evaluates the efficacy of Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR) in conflict prevention and resolution using the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR programme as a case study. The study evaluated the effectiveness of the programme using the minimalist and maximalist framework advanced in the DDR literature. The key findings and conclusions of the Study were that a minimalist DDR would only achieve security stabilisation and return excombatants to the status quo- ante society with all the pre-conflict grievances unaddressed thereby bequeathing a high potential of relapse to violence. Furthermore, for DDR to be an effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanism and postconflict peacebuilding force, its conceptualisation, design and implementation must be maximalist in nature with a transformative agenda that aims to address the roots causes of violence.

Liberia emerged from 14 years of brutal civil conflict, demobilized and “reintegrated” large numbers of ex-combatants, but there are still concerns about ex-combatants’ re-engagement in violence. Yet, adequate knowledge and empirical evidence about this are still sketchy. Qualitative fieldwork among ex-combatants conducted in five locations in Monrovia from 2012-2013, suggests that ex-combatants are re-marginalized. This research presents excombatants’ current status, their re-marginalization, and factors indicative of their re-engagement in violence in post-conflict Liberia. The study contends that ex-combatants were apparently not satisfied with the outcome of the DDRR programme, as it failed to reintegrate them successfully. The study developed a four dimensional analytical framework that includes, (a) re-marginalization (b) re-criminalization (c) exploitation, and (d) economic insecurity, which are then applied to the outcome of the reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia. On the basis of the data collected in fieldwork, the analytical framework reveals how these factors and dynamics interacted and facilitated the occurrence of violence. The study argues that an awareness of ex-combatants’ vulnerability and re-marginalization should put state actors in a position to better predict their violent inclinations. It further notes that ex-combatant re-engagement in violence is largely manifested at the political and economic levels and this has the potential to lead to a renewed conflict if not mitigated. This study by no means completes the tasks of research and analysis on violence and excombatants, but it outlines theoretical propositions and conclusions, which can hopefully spark further debate and collective efforts among researchers to push this field of study forward.

Yes / In this report, we identify some of the key technical and political challenges currently facing the broader Chemical and Biological Weapon (CBW) regime- with a particular emphasis on major forthcoming diplomatic meetings. Most significantly the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (1972) (BTWC) which will take place in 2022 and preparations for the Fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) (CWC), expected in 2023. This report is an output of an ongoing project, designed to stimulate thinking and discussion about these issues, within relevant stakeholder communities. The report provides an introduction to this issue area for the general reader before surveying key issues and developing a series of practical policy suggestions for further consideration.

The purpose of this paper is to describe and explain the dynamics of the post-war British peace movement. This examination will account for, and link the two distinct phases of activity which encompassed at their peaks, the periods of 1958 to 1960, and 1981 to 1983. The defence issue declined in salience in the intervening years and was largely ignored. The paper sets out to account for these cycles of protest by determining four key factors; the creation of a potential clientele, the symbolic meaning of the movement, the catalytic historical events and the incentives for mobilisation. Three theories are used to explain these elements. Inglehart's 'Post-Materialism' thesis is utilised to explain the presence of a potential clientele in terms of a new value orientation that is emerging among post-war generations due to the unprecedented affluence experienced in their formative years. Parkin's case study of the first phase of the movement provides the symbolic protest element, that explains the salience of the peace movement to these post-materialists. It also suggests that the clientele's interest in the issue lasts as long as the issue is significant and that as soon as it declines other issues claim their attentions and energies. The final vital element is explained by adapting Olson's cost and benefit 'Collective Action' theory to this non-economic case. This theory suggests that the prominent peace movement organisation, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, provided and distributed vital selective incentives that motivated the existing clientele into protest activity. However, once the costs of non-achievement of policy goals add to the costs of protest activity (which are being raised by the radicalisation of tactics) and the organisation becomes inefficient at distributing these selective goods, the incentive to participate is removed and activity begins to decline. The combination of these three theories with the impact of historical atmosphere and a catalytic event creates a coherent explanation of the movement in both phases. / M.A.