Įrodymų leistinumas yra vienas aktualiausių įrodymų savybių klausimų, kuris šiuolaikiniame teis÷s moksle n÷ra sistemiškai ir pakankamai atskleistas. Nebuvimas tikslios ir vienareikšm÷s įrodymų leistinumo definicijos – daro šį klausimą dar aktualesniu. Tad šis magistro baigiamasis darbas yra skirtas įrodymų leistinumo problemos nagrin÷jimui, naujai apibr÷žiant įrodymų leistinumo turinį, pateikiant jo sąvoką ir reikšmę civilinio proceso mokslui. Apibr÷žiant įrodymų leistinumą bus aptarta bendroji įrodymų leistinumo taisykl÷, į kurią bus pažvelgta keliais aspektais. Kadangi kiekviena įrodin÷jimo priemon÷ turi savo specifiką, ypatingas d÷mesys bus skiriamas atskirų įrodin÷jimo priemonių leistinumo ypatumams. Atkreiptinas d÷meys bus į problematiškus leistinumo klausimus, tame tarpe ir į klausimus, susijusius su leistinų elektroninių duomenų naudojimu civiliniame procese. Tad šio magistro baigiamojo darbo tiklsas yra apibendrintai pateikti teorinius ir praktinius įrodymų leistinumo civiliniame procese aspektus. / The reliability of evidences is one of the most actual aspects of evidences which are not enough analyzed in science of law. The fact that there is no clear meaning of reliability of evidences makes the problem even more actual. The purpose is to analyze the problem of the reliability of evidences and to clarify a definition and conception of reliability of evidences. Analyzing and defining the aspects of reliability of evidences the author pays attention to the common rule of reliability of evidences in few ways. The author also pays attention to the peculiarity of the particular kinds of evidences which every have it’s own specifics. Analyzing some aspects of the reliability author pays attention to actual problems, for example, the legal use of electronic data as evidences in civil procedure. The purpose of this scientific work is to show and analyze the conception, meaning and actual problems of the reliability of evidences as well as to suggest possible ways for resolving actual problems and gaps in both theoretical and practical levels.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

I evaluate the methods of cladistic parsimony and maximum likelihood in phylogenetic systematics by their affinity to Popper‘s degree of corroboration. My work analyzes an important recent exchange between the proponents of the two methods. Until this exchange, only advocates of cladistic parsimony have claimed a basis for their method on epistemological grounds through corroboration. Advocates of maximum likelihood, on the other hand, have based the rational justification for their method largely on statistical grounds. In Part One I outline corroboration in terms of content, severity of test and explanatory power. In Part Two I introduce the two methods. In Part Three I analyze three important debates. The first involves the appropriate probability interpretation for phylogenetics. The second is about severity of test. The third concerns explanatory power. In Part Four I conclude that corroboration can decide none of these debates, and therefore cannot decide the debate between cladistic parsimony and maximum likelihood.

I evaluate the methods of cladistic parsimony and maximum likelihood in phylogenetic systematics by their affinity to Popper‘s degree of corroboration. My work analyzes an important recent exchange between the proponents of the two methods. Until this exchange, only advocates of cladistic parsimony have claimed a basis for their method on epistemological grounds through corroboration. Advocates of maximum likelihood, on the other hand, have based the rational justification for their method largely on statistical grounds. In Part One I outline corroboration in terms of content, severity of test and explanatory power. In Part Two I introduce the two methods. In Part Three I analyze three important debates. The first involves the appropriate probability interpretation for phylogenetics. The second is about severity of test. The third concerns explanatory power. In Part Four I conclude that corroboration can decide none of these debates, and therefore cannot decide the debate between cladistic parsimony and maximum likelihood.

