Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät--Universität Köln, 2004. / Bibliogr. p. 200-207.

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Husserl’s Logical Investigations contain an apparent discrepancy in their account of meaning. They first present meanings, contra psychologism, as commonly available, reiterable, invariant, possibly valid, and independent of our “acts of meaning”. They then present meaning, almost psychologistically, as a kind of intentional experience on which all truths and other transcendent meanings depend. I offer a critical developmental study of this problem within Husserl’s semantics. I argue (1) that Husserl had reason to adopt his dyadic account of signification, (2) that this “two-sided” account shaped, and was reciprocally informed by, the two-step phenomenological method, and (3) that Husserl’s proposed resolution to the strain within his semantics, while driven by legitimate motivations, is precarious. I begin with the Logical Investigations and their context. I represent their two sets of semantic claims, recalling how the discord between claims of those sets would have been especially conspicuous when the Investigations were published, amid much debate over psychologism, in 1900-01. I then show why Husserl embraced two discordant views of meaning. I survey the 19th century sources for these views, confirming Jocelyn Benoist’s genealogical thesis that Husserl’s semantics took its psychological and logical sides primarily from Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, respectively. And I present the Bolzanian arguments and Brentanian descriptions that served as grounds for Husserl’s semantics, showing how these pieces of reasoning were appropriated, and weighing their strength. Next, I trace how Husserl’s two-sided theory of meaning, and its apparent incoherence, both inspired and determined the transcendental and eidetic reductions. I then examine how Husserl subsequently used the phenomenological method to reinforce, to integrate, and to revise his theory of meaning. And I address a methodological criticism that this circular development prompts. Finally, I assess Husserl’s attempt to explain the division within the phenomenon of meaning by reference to what he called “transcendental subjectivity”. I consider two contrary objections to this explanation. I indicate how Husserl’s explanation is responsive to the insight behind each objection, but contend that it is perhaps not adequately responsive to the insight behind either.

Zugl.: Wien, Universiẗat, Diss., 2006.

Diss.--Theologische Fakultät--Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, 1991.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Basel, 1938. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 125.

El artículo constituye una breve investigación histórica y teórica en torno a  los principales nexos entre el pensamiento temprano de William James y el  trabajo desplegado por Edmund Husserl en las Investigaciones lógicas. A través  de un examen preliminar de las relaciones personales entre ambos autores,  pasaremos a un estudio sobre el aparato conceptual desarrollado por James,  sobre todo en Principios de psicología, con el objetivo de contrastarlo con el  planteado por Husserl, mostrando cómo el primer autor esbozó, entre otros,  los conceptos fenomenológicos de intencionalidad y objetividad ideal.

In 1929, Edmund Husserl held a series of lectures at Sorbonne. These lectures were later published as a book called Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (Méditations cartésiennes: Introduction à la phénoménologie). This book has engaged philosophers, but also psychologists, ethnologists and feminists among others. Still to this day, interpreters disagrees on what Husserl actually says. This is partly because his collected works are still being edited. But it is also because Husserl doesn’t really succeed in illustrating his efforts in a comprehensible way. That is why it’s possible to deduce ambiguities. This essay will focus on one of these ambiguities, namely, the relation of the ego-alter ego or my body and the body of the Other, in Husserls fifth Cartesian Meditation. Using the knowledge of philosophers as Dan Zahavi, Paul Ricoeur and Bernhard Waldenfels, we set out to reflect around this ambiguity in how the body is defined, how the Other body is defined, and in which way the Other is synonymous with the world. Thereafter, I consider whether Zahavi, Ricoeur or Waldenfels concepts of ambiguity exposes what I rather conceive as a mutuality. Consequently, the question at issue is; How can we understand the mutual relation between body and world in Husserls fifth Cartesian Meditation?

