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Quite apart from its apparent political obsolescence, the policy of nuclear deterrence is vulnerable to attack for its seemingly obvious immorality. Nuclear war is blatantly immoral, and nuclear deterrenec requires a genuine intention to resort to the nuclear retaliation which would precipitate such a war. Therefore, since it is wrong to intend that which is wrong to do, deterrence is immoral. This thesis seeks to examine the nature of the deterrent intention as a means of verifying the soundness of the above deontological argument. This examination is carried out by first suggesting an acceptable notion of intention in general and then, after analysing the views of deterrent intention by other writers, proceeding to demonstrate the uniqueness of that intention. Having done this, and having explored the possibility that deterrence need not contain a genuine intention to retaliate, the thesis moves on to suggest and defend a moral principle which states that endeavours requiring the formation of an immoral intention may nevertheless be moral. Called the Principle of Double Intention (and based on the Principle of Double Effect), it offers a method for the moral assessment of agents who form immoral intentions within larger contexts. By applying this principle to nuclear deterrence, it is demonstrated that agents who undertake such a policy may be morally justified in doing so, provided certain conditions are met. The thesis closes with a refutation of the objection that an agent cannot rationally form an intention (such as that required in deterrence) which he has no reason to carry out. By highlighting the objection's reliance on a claimed isomorphism between intention and belief, it is shown that the objection, while generally sound, does not apply to the special case of nuclear deterrence. The conclusion suggests a framework for disarmament which results in a deterrent force structure which is both strategically effective and morally acceptable.

Since the end of the Cold War, the emphasis on nuclear deterrence has declined. The rise of China has generated a voluminous literature on power transition theory and whether China and the United States can avoid the “Thucydides Trap.” A lacuna in this literature is the role that nuclear deterrence plays in the strategic dynamic between the United States, Japan, and China. This dissertation fills this lacuna by analyzing the role that nuclear deterrence plays in the military strategies of Japan, China, and the United States. How do China and Japan internalize and understand nuclear deterrence theory in ways that depart from the Cold War paradigm? What effect do dissimilar conceptions of nuclear deterrence theory have on the nuclear and conventional force structure and strategies of each country? To understand the reasons for variation in nuclear strategy in East Asia, I argue that contra systemic theories Japan legitimizes its military capabilities in an extended nuclear deterrence framework based on ideationally driven constitutional theory. Departing from Japan’s strategic mindset during the Cold War, China now occupies the place of the “Other” in Japanese national identity, thus in part explaining its shift to a more pro-active military posture. This is to say that it is not China’s rise that preoccupies Japan, but China’s rise that influences Japanese strategic behavior. Lastly, I argue that China’s assertive foreign policy behavior and nuclear strategy are driven not by structural incentives dictated by the international system, but by ideational and historical imperatives under the rubric of the “China Dream (zhongguo meng)” and “National Rejuvenation (minzu fuxing).” Using analyses of Japanese and Chinese language sources, e.g., official government and defense documents, newspapers, books, and journal articles, this dissertation makes two major contributions. First, departing from the dominant and acultural structural realist and game theoretic approaches to nuclear deterrence theory, it offers an alternative “thin constructivist approach” that considers distinct ideational determinants of each country’s approach to nuclear deterrence theory and their effect on nuclear strategy. Second, it uncovers dissimilar approaches to nuclear escalation that depart from Cold War-derived models.

The recent developments in negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe mark a watershed in attitudes towards nuclear deterrence and security. On the one side lie all the old beliefs and assumptions about nuclear defence and security that have been common parlance for the last forty years and more. On the other side lies a unique opportunity to develop a new relationship of increased mutual trust between East and West that could ultimately lead to substantial reductions in the world's nuclear arsenal. The object of this thesis is to establish how much information already exists about attitudes towards nuclear deterrence and the processes of attitude change. From there, to extend these boundaries of knowledge in the belief that if we are able to understand more exactly what people think about nuclear deterrence, why they hold these attitudes and how attitudes change then we will be in a better position to ease the transitional stage between one set of attitudes and another.

