A presente dissertação tem como propósito estudar o que denominamos herói anti-existencialista do romance Angústia, de Graciliano Ramos, ao analisar sua dificuldade de auto-afirmação diante do mundo de que faz parte, a qual o conduzirá à ação central do livro, o assassinato de Julião Tavares. Escamoteando essa causa subjetiva dos afetos aparentes, os sentimentos de opressão e inferioridade, o protagonista irá atribuí-los ao exterior, à sua existência citadina, ao convívio com o outro, ao rival, Julião Tavares. A dificuldade de auto-afirmação causa de ordem subjetiva desses afetos aparentes , com origem no passado da infância, na não superada rivalidade edipiana, ameaça trazer a tona dois afetos latentes, que se revelam por meio da narrativa digressiva, enquanto forma de auto-análise, a saber: o medo da castração simbólica, e a culpa pelo desejo da morte do pai na infância. Daí a necessidade de escamoteá-la, atribuindo-se ao exterior, a uma causa de ordem objetiva, portanto, os sentimentos de opressão e inferioridade, o que engendrará a idéia de vingança, motivo aparente do assassinato. No ato de vingança estaria implicado um valor anacrônico, com origem na sociedade patriarcal, na qual vivera o menino Luís da silva, a saber: a prática da violência naturalizada, enquanto expressão do sentido arcaico da liberdade, a liberdade ilimitada. Nesse sentido, o caráter anti-existencialista do herói o levará para a livre escolha do assassinato, como forma imprópria de tentar superar os sentimentos de opressão e inferioridade, cuja conseqüência será o aniquilamento do seu ser, descaminho da sua liberdade. / This dissertation aims at studying the anti-existentialist hero in Angústia, a novel by Graciliano Ramos. In doing so, one analyzes the character´s difficulty of self-affirmation to the world in which he lives, and which will occasionally take him to the central action of the story, that is, the murder of Julião Tavares. As to hide the underlying causes of the apparent affections i.e., feelings of oppression and inferiority , the protagonist will tie them to exterior elements, such as the fact that he lives in town or to the fact that he lives with his enemy, Julião Tavares. The difficulty of self-affirmation is the cause for the underlying apparent affections and has its origins on his childhood, instead of being based on the surpassed oedipal rivalry. It risks bringing up two underlying affections shown up in the story by means of digressions in moments of self analysis done by the character. There are the fear of symbolic castration, end the guilty for wishing for his father´s death when he was a child. This is why he feels the need of hiding them and ties their existence to exterior reasons, to something objective, and this is why he feels inferior and oppressed. Ultimately, there are reasons that will make him wish for revenge and will also constitute the reasons for murder. There is an anachronistic value implied on such revenge, whose origin goes back to the patriarchal society in which the boy Luís da Silva lived: the common naturalized violence as an expression of the archaic sense of freedom an unlimited freedom. In this sense, the anti-existentialist trace of the hero will take him to the free will of murdering as an improper way trying to overcome the feeling of oppression and inferiority, whose consequence will be his own annihilation, a misleading of his freedom.

A presente dissertação tem como propósito estudar o que denominamos herói anti-existencialista do romance Angústia, de Graciliano Ramos, ao analisar sua dificuldade de auto-afirmação diante do mundo de que faz parte, a qual o conduzirá à ação central do livro, o assassinato de Julião Tavares. Escamoteando essa causa subjetiva dos afetos aparentes, os sentimentos de opressão e inferioridade, o protagonista irá atribuí-los ao exterior, à sua existência citadina, ao convívio com o outro, ao rival, Julião Tavares. A dificuldade de auto-afirmação causa de ordem subjetiva desses afetos aparentes , com origem no passado da infância, na não superada rivalidade edipiana, ameaça trazer a tona dois afetos latentes, que se revelam por meio da narrativa digressiva, enquanto forma de auto-análise, a saber: o medo da castração simbólica, e a culpa pelo desejo da morte do pai na infância. Daí a necessidade de escamoteá-la, atribuindo-se ao exterior, a uma causa de ordem objetiva, portanto, os sentimentos de opressão e inferioridade, o que engendrará a idéia de vingança, motivo aparente do assassinato. No ato de vingança estaria implicado um valor anacrônico, com origem na sociedade patriarcal, na qual vivera o menino Luís da silva, a saber: a prática da violência naturalizada, enquanto expressão do sentido arcaico da liberdade, a liberdade ilimitada. Nesse sentido, o caráter anti-existencialista do herói o levará para a livre escolha do assassinato, como forma imprópria de tentar superar os sentimentos de opressão e inferioridade, cuja conseqüência será o aniquilamento do seu ser, descaminho da sua liberdade. / This dissertation aims at studying the anti-existentialist hero in Angústia, a novel by Graciliano Ramos. In doing so, one analyzes