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / Martin Heidegger’s work centers on the task of retrieving the traditional problem of ontology, metaphysics, and first philosophy: the problem of Being. There has been a tendency in the scholarship to take Heidegger’s formulation and solution to the problem together as a whole. In contrast, I propose to differentiate between the two, and to engage Heidegger’s formulation of the problem as such, which takes shape as phenomenological ontology in the second half of the 1920s. I claim that the subject matter of phenomenological ontology, the problem of Being, is in fact the unitary articulation of four problems: the ontological difference, the basic articulation of Being, the possible modifications of Being, and the truth-character of Being. My analysis shows that these four problems are Heidegger’s problematization (following Brentano) of the four main senses of Being, traditionally associated with Aristotle and Aristotelianism: the difference between the incidental and the in itself; the articulation of being-at-work, potency, and being-at-work-staying-itself; Being in the sense of the categories; and Being in the sense of truth. Concerning its method, I claim that phenomenological ontology reformulates the problem of Being in three moments: reduction, construction, and destruction. My analysis shows that, with these three moments, Heidegger problematizes (following Husserl) the movement of ascent and descent traditionally associated with Plato and Platonism. Although Heidegger never makes it fully explicit, the problem of the phenomenologically reductive, constructive, and destructive unitary whole of the four basic problems of Being is in fact his problematization of a (the) perennial locus philosophiae—the unity of the four senses of Being in an ascent and a descent. Moreover, I claim that phenomenological ontology has a transcendental-architectonic character, in a Kantian sense. The problem of Being is formulated in three differentiated moments: the reductive fundamental ontology asks and answers the question of the sense of Dasein’s Being; the constructive transcendental science of Being asks and answers the question of the sense of Being as such; and the destructive groundwork of metaphysics asks and answers the question of the (historical) whole [καθ'ὅλου] of the Being of entities. Heidegger considers that his own architectonic is the historical outcome of the ontotheological orientation of the problem since Antiquity (Aristotle’s Metaphysics), during the Middle Ages (Suárez’s Disputationes), and throughout Modernity (Kant’s Critiques.) Because my interest lies in the problem itself, my aim is to problematize Heidegger’s ontotheological interpretation of the locus philosophiae. The first task in this direction is to clarify Heidegger’s incomplete construction of a unitary phenomenological ontology during the mid-late 1920s. The present text begins this clarification by outlining the reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being, and on the basis of the indicated locus. The reconstruction is a clarification in that it exhibits the simplest moments of the inner structure of phenomenological ontology. The dissertation is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I analyze the basic concepts of phenomenological ontology. I exhibit first the basic concepts of fundamental ontology (Chapter 1), and then the basic concepts of the science of Being (Chapter 2.) Through these first two chapters I show the correspondence between the concepts of fundamental ontology and the science of Being based on the projection of the former onto the latter. It is here that I argue that fundamental ontology and the science of Being are two stages in Heidegger’s architectonic reformulation of the problem of Being. I also argue that each of these stages reflects the whole problem from its own standpoint. In the second part, I begin the reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being. I claim that the analytic of Dasein is to be understood as the reduction of Dasein. The reduction of Dasein is articulated in two distinct moments that I call ‘ontological’ and ‘existential.’ I first characterize the reduction of Dasein as a whole (Chapter 3) and then its first moment—the ontological reduction (Chapter 4.) The text ends with an Appendix where I clarify Heidegger’s lexicon of Being. Here, I anticipate fundamental aspects of the existential reduction, and point toward the connection between Heidegger’s and Husserl’s accounts of the reduction. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Le présent travail propose de caractériser le projet philosophique de Husserl et de Heidegger comme une phénoménologie de la possibilité. Il s’agit, ce faisant, de démontrer qu’il existe un concept phénoménologique de possibilité, qui ne se confond ni avec le concept métaphysique ni avec le concept modal, et de reconstruire ce concept à l’aide de Husserl et de Heidegger. Il apparaît ainsi que la phénoménologie, non seulement renverse le primat traditionnel de l’effectif sur le possible, mais accomplit le dépassement de leur opposition statique pour mettre au jour leur co-appartenance dynamique. Si donc, pour la phénoménologie, « plus haut que l’effectivité se tient la possibilité », c’est pour autant qu’elle découvre l’entrelacement de l’effectif et du possible dans le réel. / While describing Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophical project as a phenomenology of possibility, we intend to prove the existence of a phenomenological concept of possibility that cannot be reduced to a metaphysical or a mere modal concept. For phenomenology not only inverts the traditional primacy of effectivity on possibility, but also, and most importantly, overcomes the static opposition of the two by bringing to light the fact that they dynamically belong together. Therefore, phenomenology has the right to assert that « higher than effectivity stands possibility » insofar it discovers their constant and irreducible intertwining within reality.