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In chapter 1, I study how spillover effects from competitors' choices affect a firm's decision to open a store. Using panel data from the United Kingdom's fast food industry, I propose and estimate a game of entry under incomplete information that incorporates spillover effects between firms' entry decisions. A positive spillover is identified for Burger King - increasing the stock of existing McDonald's by 1 outlet increases Burger King's estimated equilibrium probability of opening a new store by approximately 18 percentage points. Chapter 2 advances our collective knowledge about the impact of learning from others in industry dynamics, and whether it can generate the clustering of rival retailers. Uncertainty about new markets provides an opportunity for learning from others, where one firm's past entry decisions signal to others the potential profitability of risky markets. The setting is Canada's hamburger fast food industry from its inception in 1970 to 2005, where I introduce a new estimable dynamic oligopoly model of entry/exit with unobserved heterogeneity, common uncertainty about demand, learning through entry, and learning from others. I find that the presence of uncertainty induces retailers to herd into markets that others have previously done well in. Finally, chapter 3 (joint with Feng Chi) studies the early adoption of Twitter in the 111th House of Representatives. Our main objective is to determine whether successes of past adopters have the tendency to speed up Twitter adoption, where past success is defined as the average followers per Tweet - a common measure of "Twitter success" - among all prior adopters. The data suggests that accelerated adoption can be associated with favorable past outcomes: increasing the average number of followers per Tweet among past adopters by a standard deviation (of 8 followers per Tweet) accelerates the adoption time by about 112 days.

In chapter 1, I study how spillover effects from competitors' choices affect a firm's decision to open a store. Using panel data from the United Kingdom's fast food industry, I propose and estimate a game of entry under incomplete information that incorporates spillover effects between firms' entry decisions. A positive spillover is identified for Burger King - increasing the stock of existing McDonald's by 1 outlet increases Burger King's estimated equilibrium probability of opening a new store by approximately 18 percentage points. Chapter 2 advances our collective knowledge about the impact of learning from others in industry dynamics, and whether it can generate the clustering of rival retailers. Uncertainty about new markets provides an opportunity for learning from others, where one firm's past entry decisions signal to others the potential profitability of risky markets. The setting is Canada's hamburger fast food industry from its inception in 1970 to 2005, where I introduce a new estimable dynamic oligopoly model of entry/exit with unobserved heterogeneity, common uncertainty about demand, learning through entry, and learning from others. I find that the presence of uncertainty induces retailers to herd into markets that others have previously done well in. Finally, chapter 3 (joint with Feng Chi) studies the early adoption of Twitter in the 111th House of Representatives. Our main objective is to determine whether successes of past adopters have the tendency to speed up Twitter adoption, where past success is defined as the average followers per Tweet - a common measure of "Twitter success" - among all prior adopters. The data suggests that accelerated adoption can be associated with favorable past outcomes: increasing the average number of followers per Tweet among past adopters by a standard deviation (of 8 followers per Tweet) accelerates the adoption time by about 112 days.