the character´s difficulty of self-affirmation to the world in which he lives, and which will occasionally take him to the central action of the story, that is, the murder of Julião Tavares. As to hide the underlying causes of the apparent affections i.e., feelings of oppression and inferiority , the protagonist will tie them to exterior elements, such as the fact that he lives in town or to the fact that he lives with his enemy, Julião Tavares. The difficulty of self-affirmation is the cause for the underlying apparent affections and has its origins on his childhood, instead of being based on the surpassed oedipal rivalry. It risks bringing up two underlying affections shown up in the story by means of digressions in moments of self analysis done by the character. There are the fear of symbolic castration, end the guilty for wishing for his father´s death when he was a child. This is why he feels the need of hiding them and ties their existence to exterior reasons, to something objective, and this is why he feels inferior and oppressed. Ultimately, there are reasons that will make him wish for revenge and will also constitute the reasons for murder. There is an anachronistic value implied on such revenge, whose origin goes back to the patriarchal society in which the boy Luís da Silva lived: the common naturalized violence as an expression of the archaic sense of freedom an unlimited freedom. In this sense, the anti-existentialist trace of the hero will take him to the free will of murdering as an improper way trying to overcome the feeling of oppression and inferiority, whose consequence will be his own annihilation, a misleading of his freedom.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T14:27:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Roberto Abreu de Mattos.pdf: 1065680 bytes, checksum: e698392ff109025c1b789802d20da2ac (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-06-05 / The aim of this monographic paper is to reflect upon the problem of evil. For a better understanding of the subject we decided to approach fundamental issues issues such as : what is evil, the reason of evil, its origen and mainly the meaning of evil and its suffering in relation to one s free will. Appealing to specialized bibliography, other concepts are seen essential for the understanding of this subject like: grace, freedom, divine prescience, will, love and so on. Basically all the answers about the issue of evil envolve directly or indirectly a reflection about God, in other words everything about evil envolves human suffering, and one of the strong points regarding modern atheism is why do I suffer? Where is God? Well, looking precisely through this prespective that is, approaching the issue of evil together with the issue of God arises the legitimaly and necessity to conceive and defend a right concept of as being almighty googd and fair / Uma vez que o objetivo deste trabalho monográfico é apresentar reflexões sobre a questão do problema do mal, para melhor compreensão do tema decidimos abordar questões fundamentais, tais como: o que é o mal, porque o mal, qual a sua origem e, principalmente, qual o sentido do mal e do sofrimento em relação ao livre-arbítrio. Buscando recurso na bibliografia especializada vamos encontrar outros conceitos que se apresentam como essenciais para a compreensão do tema proposto, dentre os quais destacamos: Graça, liberdade, Presciência divina, vontade, amor, etc. Não há como deixar de observar que praticamente todas as tentativas de respostas sobre a questão do mal envolvem, direta ou indiretamente, uma reflexão sobre a questão de Deus . Ou seja, toda a questão sobre o mal envolve a realidade do sofrimento humano, e uma das rochas do ateísmo moderno é justamente a questão do porque sofro? , onde está Deus? . Pois bem, é justamente dentro desta perspectiva, isto é, do afrontamento da questão do mal , arrostando conjuntamente a questão de Deus , que surge a legitimidade e a necessidade de conceber e defender um justo conceito de Deus como Onipotente, Bom e Justo

Aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles, avec la lecture des œuvres d’Achille Tatius et Héliodore d’Émèse, auteurs grecs des premiers siècles de l’ère chrétienne, les auteurs espagnols redécouvrent un genre particulier qui sera qualifié tantôt de romand’aventures, tantôt de roman byzantin. Tant l’appellation de roman que la qualification de byzantin sont fautives puisqu’il s’agit en fait de récits poétiques ou en prose antérieurs à la fin du IVe siècle, c’est-à-dire antérieurs à ce qu’il est convenud’appeler historiquement l’ère byzantine. Pour notre part, nous retiendrons l’appellation de roman néo-hellénistique ou roman néo-grec espagnol – voire « roman baroque », à l’instar de Georges Molinié1 – pour qualifier le nouveau genreromanesque créé à partir de ces récits. Nous voyons dans ce genre le développement d’une littérature en adéquation avec les exigences éthiques et esthétiques de l’« utile dulci » horacien. Influencé par le contexte politico-religieux de la Contre-Réforme, le roman néo-grec espagnol ou roman baroque expose de manière plus ou moins patente le thème de