Many previous studies suggest that agency costs and information asymmetry are signifi-cant factors that affect the relationship between the investment expenditures of firms and the availability of cash from internal operations. Some other studies show that dividing firms in terms of the degree of ownership concentration further explains the relationship. However, the findings of previous studies are not consistent suggesting that other firm characteristics may be affecting the results. We propose that additional attention to the nature of ownership control of firms may explain the inconsistency. In this study, we examine the investment behaviour of family-controlled firms, institu-tion-controlled firms and widely-held firms. We distinguish between these three kinds of firms as they represent different levels of market imperfection. Therefore, we expect diverse investment behaviours among the three groups. Compared with family-controlled and institution-controlled firms, widely held firms have dispersed ownership structures. The greatest weakness of a widely-held ownership structure is the lack of shareholder monitoring due to the unmatched benefit and cost of control for small shareholders. The existence of at least one large shareholder will reduce the agency costs and asymmetric information. On one hand, enhanced monitoring will decrease the waste of free cash flows by managers. On the other hand, large shareholders are willing to spend time and effort to collect more information on management performance or to estimate the firms investment projects and thus reduce the information asymmetry. Both family-controlled firms and institution-controlled firms have large shareholders. However, whether or not the shareholders are playing an active monitoring role is still an important issue. From the point of aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, the family-controlled group is superior to the institution-controlled group as family-controlled firms generally assign influential positions to family members whose focus is in line with that of the family group. Even though a non family member may be appointed as the manager, the level of monitoring is significant given the high ownership concentration by the family. On the other hand, significant family ownership may lead to agency costs of its own. The main disadvantage of owner-managers is that they may lack the expertise to manage their firms although their position in the family may make it natural for them to be the manager. Another advantage of the family-controlled firm is that the family may divert company resources for its own benefit despite the presence of a manager who may or may not be a family member. Essentially, the family and the manager can all collude to spend on perks and personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Therefore, as we move from widely-held to institution-controlled the level of agency costs may decrease but as we move further into higher control, as may be suggested by family ownership, the level of agency costs may increase again. Although previous studies have noticed the influence of ownership structure, no analysis has been carried out to explore the investment behaviour of firms controlled by the three differ-ent kinds of shareholders. Our first motivation is to fill this gap. Splitting our sample into three representative groups enables us to study the financing constraints and investment behaviour of firms that are family-controlled, institution-controlled, and widely held. The focus of this study is on Canadian firms. The Canadian evidence is worth particular attention because the Canadian business environment is similar to the US business environment in terms of legal, regulatory, and market institutions but it is similar to European or Asian firms in terms of ownership structure. Therefore, a study of Canadian firms can provide a useful and rational assessment of the investment behaviour of firms that follow the ownership structures of Europe and Asia but operate in a business environment and institutional setting similar to those of the US. Further, a large number of Canadian firms have controlling shareholders and a large proportion, approximately 60%, of Canadian firms can be categorized as having concentrated ownership structure. Among the firms with concentrated ownership, over 1/3 of them can be dis-tinguished as family-controlled. This dataset provides an ideal setting to study the investment behaviours of firms according to the nature of their controllers. Our results illustrate that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is higher than the intensity of investments of concentrated ownership firms and that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is positively and significantly affected by the availability of funds from internal sources. In contrast, for concentrated ownership firms the intensity is positively and significantly affected by the availability of growth opportunities. These observations suggest that in comparison with the concentrated ownership firms, the widely-held firms face higher levels of financing constraints and exhibit less value maximizing behaviour. However, once we separate the family-controlled firms from the institution-controlled firms, we find that the investment expenditures of the family-controlled firms and the institution-controlled firms are not significantly different in terms of their dependence on internal cash flows or on the market-to-book ratios. We also find that widely-held firms tend to invest in projects that payoff quickly. This preference may be the result of these firms desires to ease their external funding constraints by generating funds internally.