The United States acute care hospital (ACH) market provides a unique environment in which to examine questions about market structure and performance. The ACHs operate in a mature market of health services that is highly regulated and has one dominant primary consumer of services. The uncharacteristic industry structure offers the opportunity to analyze pervasive agency relationships and capital structure issues in a new setting. In addition, the policies of the U.S. Government have created an environment in which tacit collusion is likely to flourish, which leads to market buyer power (monopsony, or buyers acting as one monopoly buyer). A key question is the extent to which monopsony and agency affect capital structure decisions. Agency is defined by Ross (1973, p.134) as a relationship formed between a principle and their agents, “when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems.” This thesis extends the agency framework provided by Jensen and Meckling (1976), along with the econometric understanding of monopsony in healthcare via tacit collusion, as suggested by Pauly (1998) and Sevilla (2005), and the research constraints of monopsony under an all-or-nothing contract, as outlined by Taylor (2003). Using data on ACHs from the period of 1995 to 2007 for approximately 5,000 ACHs, which was derived from the Medicare Cost Report and medical payments for a sub-population of 1,500, this research examines the determinants of capital structure in a distorted market. Building upon this initial analysis, the research seeks to examine the effects of market distortions upon free cash flow, and ultimately, capital structure. Two theories of distortion are presented that would affect free cash flow: The first is that of the agency cost of free cash flow and signaling, and the second is a theory of monopsony via tacit collusion between buyers. A model of the agency relationship between ACHs and the U.S. Government is proposed, promoting agency cost (signaling and the agency cost of free cash flows) as a causal relation with free cash flows and capital structure (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). Empirical models of agency are constructed, examining the dependence on government business and the relation to the leverage (signaling) and free cash flows (agency cost of free cash flows) for ACHs. In addition, a complementary theory of capital structure determinant via market power (monopsony) is formulated, suggesting that monopsony conditions within the ACH market affect free cash flows and capital structure. The analysis provides a framework for understanding the environments in which ACHs operate and the strength of bargaining within the market. The research concludes with a review of the determinants of capital structure in light of the inefficiencies and distortions of the industry and the relationships observed.

Real estate activity is notably influenced by local land use regulation. By acting as redtape costs or explicitly through compensatory payments, such rules typically increase construction costs by reducing supply and increasing demand in the housing market, which leads to higher prices. This is the first study to model the decision-making process of housing supply using a game theoretic approach. To shed light on the roleof regulation and competition in this industry, I employ a static-entry model that incorporates the demand, cost and strategic factors common to the activity. I built aunique data set forthe city of São Paulo, Brazil, with information on the universe ofnew residential buildings launched in the city, along with a history of all licenses requested by the developers tothe government for each project. My empirical results show that the regulation play akey role in developer activity. For the areas with the most intense activity of the city,the bureaucracy in the residential approval process cost annually R$ 47 millions (US$ 14millions) by entrant firm. / A atividade imobiliária é particularmente influenciada pela regulação do uso da terra. Ao agir como \"custos burocráticos\" ou explicitamente por meio de pagamentos compensatórios,essas regras normalmente aumentam os custos de construção ao reduzir a oferta e aumentara demanda de novas residências, o que leva a preços mais altos. Este é o primeiro estudo amodelar o processo de decisão de oferta de residências usando uma abordagem de teoria dos jogos. Para mostrar os efeitos da regulação e da competição nesse setor, eu emprego um modelo de entrada estático que incorpora os fatores de demanda, custo e estratégicos comuns a essa atividade. Eu construí uma base de dados única para a cidade de São Paulo, Brasil, com informações sobre o universo de novos empreendimentos residenciais na cidade, juntamente comum histórico de todas as licenças e alvarás requeridos pelas incorporadoras à Prefeitura para cada projeto. Meus resultados mostram que a regulação tem um papel chave na atividade imobiliária. Para as áreas com atividade mais intensa da cidade, a burocracia no processo de aprovação de novas residências tem um custo média anual de R$ 47 milhões por firma entrante no mercado.

Real estate activity is notably influenced by local land use regulation. By acting as redtape costs or explicitly through compensatory payments, such rules typically increase construction costs by reducing supply and increasing demand in the housing market, which leads to higher prices. This is the first study to model the decision-making process of housing supply using a game theoretic approach. To shed light on the roleof regulation and competition in this industry, I employ a static-entry model that incorporates the demand, cost and strategic factors common to the activity. I built aunique data set forthe city of São Paulo, Brazil, with information on the universe ofnew residential buildings launched in the city, along with a history of all licenses requested by the developers tothe government for each project. My empirical results show that the regulation play akey role in developer activity. For the areas with the most intense activity of the city,the bureaucracy in the residential approval process cost annually R$ 47 millions (US$ 14millions) by entrant firm. / A atividade imobiliária é particularmente influenciada pela regulação do uso da terra. Ao agir como \"custos burocráticos\" ou explicitamente por meio de pagamentos compensatórios,essas regras normalmente aumentam os custos de construção ao reduzir a oferta e aumentara demanda de novas residências, o que leva a preços mais altos. Este é o primeiro estudo amodelar o processo de decisão de oferta de residências usando uma abordagem de teoria dos jogos. Para mostrar os efeitos da regulação e da competição nesse setor, eu emprego um modelo de entrada estático que incorpora os fatores de demanda, custo e estratégicos comuns a essa atividade. Eu construí uma base de dados única para a cidade de São Paulo, Brasil, com informações sobre o universo de novos empreendimentos residenciais na cidade, juntamente comum histórico de todas as licenças e alvarás requeridos pelas incorporadoras à Prefeitura para cada projeto. Meus resultados mostram que a regulação tem um papel chave na atividade imobiliária. Para as áreas com atividade mais intensa da cidade, a burocracia no processo de aprovação de novas residências tem um custo média anual de R$ 47 milhões por firma entrante no mercado.

L’estimation structurelle des modèles de demande sur des marchés de produits différenciés joue un rôle important en économie. Elle permet de mieux comprendre les choix des consommateurs et, entre autres, de mesurer les effets d’une fusion d’entreprise, de l’introduction d’un nouveau produit sur le marché ou d’une nouvelle régulation. L’approche traditionnelle consiste à spécifier un modèle d’utilité, typiquement un modèle d’utilité aléatoire additif, à en calculer ses demandes et à inverser ces dernières pour obtenir des équations de demande inverse qui serviront de base pour l’estimation. Toutefois, en général, ces demandes inverses n’ont pas de forme analytique. L'estimation exige donc une inversion numérique et l’emploi de procédures d’estimation non-linéaire, qui peuvent être difficiles à mettre en oeuvre et chronophages.Cette thèse adopte une approche différente, en développant de nouveaux modèles de demande inverse qui sont cohérents avec un modèle d’utilité de consommateurs hétérogènes. Cette approche permet de capter de façon plus flexible les substitutions entre les produits, grâce à de simples régressions linéaires basées sur des données incluant les parts de marché, les prix et les caractéristiques des produits. Le premier chapitre de cette thèse développe le modèle inverse product differentiation logit (IPDL), qui généralise les modèles logit emboîtés, permettant ainsi de capter de façon flexible les substitutions entre les produits, y compris de la complémentarité. Il montre que le modèle IPDL appartient à une classe de modèles de demande inverse, nommée generalized inverse logit (GIL), laquelle inclut une grande majorité de modèles d’utilité aléatoire additifs qui ont été utilisés à des fins d'estimation de la demande. Le second chapitre développe le modèle flexible inverse logit (FIL), un modèle GIL qui utilise une structure de nids flexible avec un nid pour chaque pair de produits. Il montre que le modèle FIL, projeté dans l’espace des caractéristiques des produits, permet d’obtenir des élasticités-prix qui dépendent directement des caractéristiques des produits et, en utilisant des simulations de Monte-Carlo, qu’il est capable de reproduire celles du "flexible" modèle logit à coefficients aléatoires. Le troisième chapitre étudie la micro-fondation du modèle GIL. Il montre que les restrictions que le modèle GIL impose sur la fonction de demande inverse sont des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de cohérence avec un modèle de consommateurs hétérogènes maximisant leur fonction d’utilité, connu sous le nom de perturbed utility model (PUM). Il montre également que tout modèle GIL génère une fonction de demande qui satisfait une légère variante des conditions de Daly-Zachary, laquelle permet de combiner substituabilité et complémentarité en demande. / Estimation of structural demand models in differentiated product markets plays an important role in economics. It allows to better understand consumers’ choices and, amongst other, to assess the effects of mergers, new products, and changes in regulation. The standard approach consists in specifying a utility model, typically an additive random utility model, computing its demands, and inverting them to obtain inverse demand equations, which will serve as a basis for estimation. However, since these inverse demands have generally no closed form, estimation requires numerical inversion and non-linear optimization, which can be painful and time-consuming. This dissertation adopts a different approach, developing novel inverse demand models, which are consistent with a utility model of heterogeneous consumers. This approach allows to accommodate rich substitution patterns thanks to simple linear regressions with data on market shares, prices and product characteristics. The first chapter of this dissertation develops the inverse product differentiation logit (IPDL) model, which generalizes the nested logit models to allow for richer substitution patterns, including complementarity. It also shows that the IPDL model belongs to the class of generalized inverse logit (GIL) models, which includes a vast majority of additive random utility models that have been used for demand estimation purposes. The second chapter develops the flexible inverse logit (FIL) model, a GIL model that uses a flexible nesting structure with a nest for each pair of products. It shows that the FIL model, projected into product characteristics space, makes the price elasticities depending on product characteristics directly and, using Monte Carlo simulations, that it is able to mimic those from the "flexible" random coefficient logit model. The third chapter studies the micro-foundation of the GIL model. It shows that the restrictions that the GIL model imposes on the inverse demand function are necessary and sufficient for consistency with a model of heterogeneous and utility-maximizing consumers, called perturbed utility model. It also shows that any GIL model yields a demand function that satisfies a slight variant of the Daly-Zachary conditions, which allows to combine substitutability and complementarity in demand.

Dans de nombreuses industries, les producteurs doivent passer par des intermédiaires afin de distribuer leurs produits sur les marchés. Par exemple, dans le secteur de la grande distribution alimentaire, les producteurs vendent leurs produits à des distributeurs qui ont un accès direct aux consommateurs finaux; dans les secteurs de la santé, les fournisseurs de soins médicaux (e.g., les hôpitaux) traitent avec les assureurs afin d’avoir accès aux patients. Toutes ces industries sont souvent caractérisées par une structure oligopolistique bilatérale avec un petit nombre d'entreprises opérant sur les deux côtés du marché, impliquant des relations commerciales complexes entre les acteurs. En effet, les externalités contractuelles sont omniprésentes dans ce type d’environnement puisque la valeur générée par une transaction et partagée entre un fabricant et un détaillant dépend généralement des décisions contractuelles des autres entreprises opérant sur le marché. Un certain nombre de pratiques, communément appelées « restrictions verticales », peuvent également survenir, telles que des contrats d'exclusivité, des pratiques de ventes liées, ou bien des fixations de prix de revente. En outre, les conditions tarifaires sont principalement déterminées par un processus de négociation entre les entreprises. L’objet de ma recherche consiste à analyser comment les relations verticales entre entreprises dans un contexte aussi complexe que celui des oligopoles bilatéraux peuvent avoir un impact sur le surplus du consommateur et le bon fonctionnement de l’industrie. Dans le premier chapitre de ma thèse, j’élabore un modèle d’économétrie structurelle afin d’analyser empiriquement les relations producteur- distributeur dans des oligopoles bilatéraux avec produits différenciés. L’approche contraste avec la plupart des méthodes empiriques antérieures et permet d’identifier la division du surplus entre les entreprises sans la nécessité d’avoir des données sur les contrats de gros et les coûts marginaux des firmes. Le deuxième chapitre se concentre sur l’étude des effets générés par la formation d’alliances entre distributeurs pour négocier des tarifs communs et acheter des produits auprès de leurs fournisseurs. En utilisant des données d’achats sur les eaux embouteillées réalisés par un panel de consommateurs représentatif de la population Française, j'estime un modèle structurel de demande et d'offre. Je réalise ensuite des simulations pour étudier les effets de trois alliances formées par des distributeurs dans le secteur de la distribution alimentaire en France. Les résultats montrent que le pouvoir de négociation des distributeurs est affaibli, le profit total de l'industrie diminue, et que les consommateurs finaux font face à des prix plus élevés. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse analyse la pratique du «full-line forcing» comme mécanisme d’éviction sur les marchés verticalement liées. Je considère un modèle dans lequel un producteur multi-produit offre une marque leader et une marque secondaire sur laquelle il est en concurrence avec une entreprise plus efficace. Le modèle permet de mettre en évidence que le « full-line forcing » est une stratégie de négociation efficace car elle permet au producteur multi-produit d’influer sur les points de menace dans les négociations et d’imposer son portefeuille de marques sur les étagères du distributeur, excluant ainsi le producteur concurrent. Cette stratégie émerge à l’équilibre sous trois conditions : (i) la marque leader de l’entreprise multi-produit est suffisamment forte, (ii) son inefficacité sur la marque secondaire n’est pas trop sévère, et (iii) le fournisseur concurrent est assez puissant dans sa négociation avec le distributeur. Les résultats suggèrent que les consommateurs finaux et le bien-être total peuvent être réduit alors que, dans certains cas, le distributeur bénéficie d’une telle stratégie d’éviction. / In many economic environments, producers need to deal with intermediaries to supply their products on markets. Examples include grocery markets in which food manufacturers sell their products to retailers who have direct access to final consumers; pharmaceutical industries where manufacturers distribute their drugs on markets through drugstores; multichannel television industries where cable channels sell their programs to multichannel video program distributors who then charge fees to consumers; private healthcare sectors in which medical providers (e.g., hospitals) deal with insurers to have access to sick patients. One particular feature of such industries is that they are often characterized by a bilateral oligopolistic structure with a small number of firms operating on both sides of the market, resulting in complex vertical relationships. Contracting externalities are indeed intrinsic to such environments because the value generated by a transaction and shared between a manufacturer and a retailer generally depends on the contracting decisions of other firms operating on the market. A number of practices, commonly referred to as vertical restraints, may also arise such as exclusive dealing, bundling and tying, resale price maintenance, or quantity discounts. Furthermore, trading terms are mostly determined through a bargaining process between upstream and downstream firms rather than being fixed by one-side of the market. My research consists in analyzing how vertical relationships between firms in such complex settings impact consumer surplus and total welfare. To this end, I rely on both theoretical models and empirical methods to derive predictions of the effects of contractual arrangements within the supply chain. In the first chapter of this dissertation I design a structural framework to analyze manufacturer-retailer relationships in bilateral oligopolies with differentiated products. Our approach contrasts with most prior empirical models of bargaining and allows to identify the division of surplus between firms without data on wholesale contracts and marginal costs. The second chapter investigates the economic effects of alliances formed by retailers to negotiate common prices and purchase products from manufacturers. I use household- level scanner data on bottled water purchases and estimate a structural model of demand and supply. I perform simulations to study the economic effects of three buyer alliances that have been formed by competing retailers in the French food retail sector. Results show that the bargaining power of retailers is weakened, total industry profit decreases, and final consumers face higher prices. The third chapter examines the case of full-line forcing as a foreclosure device in vertically related markets. We consider a setting in which a multi-product manufacturer offers a leading brand and a secondary brand for which it competes with a more efficient single-product firm. We show that full-line forcing is an efficient bargaining strategy as it allows the multi-product manufacturer to affect threat points and impose its brand portfolio on the retailer’s shelves therefore excluding the rival supplier. This strategy arises in equilibrium under three conditions (i) the leading brand of the multi- product firm is strong enough, (ii) the inefficiency on the secondary brand is not too severe, and (iii) the rival supplier is powerful enough in its bargaining with the retailer. Our results suggest that final consumers and total welfare may be harmed whereas, in some cases, the retailer benefits from such a foreclosure strategy.

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Die Dissertation beinhaltet drei Arbeiten zur europäischen Zusammenkontolle. Die ersten zwei empirischen Arbeiten befassen sich mit der Schätzung von Abschreckungseffekten der Zusammenschlusskontrollpolitik der Europäischen Union, und die dritte theoretische Arbeit untersucht die strategische Interaktion zwischen Wettbewerber und Behörde im Rahmen eines Signaling Modells. / The dissertation contains three papers on European merger control. The first two empirical papers discuss the estimation of deterrence effects in the merger control policy of the European Union, whereas the third theoretical paper examines the strategic interaction between competitor and authority by using a signaling model.