la diatribe à propos du libre arbitre et de la prédestination. Le rôle joué au cœur de ces romans par la Providence et le Destin, en particulier sous leur forme emblématique, semble empreint de l’enseignement des dogmes catholiques défendus lors du Concile de Trente. Dans les quatre ouvrages du corpus (El peregrino en su patria de Lope de Vega, Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda de Miguel de Cervantès, Historia de Hipólito y Aminta de Francisco de Quintana, El Criticón de Baltasar Gracián), le problème du déterminisme et celui du salut sont de nombreuses fois soulevés. Cela se produit soit dans des discussions entre les personnages, soit dans le cours même de l’intrigue par l’apparition de phénomènes de prédiction astrologique ou autre mettant en cause les notions de Fortune et de Destin. De la même façon, les personnages, par leur manière d’être et d’agir, évoquent la notion de libre arbitre soulignant ainsi l’importance des actes qu’ils accomplissent pour assurer leur salut. / In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, thanks to the writings of Achilles Tatiusand Heliodorus of Emesa, two Greek authors who lived the first centuries of the Christian era, the Spanish writers rediscover a new particular genre. Those books are either labeled as adventure novels or Byzantine novels. Both the terms “novel” and “Byzantine” are inadequate since those books deal with storylines in prose or in verse dating back to the end of the fifth century, that is to say prior to what is commonly and historically termed as the Byzantine era. We will stick to the expressions “Spanishand Greek novel” or “Baroque novel” as taken up by Georges Molinié in order to label this new fictional genre in which we can perceive the development of a literature more in terms with the ethic and a esthetic standards of the Horacian « utile dulci ».Influenced by the political and religious frame of the Counter Reformation, the Spanish and Greek novel or « Baroque novel » exposes in an underlying way the theme of the diatribe about free will and predestination. The role played byProvidence and Fate in those novels, in particular under their emblematic form, is revealing of the Catholic dogmas defended during the Council of Trent. In the four books of the corpus (El peregrino en su patria by Lope de Vega, Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda written by Miguel de Cervantes, Historia deHipólito y Aminta by Francisco de Quintana, Baltasar Gracian’s El Criticón) the issues of determinism and salvation are being raised. This occurs either during thedialogues, or in the development of the plot through the appearance of phenomena of astrological prediction or of other natures dealing with the notions of Fortune and Destiny. In the same way, the characters – through the way they act and behave –evoke the notion of free will, thus underlining the importance of the actions they accomplish in order to secure their salvation.

Includes abstract. Bibliography: leaves 346-374.

This dissertation examines the doctrines of effectual calling and regeneration and argues that the biblical view is that God's saving grace is monergistic - meaning that God acts alone to effectually call and monergistically regenerate the depraved sinner from death to new life - and therefore effectual calling and regeneration causally precede conversion in the ordo salutis, thereby ensuring that all of the glory in salvation belongs to God not man. Stated negatively, God's grace is not synergistic - meaning that God cooperates with man, giving man the final determative power to either accept or resist God's grace - which would result in an ordo salutis where regeneration is causally conditioned upon man's free will in conversion and, in the Calvinist's opinion, would rob God of all of the glory in salvation. Chapter 1 introduces the monergism-synergism debate by placing it within the contemporary evangelical context. Chapter 1 not only introduces the debate between Calvinists and Arminians but also introduces the recent attempt of modified views to present a via media between the two. Chapter 1 also presents the thesis and explains the parameters and presuppositions of the dissertation. Chapter 2 examines the doctrine of monergism within the Reformed tradition. Rather than an exhaustive survey, chapter 2 selects some of the most important representatives from the Reformed tradition including: Augustine, John Calvin, the Canons of Dort, and the Westminster Confession. In discussing these figures and confessions, chapter 2 provides the historical and theological context in which the Reformed argued against the synergists of their own day. Chapter 3 turns to a biblical and theological defense of total depravity and effectual calling. Chapter 3 first begins with a biblical defense of total depravity and spiritual inability, as well as a brief discussion and utilization of Jonathan Edwards' understanding of free will (the freedom of inclination). Chapter 3 then seeks to argue for the thesis presented in chapter 1 by showing from Scripture that the Calvinist view of effectual calling is biblical. Chapter 4 continues the argument