This research examines the recent global financial crisis’ (GFC) impact on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and analyses governments’ responses. According to most literature, SMEs already faced obstacles prior to the GFC, such as paying high taxes, overcoming low profitability, being affected by rising business costs, finding qualified labour, dealing with increasing competition, etc. The GFC has had serious repercussions for SMEs with respect to financing, markets, and liquidity. In order to explore in depth the governments’ responses, qualitative methods are employed to test the following three research questions: 1) To what extent did governments aim to assist SMEs to survive the GFC? What types of programs have been implemented to address new and existing obstacles? 2) Did governments apply appropriate strategic initiatives to realize their goals? If the initiatives could not achieve the governments’ original goals, what obstacles did they address? 3) Did governments tend to help SMEs more after the GFC? Did governments give up on disadvantaged firms or did they try to help them survive the crisis? Analysis revealed that, as a result of the GFC, governments developed programs aimed at new obstacles and at some of the existing ones. The aims did not differ materially for developed and less-developed economies. Financing and taxation programs tended to be designed to achieve their goals directly, where other programs tended to achieve them in a more indirect manner. Overall, government initiatives covered most of the serious obstacles faced by SMEs and government assistance programs aimed at SMEs tended to have been augmented in light of the GFC.

Many previous studies suggest that agency costs and information asymmetry are signifi-cant factors that affect the relationship between the investment expenditures of firms and the availability of cash from internal operations. Some other studies show that dividing firms in terms of the degree of ownership concentration further explains the relationship. However, the findings of previous studies are not consistent suggesting that other firm characteristics may be affecting the results. We propose that additional attention to the nature of ownership control of firms may explain the inconsistency. In this study, we examine the investment behaviour of family-controlled firms, institu-tion-controlled firms and widely-held firms. We distinguish between these three kinds of firms as they represent different levels of market imperfection. Therefore, we expect diverse investment behaviours among the three groups. Compared with family-controlled and institution-controlled firms, widely held firms have dispersed ownership structures. The greatest weakness of a widely-held ownership structure is the lack of shareholder monitoring due to the unmatched benefit and cost of control for small shareholders. The existence of at least one large shareholder will reduce the agency costs and asymmetric information. On one hand, enhanced monitoring will decrease the waste of free cash flows by managers. On the other hand, large shareholders are willing to spend time and effort to collect more information on management performance or to estimate the firms investment projects and thus reduce the information asymmetry. Both family-controlled firms and institution-controlled firms have large shareholders. However, whether or not the shareholders are playing an active monitoring role is still an important issue. From the point of aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, the family-controlled group is superior to the institution-controlled group as family-controlled firms generally assign influential positions to family members whose focus is in line with that of the family group. Even though a non family member may be appointed as the manager, the level of monitoring is significant given the high ownership concentration by the family. On the other hand, significant family ownership may lead to agency costs of its own. The main disadvantage of owner-managers is that they may lack the expertise to manage their firms although their position in the family may make it natural for them to be the manager. Another advantage of the family-controlled firm is that the family may divert company resources for its own benefit despite the presence of a manager who may or may not be a family member. Essentially, the family and the manager can all collude to spend on perks and personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Therefore, as we move from widely-held to institution-controlled the level of agency costs may decrease but as we move further into higher control, as may be suggested by family ownership, the level of agency costs may increase again. Although previous studies have noticed the influence of ownership structure, no analysis has been carried out to explore the investment behaviour of firms controlled by the three differ-ent kinds of shareholders. Our first motivation is to fill this gap. Splitting our sample into three representative groups enables us to study the financing constraints and investment behaviour of firms that