abstract: The purpose of this study was to investigate the impacts of visual cues and different types of self-explanation prompts on learning, cognitive load and intrinsic motivation, as well as the potential interaction between the two factors in a multimedia environment that was designed to deliver a computer-based lesson about the human cardiovascular system. A total of 126 college students were randomly assigned in equal numbers (N = 21) to one of the six experimental conditions in a 2 X 3 factorial design with visual cueing (visual cues vs. no cues) and type of self-explanation prompts (prediction prompts vs. reflection prompts vs. no prompts) as the between-subjects factors. They completed a pretest, subjective cognitive load questions, intrinsic motivation questions, and a posttest during the course of the experience. A subsample (49 out of 126) of the participants' eye movements were tracked by an eye tracker. The results revealed that (a) participants presented with visually cued animations had significantly higher learning outcome scores than their peers who viewed uncued animations; and (b) cognitive load and intrinsic motivation had different impacts on learning in multimedia due to the moderation effect of visual cueing. There were no other significant findings in terms of learning outcomes, cognitive load, intrinsic motivation, and eye movements. Limitations, implications and future directions are discussed within the framework of cognitive load theory, cognitive theory of multimedia learning and cognitive-affective theory of learning with media. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Educational Technology 2011

This thesis investigates the interplay between explanatory issues in special relativity and the theory's metaphysical foundations. Special attention is given to the 'dynamical approach' to relativity, promoted primarily by Harvey Brown and collaborators, according to which the symmetries of dynamical laws are explanatory of relativistic effects, inertial motion, and even the Minkowskian geometrical structure of a specially relativistic world. The thesis begins with a review of Einstein's 1905 introduction to special relativity, after which brief historical introductions are given for the standard 'geometrical' approach to relativity and the unorthodox 'dynamical' approach. After a critical review of recent literature on the topic, the dynamical approach is shown to be in need of a metaphysical package that would undergird the explanatory claims mentioned above. It is argued that the dynamical approach is best understood as a form of relationalism - in particular, as a relativistic form of 'regularity relationalism', promoted recently by Nick Huggett. According to this view, some portion of a world's geometrical structure actually supervenes upon the symmetries of the best-system dynamical laws for a material ontology endowed with a primitive sub-metrical structure. To explore the plausibility of this construal of the dynamical approach, a case study is carried out on solutions to the Klein-Gordon equation. Examples are found for which the field values, when purged of all spatiotemporal structure but their induced topology, are still arguably best-systematized by the Klein-Gordon equation itself. This bolsters the plausibility of the claim that some system of field values, endowed with mere sub-metrical structure, might have as its best-systems dynamical laws a (set of) Lorentz-covariant equation(s), on which Minkowski geometrical structure would supervene. The upshot is that the dynamical approach to special relativity can be defended as what might be called an ontologically and ideologically relationalist approach to Minkowski spacetime structure. The chapters refer regularly to three appendices, which include a brief introduction to topological and differentiable spaces.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009-08-21Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:27:35Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 rodrigues_gcl_me_mar.pdf: 1075481 bytes, checksum: aaa7d51ba45d757b5a6f878845828d93 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Tradicionalmente a ação é explicada na Filosofia por meio de teorias que a consideram como o efeito de uma ou várias causas (DAVIDSON, 1968, 1980). Embora o princípio da causalidade mecânica – entendida como causa eficiente − seja satisfatório para explicar uma gama de eventos físicos, ele se mostra insuficiente na explicação da ação, conforme ressaltam filósofos, tais como von Wright (1973), Dretske (1981, 1988, 1995), Juarrero (1999), Emmeche (2006, 2007), Gonzalez (2005, 2006, 2007) e Üexküll (1982). No âmbito humano, por exemplo, esses filósofos indicam limites e problemas relativos à tentativa de explicar a ação como o resultado de uma sequencia de causas eficientes. Neste sentido, o objetivo da presente dissertação é analisar e discutir problemas centrais da filosofia da ação, em especial: (i) a distinção entre movimento e ação; (ii) limites da causalidade na explicação da ação; (iii) alcance da abordagem informacional da ação; (iv) a pertinência da concepção pragmática de informação genuína na explicação da ação significativa. No que diz respeito ao problema (i), focalizamos o papel da intenção presente na ação que a distingue de movimento. No que diz respeito ao problema (ii), examinamos em que medida seria válido o pressuposto segundo o qual uma teoria é explicativa quando descreve as causas mecânicas envolvidas na ação. Nossa hipótese central é a de que as explicações da ação não deveriam se limitar à relação causal mecânica, porque a ação, além do elemento causal, comporta uma intermediação sígnica que não se reduz ao plano diádico da ação-reação. Seguindo as trilhas de filósofos estudiosos da teoria da informação, argumentamos, na discussão do problema (iii), que a explicação da ação extrapola o domínio causal diádico e incorpora um patamar que inclui a manipulação de informação... / Action is traditionally explained in philosophy by means of theories that consider it to be the effect of one or several causes (DAVIDSON, 1968, 1980). Although the principle of mechanical causality – understood as efficient cause – may be sufficient to explain a range of physical events, it has been found to be inadequate to explain action, as pointed out by philosophers including von Wright (1973), Dretske (1981, 1988, 1995), Juarrero (1999), Emmeche (2006, 2007), Gonzalez (2005, 2006, 2007) and Üexküll (1982). In the human domain, for example, these philosophers indicate the existence of limits and difficulties related to the attempt to explain action as the result of a sequence of efficient causes. Hence, the objective of the present work is to analyze and discuss central problems of the philosophy of action, especially: (i) the distinction between movement and action; (ii) limits of causality in the explanation of action; (iii) extent of the informational approach to action; (iv) relevance of the pragmatic conception of genuine information in explanation of meaning action. Concerning problem (i), we focus on the role of intention, which is present in action and distinguishes it from movement. To address problem (ii), we examine the validity of the presupposition according to which a theory is explanatory when it describes the mechanical causes involved in action. Our central hypothesis is that explanations of action should not be limited to the mechanical causal relationship, because action, besides the causal element, also depends on an intermediation driven by signs that cannot be reduced to the dyadic plane of action-reaction. Following the line taken by earlier philosophers, in discussion of problem (iii), we argue that the explanation of action must extend beyond the dyadic causal domain and incorporate a level that includes the manipulation of meaningful information. In ... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissCL.pdf: 1141798 bytes, checksum: 937f7ca204b0a90bbde9494a89d09b45 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004-03-17 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / Radical behaviorism was presented as the philosophy of science of human behavior. This has important consequences. One of them has to do with questions regarding scientific explanation. The present essay essentially deals with the following question: what is the model of explanation of radical behaviorism? Some characteristics of the explanation model of behavior are examined, based on a discussion of the ideas of Skinner and two others philosophers of science, to wit, David Hume and Ernst Mach. Hume offers a logical-empirical critique of the concept of causality as necessary connection, by arguing that causal relations can not be demonstrated on the basis of statements of fact. Moreover, experience does not furnish the necessary causal link between cause and effect. He concludes the human knowledge deals solely with constant relations. This critique was taken over by Skinner by way of Mach s functional descriptivism . Mach s substitution of the concept of cause by that of functional relations, and its consequent distinction between scientific explanation and causal explanation is based on Hume s critique. One might also argue that Mach advances on Hume s critique by asserting that the world is, in principle, probabilistic. Skinner, from the beginning, offered an interpretation of behavioral theory as description in accordance with Mach s philosophy of science. Accordingly, he limited himself to explaining behavior in terms of functional relationships. However, it is argued that the explanation of behavior is not only the discovery of functional relations. Skinner does not comply with the restrictions of descriptivism when he offers an interpretation, beyond the bounds of mere functional relations, of the origin of behavior, as is the case with philogenetic behavior and with cultural practices. Accordingly, interpretation is included in radical behaviorism s explanatory system. In this way, the theory of behavior, without rejecting descriptivism, may be associated with a version of scientific instrumentalism. This is done via Mach in a somewhat surprising way. Mach s emphasis on the notions of scientific concept and hypothesis leads us to a kind of reticent instrumentalism which emerges as a reaction to the realist view of theories. As a version of scientific instrumentalism, the theory of behaviorism can be seen as pragmatic, and so radical behaviorism enters the field of ethics. The alliance of descriptivism and instrumentalism rule out realist interpretations of the theory of behavior. A reading of Skinner s theory from the perspective of the philosophical works of Hume and Mach also weaken the association of radical behaviorism with the metaphysical determinism. It is concluded that the model of selection by consequences is a functional, instrumental and probabilistic, rather than causal, way of explaining behavior. / O behaviorismo radical se apresenta como a filosofia da ciência do comportamento humano. Essa asserção tem decorrências importantes. Uma delas esbarra, imediatamente, em questões concernentes à explicação científica. O presente trabalho trata essencialmente desta questão: qual o modelo de explicação do comportamento defendido pelo behaviorismo radical? Todavia, seu escopo é limitado. Foram examinadas algumas características do modelo explicativo comportamental através de um debate travado entre Skinner e outros dois filósofos da ciência, a saber: David Hume e Ernst Mach. Hume faz uma crítica lógicaempírica do conceito de causalidade como conexão necessária, afirmando que as relações causais, com respeito ao campo das questões de fato, não são passíveis de demonstração. Somado a isso, a experiência não fornece os elos causais que conectam inelutavelmente a causa ao efeito. Ao final, podemos tratar do conhecimento humano, apenas, em termos de relações constantes. Essa crítica foi legada a Skinner através de suas relações com o descritivismo funcional machiano. Mach incorporou a crítica de Hume ao substituir a noção de causa pela de relações funcionais, operando uma desvinculação entre explicação científica e explicação causal. É possível também argumentar que Mach avança a crítica de Hume afirmando que o mundo é, em princípio, probabilístico. Skinner, desde o início de sua obra, anunciou sua interpretação da teoria do comportamento como descrição nos moldes machianos. Com isso, confinou-se a explicar o comportamento em termos de relações funcionais. Entretanto, é possível identificar que a explicação do comportamento não se resume à descoberta de relações funcionais. Skinner rompe os limites do descritivismo interpretando a origem de comportamentos que ultrapassam descrições meramente funcionais, como é o caso do comportamento filogenético e das práticas culturais. O behaviorismo radical inclui no seu sistema explicativo a interpretação. Nesse sentido, a teoria do comportamento, sem renegar o descritivismo, conjuga-se como uma versão do instrumentalismo científico. A novidade está que o faz via relações com Mach. A ênfase dada por Mach com respeito às noções de conceito e hipótese científicas, nos leva a encontrar uma espécie de instrumentalismo reticente que emerge como uma reação à interpretação realista das teorias. Como uma versão do instrumentalismo científico, a teoria do comportamento também se afirma como um pragmatismo, que acaba inserindo o behaviorismo radical no campo da ética. A conjugação das versões descritivistas e instrumentalistas impede interpretações realistas da teoria do comportamento. Ademais, uma leitura da teoria de Skinner através dos textos filosóficos de Hume e Mach afasta o behaviorismo radical de laços com o determinismo metafísico. Conclui-se que o modelo de seleção por conseqüências se apresenta não como um modo causal, mas como um modo funcional, instrumental e probabilista de explicação do comportamento.