from chapter 3 by focusing in on the doctrine of regeneration. Chapter 4 argues that regeneration is monergistic rather than synergistic, meaning that God's grace in regeneration is not contingent on the will of man to believe but God's grace works alone. Therefore, faith and repentance are the result not the condition of regeneration in the ordo salutis. Chapter 5 seeks to give an accurate and fair presentation of the Arminian view(s), giving attention to the theological nuances among Arminians. Chapter 5 shows that there is diversity within Arminianism, so that there are those who hold to a "classical Arminian" view and there are those who hold to a Semi-Pelagian view. However, chapter 5 demonstrates that both views end up in the same place, namely, affirming the doctrine of synergism which makes God's grace contingent upon man's will. Chapter 6 is a biblical and theological critique of the Arminian view. Chapter 6 shows that the Arminian doctrine of synergism is not found in Scripture, contradicts Scripture, and robs God of all his glory in salvation. Chapter 7 turns from the Arminian view to examine recent modified attempts to pave a middle way between Calvinism and Arminianism. Chapter 7 shows specifically that attempts at a middle way borrow from Arminianism and consequently fall prey to an erroneous interpretation of Scripture. Chapter 7 shows that a middle way is biblically impossible and it also robs God of all his glory in salvation. Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation by restating the thesis, summarizing the biblical data, and arguing that only the Calvinist view can preserve the glory of God to save sinners. Three appendixes conclude the dissertation. Appendix 1 examines the Arminian and Calvinist views of the love of God and argues that divine love in Scripture is far more complex than the Arminian makes it out to be. God not only has a universal love for all people but a special, particular, and efficacious love only for the elect. Appendix 2 examines the Arminian and Calvinist views of the will of God and argues once again that the will of God in Scripture is far more complex than the Arminian makes it out to be. Scripture shows, it is argued, that God not only has a moral or preceptive will as well as a will of disposition but also a will of decree by which he effectually ordains all that comes to pass. Appendix 3 looks at the relationship between effectual calling and regeneration in the Reformed tradition and the diversity that exists among the Reformed as to how exactly describe this relationship. Appendix 3 presents and critiques each view, but pays particular attention to Michael Horton's recent proposal for "covenant ontology and effectual calling."

In this dissertation, I argue for what I call “practical perspective compatibilism”. According to this thesis, an agent with practical freedom is sufficiently free to be a moral agent and morally responsible for his or her actions. The concept of practical freedom is originally found in the writings of Kant. Kant argued that we can view the world from either a theoretical or a practical perspective. The theoretical perspective is that of causal explanation and prediction, whereas the practical perspective is that of choosing what to do and how to act. We see that we are free when we view things from a practical perspective. Determinism cannot threaten our practical freedom, since from a practical perspective we must choose what to do even if everything ultimately is determined. I argue that practical freedom is sufficient freedom-wise for moral agency and moral responsibility because morality is action-guiding. Right and wrong are concepts to be employed in deliberation and advice. This is a strong reason to regard factors irrelevant to deliberators and advisers as irrelevant when making judgements of right and wrong, and whether somebody had some other kind of freedom than practical freedom is irrelevant to deliberators and advisers. There are also prima facie reasons to regard moral responsibility as tied to rightness and wrongness, so that agents are blameworthy when they did wrong (or subjectively wrong, or what would have been wrong given their state of information and so on) and praiseworthy when they did right (subjectively right and so on). I also show that no classic arguments for incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility work when directed against practical perspective compatibilism. Finally, this thesis discusses metaethics in relation to compatibilism. Since competing theories imply the falsity of some respected metaethical positions, metaethical considerations lend further support to practical perspective compatibilism. / I den här avhandlingen argumenterar jag för en tes som jag kallar “praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism”. Enligt praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är det så att en agent med praktisk frihet är tillräckligt fri för att vara en moralisk agent och moraliskt ansvarig. Praktisk frihet är ett koncept vi ursprungligen hittar hos Kant. Det används också av en del nutida Kantianer. Kant argumenterade för att vi