L’Irish Republican Army (IRA), le principal groupe paramilitaire républicain, fut fondé en 1969. Dès lors, il lutta contre la présence britannique en Irlande du Nord et pour la réunification de l’île d’Irlande. Le désarmement de l’IRA, considéré comme irréalisable jusqu’en 2001, s’accomplit pourtant bel et bien entre 2001 et 2005 dans le cadre du processus de paix. Le 26 septembre 2005, l’IRA avait officiellement déposé les armes. Quels mécanismes avaient alors permis, au sein du processus de paix nord-irlandais, d’aboutir à la "mise hors d’état de nuire" de l’arsenal de l’IRA qui déclarait pourtant encore en 1998 qu’il n’accepterait pas de rendre les armes ? Comme l’annonce le titre de cette thèse, trois questions sous-tendent notre analyse : quels étaient les enjeux de l’abandon de la violence et du désarmement pour l’IRA et le Sinn Féin durant tout le processus de paix ? Quelle était la portée symbolique du désarmement pour le groupe armé clandestin et pour le mouvement républicain dans son ensemble ? Enfin, quels mécanismes, tant diplomatiques que psychologiques, avaient pu convaincre l’IRA d’abandonner la violence puis de désarmer ? À la demande du groupe clandestin, la nature du dispositif de désarmement et le nombre d’armes détruites demeurent confidentiels. Cette étude ne prétend donc pas révéler des secrets d’État, mais bien de mettre en évidence la dynamique du processus qui a mené l’IRA de la violence armée à l’abandon des armes. / The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the main Republican paramilitary group in Northern Ireland was founded in 1969. From then on it fought to put an end to the British presence in Northern Ireland and to achieve the unification of Ireland. The decommissioning of the IRA, which seemed unrealizable until 2001, was indeed accomplished between 2001 and 2005, as part of the Peace Process. On 26 September 2005, the IRA officially laid down its weapons. What mechanisms played a role in the IRA putting its arsenal beyond use during the Northern Ireland Peace Process, despite the armed group’s declaration in 1998 that there would be no disarmament? As mentioned in the title of this thesis, three questions underlie our analysis: What was at stake in the giving up of violence and in decommissioning for the IRA and Sinn Féin during the Peace Process? What was the symbolic significance of decommissioning for the IRA and for the whole Republican movement? Finally, what diplomatic and psychological mechanisms managed to convince the IRA to give up violence and then to disarm? At the clandestine group’s own request, the technical aspects of decommissioning and the number of arms which were destroyed still remain confidential. Therefore, this study does not reveal any State secrets, but rather underlines the dynamics of the process which led the IRA from armed violence to the giving up of arms.

La prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre est un phénomène nouvellement saisi par le droit international. En tant que menace pour la paix et la sécurité internationale, elle fait, depuis la fin de la guerre froide, l’objet d’attentions grandissantes. Tout d’abord abordée par des organisations internationales régionales, elle constitue désormais le domaine d’action privilégié de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en matière de désarmement. Néanmoins, la construction d’une lutte contre la prolifération ambitieuse et cohérente est difficile et doit faire face à des oppositions nombreuses justifiées par des intérêts étatiques profondément divergents. Le corpus normatif adopté est donc sujet à d’importantes limites et insuffisances. Par ailleurs, les instruments classiques de l’ordre juridique international apparaissent inaptes à garantir l’effectivité de ces nouvelles règles qui étendent le champ du droit international. La lutte contre la prolifération nécessite, pour être effective, de reposer sur des mécanismes plus approfondis que ceux régissant le droit international de la coopération duquel les règles classiques de désarmement étaient jusqu’alors issues. / The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has only recently been inquired into by international law. As for threatening the global peace and security, it has increasingly been scrutinized since the end of the Cold War. First handled by regional international organizations, it henceforth constitutes, regarding disarmament, the elected field of action for the United Nations. Structuring, nevertheless, an ambitious and coherent action against this proliferation appears quite challenging and has thus to overcome numerous oppositions grounded in profoundly diverging static interests. The current body of norms appears rather limited and inadequate. Furthermore, the classical instruments of the international legal order do not seem suitable to secure the effectiveness of those recent norms that expand the reach of international law. Successfully acting against this proliferation requires to relying on mechanisms that are deeper than the current international law of cooperation, and out of which the classical rules of disarmament have been hitherto extracted.