En Interaction Homme-Machine, la qualité est une utopie : malgré toutes les précautions prises en conception, il existe toujours des utilisateurs et des situations d'usage pour lesquels l'Interface Homme-Machine (IHM) est imparfaite. Cette thèse explore l'auto-explication des IHM pour améliorer la qualité perçue par les utilisateurs. L'approche s'inscrit dans une Ingénierie Dirigée par les Modèles. Elle consiste à embarquer à l'exécution les modèles de conception pour dynamiquement augmenter l'IHM d'un ensemble de questions et de réponses. Les questions peuvent être relatives à l'utilisation de l'IHM (par exemple, "A quoi sert ce bouton ?", "Pourquoi telle action n'est pas possible ?) et à sa justification (par exemple, "Pourquoi les items ne sont-ils pas rangés par ordre alphabétique ?"). Cette thèse propose une infrastructure logicielle UsiExplain basée sur les méta-modèles UsiXML. L'évaluation sur un cas d'étude d'achat de voitures montre que l'approche est pertinente pour les questions d'utilisation de l'IHM. Elle ouvre des perspectives en justification de conception. / In Human-Computer Interaction, quality is an utopia. Despite all the design efforts, there are always uses and situations for which the user interface is not perfect. This thesis investigates self-explanatory user interfaces for improving the quality perceived by end users. The approach follows the principles of model-driven engineering. It consists in keeping the design models at runtime so that to dynamically enrich the user interface with a set of possible questions and answers. The questions are related to usage (for instance, "What's the purpose of this button?", "Why is this action not possible"?) as well as to design rationale (for instance, "Why are the items not alphabetically ordered?"). This thesis proposes a software infrastructure UsiExplain based on the UsiXML metamodels. An evaluation conducted on a case study related to a car shopping webiste confirms that the approach is relevant especially for usage questions. Design rationale will be further explored in the future.STAR

La présente thèse envisage de cerner les comportements des Camerounais sur les routes.En l’occurrence, nous voulons savoir comment les croyances fatalistes, les croyances decontrôle, les croyances au contrôle divin, les croyances et valeurs culturelles, l’explicationnaïve des accidents et la perception du risque peuvent affecter les comportements des usagerset agents du trafic routier au Cameroun. Cinq études sont réalisées dans le cadre de notrethèse. La première étude examine 522 procès-verbaux d’accidents réels et montre qu’unegrande majorité des accidents surviennent dans de bonnes conditions de conduite. De plus, lesconducteurs se rejettent mutuellement la faute, mais s’accordent avec les gendarmes pour direque le comportement des conducteurs est la première cause des accidents de la route auCameroun. Une deuxième étude évalue la variation des comportements en fonction des explicationscausales et des croyances, sur un échantillon de 525 participants. On observe que lesparticipants présentent davantage des comportements sécuritaires lorsqu’ils expliquent lesaccidents par le comportement des conducteurs, mais leurs comportements tendent à êtremoins sécuritaires lorsqu’ils expliquent ceux-ci par des causes externes non contrôlables. Lesexplications causales tendent à être externes aux conducteurs lorsque les participants sontfatalistes, croient qu’ils peuvent affronter les situations de trafic dangereuses sans en êtreinquiété, croient que Dieu contrôle les situations dangereuses auxquelles ils peuvent faire faceou lorsqu’ils adhèrent fortement aux croyances et valeurs culturelles. En particulier, lescroyances et valeurs culturelles qui sont supposées protéger la vie, les croyances fatalistes etles croyances au contrôle divin se distinguent par leur capacité à favoriser l’explication desaccidents par des forces invisibles et à induire des comportements insécuritaires. Enfin, le rôlemédiateur des explications causales se révèlent pour toutes les croyances.A partir d’une quasi-expérimentation réalisée auprès de 444 participants, l’étude 3analyse la variation des explications causales et de l’attitude vis-à-vis des mesures deprévention, en fonction de la pertinence situationnelle, de la pertinence personnelle et de lagravité de l’accident. On observe que les participants ont tendance à fournir des explicationscausales défensives d’autant plus que la situation accidentelle leur est