are family-controlled, institution-controlled, and widely held. The focus of this study is on Canadian firms. The Canadian evidence is worth particular attention because the Canadian business environment is similar to the US business environment in terms of legal, regulatory, and market institutions but it is similar to European or Asian firms in terms of ownership structure. Therefore, a study of Canadian firms can provide a useful and rational assessment of the investment behaviour of firms that follow the ownership structures of Europe and Asia but operate in a business environment and institutional setting similar to those of the US. Further, a large number of Canadian firms have controlling shareholders and a large proportion, approximately 60%, of Canadian firms can be categorized as having concentrated ownership structure. Among the firms with concentrated ownership, over 1/3 of them can be dis-tinguished as family-controlled. This dataset provides an ideal setting to study the investment behaviours of firms according to the nature of their controllers. Our results illustrate that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is higher than the intensity of investments of concentrated ownership firms and that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is positively and significantly affected by the availability of funds from internal sources. In contrast, for concentrated ownership firms the intensity is positively and significantly affected by the availability of growth opportunities. These observations suggest that in comparison with the concentrated ownership firms, the widely-held firms face higher levels of financing constraints and exhibit less value maximizing behaviour. However, once we separate the family-controlled firms from the institution-controlled firms, we find that the investment expenditures of the family-controlled firms and the institution-controlled firms are not significantly different in terms of their dependence on internal cash flows or on the market-to-book ratios. We also find that widely-held firms tend to invest in projects that payoff quickly. This preference may be the result of these firms desires to ease their external funding constraints by generating funds internally.

This study examines the interactive effects of family and minority ownership on small business debt financing. On one hand, family involvement in ownership has an influence on small firms financial decision. On the other hand, racial disparities in small business ownership make these firms experience differently in credit markets. In the context of family and minority involvements, this study measures two dimensions of small business debt financing, one for its use, a financing issue directly related to the capital structure, and the other for its cost, an agency issue related to the firms ability to borrowing and repayment. By using the unique data from the 1993, 1998, and 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances, our empirical results show significant evidence that family involvement has an impact on both the use of debt and the cost of debt financing in small businesses. That is, family ownership are negatively related to both the use of debt and the cost of debt financing, and when the firms are all non-visible minority owned, family firms have a lower level of debt and pay a lower interest rate than non-family firms. The results also show that the firm owners visible minority are positively related to the cost of debt financing, and when these firms are all family owned, visible minority owned firms pay a higher interest rate than non-visible minority owned firms. These results of our study also have important implications for both small business and family business research. For small business owners, it is important to understand the advantages and disadvantages of family as well as minority involvements to finance their businesses. And for policymakers and institutional lenders, understanding the family and minority effects also assists small businesses in obtaining debt financing.

This paper focuses on identifying factors influencing the financing decisions of growth-oriented start-ups. A sample of 8 business incubator start-ups has been studied within a qualitative research so as to reach that goal. Their fundraising choices are analyzed using supporting financial and psychological theories. Also, the thesis examines the start-ups’ interaction with a business incubator and investors.It is found that growth oriented start-ups use internal funds in the first instance, the lack of financial capital representing the main reason behind this decision. Moreover, it is clear that bank loans are not a viable alternative for start-ups mainly because of the collaterals required. However, debt financing, coming from more accessible sources, is used despite the higher costs, this if it helps in achieving growth. Lastly, equity capital is regarded positively by growth oriented start-ups although it dilutes the control. The reasoning is that control is traded-off with the skills and experience the external investors bring in once with their investments.

