No presente trabalho propomos aproximar criticamente as filosofias de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger, no que concerne às concepções de intencionalidade, intuição categorial e a questão do ser. Com isso, o objetivo é apontar que a questão do ser articulada em Ser e Tempo é consequência de um processo investigativo do jovem Heidegger no qual a fenomenologia husserliana desempenha papel fundamental. Para isso, versamos mostrar conceitualmente como algumas das noções propostas por Husserl em particular a de intuição categorial são empregadas nas problematizações do jovem Heidegger. Desse modo, almejamos mostrar que a questão do ser formulada por Heidegger deve muito à noção de intencionalidade de origem husserliana. / In the present study we propose to approximate critically the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, regarding the conception of intentionality, categorial intuition and the question of being. Therewith, the aim is to point that the question of being articulated in Being and Time is a consequence of an investigative process of the young Heidegger, in which the husserlian\'s phenomenology performs a main role. Thereunto, we plan to show conceptually how some of the notions proposed by Husserl in particular the categorial intuition are employed in the thesis of the young Heidegger. Thereby, we intend to show that the question of being formulated by Heidegger owes much to the husserlian\'s notion of intentionality.

Si certains héritiers de la phénoménologie ont cherché à libérer l'apparaître des normes qui lui étaient imposées, il en allait autrement chez Husserl. Les normes étaient d'abord appliquées aux visées de sens elles-mêmes, lesquelles étaient dites « correctes» ou « incorrectes». Autre façon de dire que la phénoménologie ne pouvait faire l'économie des normes : point de description sans prescription, et sans prescription à la description. Dire que le projet phénoménologique est essentiellement descriptif, c’est cependant admettre que les normes s'y tiennent en retrait. Le premier défi d'une phénoménologie des normes est donc de les mettre au jour. De plus, en son versant critique, la phénoménologie des normes doit justifier notre droit de les poser et de les appliquer normativement. À ce titre, elle sera une phénoménologie du caractère normatif des normes . Suivant les traces de Husserl, nous considèrerons d'abord les enjeux normatifs liés à la logique, puis les autres normes reconnues par lui. Ces normes étant assimilées à l'obtention d'une évidence ou d'un certain type d'évidence, elles avaient toutes un usage théorique. Nous ferons cependant l'hypothèse que certaines normes peuvent avoir un usage pratique. Cette hypothèse se heurtera à un obstacle de taille chez Husserl, qui proposait de justifier les devoirs pratiques grâce aux valeurs et non par les normes. Déconstruisant chacun des présupposés normatifs ayant conduit Husserl à recourir aux valeurs en éthique, nous paverons la voie à une éthique phénoménologique, normative et suspensive. / If some of phenomenology's heirs sought to free that which appears from the norms imposed upon it, it was not Husserl's main concern. He applied norms foremost to sense itself, which was then said to be «correct» or «incorrect». This was another way of saying that phenomenology could not avoid norms: no description without prescription, and without prescription to description. To say that the phenomenological project is essentially descriptive is to admit that norms keep out of the limelight in phenomenology. The first challenge of a phenomenology of norms is therefore to shine a spot upon them. Moreover, in its critical orientation, a phenomenology of norms must justify our right to posit and apply them normatively. As such, it is a phenomenology of the normative character of norms. Following Husserl's reflection, I will first consider the normative stakes linked to logic and then the other norms he recognized. As norms were assimilated to evidence or to some type of evidence, they all had a theoretical use. I will assume, however, that some norms may have a practical function. This hypothesis will encounter a major obstacle, as Husserl proposed to justify practical ougths by means of values instead of norms. By deconstructing each of the normative presuppositions that led Husserl to rely on values in ethics, I will pave the way for a phenomenological, normative and suspensive ethic.

No presente trabalho propomos aproximar criticamente as filosofias de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger, no que concerne às concepções de intencionalidade, intuição categorial e a questão do ser. Com isso, o objetivo é apontar que a questão do ser articulada em Ser e Tempo é consequência de um processo investigativo do jovem Heidegger no qual a fenomenologia husserliana desempenha papel fundamental. Para isso, versamos mostrar conceitualmente como algumas das noções propostas por Husserl em particular a de intuição categorial são empregadas nas problematizações do jovem Heidegger. Desse modo, almejamos mostrar que a questão do ser formulada por Heidegger deve muito à noção de intencionalidade de origem husserliana. / In the present study we propose to approximate critically the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, regarding the conception of intentionality, categorial intuition and the question of being. Therewith, the aim is to point that the question of being articulated in Being and Time is a consequence of an investigative process of the young Heidegger, in which the husserlian\'s phenomenology performs a main role. Thereunto, we plan to show conceptually how some of the notions proposed by Husserl in particular the categorial intuition are employed in the thesis of the young Heidegger. Thereby, we intend to show that the question of being formulated by Heidegger owes much to the husserlian\'s notion of intentionality.

Submitted by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2017-09-27T13:57:14Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Augusto Seixas Brandão Rêgo - 2017.pdf: 1709044 bytes, checksum: 4b49cd4ee3863319f68cb444e937e8e4 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2017-09-27T13:57:33Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Augusto Seixas Brandão Rêgo - 2017.pdf: 1709044 bytes, checksum: 4b49cd4ee3863319f68cb444e937e8e4 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-27T13:57:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Augusto Seixas Brandão Rêgo - 2017.pdf: 1709044 bytes, checksum: 4b49cd4ee3863319f68cb444e937e8e4 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Le présent travail a pour intention d'analyser les concept de conscience et d'ego tels que développés par le philosophe Jean-Paul Sartre dans ses oeuvres de jeunesse, plus spécifiquement dans l'opuscule la transcendance de l'ego. Une brève présentation historique de l'atmosphère intellectuelle de l'époque de Sartre montre l'importance de la réception de l'oeuvre de Husserl en France mais aussi les obstacles que celle-ci implique relativement à la question du contact immédiat avec le concret. Ce contact, rendu possible par l'idée d'intetionalité développée par Husserl, sera graduellement surmonté au nom d'un transcendantalisme auquel il se référe en tant que phénoménologue. Afin de revenir au concret, Sartre abandonnera l'idéalisme transcendantal au profit d'une relation avec le monde non intellectualiste, qui permettra la réflexion à partir d'une conscience pré-réflexive. Ce type de conscience pourra être perçue dans divers concepts de Sartre développés à la même époque, comme, entre autres, la magie, la mauvaise foi, la temporalité. Notre hypothése d'interprétation avance l'idée selon laquelle la dynamique entre la conscience et l'égo oriente l'argumentation de Sartre dans cette période où l'ego, passant du réfléchi à l'irréflechi, perd son "intimité" et où la conscience reprend sa loi absolue selon notre auteur: l'immédiat. / Na presente dissertação pretendemos analisar o conceito de consciência e de ego no pensamento desenvolvido pelo filósofo Jean-Paul Sartre em seus trabalhos de juventude, nomeadamente no opúsculo A Transcendência do ego. Uma breve exposição histórica do ambiente intelectual francês à época de Sartre esclarece a importância do advento da obra de Husserl na França, bem como os obstáculos que ela impõe no que concerne a um contato imediato com o concreto. Tal contato, possibilitado pela ideia de intencionalidade desenvolvida por Husserl, gradativamente será obliterado em nome de um transcendentalismo ao qual como fenomenólogo ele se adéqua. Para retomar o concreto, Sartre lançará mão do idealismo transcendental, vai elaborar uma filosofia da relação não intelectualista com o mundo para fundamentar a reflexão a partir de uma consciência pré-reflexiva. Esse tipo de consciência se fará perceber em diversos conceitos de Sartre também desenvolvidos neste período, como a mágica, a má-fé, a temporalidade, dentre outros. A dinâmica entre a consciência e o ego orienta a argumentação de Sartre, eis nossa hipótese interpretativa, neste período em que o ego, resvalando do plano refletido para o irrefletido, perde sua “intimidade” e a consciência retoma o que para nosso autor configura sua lei absoluta: o imediato.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-04T18:29:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tommy Akira.pdf: 1262809 bytes, checksum: e0d6cd9384e939d230308dd228da5829 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-02-06 / The German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), founding father of Phenomenology, was one of the most prominent thinkers of the 20th century, who not only influenced the philosophical trends of his time but also the sciences in general. Nevertheless, psychology was the science which strongly had direct influence of phenomenology which, in its turn, provided the possibility of developing a phenomenological psychology. The aim of this thesis is to (re)constitute, from a historical-critical point of view, the conception of phenomenological psychology in Husserl s last work: The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology (Die Krisis der europ?ischen Wissenchaften und die transzendentale Ph?nomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die ph?nomenologische Philosophie). At present, psychologists are developing a large number of versions of phenomenological psychology, particularly in Brazil; however, none of them have rigorously been based on Husserl s concepts. Thus, in order to have an understanding of what constitutes to Husserl a phenomenological psychology, we present, to start with, a brief introduction to the transcendental phenomenology, explaining the variations of the phenomenological method (i. e. phenomenological levels). After that, we point out the most meaningful aspects of Husserl s last piece of writing, concentrating our efforts on the revelation the philosopher makes concerning a crisis of the sciences and of reason, as well as his phenomenological criticism on epistemology of Psychology. At last, following Husserl s analyses of phenomenology and psychology, we conclude that the conception of phenomenological psychology will constitute a universal science of human beings whose object of study is the animistic being. This science will have basic functions such as: a) the rebuilding of the scientific psychology and the explanation of the psychological concepts; b) the constitution of a universal science of the psychic; c) the description of the intentional experiences and d) be a propaedeutic discipline for the transcendental phenomenology. For Husserl, the authentic and genuine conception of the phenomenological psychology is important to the psychologists since that it is through the development of this discipline that they will recover the subjectivity as the original source of human life and its correlation with the world-life. / O fil?sofo alem?o Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), fundador da Fenomenologia, foi um dos principais pensadores do s?culo XX, que influenciou tanto as correntes filos?ficas de seu tempo quanto as ci?ncias em geral. No entanto, a psicologia foi a que mais recebeu influ?ncia direta da fenomenologia, a qual proporcionou a essa ci?ncia a possibilidade de desenvolver uma psicologia fenomenol?gica. A finalidade dessa tese ? (re) constituir, a partir de uma leitura hist?rico-cr?tica, a concep??o de psicologia fenomenol?gica na ?ltima obra de Husserl: A Crise das Ci?ncias Europ?ias e a Fenomenologia Transcendental (Die Krisis der europ?ischen Wissenchaften und die transzendentale Ph?nomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die ph?nomenologische Philosophie). Atualmente, os psic?logos est?o desenvolvendo muitas vers?es de psicologia fenomenol?gica, principalmente no Brasil, por?m nenhuma delas tem se fundamentado rigorosamente nas conceitua??es de Husserl. Assim, para termos uma compreens?o do que constitui para Husserl uma psicologia fenomenol?gica, apresentamos, de in?cio, uma breve introdu??o ? fenomenologia transcendental, explicitando as varia??es do m?todo fenomenol?gico (n?veis fenomenol?gicos). Em seguida, destacamos os pontos principais do ?ltimo escrito de Husserl, concentrando-nos na den?ncia que o fil?sofo faz de uma crise das ci?ncias e da raz?o bem como sua cr?tica fenomenol?gica ? epistemologia da Psicologia. Por fim, seguindo as an?lises de Husserl sobre a fenomenologia e a psicologia, conclu?mos que a concep??o de psicologia fenomenol?gica se constituir? em uma ci?ncia universal do seres humanos cujo objeto de estudo ? o ser an?mico. Esta ci?ncia tem como fun??es b?sicas: a) a reformula??o da psicologia cient?fica; o esclarecimento dos conceitos psicol?gicos; b) a constitui??o de uma ci?ncia universal do ps?quico; c) a descri??o das viv?ncias intencionais e; d) ser uma disciplina proped?utica ? fenomenologia transcendental. Para Husserl, a aut?ntica e genu?na concep??o de psicologia fenomenol?gica ? importante para os psic?logos, porque ? com o desenvolvimento dessa disciplina que eles poder?o resgatar a subjetividade como fonte origin?ria da vida humana e a sua correla??o com o mundo-da-vida (Lebenswelt).

This thesis is basically an attempt to discuss the intrinsic intersubjective nature of the so-called ideal sciences, i.e. geometry or arithmetic. Based upon a thorough analysis of Husserls The Origin of Geometry and Derridas Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: an Introduction this thesis takes geometry as an example of an ideal science. The main question of the thesis is how an ideal science or object is constituted. The thesis consist of two main chapters - “Geometry and Historicity” and “Language”- and a concluding discussion. "Geometry and Historicity” reflects upon the relationship between the ideal sciences, using geometry as an example, and historicity, time and traditionality." The “Language” chapter discusses the need for language to make communication within an intersubjective space possible", and further which implications writing has upon the formations of ideal structures. To conclude the thesis demonstrates how geometry is far from a 'neutral' science but is constituted and idealized within the intersubjective space. The thesis argues that geometry has been “traditionalized” as an authentic and, as it is conceived, true form of knowledge through a historical process of human relations. This is made possible with the intrinsic “objectifying” ability within language and more specifically the human literacy, which is essential for this “idealization” process. As a consequence our understanding of science needs further reflections on how language, historicity and ultimately human relations have played an essential part in its formation.

Phenomenology systematically clarifies the structures and processes that make possible different experiences of communication based on pre linguistic foundation. This article explores this perspective and argues that it allows a deeper comprehension of experiences of personal and social reintegration through the interaction with animals of inmates and children with autism. Also, this article follows the thesis of David Abram: that the re discovery of the amplitude od the communicational possibilities in the human beings opens up alternatives of solution to the cultural discomforts that are growing deep in contemporary urban cultures of the world. / La fenomenología aclara sistemáticamente las estructuras y procesos que hacen posible las diversas experiencias comunicativas desde sus estratos fundamentales prelingüísticos. El artículo argumenta que esta perspectiva permite una comprensión más profunda de las experiencias de reintegración personal y social de reclusos y niños autistas a partir de la interacción con animales. Sostiene, siguiendo las tesis de David Abram, que el redescubrimiento de la amplitud de las posibilidades comunicativas en los seres humanos abre alternativas de respuesta a los malestares culturales que se van profundizando en las culturas urbanas contemporáneas.

Cette thèse se donne pour tâche d’expliciter et de déployer, à partir de l’œuvre de Husserl, les diverses conceptions phénoménologiques directrices du mouvement de la chair. En un premier temps, nous cherchons à préciser le contexte d’origine du concept de « kinesthèse », élaboré une première fois à l’été 1907 dans le cadre des leçons de Husserl sur la chose et l’espace. En un deuxième temps, il nous apparaîtra nécessaire d’élargir la signification technique et restreinte que possède le se-mouvoir dans la phénoménologie statique de la perception, afin de prendre en compte le mouvement en tant qu’action pratique du sujet dans divers horizons du monde. L’étude de certains textes qui relèvent de la phénoménologie génétique semble alors permettre de parler d’une co-constitution pratique entre la mobilité de la chair et la choséité, et ainsi de considérer à neuf l’hypothèse d’une historicité de la chair. Dans un troisième et dernier temps, il s’agira d’opérer une radicalisation de la compréhension du mouvement de la chair, afin de la ressaisir comme « geste », c’est-à-dire non plus simplement comme officiant des projets intentionnels de l’ego, mais bien comme origine et support des structures cardinales du monde. La lecture croisée de divers textes tardifs de Husserl et de Heidegger nous permettra de dégager une compréhension ontologique, et non plus strictement sensualiste ou pratique, de la mobilité charnelle. Au travers de ces études, le mouvement se révèle originairement impliqué dans les divers niveaux de la constitution de la mondanéité, mais aussi constitué en retour. / This thesis sets itself the task of clarifying and deploying the various phenomenological conceptions of bodily movement within Husserl’s work. As a first step, we seek to shed light on the context which guided the formation of the concept of “kinesthesis” in the 1907 summer lectures on thing and space. As a second step, it will appear necessary to expand the narrow and technical meaning that this “moving-oneself” has in the static phenomenology of perception, in order to take into account the movement thought as a practical action throughout various horizons of the lifeworld. Some texts pertaining to Husserl’s genetic phenomenology seem to allow us to speak of a practical “co-constitution” between the mobility of the flesh and the handiness of the thing and, in doing so, to consider anew the hypothesis of a historicity of the flesh. As a third and final step, we will operate a radicalization of the understanding of bodily movement, in order to grasp it as a “gesture”, that is to say, not only as a mere implement of the intentional projects of the ego, but as the very origin and support of the cardinal structures of the world. The cross-reading of different later texts by Husserl and Heidegger seems to support the project of setting forth an ontological understanding of mobility that is no longer in any way sensualistic or pragmatic. Through these meanings, bodily movement reveals itself as being originally involved in the various constitutive levels of worldliness.

Cette thèse cherche d’abord à confronter les prétentions respectives des méthodes phénoménologique et analytico-linguistique classiques à fournir chacune une explication de la connaissance a priori des nécessités d’essence qui soit aussi dépourvue que possible de présupposés et de pétitions de principe. Le problème précis autour duquel se noue cette confrontation est celui de la possibilité des vérités a priori matérielles. Dans un premier temps, nous proposons une lecture et une résolution méréologiques de ce problème en termes husserliens de touts composés des parties dépendantes, qui permet mieux de rendre compte des tels ensembles que la méréologie atomiste qui caractérise la plupart des ontologies formelles « analytiques » ; et nous proposons ce faisant une compréhension de la méthode d’intuition eidétique comme analyse méréologique. Dans un second temps, nous appliquons cette analyse à la méthode phénoménologique elle-même, comprenant la réduction transcendantale comme une variation méréologique sur l’a priori matériel de la corrélation qui caractérise la structure même de la relation entre l’ego et le monde, ce qui nous oblige de voir cette structure à son tour comme un tout concret intuitionnable dont les parties subjective et objective ne sont que des moments absolument dépendants, sans aucun privilège accordé au pôle sujet de cette structure. Ainsi, ce n’est qu’à la stricte condition que la phénoménologie se « désubjectivise » qu’elle puisse à la fois réfuter un certain nombre de dogmes analytiques et empiristes et fonder sa propre méthode dans une absence comparative de présupposés. / This dissertation takes as its point of departure a polemical comparison of the respective claims of the phenomenological and classical analytic-linguistic methods to provide an account of a priori knowledge of essential or necessary truth that is as free as possible of presuppositions and circular reasoning. The precise problem around which this confrontation crystalizes is the one concerning the possibility of material a priori truths. First, we propose a mereological interpretation of and solution to this problem in the Husserlian terms of wholes composed of dependent parts, which allows for a better account of such wholes than does the atomistic mereology that characterizes most “analytic” formal ontologies, and we propose an understanding of the method of eidetic intuition as mereological analysis. Secondly, we apply this analysis to the phenomenological method itself, understanding the transcendental reduction as a mereological variation on the material a priori of correlation that characterizes the very structure of the relation between the ego and the world; this obliges us to see this structure in turn as an intuitable concrete whole whose subjective and objective parts are merely absolutely dependent moments, without privileging the subject-pole of this structure. In this way, it is only on the strict condition that phenomenology “desubjectivize” itself that it might at once refute a certain number of analytic and empiricist dogmas and ground its own method without recourse to unnecessary and untenable presuppositions.

Cette thèse examine la phénoménologie en tant que philosophie-en-travail, en tant que projet ouvert de recherche. Sa tâche principale consiste à déterminer la façon d'accomplir le travail phénoménologique. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous examinons les analyses de la doctrine phénoménologique de l'attitude (Partie I.), de la doctrine de la méthode (Partie II.) et de l'architectonique " flexible " (Partie III.) de la phénoménologie. Ces élaborations nous permettent de thématiser la dé-limitation de la conscience, l'enrichissement de sens et l'institution du nouveau en tant que traits caractéristiques de la manière phénoménologique d'opérer. Cette recherche exige une oscillation constante entre une systématique ouverte de la philosophie d'Edmund Husserl et des analyses phénoménologues particulières.