kan betrakta världen från antingen ett praktiskt eller ett teoretiskt perspektiv. Det teoretiska perspektivet är det vi har när vi gör förutsägelser och hittar kausala förklaringar, medan det praktiska är det vi har när vi väljer och handlar. Vi kan se att vi är fria när vi ser på tillvaron ur det praktiska perspektivet. Determinismen kan inte hota vår praktiska frihet, för vi måste välja våra handlingar oavsett om allting i slutändan är determinerat. I denna avhandling definierar jag praktisk frihet på följande sätt: En agent har minimal praktisk frihet om och endast om han måste välja sina handlingar, och han tror att hans vilja är effektiv när det gäller att realisera de handlingsalternativ han funderat över och väljer mellan. En agent har maximal praktisk frihet om och endast om han har minimal praktisk frihet, hans vilja verkligen är effektiv, han har full information om de alternativ han funderar över, och alla alternativ han inte tänkt på är sådana att hans egna värderingar inte ger honom ett övervägande skäl att välja ett av dessa alternativ snarare än det han faktiskt väljer. Jag argumenterar för att praktisk frihet så definierat är tillräckligt med frihet för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar eftersom moralen är handlingsvägledande. Det betyder att rätt och fel är koncept som ska användas i övervägning av olika handlingsalternativ och rådgivning. Tredje-persons-omdömen om ifall någon handlade rätt eller fel måste vara sådana att de hypotetiskt sett skulle kunna fungera som råd; egenskapen att vara rätt eller fel kan inte förändras beroende på om vi ger råd eller bara faller omdömen. Detta är ett starkt skäl för att betrakta faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare som irrelevanta när man faller omdömen om rätt och fel, och ifall någon hade en annan sorts frihet än den praktiska är irrelevant för övervägare och rådgivare. Vi har också prima facie skäl att betrakta moraliskt ansvar som knutet till rätt och fel, så att agenter är klandervärda när de gjorde fel (eller subjektivt fel, eller vad som skulle ha varit fel givet den information agenten hade osv) och berömvärda när de gjorde rätt (subjektivt rätt osv). Att det finns prima facie skäl för att betrakta praktisk frihet som tillräckligt för moraliskt ansvar utesluter förstås inte att det finns övervägande skäl för den motsatta ståndpunkten. Jag visar dock att inga klassiska argument för inkompatibilism om determinism och moraliskt ansvar fungerar när man riktar dem mot praktisk-perpsektiv-kompatibilism. Alla sådana argument förutsätter vad som skulle bevisas, nämligen att faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare är moraliskt relevanta, och att pålitliga moraliska intuitioner uppstår när vi betraktar agenter från ett teoretiskt snarare än praktiskt perspektiv. Slutligen diskuterar denna avhandling relationen mellan metaetik och kompatibilism. Praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är kompatibel med samtliga metaetiska teorier, medan det finns flera metaetiska teorier som implicerar att inkompatibilismen är falsk, och åtminstone en som implicerar att vissa kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Enligt en speciell Kantiansk konstruktivistisk teori så finns det rätt- och felaktiga handlingar och moraliskt ansvar på grund av att det finns praktisk frihet. Om detta är den sanna metaetiska teorin, så följer det att praktisk frihet är tillräckligt för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar, och att inte bara inkompatibilism men andra kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Beroende på vilken metaetisk teori som är den sanna, kan det alltså vara så att de föregående argumenten är överflödiga för att bevisa praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism. Det kan vara så att denna tes helt enkelt följer från den sanna metaetiska teorin.

The aim of this study is to examine the meaning and the morality of suicide through the history of philosophy. To this aim, firstly, the historical evaluation of the concept of suicide is explained in detail. The effects of sociological and the religious transformations on the meaning of suicide are analyzed. Afterwards, the moral theories about suicide are discussed. The anti-suicide arguments about suicide in the history of philosophy are classified under three parts mainly. These anti-suicide arguments &mdash / that suicide is a violation of our duties to God, to the society and to the self &mdash / are handled and explained in detail with their counter arguments. Then, the problem of the permissibility of suicide is analyzed and whether suicide is morally permitted under some conditions or it is absolutely forbidden is discussed. Next, the philosophical meaning of suicide in literature is investigated by analyzing the meanings that are given to suicide by Dante iv and Dostoevsky. In the conclusion, a brief summary is given, and the moral theories about suicide are criticized. ,

Includes abstract / Bibliography: leaves 346-374 / viii, 374 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, 1988

Zugl.: Regensburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2006.