pertinente, qu’ilss’identifient à la victime et que l’accident est grave. De plus ils ont une préférence pour desmesures de prévention orientées vers les conducteurs lorsqu’ils expliquent les accidents par lecomportement de ces derniers. L’étude 4 montre une tendance à adopter des comportements moins sécuritaires lorsque les participants sous-estiment le risque routier. En outre, ces derniers ont tendance à sousestimer le risque lorsqu’ils sont fatalistes alors qu’ils ont davantage peur du risque lorsqu’ils sont attachés à leur identité culturelle. Enfin, les participants ont tendance à se croire capables d’affronter le risque routier sans en être inquiété lorsqu’ils croient que Dieu contrôle lessituations dangereuses ou lorsqu’ils croient aux pratiques culturelles supposées protéger lavie. Dans l’étude 5, on montre que les participants ont tendance à adopter descomportements davantage sécuritaires lorsqu’ils ont une perception élevée du risque etexpliquent les accidents par des causes contrôlables. Par contre, ils se montrent plutôtimprudents sur les routes lorsqu’ils ont une perception élevée du risque et croient que lesaccidents sont causés par des forces invisibles. Les résultats vont dans le sens des travaux antérieurs et sont discutés en rapport avec les connaissances théoriques. Enfin, des suggestions encouragent une prévention fondée sur les croyances de la population cible. / This thesis intends to examine Cameroonians behaviors on the roads. Our objective is toknow how fatalistic beliefs, control beliefs, divine control beliefs, cultural beliefs and values,naive explanation of accidents and risk perception can affect road users and traffic agents’behaviors. Five studies are carried out within the framework of our thesis. The first study examined 522 actual accidents reports and shows that a large majority of accidents occur in good driving conditions. In addition, drivers accused each other of wrongdoing, but agree with the gendarmes that, drivers’ behavior is the main cause of trafic accidents in Cameroon. A second study evaluates the variability of behaviors according to the causal explanations and beliefs, on a sample of 525 participants. It is shown that, participants adopt safer behaviors when they explain accidents by drivers’ behavior, but their behavior tend to be less safe when they explain accidents by external and uncontrollable causes. Causal explanations tend to be external to drivers when participants are fatalists, believe they can face dangerous traffic situations without being worried, believe that God is in control of dangerous situations that they may faced or when they adhere strongly to cultural beliefs and values. In particular, cultural beliefs and values that are supposed to protect the life, fatalistic beliefs, divine control beliefs tend to promote the explanation of accidents in terms ofinvisible forces and induce unsafe behaviors. Finally, the mediating role of causalexplanations is confirmed on all the beliefs. From a quasi-experiment conducted with 444 participants, the third study analyzes the variation of the causal explanations and attitude towards prevention measures, according to the situational relevance, personal relevance, and the severity of the accident. It is shown that participants tend to provide defensive causal explanations especially when the accident situation is relevant to them, they identify themselves to the victim and when the accident is serious. In addition they prefer drivers-oriented preventive measures when they explainaccidents by the drivers’ behaviors. Study 4 shows a tendency to adopt unsafe behaviors when participants underestimate traffic risk. Moreover, they tend to underestimate the traffic risk when they are fatalistic, but they fear risk when they are attached to their cultural identity. Finally, participants tend to believe that they can face traffic risk without being worried when they believe that God controls dangerous situations, or when they believe on cultural practices intended to protect life. In Study 5, we show that participants tend to adopt safer behaviors when they feartraffic risk and explain accidents by controllable causes. They are rather careless on the roadswhen they fear risk but believe that accidents are caused by invisible forces. The results are consistent with previous studies and are discussed in relation to the theoretical knowledge. Finally, suggestions encourage preventive measures based on the beliefs of the target population.