ABSTRACT In the past decades, the investment of Taiwan enterprises in mainland China, cross-strait trade and banking intercourse were required in indirect ways in view of economic security by the government due to the special political cross-strait relationship, which was the reason that the government could not get over exact amount of capital flowing into mainland China precisely. On the other hand, because of the various constraints on investment in mainland China, some companies transfer capital to mainland through various circuitous channels for the reasons of more flexible operations and avoiding government¡¦s regulations, which makes the cross-strait capital flow more complicated. No matter how cross-strait political situation goes, mutual business relationship is getting prosperous, we can tell from the fast growth of investment in mainland China, where is still the first choice to transplant for Taiwan's industrialists. Comparing y2000 and 2008¡¦s prime index statistics of cross-strait business collected from Mainland Affairs Council and Ministry of Economic affairs, the total volume of cross-strait trade (including Hong Kong) increased from US dollar 31.24 billion up to 105.37 billion that represented 3.4 times¡¦ growth; Taiwan¡¦s trade surplus against Mainland China was US dollar 18.78 billion increasing to 42.58 billion that represented 2.3 times¡¦ growth; Taiwan¡¦s export volume to mainland China (including Hong Kong) took 24.4% of total export volume in 2000 and then the percentage grew up to 38.5% in 2008, it was 1.6 times¡¦ expansion; the investment amount in mainland China was increased by 4.1 times from US dollar 2.607 billion to 10.61billion; the investment in mainland China took 33.9% of total outward investment in 2000 and then it grew up to 57.1% in 2008, it was 1.7 time¡¦s growth. Based upon the phenomenon the said statistics revealed, this study conducts deeper analysis in a practical way in capital flow across strait for solving investors¡¦ problems of fund raising and financial operation especially in the financial cash flow issues derived by trade, it tries to give financial layout advices for those who invested in mainland China or traded across strait. This study conducts analysis with SWOT and Porter¡¦s five forces model for reviewing an enterprise¡¦s Strength, Weakness, industrial¡¦s Opportunities and Threats from competitor it confronts. This study analyses chosen subject¡¦s (bank) strength and opportunities with SWOT model. Porter¡¦s five forces model is conducted for stress analysis on five kinds of impact on enterprises¡¦ operation. From conducting analysis on chosen subject, we discover that Porter¡¦s five forces model is interesting because it can spread and extend. For example, from the aspect of cooperation (ex strategic alliance) instead of competition, a lot of cooperative opportunities may emerge among the global competitive banking institutes. In the other way, verifying chosen bank through Porter¡¦s five forces model can also apply to discuss the issues of vertical and horizontal integration of banking industry. An analysis through this model concludes that applying offshore banking financing is the most favorable to enterprises and their operation flexibility. Banking industry in Taiwan will ultimately face the impact of competition from mainland China¡¦s banks after the MOU is signed. No matter being the banks¡¦ share holders in mainland China¡¦s banks, or setting up branches there directly, all banks include ones from Taiwan or cross nation banks cannot compete with the top four big state-run banks in mainland China according the conclusion of this study. This study tries to offer proper advices to the banks in Taiwan for making good operation strategies.

Since the financial markets keep developing, the way of off-balance-sheet financing weeds through the old to bring forth the new, Accounting information frequently cannot promptly and faithfully responds the real finance condition of a company. Those activities, such as operating leases, sale of receivables with the right of recourse, asset-backed securitization (ABS), joint ventures and investment in affiliates, finance subsidiaries, take-or-pay contracts, throughput arrangements, hedging activities, pensions and other employee benefits, have insufficient expression in financial reports that may let investors neglect the influence on the company behind these activities. This research namely wants to discuss how off-balance-sheet financing activities influence the value of the stockholder equity. Because the types of off-balance-sheet financing activities are many, and the correlative information obtains not easily, this research only chooses available information ¡§off-balance-sheet pensions financing¡¨ as the proxy variable of off-balance-sheet financing. It is found that, the equity book value and abnormal earnings as Ohlson (1995) says, have significant positive influence on stock price. It is also found that preceding-period off-balance-sheet pensions financing can be used to forecast current stock price, this may attribute to that investors only can obtain the preceding -period off-balance-sheet pensions financing, but unable to obtain current pensions information. Among the related theories that affect the funding policy, the findings suggest that: (1) Financial slack theory is tenable. (2) The debt covenant effect theory has not obtained the uniform conclusion. (3) Tax effect theory isn¡¦t supported.