O presente trabalho desenvolve o tema da dissuasão nuclear, partindo de uma discussão teórica sobre alguns conceitos desenvolvidos pela escola neorrealista de Relações Internacionais. Especificamente entra em consideração a obra de Kenneth Waltz e de John Mearsheimer, com vistas à elucidação de termos como poder, polaridade e capacidade nuclear. Num segundo momento, para fazer um contraponto à escola neorrealista, são abordados autores dos Estudos Estratégicos, com destaque para Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Lawrence Freedman, Colin Gray e Eugenio Diniz. Procura-se retratar, entre outros fatores, a evolução do pensamento estratégico nuclear ao longo da Guerra Fria. O trabalho também é permeado por questões relacionadas com uma elaborada explanação do que vem a ser dissuasão nuclear, aqui entendida como capacidade de poder. Embora grande parte do esforço desse trabalho esteja voltada para questões de cunho teórico, o refinamento da literatura permite, inerentemente, que o debate se estenda para o campo prático/político. Verificar quais são os pré-requisitos para um país ser considerado uma potência nuclear, bem como o significado e as implicações práticas disso tudo, permeiam grande parte da presente pesquisa. Acima de tudo, cabe verificar quem a Índia é capaz de dissuadir com as suas forças estratégicas/nucleares. Após a apresentação de um breve panorama securitário do subcontinente indiano, para que se tenha uma maior e melhor compreensão do que levou a Índia a se nuclearizar, o capítulo final desenvolve o tópico das implicações da dissuasão nuclear como capacidade de poder, aplicado ao caso indiano. / This dissertation deals with the topic of nuclear deterrence and takes as its starting point a theoretical discussion of some of the concepts presented by the neorealist school of International Relations. In particular, this paper focuses on the work of Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, explaining terms like power, polarity and nuclear capacity. Secondly, in order to provide a kind of foil or counterpoint to the neorealist school, this dissertation presents the views of various authors from the field of Strategic Studies, particularly Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Lawrence Freedman, Colin Gray and Eugenio Diniz. Among other things, the investigation traces the evolution of nuclear strategic theory during the period of the Cold War. The dissertation also deals with issues related to the meaning of nuclear deterrence, seen here as power capability. Although the main focus of this research has to do with theoretical matters, the literature that was taken into consideration also allows one to branch out into the more practical field of politics. Thus, a good deal of the research centers on the prerequisites that have to be met before a nation can be considered a nuclear power and the meaning and practical implications of this. Above all, what needs clarification is whom or which countries India is able to deter with the nuclear or strategic power at its disposal. Therefore, after a brief presentation of the security landscape of the Indian subcontinent, which will allow one to gauge why India decided to go nuclear, the last chapter of this dissertation takes up the implications of nuclear deterrence as power capability, as it applies to India.

O presente trabalho desenvolve o tema da dissuasão nuclear, partindo de uma discussão teórica sobre alguns conceitos desenvolvidos pela escola neorrealista de Relações Internacionais. Especificamente entra em consideração a obra de Kenneth Waltz e de John Mearsheimer, com vistas à elucidação de termos como poder, polaridade e capacidade nuclear. Num segundo momento, para fazer um contraponto à escola neorrealista, são abordados autores dos Estudos Estratégicos, com destaque para Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Lawrence Freedman, Colin Gray e Eugenio Diniz. Procura-se retratar, entre outros fatores, a evolução do pensamento estratégico nuclear ao longo da Guerra Fria. O trabalho também é permeado por questões relacionadas com uma elaborada explanação do que vem a ser dissuasão nuclear, aqui entendida como capacidade de poder. Embora grande parte do esforço desse trabalho esteja voltada para questões de cunho teórico, o refinamento da literatura permite, inerentemente, que o debate se estenda para o campo prático/político. Verificar quais são os pré-requisitos para um país ser considerado uma potência nuclear, bem como o significado e as implicações práticas disso tudo, permeiam grande parte da presente pesquisa. Acima de tudo, cabe verificar quem a Índia é capaz de dissuadir com as suas forças estratégicas/nucleares. Após a apresentação de um breve panorama securitário do subcontinente indiano, para que se tenha uma maior e melhor compreensão do que levou a Índia a se nuclearizar, o capítulo final desenvolve o tópico das implicações da dissuasão nuclear como capacidade de poder, aplicado ao caso indiano. / This dissertation deals with the topic of nuclear deterrence and takes as its starting point a theoretical discussion of some of the concepts presented by the neorealist school of International Relations. In particular, this paper focuses on the work of Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, explaining terms like power, polarity and nuclear capacity. Secondly, in order to provide a kind of foil or counterpoint to the neorealist school, this dissertation presents the views of various authors from the field of Strategic Studies, particularly Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Lawrence Freedman, Colin Gray and Eugenio Diniz. Among other things, the investigation traces the evolution of nuclear strategic theory during the period of the Cold War. The dissertation also deals with issues related to the meaning of nuclear deterrence, seen here as power capability. Although the main focus of this research has to do with theoretical matters, the literature that was taken into consideration also allows one to branch out into the more practical field of politics. Thus, a good deal of the research centers on the prerequisites that have to be met before a nation can be considered a nuclear power and the meaning and practical implications of this. Above all, what needs clarification is whom or which countries India is able to deter with the nuclear or strategic power at its disposal. Therefore, after a brief presentation of the security landscape of the Indian subcontinent, which will allow one to gauge why India decided to go nuclear, the last chapter of this dissertation takes up the implications of nuclear deterrence as power capability, as it applies to India.