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to explain why states obtain nuclear weapons and the role various</p><p>actors and interests play in the making of states´ nuclear policies. The main questions are as</p><p>follows: (1) What big theories exist concerning states obtaining nuclear weapon and nuclear</p><p>armament in International Relations and what relevance do they have of the post cold-war period?,</p><p>(2) What is the meaning of the perspective of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC)?, and (3)Are</p><p>there empirical studies which supports the existence of a MIC in the United States?</p><p>The focus lies on actors and driving forces that are internal to states and it is also important to</p><p>investigate if the theories have relevance for the post 9/11-era. The study uses the method of</p><p>qualitative literature-study with some quantitative segments. It is claimed that states might be</p><p>interested in justifying their behaviour in a morally appealing way and that real reasons may be</p><p>hidden. There are many reasons for states to obtain and keep nuclear weapons and related</p><p>technology (which includes many of the most lucrative elements of the arms industry´s sales).</p><p>Among this reasons are that arms and related technology may be used to influence other states and</p><p>nuclear weapons-construction and modernisation might be used to protect the state from external</p><p>threats, stop unwanted interference from other actors, secure job and gain recognition and prestige</p><p>in world politics. For security reasons states might hold onto their own nuclear weapons and try to</p><p>hinder other actors from getting access to them. The internal actors and driving forces we look at</p><p>are bureaucratic, economical and political, and the MIC-perspective. The military can be said to</p><p>have interests in as much resources and capabilities as possible, which includes advanced</p><p>weaponary such as nuclear weapons and related technologies, at its disposal because of the goal to</p><p>defend the state from all possible threats and for officers career reasons. Much of its influence is</p><p>said to come from its expert knowledge and position and it is said to be especially influential in</p><p>matters of foreign policy, military spending and foreign policy. The major economical actors</p><p>mentioned are big corporations involved in military spending and these have interests in</p><p>maximizing profits. Nuclear weapons making and maintenance and the related areas of missile</p><p>defense and delivering methods for nuclear weapons seem to be areas with high changes of being</p><p>profitable for the involved major companies. The actors wield influence for example through</p><p>lobbying and campaign contributions. An economic driving force claim is that state spending is</p><p>necessary for stimulating the economy and defense spending is easily justified in other ways.</p><p>Political actors and driving forces concerns politicians interest in promoting the interests of</p><p>supporting groups, there are indications that the weapon industry is such a group. Research have</p><p>shown various results about the extent politicians tend to further the interests of supporting groups.</p><p>The MIC-perspective talks about groups with interest in high levels of military spending. Most</p><p>researchers seem to agree that the complex exists but there are different opinions about what actors</p><p>belongs to it and its power on various issues. There is some mention of the core of the complex</p><p>consisting of such internal actors as mentioned above. MIC-related empirical research has been</p><p>conducted and this author finds that the MIC is a relevant analytical tool for the post cold war – and</p><p>9/11 era.</p>

No description available.

In 1936 the founders of PAX aimed at 'resistance to modern warfare on grounds of traditional morality'. Believing that 'just war' criteria could no longer be met, they called themselves pacifists. Although most members were Roman Catholic Pax did not claim to be a 'Catholic society' because the RC Church at that time took an opposing view, particularly of conscientious objection. Church authorities attempted to censor Pax literature and instructed clergy to resign from the society. Pax supported conscientious objectors during the Second World War. When membership declined afterwards it continued to publish the Pax Bulletin and to provide a forum where Catholics could debate theological and practical questions of war and peace. By the 1960s Pax had gained some distinguished sponsors and a branch in the United States - support which enabled it to influence debate at the Second Vatican Council in 1965. The Council endorsed the right to conscientious objection. In 1971 Pax merged with Pax Christi, the international Catholic peace organisation which began in France in 1944/45. This is the first detailed historical study of the Roman Catholic element in the British peace movement. The story of Pax demonstrates the part that even a small pressure group can play in changing public opinion through patient work. Eventually, despite apathy and opposition, Pax helped bring the RC Church to a recognition of the right to conscientious objection and played a crucial role in the development of a more widespread peace movement within the Church

A partir da década de 1990, quando se concretizaram as iniciativas de controle da proliferação de armas químicas, biológicas e nucleares, estudiosos do ramo do desarmamento passaram a alertar a comunidade internacional a respeito dos perigos inerentes à falta de controle do comércio e da circulação de armas convencionais pelo planeta. Mais especificamente, no novo cenário internacional inaugurado com o final da Guerra Fria, diante da multiplicação de casos de genocídio em inúmeros países da África e da Ásia, do crime organizado, do tráfico de drogas e do aumento da violência armada em diversos países do mundo, o acúmulo excessivo, a proliferação irrestrita e o desvio à ilicitude de armas de fogo pequenas e leves (AP/AL) passaram a fazer parte do rol de ameaças à paz e à segurança em múltiplos níveis. Intensificaram-se, diante disso, as ações da comunidade internacional para prevenir, combater e erradicar a proliferação e o comércio ilícito de AP/AL. Em 2001, a ONU adotou um Programa de Ação que inaugurou o processo de construção de um regime próprio para tal finalidade, que implica, entre outros, a adoção de medidas que dificultam e restringem o comércio lícito de tais produtos. O Brasil é um dos Estados mais afetados pela violência armada cotidiana e é, ao mesmo tempo, dono de uma das mais expressivas indústrias de AP/AL do mundo. No plano doméstico, diversos atores interessados, respectivamente, em mais segurança para a população e/ou em mais lucro para a indústria bélica nacional, trabalham no sentido de influenciar Política Externa brasileira, que, desde 2001, vem apresentando o Brasil como favorável à continuidade e à ampliação do processo. / Since the 1990s, when the attempts to control the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons achieved a solid status, scholars from the disarmament realm have been warning the international community about the dangers of the lack of control that surrounds the trade of conventional arms around the planet. More specifically - in the post-cold scenario - in virtue of the multiplication of cases of genocide in Africa and Asia, and of organized crime, drug trafficking and the rise of armed violence levels in several countries of the world, the excessive accumulation and proliferation, as well as the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) were incorporated to list of threats to peace and security in different levels. As a result one can observe the intensification of the international community actions aimed at the prevention, the combat and the eradication of the proliferation and the illicit trade of SA/LW. In 2001, the United Nations adopted a Programme of Action that inaugurated the process of construction of a specific regime for those objectives, which implies, inter alias, the adoption of trade-restrictive measures to the field. Brazil is one of the most affected States by daily armed violence and also has one of the most relevant SA/LW industries of the world. In the domestic level, several actors interested in more security for the population on the one hand, and/or interested in more profit for the arms industry on the other, have worked to influence the Brazilian Foreign Policy which since 2001 presents the country as supportive of the continuation and the deepening of the process.

A partir da década de 1990, quando se concretizaram as iniciativas de controle da proliferação de armas químicas, biológicas e nucleares, estudiosos do ramo do desarmamento passaram a alertar a comunidade internacional a respeito dos perigos inerentes à falta de controle do comércio e da circulação de armas convencionais pelo planeta. Mais especificamente, no novo cenário internacional inaugurado com o final da Guerra Fria, diante da multiplicação de casos de genocídio em inúmeros países da África e da Ásia, do crime organizado, do tráfico de drogas e do aumento da violência armada em diversos países do mundo, o acúmulo excessivo, a proliferação irrestrita e o desvio à ilicitude de armas de fogo pequenas e leves (AP/AL) passaram a fazer parte do rol de ameaças à paz e à segurança em múltiplos níveis. Intensificaram-se, diante disso, as ações da comunidade internacional para prevenir, combater e erradicar a proliferação e o comércio ilícito de AP/AL. Em 2001, a ONU adotou um Programa de Ação que inaugurou o processo de construção de um regime próprio para tal finalidade, que implica, entre outros, a adoção de medidas que dificultam e restringem o comércio lícito de tais produtos. O Brasil é um dos Estados mais afetados pela violência armada cotidiana e é, ao mesmo tempo, dono de uma das mais expressivas indústrias de AP/AL do mundo. No plano doméstico, diversos atores interessados, respectivamente, em mais segurança para a população e/ou em mais lucro para a indústria bélica nacional, trabalham no sentido de influenciar Política Externa brasileira, que, desde 2001, vem apresentando o Brasil como favorável à continuidade e à ampliação do processo. / Since the 1990s, when the attempts to control the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons achieved a solid status, scholars from the disarmament realm have been warning the international community about the dangers of the lack of control that surrounds the trade of conventional arms around the planet. More specifically - in the post-cold scenario - in virtue of the multiplication of cases of genocide in Africa and Asia, and of organized crime, drug trafficking and the rise of armed violence levels in several countries of the world, the excessive accumulation and proliferation, as well as the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) were incorporated to list of threats to peace and security in different levels. As a result one can observe the intensification of the international community actions aimed at the prevention, the combat and the eradication of the proliferation and the illicit trade of SA/LW. In 2001, the United Nations adopted a Programme of Action that inaugurated the process of construction of a specific regime for those objectives, which implies, inter alias, the adoption of trade-restrictive measures to the field. Brazil is one of the most affected States by daily armed violence and also has one of the most relevant SA/LW industries of the world. In the domestic level, several actors interested in more security for the population on the one hand, and/or interested in more profit for the arms industry on the other, have worked to influence the Brazilian Foreign Policy which since 2001 presents the country as supportive of the continuation and the deepening of the process.

A partir da década de 1990, quando se concretizaram as iniciativas de controle da proliferação de armas químicas, biológicas e nucleares, estudiosos do ramo do desarmamento passaram a alertar a comunidade internacional a respeito dos perigos inerentes à falta de controle do comércio e da circulação de armas convencionais pelo planeta. Mais especificamente, no novo cenário internacional inaugurado com o final da Guerra Fria, diante da multiplicação de casos de genocídio em inúmeros países da África e da Ásia, do crime organizado, do tráfico de drogas e do aumento da violência armada em diversos países do mundo, o acúmulo excessivo, a proliferação irrestrita e o desvio à ilicitude de armas de fogo pequenas e leves (AP/AL) passaram a fazer parte do rol de ameaças à paz e à segurança em múltiplos níveis. Intensificaram-se, diante disso, as ações da comunidade internacional para prevenir, combater e erradicar a proliferação e o comércio ilícito de AP/AL. Em 2001, a ONU adotou um Programa de Ação que inaugurou o processo de construção de um regime próprio para tal finalidade, que implica, entre outros, a adoção de medidas que dificultam e restringem o comércio lícito de tais produtos. O Brasil é um dos Estados mais afetados pela violência armada cotidiana e é, ao mesmo tempo, dono de uma das mais expressivas indústrias de AP/AL do mundo. No plano doméstico, diversos atores interessados, respectivamente, em mais segurança para a população e/ou em mais lucro para a indústria bélica nacional, trabalham no sentido de influenciar Política Externa brasileira, que, desde 2001, vem apresentando o Brasil como favorável à continuidade e à ampliação do processo. / Since the 1990s, when the attempts to control the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons achieved a solid status, scholars from the disarmament realm have been warning the international community about the dangers of the lack of control that surrounds the trade of conventional arms around the planet. More specifically - in the post-cold scenario - in virtue of the multiplication of cases of genocide in Africa and Asia, and of organized crime, drug trafficking and the rise of armed violence levels in several countries of the world, the excessive accumulation and proliferation, as well as the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) were incorporated to list of threats to peace and security in different levels. As a result one can observe the intensification of the international community actions aimed at the prevention, the combat and the eradication of the proliferation and the illicit trade of SA/LW. In 2001, the United Nations adopted a Programme of Action that inaugurated the process of construction of a specific regime for those objectives, which implies, inter alias, the adoption of trade-restrictive measures to the field. Brazil is one of the most affected States by daily armed violence and also has one of the most relevant SA/LW industries of the world. In the domestic level, several actors interested in more security for the population on the one hand, and/or interested in more profit for the arms industry on the other, have worked to influence the Brazilian Foreign Policy which since 2001 presents the country as supportive of the continuation and the deepening of the process.

As part of the peacebuilding measures in scenarios of transformation from civil conflict to a state of post-conflict, the control of hostile forces constitutes a risky, yet necessary process. In such contexts there is also a concern to generate strong ties and incentives that minimize the recurrence of violence. For this purpose reconciliation emerges as a condition for long-lasting peace. This concept eventually requires that armed actors, victimized subjects and society in general agree on critical points and become able to live together. For former combatants these steps are especially challenging since they are confronted by an adverse environment that requires the assumption of new codes of conduct that are no longer ruled by any sort of weaponry. With this puzzle in mind, this study enquired about the extent to which social contact is likely to influence the perspectives of reconciliation held by demobilized combatants immerse in an institutional scheme of DDR. In order to gather a comprehensive discussion around this question, this thesis observed the Colombian DDR process, gathering unique empirical data from individuals exposed to varying degrees of contact. From the information collected and its qualitative analysis, it was found that inter-group interactions are able to promote deep understanding about out-groups; nonetheless, extended contact along ongoing hostilities does not ensure complete transformation of misperceptions, even among subjects coming to the end of their reintegration process.

Between 1999 and 2009 the Swedish Armed Forces underwent an immense reformation. This thesis aims to contribute to the discussion on small state foreign policy behaviour within the wider field of international relations by explaining why Sweden decided to reform their national defence from an invasion-based defence to a mission-based defence. Using a neoclassical realist approach and a process tracing methodology, two hypotheses are tested to analyze a predicted causal relationship between systemic imperatives, the search for influence, and the decision to reform the Armed Forces. The first hypothesis is that when a state’s relative power rises it will initially seek, but ultimately attempt to gain, more influence abroad. The second hypothesis is that the search for influence is the driving force behind the reformation of the Armed Forces. The analysis corroborates both hypotheses, although the former with a relative amount of uncertainty, and argues that both system and intervening unit-level variables matter. The main conclusion is that the favourable situation in the international system has permitted an increased search for influence. This search for influence has in turn been the driving force behind the reformation. Since the first hypothesis has a relative amount of uncertainty connected to it, the certainty of the conclusions in this thesis can be discussed, and must therefore be subject to further empirical research.