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1	Asymmetric information in the regulation of the access to markets Ghislandi, Simone, Kuhn, Michael 02 1900 (has links) (PDF) It is frequently argued that the high costs of clinical trials prior to the admission of new pharmaceuticals are stifling innovation. At the same time, regulation of the access to markets is often justified on the basis of consumers` inability to detect the true quality of a product. We examine these arguments from an information economic perspective by setting a framework where the incentives to invest in R&D are influenced by the information structure prevailing when the product is launched in the market at a later stage. In this setting, by changing the information structure, regulation (or the lack of) can thus indirectly affect R&D efforts. More formally, we construct a moral hazard - cum - adverse selection model in which a pharmaceutical firm exerts an unobservable effort towards developing an innovative (high quality) drug (moral hazard) and then announces the (unobservable) quality outcome to an uninformed regulator and/or consumers (adverse selection). We compare the outcomes in regard to innovation effort and expected welfare under two regimes: (i) regulation, where products undergo a clinical trial designed to ascertain product quality at the point of market access; and (ii) laissez-faire with free entry, where the revelation of quality is left to the market process. Results show that whether or not innovation is greater in the presence of entry regulation crucially depends on the efficacy of the trial in identifying (poor) quality, on the probability that unknown qualities are revealed in the market process, and on the preference and cost structure. The welfare ranking of the two regimes depends on the differential effort incentive and on the net welfare gain from implementing full information instantaneously. For example, in settings of vertical monopoly, vertical differentiation and horizontal differentiation with no variable cost of quality, entry regulation tends to be the preferred regime if the effort incentive under pooling is relatively low and profits do not count too much towards welfare. A complementary numerical Analysis shows how the outcomes vary with the market and cost structure. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series JEL D82, I18, L15, L51, O31
2	Entry regulation: Peruvian experience on prohibitions and restrictions to the market access / Regulación de entrada: Experiencia peruana sobre prohibiciones y restricciones para el acceso al mercado Quintana Sánchez, Eduardo, Villarán, Lucía 12 April 2018 (has links) This article addresses the way entry regulation works, creating prohibitions for the access of new competitors to markets (absolute effects) or limitations to the number of providers that can operate in the market (relative effects). The paper also assesses whether Peruvian legal framework allows for entry regulation, because it guarantees free private initiative and prohibits the creation of legal monopolies. Finally, several examples from Peruvian experience are used to explain the scenarios were entry regulation can have suitable and reasonable justification, as well as other scenarios were such measures lack support and cause negative effects on the market and consumer choices. / En este artículo, se explica cómo funciona la regulación de entrada estableciendo prohibiciones o impedimentos para la entrada de nuevos competidores (efectos absolutos) o limitaciones al número de operadores que pueden actuar en el mercado (efectos relativos). Asimismo, se evalúa si existe espacio para la regulación de entrada dentro del marco legal peruano, que garantiza la libre iniciativa privada y prohíbe el establecimiento de monopolios legales. Finalmente, a través de diversos casos concretos peruanos, se explica los escenarios en que la regulación de entrada, ya sea con efectos absolutos o relativos, puede tener una justificación válida y razonable, así como otros supuestos en que ese tipo de medidas carecen de sustento y ocasionan efectos negativos para el mercado y las opciones de elección de los consumidores. Entry Regulation Legal Monopolies Regulación De Entrada Monopolios Legales
3	Den finansiella inträdesregleringens systematik och integreringen av kryptomarknaderna / The Systematics of Financial Market Entry Regulation and the Integration of Cryptocurrency Markets Falkman, Adam January 2024 (has links) No description available. financial regulation financial entry regulation entry regulation crypto crypto market crypto assets MiCA Regulation MiCA licensing permit crypto asset service provider market failure market entry finansiell reglering inträdesreglering krypto kryptomarknaden kryptotillgångar MiCA-förordningen MiCA anmälningsplikt registreringsplikt tillståndsplikt tillståndskrav tillstånd leverantör av kryptotillgångstjänst anmälan registrering marknadsmisslyckanden marknadsinträde Law Juridik

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