O presente trabalho desenvolve o tema da dissuasão nuclear, partindo de uma discussão teórica sobre alguns conceitos desenvolvidos pela escola neorrealista de Relações Internacionais. Especificamente entra em consideração a obra de Kenneth Waltz e de John Mearsheimer, com vistas à elucidação de termos como poder, polaridade e capacidade nuclear. Num segundo momento, para fazer um contraponto à escola neorrealista, são abordados autores dos Estudos Estratégicos, com destaque para Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Lawrence Freedman, Colin Gray e Eugenio Diniz. Procura-se retratar, entre outros fatores, a evolução do pensamento estratégico nuclear ao longo da Guerra Fria. O trabalho também é permeado por questões relacionadas com uma elaborada explanação do que vem a ser dissuasão nuclear, aqui entendida como capacidade de poder. Embora grande parte do esforço desse trabalho esteja voltada para questões de cunho teórico, o refinamento da literatura permite, inerentemente, que o debate se estenda para o campo prático/político. Verificar quais são os pré-requisitos para um país ser considerado uma potência nuclear, bem como o significado e as implicações práticas disso tudo, permeiam grande parte da presente pesquisa. Acima de tudo, cabe verificar quem a Índia é capaz de dissuadir com as suas forças estratégicas/nucleares. Após a apresentação de um breve panorama securitário do subcontinente indiano, para que se tenha uma maior e melhor compreensão do que levou a Índia a se nuclearizar, o capítulo final desenvolve o tópico das implicações da dissuasão nuclear como capacidade de poder, aplicado ao caso indiano. / This dissertation deals with the topic of nuclear deterrence and takes as its starting point a theoretical discussion of some of the concepts presented by the neorealist school of International Relations. In particular, this paper focuses on the work of Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, explaining terms like power, polarity and nuclear capacity. Secondly, in order to provide a kind of foil or counterpoint to the neorealist school, this dissertation presents the views of various authors from the field of Strategic Studies, particularly Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Lawrence Freedman, Colin Gray and Eugenio Diniz. Among other things, the investigation traces the evolution of nuclear strategic theory during the period of the Cold War. The dissertation also deals with issues related to the meaning of nuclear deterrence, seen here as power capability. Although the main focus of this research has to do with theoretical matters, the literature that was taken into consideration also allows one to branch out into the more practical field of politics. Thus, a good deal of the research centers on the prerequisites that have to be met before a nation can be considered a nuclear power and the meaning and practical implications of this. Above all, what needs clarification is whom or which countries India is able to deter with the nuclear or strategic power at its disposal. Therefore, after a brief presentation of the security landscape of the Indian subcontinent, which will allow one to gauge why India decided to go nuclear, the last chapter of this dissertation takes up the implications of nuclear deterrence as power capability, as it applies to India.

No description available.

The recent developments in negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe mark a watershed in attitudes towards nuclear deterrence and security. On the one side lie all the old beliefs and assumptions about nuclear defence and security that have been common parlance for the last forty years and more. On the other side lies a unique opportunity to develop a new relationship of increased mutual trust between East and West that could ultimately lead to substantial reductions in the world's nuclear arsenal. The object of this thesis is to establish how much information already exists about attitudes towards nuclear deterrence and the processes of attitude change. From there, to extend these boundaries of knowledge in the belief that if we are able to understand more exactly what people think about nuclear deterrence, why they hold these attitudes and how attitudes change then we will be in a better position to ease the transitional stage between one set of attitudes and another. / Barrow and Geraldine S. Cadbury Trust

Yes / This briefing paper is the second in a series to be published during 2007 and 2008 as part of the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre¿s programme on Nuclear-Armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability.