Thesis (MA )--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Understanding a risk is the first step in managing and mitigating it. Maritime insecurity has been an integrated risk for investors in the Gulf of Guinea for many years. But what do investors know about the nature of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, besides a general risk rating? This thesis conceptualises and maps the maritime political risks in the Gulf of Guinea in order to give investors a better understanding of the nature of maritime political risk for the offshore oil and gas industry in the Gulf of Guinea. This conceptualisation is based on identifying the actors and actions of maritime security, i.e. people create maritime insecurity and identifying the people behind maritime insecurity provides valuable information for management and mitigation strategies. These actors create maritime insecurity by using a variety of actions, i.e. identifying these actions tells the investor more about the nature of maritime insecurity. However, there are also actors that contribute to maritime security and these actors use a set of actions to make maritime security a reality. In summary, this thesis creates a maritime political risk tool where one axis consists of actors contributing positively and/or negatively to maritime security and another axis that consists of actions these actors employ. This is done by providing the reader with a strong understanding of the theory behind political risk and conceptualising relevant concepts. The thesis contextualises maritime security, the offshore oil and gas industry and general political risks in the Gulf of Guinea. On this foundation, the maritime political risk tool is created by extrapolating information from four political risk companies: Aon, Control Risk, Bergen Risk Solution and Risk Intelligence. The maritime political risk actors and actions are also identified. The maritime political risk tool is applied to the case of the Gulf of Guinea. The conclusion is that conceptualising and mapping maritime political risk can improve management and mitigation strategies. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die verstaan van ‘n risiko is die eerste stap in die bestuur en beheer daarvan. Maritieme onveiligheid is al vir jare 'n geïntegreerde risiko vir beleggers in die Golf van Guinee, maar wat weet beleggers werklik oor die aard van die gebied van maritieme onveiligheid in die Golf van Guinee, behalwe vir ʼn risikogradering? Hierdie tesis konseptualiseer die maritieme politieke risiko's in die Golf van Guinee om vir beleggers 'n beter begrip van die aard van maritieme politieke risiko's in die aflandige olie- en gasindustrie in die Golf van Guinee te gee. Hierdie konseptualisering is gebaseer op die identifisering van die akteurs en die aksies betrokke by maritieme veiligheid, d.w.s. maritieme onveiligheid word geskep deur mense. Die identifisering van die mense wat maritieme onveiligheid skep, bied waardevolle inligting tot bestuurs- en beheerstrategieë aan. Die akteurs van maritieme onveiligheid skep onsekerheid deur die gebruik van 'n verskeidenheid van aksies, dit wil sê die identifisering van hierdie aksies gee die belegger meer inligting oor die aard van maritieme onveiligheid. Daar is egter ook akteurs wat bydra tot die gebied van maritieme veiligheid. Dié akteurs gebruik 'n reeks van aksies om veiligheid op see 'n werklikheid te maak. Om op te som, skep hierdie tesis 'n maritieme politiese risiko instrument waar die een as uit akteurs bestaan wat 'n positiewe en / of negatiewe bydra tot maritieme veiligheid maak, en die ander as bestaan uit die gebeure wat hierdie akteurs in diens kan neem. Dit word gedoen deur die leser met 'n sterk begrip van politieke risiko teorie te voorsien, asook om relevante konsepte duidelik te konseptualiseer. Dié tesis kontekstualiseer maritieme veiligheid, die aflandige olie- en gasindustrie en politieke risiko soortgelyk met betrekking tot die Golf van Guinee. Op hierdie fondament word die maritieme politieke risiko instrument geskep deur die ekstrapolering van inligting uit vier politieke risiko maatskappye: Aon, Control Risk, Bergen Risk Solution en Risk Intelligence. Die maritieme politieke risiko akteurs en aksies word ookgeïdentifiseer. Verder word die maritieme politieke risiko-instrument toegepas op die geval van die Golf van Guinee. Die gevolgtrekking wat bereik word, is dat die konseptualisering en die kartering van akteurs en aksies, maritieme politieke risiko, bestuur- en versagtingstrategieë kan verbeter.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Somalia continues to intrigue scholars and policy-makers around the world, due to the fact that it is enduring what few others have, total state collapse. Not only does the situation defy easy explanation, the degree of state failure is unprecedented. After more than two decades without a functioning central authority, Somalia is now the longest-running instance of state collapse in postcolonial history. While researching and understanding state weakness and state failure is critical, it is useless unless combined with devising ways to prevent state failure in the future. Somalia provides policy makers with a unique opportunity to study the consequences of state collapse. Understanding the complex dynamics of state weakness and state collapse could ultimately help save the lives of thousands of people on the African continent. This study focuses on the mechanisms of coping by analysing the actors who have stepped up to fill the political vacuum left behind by the collapsing state. The role played by both state and non-state actors will be explored throughout this study. As it is not possible to address every actor who has played a part in Somalia since the implosion of the state in 1991, only the three most important internal and external actors will be analysed. The role played by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) will be discussed at length. The contributions made by neighbouring country Ethiopia, will also be investigated. Although the contributions and the impact of these external actors have in some instances led to undesired results, it does not change the fact that these actors attempted to fill the void in Somalia. Non-state actors positions within Somalia will also be examined in detailed. These actors include regional authorities, the role of Al-Shabaab, as well as the Islamic Courts Union. The study does not excuse the behaviour of these actors but rather discusses the rise of these organizations in light of the collapsing state and the position which they have taken up in Somalia to fill the political void. Lastly the role of the “Somali coast guards” also known as the Somali pirates, will be discussed.ipti / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Somalië bly die brandpunt van belangstelling vir geleerdes en beleidmakers dwarsoor die wêreld. Die hoofrede hiervoor is dat hierdie land ervaar het wat min ander lande het, naamlik algehele ineenstorting van die staat en bestuur. ‘n Maklike verduideliking of vereenvoudiging van die situasie is daar nie, want die ongeëwenaarde ineenstorting van stuktuur en staat, van Somalië is uniek. Twee dekades later is hierdie land nogsteeds sonder ‘n funksioneerende gesetelde staatsgesag. Hierdie tydperk is die langste voorbeeld van staatsineenstorting sonder herstel in post-koloniale geskiedenis. Navorsing en insig in elke staat se inherente swakhede en probleme help om mislukte bestuur te voorspel en te voorkom. Hierdie inligting moet korrek geimplimenteer en geinterpreteer word om krissise en mislukkings binne staatsbestel te verhoed. Somalië bied beleidmakers ‘n unieke geleentheid om die gevolge van totale staatsineenstorting te bestudeer en daaruit te leer. Net deur middel van begrip vir die komplekse dinamika van ‘n staat wat ineenstort en deur wanbestuur verswak word, sal daar uikoms vir duisende mense op hierdie vasteland kom. Sodoende sal ontelbare lewens in Afrika gered kan word. Hierdie studie analiseer die tegnieke van aanpassing, gebruik deur die rolspelers wat die politieke vakuum vul, wat deur die staatineenstorting nagelaat is. Die ondersoek fokus ook op die impak en effekte van beide interne en eksterne rolspelers. Aangesien dit onmoontlik is om die aandeel wat elke rolspeler sedert die ineenstorting van Somalië in 1991 gehad het te bestudeer, word net die drie belangrikste interne en eksterne rolspelers bespreek. Die Verenigde Nasies (VN), Afrika Unie (AU) en die buurland Ethiopië se bydraes sal ondersoek word. Alhoewel die bydraes en insette van hierdie eksterne rolspelers soms tot ongewenste resultate gelei het, bly die feit staan dat hulle probeer het om die leemtes in Somalië te vul. Ander belangrike rolspelers wat nie deel van die plaaslike regering is nie, sal ook in diepte bespreek word. Hierdie invloede binne Somalië sluit streeksowerhede in, asook die rol van Al Shabaab en die Islamitiese Howe Unie. Die studie verskoon nie die gedrag van die rolspelers nie, maar bespreek eerder die opkoms van hierdie organisasies. Dit word alles gesien in die lig van die ineenstorting van die staat en die posisie wat hulle in Somalië geneem het om mag te bekom en die politieke leemte te vul. Ten slotte word die omstrede rol van die "Somaliese kuswagte", anders bekend as Somaliese seerowers, bespreek.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / No abstract provided.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Strategies for South Africa’s development are often analysed from a predominantly economic perspective, overlooking the key role that political and sociocultural elements play in the developmental process. This study will assess possible development strategies by making use of the modern world-systems (MWS) theoretical perspective, due to the theory’s holistic approach to development. The question is posed whether South Africa – in accordance with the MWS perspective – will be able to ascend from its current semi-peripheral position in the hierarchy of the modern world-system to the core group of states by 2025. The components for national development are all-encompassing and require an increase in state strength, long-term economic development, and domestic and international sociocultural influence. Prospects for South Africa’s ascent to the core have been explored within a 15-20 year time period because the capitalist world-economy is currently still in a phase of contraction, or B-phase of growth (1973-2025). The modern world-systems theoretical approach asserts that country mobility is more likely during this phase and that ascent in the hierarchy will be increasingly difficult when the world-economy begins its expansionary phase around 2025. The study concludes that South Africa faces numerous external and internal constraints to its development, despite the noteworthy economic, political and sociocultural incentives that it could potentially capitalise on over the next fifteen years. It is anticipated that these constraints will place the country in a position whereby it will be unable to reap the benefits of the most optimal developmental strategies put forward by the modern world-systems approach; hence it will be severely challenged to attain core status by 2025. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Strategieë vir die ontwikkeling van Suid-Afrika word meerendeels geanaliseer vanuit ‘n hoofsaaklike ekonomiese invalshoek en dit het tot gevolg dat die rol wat politieke en sosio-kulturele aspekte in die ontwikkelingsproses speel nie op ag geslaan word nie. Die studie evalueer moontlike ontwikkelings-strategieë vir Suid-Afrika deur gebruik te maak van die moderne wêreld-sisteem teoretiese benadering (MWS) wat ‘n meer holistiese perspektief op ontwikkeling bied. Die vraag word gevra of Suid- Afrika – in ooreenstemming met die uitganspunte van MWS - teen 2025 sal kan vorder tot die kategorie van “kern-staat”, vanaf sy huidige status as “semi-periferale staat”. Die allesomvattende komponente vir ontwikkeling wat MWS identifiseer vereis die groei van staatskapasiteit, langtermyn ekonomiese ontwikkeling, en die uitbreiding van regionale en internasionale sosio-kulturele invloed. Die vooruitsigte vir Suid-Afrika se opgang is nagevors oor die verloop van ‘n 15-20 jaar tydperk, aangesien die kapitalistiese wêreld-ekonomie tans in ‘n fase van kontraksie verkeer (B-fase van groei) tussen 1973-2025. Die MWS benadering argumenteer dat opwaartse mobiliteit van state meer waarskynlik is tydens ‘n B-fase van groei en dat opgang moeiliker sal word wanneer die wêreld-ekonomie weer ‘n ekspansionistiese fase van groei betree in 2025. Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat Suid-Afrika se ontwikkelings-uitdagings deur beide eksterne en interne faktore bemoeilik word, nieteenstaande moontlike sterkpunte op ekonomiese, politieke en sosio-kulturele gebied waarop dit sou kon kapitaliseer oor die volgende 15 jaar. Hierdie faktore, word geargumenteer, sal veroorsaak dat die optimale ontwikkelingstrategieë wat deur ander state gevolg is, nie deur Suid-Afrika nagevolg sal kan word nie, en dat gevolglik, sonder innoverende strategieë, die kanse dat die land kern-status teen 2025 sal bereik, gering is.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Maritime piracy is not a new phenomenon. However, the nature, severity and impacts of contemporary piracy have evolved to become a highly-organised, professional and international scourge. This comparative and explanatory study set out to explore questions regarding the how and why of maritime piracy trends in Somali and Southeast Asian waters. This study sought to (a) conceptualise an appropriate definition of maritime piracy; (b) determine the causes and motivations for piracy in these regions; (c) offer insights as to the most effective ways of combating piracy; (d) investigate the various impacts and effects of piracy; and (e) discussing the significance of international responses to this phenomenon. In pursuing the above-mentioned goals this study offered a comparison of correlating trends and differences between these two regions. This study attributed the underlying motivations to two chief factors: namely, state failure and instability, as well as socio-economic factors. These two factors, along with several additional contributing factors, effectively established piracy’s main causes. The general findings of this study concluded that contemporary piracy cannot be understood without a thorough understanding of a combination of various factors. It was also argued that although the alleged link between piracy and terrorism remains speculative, piracy could have the ability to facilitate international terrorism. The nature of contemporary piracy in Somalia and Southeast Asia was examined, as well as a discussion of the most significant pirate attacks in these regions. This study established that the nature of Somali and Southeast Asian piracy display various similarities, as well as differences. Together with explanations accounting for decreases and increases in pirate attacks, it emerged that an increase in violence and sophistication of piracy is apparent. By highlighting how contemporary piracy has become both a regional and international security threat, this study brought forward arguments that showed how piracy negatively affects regional stability, as well as exacerbating poverty. Furthermore, this study found that the impacts of piracy are far-reaching and therefore require international and regional collaborative responses. Regarding solutions to piracy, emphasis was placed on including domestic, regional and international approaches. Moreover, this study argued that overlooking the internal problems on-land only serve to worsen the piracy situation in Somalia and Southeast Asia. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Seerowery is nie ‘n nuwe fenomeen nie. Die aard, erns en impak van hedendaagse seerowery het wel in ’n hoogs-georganiseerde, professionele en internasionale plaag ontwikkel. Hierdie vergelykende en beskrywende studie poog om die vrae rondom hoe en hoekom seerowery in die Somaliese en Suidoos-Asiese waters plaasvind. Die doel van hierdie studie was, om: (a) seerowery te konseptualiseer, (b) die oorsake en motivering(s) vir seerowery in spesifieke streke te bestudeer; en (c) die internasionale reaksie tot hierdie verskynsel te bespreek. Met die doel om die bogenoemde vrae te beantwoord verskaf hierdie studie ’n vergelyking van ooreenkomstige tendense en verskille tussen die twee gebiede. Hierdie studie skryf die onderliggende motiverings toe aan twee hoof faktore: naamlik, staatsmislukking en –onstabiliteit, en tweedens sosio-ekonomiese faktore. Daar is ook ’n paar aanvullende bydraende faktore wat kortliks bespreek word. Hierdie studie bevind dat hedendaagse seerowery nie volledig verstaan kan word sonder ’n begrip van verskeie faktore, wat in hierdie studie beskryf word, nie. Hierdie studie bevind ook dat alhoewel die beweerde verband tussen seerowery en terrorisme onseker is, dat seerowery wel die potensiaal besit om internasionale terrorisme te fasiliteer. Die aard van hedendaagse seerowery in Somalië en Suidoos-Asië is ondersoek, tesame met ’n bespreking van die mees beduidende seerower aanvalle in die gebiede. Hierdie studie wys dat die aard van Somaliese en Suidoos-Asiese seerowery vele ooreenkomste sowel as verskille bevat. Tesame met verduidelikings oor die afname en toename in seerower aanvalle verskaf hierdie studie ook ’n beskrywing van die toename in die gesofistikeerdheid van die hedendaagse seerowers. Die studie het ook klem op die feit gelê dat hedendaagse seerowery beide ’n streeks- asook ’n internasionale sekuriteits gevaar is. Dus het seerowery ’n breë en vêrreikende impak, en vereis internasionale en streeklikse samewerking om teenkamping te loods. Daar word ook bevind dat ’n versuiming om na interne probleme in Somalië en Suidoos-Asië kan dien as ’n versterking tot die seerowery verskynsel.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Africa’s rising international profile and geopolitical significance as well as the continent’s relatively ‘under-exploited markets’ have been pull factors for many emerging economies. Globally, the developing and emerging economies of the world for the first time captured more than half of all global FDI in 2011. Changes in the global investment regime are a clear indication of the changing dynamics in the global economy. Since India and China’s FDI liberalisation processes began to gather steam in the 1990s, they have been amongst the most aggressive of the emerging economy investors. This study appraises the role of the government in facilitating investment by Indian and Chinese firms abroad, specifically Sub-Saharan Africa. The study analyses the motivations for such outward foreign direct invest flows, the sectoral trends, and the entry mode differences of Indian and Chinese firms’ investments in Sub-Saharan African markets. Yet, there is a lack of studies that focus on both Indian and Chinese investments in Sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing from theoretical constructs from political economy, International business /economics and International Political Economy - a framework is provided to assess the influence of these investments. The methodology is interpretive and qualitative and draws largely on secondary material from international organisations, government agencies, academic literature and the media. The study finds that the role of New Delhi and Beijing in facilitating and financing outward investments is strategic and pragmatic. These policies greatly influence firms, and the locations and types of their investments. South-South cooperation provides India and China with a framework for long-term political and economic investments and development cooperation with African states. India and China’s engagements in Sub-Saharan Africa share similar and dissimilar forms and motivations for FDI. Markets and resources are primary motivations for these two countries’ firms to invest in the region. India and China’s growing commercial activities in Sub-Saharan Africa provide the region with opportunities for further international market integration and development. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Afrika se ontluikende internasionale profiel en geopolitieke belang tesame met die vasteland se relatief ‘onderbenutte’ markte is ’n trekfaktor vir baie ontluikende ekonomieë. Terwyl vloeie uit buitelandse direkte investering (BDI) na Afrika, wat ’n hoogtepunt in 2008 bereik het, in 2010 steeds afgeneem het, was die ontwikkelende en ontluikende ekonomieë van die wêreld vir die eerste keer in besit van meer as die helfte van alle wêreldwye BDI in 2011. Veranderings in die internasionale beleggingsregime is ’n duidelike aanduiding van die veranderende dinamika in die wêreldekonomie. Sedert Indië en China se liberaliseringsprosesse met betrekking tot BDI in die 1990’s begin ontwikkel het, is hulle van die aggressiefste beleggers onder opkomende ekonomieë. Die gebrek aan streekstudies wat op Indiese en Chinese beleggings fokus, verg egter verdere aandag. Die doel van die studie is om die rol van die regering in die fasilitering van Indiese en Chinese maatskappye om in die buiteland te belê te ontleed. Die fokus val veral op Afrika suid van die Sahara, en op die motiverings vir hierdie BDI-vloeie, die sektortendense en wyse van toetreding van Indiese en Chinese maatskappye se beleggings in Afrikamarkte. Bestande uit teortiese konstakke uit internasionale sakestudie, internasionale politieke ekonomie en politieke ekonomie, word ‘n raamwerk waarin die invloed van hierdie beleggings op wat assesseer word is interpritiet en kwalitatiet en stan op sekondêre materiaal en data van regeringsagentskappe, akademiese literatuur en die media. Die gebruik van ’n veelsoortige teoretiese raamwerk wat ekonomiese en politieke beleggingsverskynsels uitbeeld, illustreer die versoenbaarheid van politiek, ekonomie en sakegebaseerde akademiese gebiede en die moontlikheid om grondliggende uitkomste uitkomste vir navorsing oor beleggingstendense en -strategieë in ontluikende ekonomieë te bied. Die studie bevind dat die rol van New Delhi en Beijing in die fasilitering en finansiering van buitelandse beleggings strategiese en pragmaties is, en dat beleide maatskappye grootliks beïnvloed ten opsigte van waar hulle belê en watter soort beleggings hulle maak. Verder, verskaf Suid–Suid-samewerking, ‘n raamwerk vir verbintenis langtermyn- politieke en ekonomiese beleggings en ontwikkelingsamewerking met Afrikastate. Indië en China se betrokkenheid in Afrika toon ooreenstemmende en verskillende vorme en motiverings vir BDI, en markte en hulpbronne is primêre motiverings vir hierdie twee lande se maatskappye in die streek te belê.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The aim of this research was to explore the interaction between governance and development in post-colonial Africa. The departure point of the thesis was the understanding that the state remains a pre-eminent actor in the international system. Keeping this assumption in mind, the study made use of a comparative analysis; comparing governance and development in Botswana with governance and development in Zaire/the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), focusing on the post-colonial era. The importance of this research lies in its contribution to the debate on the role of the state in post-colonial Africa. It explores the influence of institution formation and policy implementation by governments (in other words, governance) on development. Understanding the effect of governance on development can have invaluable lessons for other African states in their efforts to develop further. The research question, which guided the thesis thus, was: in the era of the pre-eminence of the state, making use of a comparison between Botswana and Zaire/DRC, what is the influence and effect, of state institution formation and policy implementation (governance) by governments, on state development in terms of economical-, political- and social development? The two main variables were governance and development. Development was sub-divided into three indicators: political, economic and social development. Governance was evaluated in terms of being seen as poor or good governance, as per the World Bank’s definition and understanding of governance. Zaire/DRC, as an example of a failed state, was analysed first, followed by Botswana, selected for its arguably “best practice” experience. For each country the analysis was subdivided into three phases as per the theoretical framework of Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman’s book, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (1999). Their book describes three stages of change in African state development in the post-colonial era (Chazan-framework). This framework uses the Chazan-framework and thus subdivides the post-colonial era into: the concentration (centralisation) phase, the elaboration phase, and finally the reconsideration of state power phase. The research found that Zaire/DRC followed a process of state collapse in the post-colonial era, whereas in sharp contrast Botswana experienced positive state development. Since independence Zaire continuously practised poor governance whilst Botswana largely practiced good governance. This was true in all three phases of the Chazan-framework. At the same time, or perhaps due to poor governance, Zaire continuously experienced negative development in all three development categories whilst Botswana continuously experienced positive development in all three development categories, again perhaps due to good governance. The research concludes that even though Botswana is not necessarily an example of a perfect state, it is special in an African context, because of its good governance record. This study does not draw direct relationships between good governance and development, but finds that Botswana probably benefited greatly in development due to the implementation of good institutions, good government policies and general good governance. The research also found that states benefit when their governments practice and adopt policies that are anti-corruption, pro-democracy, pro-competition, pro public-private partnerships, and pro market-orientated economics. In addition, the following are also conducive to good governance: leadership with integrity, peaceful and regular leadership changes, clear distinction between government (party) and the state, and empowered government oversight institutions that act, even against the government itself when needed. The practice of good governance is thus shown to be supportive of long-term development. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie navorsing was om die interaksie tussen regering en ontwikkeling in post-koloniale Afrika te ondersoek. Die tesis gaan uit vanuit die oogpunt dat die staat steeds ‘n dominante akteur in die internasionale stelsel is. Die studie het gebruik gemaak van ‘n vergelykende ontleding. Regeringstyl en ontwikkeling in post-koloniale Afrika is met mekaar vergelyk. Die vergelyking is getrek tussen Botswana en Zaïre/Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK). Die belangrikheid van die navorsing lê in die bydrae tot die debat oor die rol van die staat in Afrika in die post-koloniale era. Dit bekyk die belangrikheid van instellingskepping en beleids-implementering (met ander woorde, regeerstyl of regering) deur regerings in terme van invloed op die ontwikkeling van state in Afrika. Beter begrip van hierdie verhouding kan waardevolle lesse bevat vir ander Afrikastate in hul pogings om verder te ontwikkel. Die navorsingsvraag wat die tesis gelei het was dus: in die era van die voorrang van die staat, en deur gebruikmaking van ‘n vergelykende studie tussen Botswana en Zaïre/DRK, wat is die invloed en effek van staatsinstelling-vorming en van beleids-implementering (regering) deur regerings, op staatsontwikkeling in terme van ekonomiese-, politieke- en sosiale ontwikkeling? In hierdie studie was regering en ontwikkeling die twee belangrikste veranderlikes gewees. Ontwikkeling is onderverdeel in drie aanwysers: politieke, ekonomiese en maatskaplike ontwikkeling. Regering is geëvalueer in terme van wat gesien word as swak of goeie regering, volgens die Wêreldbank se definisie en begrip van goeie regering. Zaïre/DRK is eerste as ‘n voorbeeld van 'n mislukte staat ontleed, gevolg deur Botswana, gekies vir sy veronderstelde "beste praktyk"-ervaring. Die analise vir elk van hierdie lande is onderverdeel in drie fases, soos gebaseer op die teoretiese raamwerk van Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, en Stedman in, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (1999) (die Chazan-raamwerk). Hierdie raamwerk onderverdeel die post-koloniale era in: die konsentrasiefase (sentraliseringsfase), die uitbreidingsfase en uiteindelik die fase van die heroorweging van staatsmag. Die navorsing bevind dat Zaïre 'n proses van ineenstorting van die staat in die post-koloniale era ervaar het, terwyl Botswana in skrille kontras positiewe staatsontwikkeling ervaar het. Hierdie tendens was aanwesig in al drie fases van die Chazan-raamwerk. Sedert onafhanklikheid het Botswana ook goeie regering toegepas terwyl Zaïre/DRK meestal swak regering toegepas het. Terselfdertyd, dalk ook weens swak regering, het Zaïre/DRK voortdurend negatiewe ontwikkeling ervaar in al drie van die ontwikkelings kategorieë, terwyl Botswana voortdurend, moontlik te danke goeie regering, positiewe ontwikkeling in al drie die ontwikkelingskategorieë ervaar het. Die navorsing kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, selfs al is Botswana nie noodwendig ‘n voorbeeld van 'n perfekte staat nie, dit steeds weens ‘n goeie regeringstradisie, uniek is in Afrika-konteks. Alhoewel hierdie studie nie 'n direkte verhouding tussen goeie regering en ontwikkeling probeer bevestig het nie, bevind dit wel dat Botswana moontlik in terme van ontwikkeling, weens die implementering van goeie instellings, goeie regeringsbeleid en algemene goeie regering, baie voordeel getrek het. Die navorsing bevind ook dat state voordeel trek wanneer hul regerings beleid aanvaar en toepas wat teen korrupsie is, maar wat demokratiese ideale, markkompetisie, openbare-private vennootskappe en markgeoriënteerde ekonomiese aktiwiteite bevorder. Goeie regering word ook bevorder deur leierskap met integriteit, vreedsame en gereelde verandering van leierskap, duidelike onderskeid tussen die regering (party) en die staat, sowel as nie-regeringsinstellings met die mag om as oorsigliggame oor die regering te funksioneer. Die praktyk van goeie regering blyk dus langtermyn staatsontwikkeling te bevoordeel en te ondersteun.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Since 2000, Chinese FDI in Zambia has steadily increased. Focused predominantly on resource extraction, China is now the third largest investor in Zambia, after only the United States and South Africa. As the title suggests, this FDI is recognized as relevant to Zambia’s developmental discourse. However, with general development indicators, there is challenge in establishing immediate causality between (Chinese) FDI and development. To address this, this study employs Capability Approach development theory, which utilizes a framework to evaluate social and political realities. Utilizing this framework, key indicators are used to look more deeply into the discussion around China’s FDI for Zambia’s development. There has been a great deal of speculation as to potential costs and/or benefits Chinese FDI may offer Zambia. As China offers Zambia a partnership of non-domestic interference, unique from Zambia’s traditional western syndicates, debate is raised as to what influence it will have on Zambia’s developmental progress. With challenges including limited information, numerous potential indicators to utilize, and a large number of contributing voices, the debate thus far lacks a means for evaluating the substance of claims made within the context of national trends. This study reviews and evaluates the debate within the framework of seven key socioeconomic and political indicators. While within economic growth and infrastructure expansion Chinese FDI are shown to indicate a conduciveness to development, FDI is not shown to be conducive for market diversification, challenging corruption, or strengthening institutions. The study therefore shows that trends of Chinese FDI’s relevance to Zambian employment and state dependency to be mixed and that assessments will need to disentangle various Chinese activities and will also need to consider contradictory effects. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sedert die jaar 2000 het Chinese direkte buitelandse belegging (DBB) in Zambië stelselmatig begin toeneem. Die groei is hoofsaaklik gekonsentreer in die hulpbron ontgunnings sektore. China is tans die derde grootste belegger in Zambia naas die Verenigde State van Amerika en Suid Afrika. Soos die titel van die tesis aandui, word DBB beskou as relevant tot Zambië se ontwikkelings dialoog. Aangesien die oorsaaklikheid tussen DBB en ontwikkeling nie maklik vasgestel kan word nie, word sleutel aanwysers gebruik om dieper in die gesprek rondom Chinese DBB ten opsigte van Zambiese ontwikkeling in te kyk. Tans is daar 'n groot mate van spekulasie aan potensiële risikos en/of voordele van Chinese DBB vir Zambië. China bied Zambië ‘n venootskap sonder inmenging in binnelandse beleid, anders as Westerse finansiering wat gekoppel word aan voorwaardes, en dit is wat die vraag lig; wat gaan die uiteindelikke invloed en effek wees op Zambiese ontwikkeling in die toekoms. Met uitdagings soos beperkte inligting, vele moontlikke aanwysers en ‘n groot aantal opinies, kort die debad tot dusver die vermoë om die waarde van argumente te evalueer binne die konteks van nasionale tendense. Hierdie studie evalueer die debat binne die raamwerk van sewe sleutel sosio-ekonomiese en politiese aanwysers. Chinese DBB word bevind om bevorderlik te wees ten opsigte van ontwikkeling in die infrastruktuur ontwikkeling- en ekonomiese groei sektore; dit word egter nie bevind as bevorderlik in terme van mark-diversifikasie, die teenkanting van korrupsie, of in die versterking van politieke instellings nie. Chinese DBB se invloed op indiensneming en op die afhanklikheid van die Zambiese staat toon gemengde resultate, en dat assesering verskeie Chinese aktiwiteite sal moet ontrafel en ook teenstrydigge effekte in gedagte moet hou.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis is a contribution to the “China in Africa” debate. Chinese development assistance includes Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and recent literature argues a significant proportion of FDI goes to the manufacturing sector in African countries. FDI allocated to industry have the potential to create employment and reduce poverty. This paper takes Zambia as a case, and looks at the textile and clothing industry as a sub- sector of the manufacturing sector. The textile and clothing industry is seen as especially appropriate for Zambia, as it; (i) adds value to natural resources; (ii) creates links to other sectors of the economy; (iii) require only basic skills; and (iv) is labour intensive. Based on primary and secondary data, this paper seeks to understand how Chinese FDI in the Zambian textile and clothing industry impact economic development, measured by; (i) formal employment creation; (ii) technology and skill transfer; (iii) state revenue; and lastly (iv) market creation of the products. Through looking at Zambian national plans and institutions, the cotton-textile-garment value chain and the organisation of Chinese companies in Zambia, this paper found currently no textile and clothing manufacturing under Chinese investors. Although, cotton quality in Zambia has improved, the majority is exported out of the continent. There are currently few textile mills left and the clothing manufacturers largely use imported inputs. Second hand clothes and cheap imports from Asian countries, have taken over large parts of the domestic market for textile and clothing in Zambia. The largest integrated textile mill was the Zambia China Mulungushi Textiles (ZCMT) operating under Chinese investors between 1997 and 2007. Findings show that the Chinese management casualised the workforce, leading to more informal employment. In addition, there were few records of skill transfer to Zambian workers, although there were investments in improving technology. This paper explores the different reasons for the TC mill to close and argue that it was not viable under a liberal market. The Zambian workers were unhappy with the labour system, wage levels and terms of employment, which caused violent riots and strikes up until closure in 2007. The Chinese management was unable to restructure the work force enough to be cost effective and to stay in business. The Lusaka East Multi Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ) is under construction, and will focus on textiles and the supportive links in the industry. It is yet to be seen, how it impacts local economic development. Based on the assumptions of economic development, this paper shows limited impact of Chinese FDI in the Zambian textile and clothing industry. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis is 'n bydrae tot die "China in Afrika” debat. Die Chinese ontwikkelings hulp sluit buitelandse direkte investering (FDI) in, en die onlangse literatuur beweer dat 'n belangrike deel van FDI na die vervaardigingsektor in Afrika-lande gaan. FDI toegeken aan die industrie het die potensiaal om werk te skep en armoede to verminder. Hierdie verhandeling neem Zambië as 'n geval, en kyk na die tekstiel-en klere-industrie as 'n subsektor van die vervaardigingsektor. Die tekstiel en klere bedryf is veral geskik vir Zambië, daar dit; (i) waarde toevoeg tot natuurlike hulpbronne; (ii) skakels skep na ander sektore van die ekonomie; (iii) slegs basiese vaardighede word vereis; (iv) arbeidsintensief is. Deur middel van primêre en sekondêre data, word in hierdie verhandeling gepoog om die impak van die Chinese FDI in die Zambiese tekstiel-en klere-industrie, op die ekonomiese ontwikkeling vas te stel, soos gemeet aan; (i) formele werkskepping; (ii) tegnologie en vaardigheids oordrag; (iii) die staat se inkomste; en laastens ( iv) die skepping van ‘n mark vir die produkte. Deur te kyk na die Zambiese nasionale planne en instellings, die katoen-tekstiel-kleed waardeketting, en die organisasie van die Chinese maatskappye in Zambië, het hierdie verhandeling bevind dat daar tans geen tekstiel-en klere vervaardiging onder Chinese beleggers is nie. Hoewel die gehalte van die katoen in Zambië verbeter het, is die meeste buite die vasteland uitgevoer. Daar is tans min tekstielfabrieke oor, en die klerevervaardigers gebruik grootliks ingevoerde insette. Tweedehandse klere en goedkoop invoere uit Asiatiese lande, het grootliks die binnelandse mark vir tekstiel en klere in Zambië oorgeneem. Die grootste geïntegreerde tekstiel fabriek was die Zambië China Mulungushi Textiles (ZCMT) wat tussen 1997 en 2007 onder Chinese beleggers was. Bevindinge toon dat die Chinese bestuur niepermanente aanstellings gemaak het, wat gelei het tot meer informele indiensneming. Verder, is daar min rekord van vaardigheids-oordrag na die Zambiese werkers, maar daar was beleggings in die verbetering van tegnologie gedoen. Hierdie verhandeling ondersoek die verskillende redes vir die TC meul/fabriek se sluiting, en bevind dat dit nie lewensvatbaar in 'n vrye mark was nie. Die Zambiese werkers was ontevrede met die arbeidstelsel, loonvlakke en terme van indiensneming, wat gewelddadige onluste en stakings veroorsaak het tot die sluiting in 2007. Die Chinese bestuur was nie in staat om die arbeidsmag te herstruktureer om koste-effektief genoeg te wees nie. Die Lusaka-Ooste Multi Fasiliteit Ekonomiese Sone (MFEZ) is onder konstruksie en sal fokus op die tekstiel en die ondersteunende skakels in die bedryf. Dit moet nog gesien word hoe dit die plaaslike ekonomiese ontwikkeling beïinvloed. Op grond van die aannames van ekonomiese ontwikkeling, toon hierdie ondersoek ‘n beperkte impak van die Chinese FDI in die Zambiese tekstiel en klere bedryf aan.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In an otherwise broad literature on civil conflict little attention has so far been paid to actual conflict violence and variation in severity. Existing work is also hampered by a reliance on a ‘closed polity’ model of the state, leading to disregard of the transnational dimensions of internal conflict, and by a dependence on over‐aggregated data. The present inquiry expands on the existing explanatory framework for variation in civil conflict severity by including transnational factors and characteristics of sub‐national actors. Data on conflict battle deaths are combined with recently available data on transnational ethnic linkages, transnational support and neighbouring conflict as well as other actor and country characteristics. Results from ordinary least squares regression analysis indicate that support for rebel groups from external non‐state actors increase conflict severity, while rebel presence in other states is associated with less severe conflicts. In addition, severity increases with duration but with a diminishing marginal return. Internal armed conflicts are less severe in democratic and ethnically polarised countries but rebel territorial control increases the level of violence. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die andersins omvangryke literatuur oor burgerlike konflik is daar tot op hede min aandag geskenk aan werklike konflikgeweld en variasie in felheid (vernietigende omvang). Bestaande werk word ook belemmer omdat dit staat maak op ’n model van die staat as ‘geslote regering’, wat lei tot verontagsaming van die transnasionale dimensies van interne konflik, en staat maak op oor‐geaggregeerde data. Hierdie ondersoek brei uit op die bestaande verklarende raamwerk vir variasie in felheid van burgerlike konflik deur transnasionale faktore en eienskappe van subnasionale deelnemers in te sluit. Data oor konflikgevegsterftes is gekombineer met onlangse data oor transnasionale etniese koppelings, transnasionale steun en naburige konflik, sowel as ander deelnemer‐ en landeienskappe. Resultate van gewone kleinstekwadrate‐regressie‐analise dui daarop dat steun aan rebellegroepe deur eksterne nie‐staatsdeelnemers konflikfelheid laat toeneem, terwyl rebelleteenwoordigheid in ander lande geassosieer word met minder fel konflikte. Felheid neem ook toe saam met duur maar met ’n afnemende marginale opbrengs. Interne gewapende konflikte is minder fel in demokratiese en etnies gepolariseerde lande, maar rebellebeheer oor grondgebied verhoog die vlak van geweld.