The concept of ¡§Web 2.0¡¨ is starting. It takes ¡§the interaction, the participation, and the sharing¡¨ as the core value.Web2.0 not only creates a unique business model, but also makes many Internet entrepreneurs miracles. Many domestic and international Web2.0 new ventures set up only a few years but have pretty high value. These successful stories attract countless creative young people, they use the Internet as a tool to make their own dreams come true again. The service industry is the core of the industrial structure in Taiwan. But compared to other developed countries, the service industry of Taiwan creates fewer employment opportunities. Taiwanese who lose their jobs are younger and younger. Besides the most special point is the better education they get, the higher unemployment rate it shows. The development of the Web2.0 service industry provides a great solution for industrial restructuring and the improvement of career problems in the future. Funding is the most important factors of the new ventures, but it is difficult for Web2.0 companies to fund because of their special characters. The development of Web2.0 new ventures includes concept formation, company foundation, breakeven and IPO. That can be separated seed, startup, expansion and mezzanine stages. Each stage has its own special funding gap and difficult as follows : 1. Application not permitted, unable to obtain grants or concessionary loans. 2. Little scale and high risk of Web2.0 companies, unable to attract venture capital industry participation. 3. Value of Web2.0 companies is focus on intangible assets, the lack of secured financing. 4. Compared with large enterprises, it is difficult for Web2.0 companies to apply for grants from our government. 5. Lack of resources to contact with famous enterprises or venture capital. Suggestion: 1. Create the ¡¨Web2.0 innovative service R&D program¡¨. 2. Set the ¡¨Web2.0 angel fund¡¨. 3. Enhance Web2.0 companies credit. 4. Provide counseling service for Government subsidies programs. 5. Make a venture capital communication and cooperation platform.

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There has been an increase in empirical evidence indicating an association between governance and health systems, suggesting that better governed countries tend to have healthier populations with better performing health systems. This is an important finding, as it could point to structural public health interventions having a greater impact on health systems performance than individually targeted interventions. This doctoral thesis in public health (DrPH) from Brunel University is a compilation of three independent research projects undertaken under different settings, converging in the examination of the relationship between governance and health systems. The first project was a study conducted in the African region of the World Health Organization with the aim of understanding how and to what extent measures of governance are statistically correlated with performance of health systems as measured by a key health outcome: the under-five child mortality. The second project was a case study from a high income country in Europe during the period in which it went through an economic meltdown, the focus being a qualitative analysis of the extent to which the response to economic crisis influenced public health policy making and short term performance of the health system. The third project was a policy analysis carried out in an upper middle income country in Asia and the focus was to examine how the long history of health financing reform has influenced the performance of the health system. All research projects indicate an association between governance and health systems and the case studies provide empirical evidence of how health systems are affected by governance quality. The African study shows a statistically positive relationship between governance indicators and health outcomes, suggesting better governed countries to have lower child mortality. The European and the Asian cases suggest accountability, responsiveness, transparency and fair partnership to be important governance qualities for successful policy making and reforms. This evidence could be of use to current and future policy makers and others with the authority to configure and implement new public health policies. It indicates the importance of comprehensive analytical work prior to policy making with easy access to documents and fair participation with all stakeholders to increase the probability of reaching consensus oriented policy proposals followed by successful implementations. The main contribution of this thesis is to provide evidence through robust statistical/ qualitative analysis around the association between governance and health systems in countries at all income levels. The originality is located in the breadth (three different settings) as well as depth (three distinct, robust methods) of this kind of research. The congruence of findings regardless of study locations, the outcome measures used or types of methods applied have added to the growing evidence that there is a strong correlation between governance and health systems performance. This increased knowledge provides policy makers with additional evidence which can be applied to develop and improve governance with the aim of allocating public resources more efficiently and equitably. However, further research is required on governance and its link to health systems, inter alia how health equity is affected by selective partnership in the decision making processes and how political ideologies influence governance practices.